The Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review

In its response to this report, the Government should set out how and when the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers will be involved in the Review process. Additionally, we seek clarity regarding: a. Which Cabinet Minister will chair the Review process in the Prime Minister’s absence b. What role the No 10 Policy Unit and Specialist Advisers will play in the Review process The Government should: c. Set out the respective roles and responsibilities of the NSC and its relevant sub-committees, the Cabinet and Government Departments in the Review process d. Explain what role the National Security Adviser and NSC(O) will play in the Review process and what role the National Security Strategy and Implementation Group will play in driving integration at an official level, and e. Explain whether thematic workstreams have been identified.

The Review should assess and report on the effectiveness of existing Government structures and policies designed to facilitate cross- Government collaboration. This should include a review of the National Security Council and associated policy frameworks and funds, such as the Fusion Doctrine and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. If existing collaboration is inadequate, the Review should identify ways to ensure greater cross-Government collaboration in the future.

To ensure lessons are learned from previous security and defence Reviews, the Integrated Review should engage with a wide range of stakeholders who were engaged in or scrutinised previous Reviews and the policies, programmes and military deployments that flowed from them.

The Government should review how far these activities were aligned with or deviated from the outcomes of previous Reviews, in order to better In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review 55 understand how to ensure the Integrated Review provides a sustainable and actionable framework for the future. In response to our report, if it has not done so before, the Government should: a. Explain how existing lessons learned will inform the Review b. Set out what new analysis will be carried out c. Ensure that there are effective mechanisms for implementing the Review, and d. Explain how the Review’s successes or failings will be measured.

We welcome the Government’s ambition to conduct the “deepest” and “most radical review since the Cold War.” At a time of such geopolitical and economic uncertainty, it is vital that the Review involves thorough consideration of the desired “ends” of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy as well as the “ways” and “means” required to achieve them. To realise its ambition, Government must identify and overcome the factors that contribute to a Review becoming a “business as usual” exercise. By answering the questions laid out in this report, the Review can overcome the tensions inherent in the Review process and identify and question assumptions at the heart of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy. In response to this Report, Government should: a. Set out the mechanisms and approach to challenging assumptions underpinning the UK’s defence strategy b. Explain what role the Dstl’s Defence Wargaming Centre and MoD’s Strategic Net Assessment Unit will play

It remains to be seen whether the foreign policy aspect of the Review will produce a distinct Foreign Policy Strategy or whether this will be combined with a National Security Strategy. Whether the Review produces one, two, or three documents, we have heard that it must first clearly identify the desired “ends” of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy. It is only by developing a detailed conceptual framework for the UK’s security and foreign policy that the Review will be able to identify and question current assumptions and provide an evidence-base to make decisions about the UK’s future defence policy and posture. We therefore recommend that the Review explains how the Government views risk, includes clear and detailed definitions of how the Government understands key terms such as “security” and “resilience” and provides answers to the following questions: a. What is the UK’s understanding of the concepts of national, international and human security and the relationships between them? In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review 56 b. What does domestic resilience mean and how is it related to the UK’s foreign and defence policy? c. What security and defence priorities emerge from an analysis of the UK’s domestic priorities? In what ways are they complementary and in what ways do they conflict? d. How does the UK view the international system and its place within it?

We have heard that in order to identify the desired “ends” of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy, the Review must clearly articulate the UK’s interests and values. Whilst scrutiny of the UK’s foreign policy falls to the Foreign Affairs Committee, from a defence perspective we believe that the Review should answer the following questions: a. How does the UK define its national interest abroad? b. What role do values play in the UK’s foreign policy? c. How will the UK pursue its objectives through hard and soft power instruments?

Particularly at a time of such geopolitical uncertainty, it is vital that the foreign policy aspect of the review reflects the UK’s understanding of, and ambitions for, its international relationships and partnerships. Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee are conducting an inquiry into the foreign policy aspects of the Review, but, from a defence perspective, the politics and power involved in international relationships are an essential reference point for understanding the threats and risks to the UK’s national and international priorities and the defence capabilities which are required to defend and protect them. The Review should therefore include a clear and detailed analysis of the UK’s approach to: a. Bilateral relationships (notably, with the U.S. and key EU member states) b. Multinational security and defence alliances (notably, NATO and the Five Eyes) c. Relationship with the European Union and the U.N, Commonwealth, G20/G7 and other regional groupings.

It remains to be seen whether the forthcoming Review will include an update to the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) or whether a new approach will emerge. Whether or not the Review uses the terminology of the NSRA, we suggest that if this aspect of the Review is to provide a useful guide to inform the UK’s defence posture, it should adhere to the following principles: In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review 57 Input Output Review • Draws on a wide • Establishes broad • Subject to robust range of sources threat and risk challenge from categories within and outside • Considers the Government capability and • Distinguishes intent of the UK’s between short term • Communicated adversaries and allies and long-term risks to Parliament and and threats the public in a way • Considers that balances the the impact and • Includes a need for secrecy threats posed by clear and realistic with the benefits of new and emerging prioritisation transparency technologies • Recognises the drivers of conflict and instability • Takes account of the changing character of warfare

We welcome the Review’s focus on intensifying geopolitical competition in light of COVID-19. To deliver a robust assessment of the capabilities and short and long term ambitions of hostile foreign states, the Review must consider the full range of Russia and China’s economic, diplomatic and military activities and include a thorough assessment of their internal political dynamics

Existing spending commitments are a necessary but insufficient basis for approaching funding decisions in the Integrated Review. Whilst the economic outlook for the UK remains uncertain, it is imperative that funding considerations are informed by the Review’s strategic analysis and not the other way around. The Integrated Review should look beyond the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP on defence to consider what financial resources are required to ensure that defence can contribute to achieving the priorities of the UK’s security.

To ensure that the Review considers the ways, ends and means of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy in the round, the Government must set out the mechanisms that will be used to ensure the alignment between the Integrated Review and the Comprehensive Spending Review and clarify the baseline for increases in defence spending.

We urge the Government to consider a long-term multi-year financial settlement for defence, in order to ensure that the Integrated Review provides a reliable basis for planning the UK’s future defence posture. In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review 58 Without this assurance, ongoing issues with the affordability and availability of the UK’s defence capabilities will persist and our role in the world diminished.

The Integrated Review is an opportunity for the Ministry of Defence to explain how our Armed Forces will fight in the future. It is promising that work is underway to develop new operating concepts but it is vitally important that this work is communicated to wider Government stakeholders involved in the Review before its completion. As demonstrated by COVID-19, our Armed Forces are required to fulfil a diverse range of domestic and international tasks. Their concept of operations must realistically reflect what commitments are possible with the resources and capabilities available. These concepts should inform capability and funding decisions made as part of the Review and, given their significance, one key output of the Review should be to formally record these new operating concepts in doctrine.

Capability decisions made as part of the Review should be informed by the Review’s foreign policy analysis, threat and risk assessment and defence operating concepts. Defence planning assumptions and the UK’s overall defence posture should be reviewed, and informed by the following questions: a. What platforms, weapons and personnel, readiness and maintenance are required to ensure the resilience, availability and adaptability of the UK’s Armed Forces? b. What “critical mass” is required for our Armed Forces to respond to the threats and risks to the UK? c. What investment and innovation are required to respond to and exploit technological developments? d. Which existing capabilities can be enhanced or retired?

Given that systemic challenges have not been resolved in the previous thirteen reviews of defence procurement, we doubt that the Integrated Review will come up with even a short-term fix. We believe that the Review ought to address the strategic issues that should underpin the UK’s approach to defence procurement, in order to provide a sound basis to address these challenges in the future. The UK’s capability priorities and force structure should inform the answers to the following strategic questions on the procurement process: a. What capabilities and skills must remain sovereign and what can be bought “off-the-shelf”? What are the implications for operational advantage, freedom of action, cost and national prosperity? ) b. How does the UK define value for money in defence procurement? In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review 59 c. How can UK defence procurement ensure the resilience of logistics and supply? d. How can the procurement process be used to foster innovation and ensure access to intellectual property? e. Is defence procurement, research and development keeping pace with future requirements? f. How will lessons from procurement failures be captured and addressed? The Committee welcomes ongoing work to review the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy. This strategy should be informed by the strategic decisions made as part of the Integrated Review. The Committee will continue to explore the UK’s defence industrial policy in our ongoing parallel inquiry on this topic.

We have heard that external engagement in the Review process provides a challenge function to the Government’s understanding, can act as an early signpost to stakeholders who can contribute to achieving the UK’s security and defence priorities and contributes to the legitimacy of the review’s outcomes. External consultation must be structured in a clear and transparent way so that all interested stakeholders can contribute. In some cases, there may be existing mechanisms for Government to solicit the views of external stakeholders (such as the Defence Suppliers Forum, the CDS’ Strategy Forum, and the Defence Policy Board) and in other cases new mechanisms and approaches should be explored. In its response to this report, Government should describe the process by which the following constituencies will be involved in the Review: a. Parliament (including relevant Select Committees) b. The public c. Civil society and academia d. International allies and partners e. Industry and trade associations f. Serving Armed Forces personnel of all ranks (Paragraph 130) In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review 60