Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications cables: resilience and crisis preparedness
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
HC 723
Published 19 September 2025
Recommendations
2
Accepted
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the...
Recommendation
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the next 5–10 years. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review set out serious preparations for future crises. However, the Minister for Data Protection and …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees to strengthen security, with DSIT writing to operators to request emergency 'good enough' repair plans within 12 months and defining standards. They are also reviewing legislation and will explore similar exercises with European counterparts.
Cabinet Office
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4
Accepted
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage...
Recommendation
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage to subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) System vulnerabilities
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees to develop more detailed technical plans for managing cable systems, engage with operators, conduct sector-specific technical impact assessments, and use these findings to inform additional contingency plans and the National Emergency Plans framework for Subsea Cables.
Cabinet Office
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7
Accepted
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage...
Recommendation
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage subsea cable providers to connect to landing stations, terrestrial routes and data centres outside high-concentration points. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the recommendation and will accelerate work with Lead Government Departments on technical impact assessments to help critical sectors prepare for subsea cable disruption, with oversight from the Cabinet Office’s ‘Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board’.
Cabinet Office
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17
Accepted
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak.
Recommendation
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak. It is encouraging that the Government has identified the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill as a potential legislative vehicle to implement changes. We would like to emphasise the urgency of …
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Government Response Summary
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing that current legislation for non-foreign power sabotage of cables is weak. It is conducting a comprehensive review of legislation related to subsea cable infrastructure to ensure robust routes for prosecuting private actors.
Cabinet Office
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21
Accepted
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring...
Recommendation
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring technology and should explore incentives to encourage such investment. This could include Government commitments to make better use of existing measures and data—for example more …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees to support the subsea cable industry in rolling out monitoring technology and is already engaged in cross-government cooperation, including commercial relationships and partnerships with the Royal Navy. It will explore better use of existing data, including AIS, and is collaborating across departments to ensure monitoring does not compromise defence or safety, while also considering new legislation.
Cabinet Office
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Conclusions (1)
3
Conclusion
Accepted
We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks of co-ordinated attacks. We agree that resilience across the sector is generally robust, major disruption is unlikely, and hype is unhelpful. But we caution against adopting ‘business as usual’ industry views to determine national security …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the underlying sentiment, committing to ensuring subsea cable infrastructure is geographically diverse and working with industry and Crown Estates to secure space for future routes to support long-term resilience.