Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications cables: resilience and crisis preparedness
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
HC 723
Published 19 September 2025
Recommendations
15
Accepted in Part
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should ensure all lead departments have detailed sector-by-sector...
Recommendation
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should ensure all lead departments have detailed sector-by-sector technical impact studies on areas most likely to be affected and response plans—notably finance, maritime and air traffic, communications, defence and supply chains including food …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees on the importance of a centralised coordination function, establishing an Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board chaired by the Cabinet Office for strategic direction, but does not adopt the specific suggestion to expand SIRG or set up a new inter-ministerial group.
Cabinet Office
View Details →
20
Accepted in Part
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade should apply...
Recommendation
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade should apply diplomatic and economic pressure to press for adequate investigations from flag states and states where vessels suspected of cable damage enter port. The Government should …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government states it frequently uses diplomatic levers to ensure investigations into cable breaks. It notes existing IMO work on data sharing and mechanisms for reporting vessel behaviour, but states there is a limit to the utility of port inspections as suspicious vessels often avoid such ports.
Cabinet Office
View Details →
22
Accepted in Part
The UK’s military deterrence concepts are too timid.
Recommendation
The UK’s military deterrence concepts are too timid. They need to place greater emphasis on prevention and punitive consequences that go beyond private or public attribution. Otherwise, aggressors that are content with ‘implausible deniability’ can cause damage with minimal risk …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating deterrence concepts are under constant review and leveraging NATO. They acknowledge the importance of effective data sharing, which remains a firm requirement in existing programmes, but do not commit to designing new schemes with NATO for speedy data sharing.
Cabinet Office
View Details →
24
Accepted in Part
The Ministry of Defence should work with international partners to ensure there are viable plans...
Recommendation
The Ministry of Defence should work with international partners to ensure there are viable plans to escort cable ships without degrading wider NATO taskings. This plan could usefully include heightened surveillance of suspicious vessel activity, rules of engagement enabling a …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, stating escorting ships is an important task and rules of engagement are routinely reviewed. They are investing in new capabilities like underwater drones and the ‘Atlantic Bastion’ concept. They also state the Royal Navy already conducts routine live escorting exercises, which are frequently reviewed, but do not explicitly commit to new plans with international partners or a low threshold for physical interdiction.
Cabinet Office
View Details →
26
Accepted in Part
The Government should seek to provide a joined-up subsea cables function providing a centralised point...
Recommendation
The Government should seek to provide a joined-up subsea cables function providing a centralised point of contact for industry and international partners. This body should co-ordinate, not duplicate, cross-government work—bringing together departments and agencies covering subsea infrastructure operations, policy, security, …
Read more
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, accepting the importance of a centralised function but rejecting the upgrade of SIRG and a new inter-ministerial group. They state an Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board has been established to provide a joined-up function and ministerial oversight is already provided by the National Security Council.
Cabinet Office
View Details →
Conclusions (2)
23
Conclusion
Accepted in Part
In a heightened threat scenario, we are uncertain about the Royal Navy’s ability to protect vulnerable cable regions and escort repair ships without undermining commitments to other NATO tasks. We admire the Minister for Armed Forces’ optimism that the problem can be solved with Atlantic Bastion’s future set of autonomous …
Government Response Summary
The government partially agreed with the Committee's concerns, stating it is investing in new capabilities such as underwater drones, autonomous sensors, and new ships under the 'Atlantic Bastion' concept to augment the Royal Navy's ability to protect vulnerable cable regions. It also noted existing routine escorting exercises are conducted and reviewed.
25
Conclusion
Accepted in Part
We commend the Government’s efforts to improve co-ordination, particularly the establishment of the Subsea Infrastructure Response Group and Subsea Communications Cables Industry Group. We accept that changing governance structures for the sake of it is not helpful. Equally, however, there is evidence that improvements to oversight and co- ordination would …
Government Response Summary
The government partially agreed, acknowledging the need for improved coordination but declining to expand the SIRG. Instead, it stated that it has established an Undersea Infrastructure Security (UIS) Oversight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office, to provide a senior-level, cross-government function for strategic direction and coordination.