Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Ninth Report - Fraud and Error
Public Accounts Committee
HC 253
Published 30 June 2021
Conclusions (31)
2
Conclusion
Government’s focus on the long-standing fraud and error risks it understands, risks large amounts of fraud and error being unidentified or untackled elsewhere. Efforts to tackle fraud and error in the tax and benefits system come under regular scrutiny. While we regularly scrutinise and challenge HMRC and DWP on their …
3
Conclusion
Departments’ lack of urgency to robustly measure fraud and error hinders their ability to direct their counter fraud and error efforts. The robust measurement of fraud and error is a crucial aspect of any counter fraud response because it shows where controls need to be improved and effort directed. BEIS, …
4
Conclusion
Departments do not make enough use of counter fraud expertise when designing new initiatives to ensure they minimise losses to the taxpayer. One of the key lessons from government’s response to the pandemic is the need to balance speed of implementation and accessibility of support schemes with efforts to prevent …
5
Conclusion
HM Treasury and Cabinet Office do not know whether departments are adequately resourced to tackle fraud and error. There are currently 16,000 members of the Counter Fraud Function within the public sector, with 77% of counter fraud professionals working in DWP or HMRC. Although Cabinet Office understands where counter fraud …
6
Conclusion
Gaps in transparency and information sharing between departments is hindering efforts to prevent, detect and correct fraud and error. Timely data sharing can be used to prevent fraud by data matching, improve detection of fraud by sharing intelligence, and enable recovery in cross-government schemes. Increasing the use of these methods …
7
Conclusion
HMRC, DWP and BEIS are unable to justify the inconsistencies in their approaches to the consequences of fraud and error for different groups of debtors. Departments need to take steps to detect, pursue and recover the billions of pounds of fraud and error overpayments it has lost during the COVID-19 …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from Cabinet Office, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and HM Treasury about fraud and error.1
8
Conclusion
Fraud and error within Universal Credit rose by £3.8 billion to an all-time high of £5.5 billion between April 2020 and March 2021. DWP told us it that during lockdown it found opportunities for innovation by adapting traditional controls, such as face-to-face meetings with claimants, for remote working. As an …
9
Conclusion
We have regularly reported on HMRC’s and DWP’s efforts to tackle fraud and error in the tax and benefit systems. DWP’s accounts have been qualified every year since 1988–89 due to material levels of overpayments and underpayments in benefits expenditure.24 In our report on their 2019–20 accounts we concluded that …
10
Conclusion
We asked Cabinet Office about fraud and error risks outside the tax and benefits system. Cabinet Office told us that the diversity of risks is “very, very large”, because government spends £850 billion and collects around £800 billion in income. It explained that this covers all the different grants, procurement, …
11
Conclusion
The Counter Fraud Function undertook a Global Fraud Risk Assessment across 206 COVID-19 response schemes, with an estimated total value of £387 billion. It risk-assessed 16 of these schemes as having a high or very high fraud risk, representing 57% (£219 billion) of the £387 billion.31 As part of this …
12
Conclusion
It also assessed a large number of other COVID-19 schemes as potentially at high risk of fraud but believed scheme owners needed to do more work to fully quantify those risks.32 Counter fraud resources across government
13
Conclusion
We asked HM Treasury and Cabinet Office about the capability and capacity of counter fraud resources across the public sector. Cabinet Office explained that traditionally Departments have decided individually what level of capability they need, but as fraud is a quickly evolving and complex crime this approach is not optimal.33 …
14
Conclusion
We asked whether counter fraud expertise is adequately deployed across the rest of government. Cabinet Office provided information on where counter fraud expertise is deployed across the rest of government but it is clear that some of the major departments have relatively few counter fraud resources.36 Cabinet Office told us …
15
Conclusion
HM Treasury told us it has ongoing dialogue with departments and supports the funding of counter fraud activity if it is cost effective. We asked HM Treasury why it took 12 months to approve the £100 million funding for a Taxpayer Protection Taskforce within HMRC. HM Treasury told us it …
16
Conclusion
HM Treasury told us that other government functions have a critical role in helping with fraud risk. It told us the Finance and Commercial Functions must operate as an effective second line of defence in advising and supporting fraud risk. It suggested that the combination of these functions operating under …
17
Conclusion
The Counter Fraud Function describes fraud as a hidden crime which you must find before you can fight.41 The government’s counter-fraud functional strategy states an aim to be the most transparent government globally in dealing with public sector fraud.42 Cabinet Office told us it aims to put as much focus …
18
Conclusion
HM Treasury’s guide to Managing Public Money states that that every department should measure and estimate the scale of fraud and error and disclose this in its Annual Report were material.45 The NAO identified the proper measurement of fraud and error as a crucial because it shows departments where controls …
19
Conclusion
We asked about DWP’s progress in developing a target for fraud and error. We have previously recommended that DWP analyse the extent to which fraud and error in the system was temporary because of the pandemic and what was due to longer term structural issues.49 DWP explained that COVID-19 has …
20
Conclusion
We asked BEIS about efforts to estimate the level of fraud and error in the Bounce Back Loan Scheme. BEIS told us it has commissioned PwC to undertake a sampling exercise to come up with a specific estimate of fraud which it expects to be completed in May 2021. BEIS …
21
Conclusion
We asked about what needed to be done to improve the consistency of fraud and error reporting across the public sector. Cabinet Office told us that the introduction of the Functional Standards, a set of minimum criteria for dealing with fraud, is an important tool to increasing consistency of approach.52 …
22
Conclusion
Cabinet Office and DWP told us that timely data sharing can be used to prevent fraud by data matching, improve detection of fraud by sharing intelligence, and enable recovery in cross-government schemes.55 The Digital Economy Act 2017 permits data-matching for the purposes of fraud and error.56 Cabinet Office told us …
23
Conclusion
In written evidence Cifas, the UK’s largest cross-sector fraud sharing organisation, told us there should be transparency around the businesses that have been in receipt of COVID-19 support scheme funds, and, in its submission to us, the Fraud Advisory Panel agreed that transparency around fraud and error is “imperative” to …
24
Conclusion
In written evidence Cifas told us that it believed government’s failure to mandate industry standard fraud significantly contributed to the vast scale of fraud in COVID-19 support schemes.66 BEIS told us that it “found cross-Whitehall collaboration incredibly useful” on the Bounce Back Loan Scheme and local authority grant schemes. It …
25
Conclusion
Each government department has a responsibility to minimise fraud and error, put it right and report on it.70 HM Treasury told us it expects policy to be developed with fraud risk considered at the development and design stage.71 The NAO concluded that deterrence and prevention are often more cost-effective for …
26
Conclusion
The Cabinet Office told us that the Counter Fraud Function is aiming to introduce a minimum standard for fraud risk assessments across government.74 But it is also still working to increase awareness of the Counter Fraud Function.75 For example, consultation with the Function’s central team of experts is at the …
27
Conclusion
The Cabinet Office told us that in emergency situations like the pandemic response it is important to get support out to communities and individuals who need it, and how you balance accessibility and control is one of the areas counter-fraud professionals and other professionals in policy, finance and risk management …
28
Conclusion
We asked DWP how it balanced the need to protect taxpayers’ money with the speed and accessibility of support schemes. DWP told us that Universal Credit was a good example of balancing these needs as applications normally rely on people coming into the jobcentre for ID checks which was no …
29
Conclusion
Departments need to ensure that they detect fraud and error and recover overpayments wherever possible.84 HM Treasury told us it is up to departments to undertake an assessment of how feasible it is to recover funds lost to fraud and error. DWP told us it has a “lot of different …
30
Conclusion
We asked DWP and HMRC about the different departmental responses to similar fraudulent actions, such as concealment of earnings. HMRC told us it has a policy of using criminal investigations in only the most serious cases, where it is the necessary response and where it will have a real deterrent …
31
Conclusion
We asked BEIS about plans to recover loans made as part of the Bounce Back Loan Scheme. BEIS told us that in the first instance, it is the banks responsibility to manage recovery in line with their usual processes.92 BEIS explained that it is planning to work with the police …