Recommendations & Conclusions
21 items
3
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department still does not fully understand Carrier Strike’s support and operating requirements or costs. In 2018, we highlighted that the Department must develop detailed estimates of the costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike. This is even more important now as the defence budget is likely to come under …
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The Department still does not fully understand Carrier Strike’s support and operating requirements or costs. In 2018, we highlighted that the Department must develop detailed estimates of the costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike. This is even more important now as the defence budget is likely to come under increasing strain in future years. The Department based its initial assessment 6 Delivering carrier strike of support and operating costs—such as fuel and spare parts—on estimates and has started to update these using information from its sea trials. However, it says that it needs more time to develop better estimates, with the deployment in 2021 providing a crucial opportunity to improve its understanding of what it takes to run a carrier strike group. The Department acknowledges that it has scaled back investment on support activities on affordability grounds, such as postponing buying a second Lightning II spares pack, and tells us that the situation is tight. As a result, it cannot assure us that it has enough funding to meet future support and operating costs. Recommendation: The Department should collect full information on the costs of operating a carrier strike group during its 2021 deployment. This is a crucial opportunity to develop its understanding of consumption issues and the level of spares it needs. The Department should be prepared to set out its findings at a future evidence session with the Committee and be able to demonstrate that it has a better grip of future support and operating costs.
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, stating it will collect full information on carrier strike group operating costs during the 2021 deployment to improve understanding. It will also address support capabilities as part of the Integrated Review, evaluating outcomes to present a future investment plan.
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HM Treasury
5
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department’s failure to ensure the timely delivery of the Crowsnest radar system leaves the carriers with less protection than planned in its early years. The Department has regarded the Crowsnest project—which will provide a new airborne radar system to protect Carrier Strike—as a very high-risk project from the start. …
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The Department’s failure to ensure the timely delivery of the Crowsnest radar system leaves the carriers with less protection than planned in its early years. The Department has regarded the Crowsnest project—which will provide a new airborne radar system to protect Carrier Strike—as a very high-risk project from the start. There were problems with it between 2016 and 2018, including slippage against milestones. Then, in January 2019, the Department realised that Crowsnest’s initial contracted capability would not be delivered until September 2021, 18 months later than planned. It has told us that the problems were because the sub-contractor did not understand the technical risks and had been overly optimistic when Delivering carrier strike 7 reporting progress. The Department assures us that there will be a “credible baseline capability” when Carrier Strike deploys in 2021 and it will be able to respond to potential threats. Although it plans to improve incrementally the radar capability by 2023, it could not assure us that it would achieve this. Recommendation: The Department should write to the Committee to advise how it has addressed the challenge of not initially having a fully operational Crowsnest system, and on the timetable for enhancements. More broadly, it should advise the Committee how it has improved the oversight of sub-contractors in the light of this case.
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing to provide a written brief by February 2021 on how it has addressed the Crowsnest system's delayed delivery and the timetable for enhancements. It also details improved oversight of sub-contractors, including through increased scrutiny and Earned Value Management.
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HM Treasury
6
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department’s failure to fund several key supporting capabilities will restrict how it can use the carriers for many years. The operational freedom of a carrier group relies on support ships providing munitions and stores where and when they are needed, and the Department has long understood that it will …
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The Department’s failure to fund several key supporting capabilities will restrict how it can use the carriers for many years. The operational freedom of a carrier group relies on support ships providing munitions and stores where and when they are needed, and the Department has long understood that it will need three new support ships to provide this. However, in 2019 it cancelled a competition to build the new ships and it has not yet started a new one. In the meantime, the Department must rely on one elderly ship, RFA Fort Victoria, which has limited cargo capacity and is due to go out of service in 2028, to perform this role. Furthermore, it will need to make alternative arrangements to restock the carriers, such as using allies’ international bases, both when this ship undergoes maintenance in 2022 and when it retires. We are also concerned that the Department has not found a solution for other unfunded supporting capabilities since our 2018 report, such as a long-term solution to move people and goods to, from and within a carrier group. In addition, the Department will face other funding pressures as it replaces the ships needed to sustain carrier operations over the next 50 years, such as anti-submarine frigates. Recommendation: The Department should develop a plan setting out the investment required to develop essential supporting capabilities for a carrier strike group. This should include cost-benefit assessments of potential capability enhancements and how to maximise the value of investment to date. It should write to the Committee by June 2021 setting out its planned investment over the next 10 years. 8 Delivering carrier strike 1 Progress to-date
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing to develop a plan for investing in essential supporting capabilities for the carrier strike group. This will be addressed through the Integrated Review by Q1 2021, including launching a new competition for Fleet Solid Support ships.
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HM Treasury
7
Conclusion
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The government is re-assessing its defence priorities in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (the Review), which, when we took evidence at the end of September, the Department expected would be published in November 2020.13 As part of the Review, government will re-assess its ambition for …
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The government is re-assessing its defence priorities in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (the Review), which, when we took evidence at the end of September, the Department expected would be published in November 2020.13 As part of the Review, government will re-assess its ambition for Carrier Strike. The Department acknowledged that any changes to this ambition, including how the carriers will be used and their deployment patterns, will affect the extent and type of supporting capabilities required, and the level of future investment needed.14 For example, the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review changed the policy ambition from deploying both carriers at the same time to having only one out at a time, with the other in dock. This reduced the number of operational squadrons required.15 The Department emphasised, however, that even without a full complement of planes or ships to support it, Carrier Strike would still be able to undertake a variety of tasks, from war fighting to humanitarian assistance, and that this would project Britain’s power in the world.16
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the observation, stating it will address carrier support capabilities as part of the Integrated Review, reporting in Q1 2021. A new competition for Fleet Solid Support requirements will be launched in Q1 2021 to allow for wider Carrier Enabled Power Projection.
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HM Treasury
8
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department told us that a key factor in its thinking going into the Review had been to ensure Carrier Strike has appropriate support to operate on a global scale.17 It said that the Prime Minister has given it a clear instruction that he expects defence to be actively deployed …
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The Department told us that a key factor in its thinking going into the Review had been to ensure Carrier Strike has appropriate support to operate on a global scale.17 It said that the Prime Minister has given it a clear instruction that he expects defence to be actively deployed in a greater number of situations around the world to promote British values, and that Carrier Strike would be an important part of that.18 However, we remain very frustrated that the Department has been left with an overall budget that is under significant pressure and an equipment programme that is unaffordable because of the government’s continued delays in conducting a strategic review of funding.19
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Government response AI summary
The government states it agrees with the recommendation and will address carrier support capabilities as part of the Integrated Review, including launching a new competition for Fleet Solid Support requirements in Q1 2021.
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HM Treasury
9
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department assured us that Carrier Strike remains a vital component of the 9 Qq 13, 15 10 C&AG’s Report para 1.12 11 Qq 13–14 12 Q 14 13 Q 6 14 Q 49 15 Q 49 16 Qq 50–51 17 Q 76 18 Q 77 19 Qq 6, 58, …
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The Department assured us that Carrier Strike remains a vital component of the 9 Qq 13, 15 10 C&AG’s Report para 1.12 11 Qq 13–14 12 Q 14 13 Q 6 14 Q 49 15 Q 49 16 Qq 50–51 17 Q 76 18 Q 77 19 Qq 6, 58, 75 10 Delivering carrier strike UK’s military capability and power, and that it is working hard to ensure that its plans are fully understood in No10, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury.20 However, it explained that any changes to the role and use of Carrier Strike, including the extent of co-operation with allies, will affect the supporting capabilities that it needs and the future size of the Royal Navy’s fleet.21 Carrier Strike’s first operational deployment in 2021 is with the US Marine Corps, when it will endeavour to learn from their longer experience of deploying this type of aircraft on carriers.22 The Department told us that developing the ability to work with allies was vital in deterring aggression around the world. However, it assured us it was committed to building Carrier Strike’s capabilities so that it could operate as a sovereign capability able to deploy up to 24 UK Lightning II jets by December 2023, and that it would maintain and develop those capabilities well into the 2050s.23 Developing an understanding of future costs
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's finding, reaffirming Carrier Strike as a vital UK military capability. It outlines steps through the Integrated Review and a new competition for Fleet Solid Support ships to ensure sovereign operational capability by 2023 and beyond.
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HM Treasury
10
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
In 2018, this Committee recommended that the Department develop more detailed estimates of the costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike.24 This is even more important now given the pressure on the defence budget, as illustrated by funding shortfalls of up to £13 billion on the Department’s Equipment Plan.25 The …
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In 2018, this Committee recommended that the Department develop more detailed estimates of the costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike.24 This is even more important now given the pressure on the defence budget, as illustrated by funding shortfalls of up to £13 billion on the Department’s Equipment Plan.25 The Department expressed its hope that the Review will result in a more balanced, affordable equipment programme.26
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, stating it will address carrier support capabilities as part of the Integrated Review, which includes launching a new competition for Fleet Solid Support ships in Q1 2021.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
11
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
Support costs include the cost of maintaining, repairing and upgrading equipment. Operating costs include items like fuel, port fees and stock.27 The Department is developing its understanding of the requirements of a carrier strike group when on deployment, and believes that its cost estimates are beginning to mature.28 It has …
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Support costs include the cost of maintaining, repairing and upgrading equipment. Operating costs include items like fuel, port fees and stock.27 The Department is developing its understanding of the requirements of a carrier strike group when on deployment, and believes that its cost estimates are beginning to mature.28 It has used the sea trials to improve its understanding of what it takes to operate Carrier Strike, and collect more information on the associated costs. However, the Department told us that these trials are not representative of routine operations and that it would not develop a fuller understanding of future support and operating costs until 2022.29 The first operational deployment in 2021 will therefore provide the Department with a crucial opportunity to understand what operating a carrier strike group costs.30
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing to use the 2021 operational deployment to understand carrier strike group costs. It will address supporting capabilities as part of the Integrated Review by Q1 2021 and launch a new competition for Fleet Solid Support requirements.
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HM Treasury
12
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department assured us that it did not have major concerns over its budget for sustaining a carrier strike group and that it could place the support contracts it needs.31 However, it admitted that it does not yet fully understand the maintenance requirements and told us that the budget for …
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The Department assured us that it did not have major concerns over its budget for sustaining a carrier strike group and that it could place the support contracts it needs.31 However, it admitted that it does not yet fully understand the maintenance requirements and told us that the budget for spare parts is tight.32 The Department acknowledged that it has not prioritised investment in support activities—including spares and weapons stockpiles—in the way that it should have done. This has meant that maintenance periods 20 Qq 6, 17, 72 21 Q 17 22 Q 20 23 Qq 19–21 24 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Delivering Carrier Strike, Fourteenth Report of Session 2017–2019, HC 394, January 2018 25 Q 75; Comptroller and Auditor General: Ministry of Defence: The Equipment Plan 2019 to 2029, Session 2019–20, HC 111, National Audit Office, February 2020 26 Q 75 27 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.15and 3.16 28 C&AG’s Report, para 15 29 Letter from Stephen Lovegrove, 20 August 2020 30 Qq 69, 70 31 Q 74 32 Qq 69, 76 Delivering carrier strike 11 for the carriers have occasionally been delayed.33 The Comptroller and Auditor General identified examples where the Department had scaled back investment on support activities on affordability grounds, such as postponing the purchase of a second Lightning II spares pack.34 As a result, there is a risk that the Department may not have sufficient provision in later years’ budgets to reflect the full costs of operating Carrier Strike.35 The Department acknowledged that it must make sure it had appropriate support to operate Carrier Strike on a global scale and meet the Government’s aims.36 33 Qq 16, 76 34 Q76, C&AG’s Report para 3.7 35 C&AG’s Report para 16 36 Q 76 12 Delivering carrier strike 2 Providing essential supporting capabilities
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation and will address carrier support capabilities, including Fleet Solid Support requirements and intra-theatre lift, as part of the Integrated Review, with a new shipbuilding competition launching in Q1 2021.
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HM Treasury
13
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department depends on the availability of various supporting capabilities if it is to achieve the full operational capabilities of Carrier Strike in 2023, and ultimately Carrier Enabled Power Projection in 2026.37 For example, the lack of inflight re-fuelling aircraft and ISTAR high range cover, will severely limit the range …
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The Department depends on the availability of various supporting capabilities if it is to achieve the full operational capabilities of Carrier Strike in 2023, and ultimately Carrier Enabled Power Projection in 2026.37 For example, the lack of inflight re-fuelling aircraft and ISTAR high range cover, will severely limit the range and operational capabilities of the lightning aircraft. We were very concerned, therefore, that the Department could not assure us when, or indeed if, these necessary capabilities would be in place. Buying enough planes
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's finding, agreeing to address the required supporting capabilities for Carrier Strike, including fleet solid support ships and intra-theatre lift, as part of the Integrated Review and a new competition by Q1 2021.
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HM Treasury
14
Conclusion
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Lightning II is a sophisticated stealth jet that will be used for both land and carrier-based operations. In 2015, the Department announced that it intended to purchase 138 jets. It is purchasing the jets in tranches under a memorandum of understanding with the US Government. It has ordered 48 …
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The Lightning II is a sophisticated stealth jet that will be used for both land and carrier-based operations. In 2015, the Department announced that it intended to purchase 138 jets. It is purchasing the jets in tranches under a memorandum of understanding with the US Government. It has ordered 48 jets, the last of which is due to be delivered in 2025–26, and currently has 18 jets.38
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the associated recommendation, arranging a private briefing by January 2021 to provide a full and detailed breakdown of Lightning II expenditure, approved budget, and forecast whole life costs for the 48 F-35 aircraft.
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HM Treasury
15
Conclusion
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department told us that its intention to buy 138 aircraft was based on its original plan that there would always be four operational squadrons and both carriers operating. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Reviews altered this expectation, and the Department now regards Carrier Strike’s full operating capability as …
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The Department told us that its intention to buy 138 aircraft was based on its original plan that there would always be four operational squadrons and both carriers operating. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Reviews altered this expectation, and the Department now regards Carrier Strike’s full operating capability as being two UK Lightning II squadrons (up to 24 jets) operating from one of the carriers. It aims to achieve this by the end of 2023. The Department assured us that having 48 aircraft by 2025– 26 would be adequate to deliver two squadrons in normal circumstances.39 However, it acknowledged that the attrition rate in a high-intensity war would mean it could not sustain two squadrons, which would very much reduce a carrier’s utility.40
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the associated recommendation, arranging a private briefing by January 2021 to provide a full and detailed breakdown of Lightning II expenditure, approved budget, and forecast whole life costs for the 48 F-35 aircraft.
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HM Treasury
17
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
As at April 2020, the Department had spent £6.0 billion on the Lightning II project, 37 C&AG’s Report, para. 2.1 and Figure 6 38 Q 22; C&AG’s Report, paras. 1.14 and 1.15 39 Qq 20, 43–45; C&AG’s Report, para. 3 40 Q 50 41 Qq 22, 49 42 Q 50 …
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As at April 2020, the Department had spent £6.0 billion on the Lightning II project, 37 C&AG’s Report, para. 2.1 and Figure 6 38 Q 22; C&AG’s Report, paras. 1.14 and 1.15 39 Qq 20, 43–45; C&AG’s Report, para. 3 40 Q 50 41 Qq 22, 49 42 Q 50 43 Q 23; C&AG’s Report, para. 1.19 44 Q 39 Delivering carrier strike 13 out of an approved budget of £10.5 billion. The approved budget had increased by £1.4 billion (15%) since 2017. However, the Department has forecast that the programme’s whole life costs for 48 jets to 2048 would be £18.4 billion, which broadly breaks down as £5 billion for development, £5 billion for production and £8 billion for sustainment and support. This is £7.9 billion more than the current approved budget, and does not include operating costs, such as manpower, fuel and weapons expenditure.45
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing to provide a full breakdown of Lightning II expenditure and whole life costs. A private briefing has been arranged for January 2021 to cover the Whole Life Costs for the 48 F-35Bs.
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HM Treasury
18
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department told us that each plane currently costs approximately $100 million and that it expected this price to fall by 13% over the next three tranches.46 Nevertheless, this basic purchase price is just one cost element, and other costs must be taken into the reckoning, including the UK’s original …
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The Department told us that each plane currently costs approximately $100 million and that it expected this price to fall by 13% over the next three tranches.46 Nevertheless, this basic purchase price is just one cost element, and other costs must be taken into the reckoning, including the UK’s original investment to be a Tier 1 partner with the US, and the costs of weapons integration, sustainment and the supporting infrastructure. The Department could only provide us with a broad breakdown of the estimated whole life cost of the Lightning II programme and asserted that it would be misleading to provide a specific per-aircraft cost. We remain concerned with the Department’s lack of clarity on these costs because it must find additional funding both to bridge the £7.9 billion funding- gap for the 48 aircraft it is committed to buying, and to purchase the additional jets it acknowledges it will require.47 Delays to the Crowsnest radar system
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation regarding cost clarity for the Lightning II program and has arranged a private briefing session for January 2021 to discuss related expenditure and Whole Life Costs for the 48 F-35 aircraft.
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HM Treasury
19
Conclusion
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
Crowsnest provides critical radar protection for Carrier Strike. It is fitted to the Royal Navy’s Merlin helicopters and provides long-range air, sea and land surveillance, detection and tracking to identify threats beyond the horizon. Crowsnest is designed to work alongside air defences provided by the Navy’s Type 45 destroyers, and …
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Crowsnest provides critical radar protection for Carrier Strike. It is fitted to the Royal Navy’s Merlin helicopters and provides long-range air, sea and land surveillance, detection and tracking to identify threats beyond the horizon. Crowsnest is designed to work alongside air defences provided by the Navy’s Type 45 destroyers, and the Department told us that it was an essential component of the Carrier Strike capability.48
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the associated recommendation, committing to provide a written brief by February 2021 on how it addressed Crowsnest's late delivery, increase oversight of sub-contractors, and use Earned Value Management to track supplier performance.
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HM Treasury
20
Conclusion
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department agreed a fixed-price contract for Crowsnest in November 2016 with Lockheed Martin, which sub-contracted delivery of the project to Thales and Leonardo Helicopters. From the very start the Department regarded the project as a very high risk, having assessed that industry might not be able to deliver the …
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The Department agreed a fixed-price contract for Crowsnest in November 2016 with Lockheed Martin, which sub-contracted delivery of the project to Thales and Leonardo Helicopters. From the very start the Department regarded the project as a very high risk, having assessed that industry might not be able to deliver the initial capability. Between 2016 and 2018 there were numerous problems with the project, which led to the Department raising its concerns with its industry partners and introducing measures to manage the risk. The Department told us that in October 2018 it had become aware that the milestones were not being met as they should be and that some were missed. Nevertheless, it assessed that the project was deliverable through to December 2018.49
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation and, despite delays to full capability, commits to providing a credible Crowsnest baseline with enhancements until FOC in 2023. It will also provide a written brief to the Committee and has increased oversight of subcontractors and improved performance tracking.
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HM Treasury
21
Conclusion
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department told us that an internal audit at Thales in January 2019 declared that it would be very late delivering the programme. As a result, the Department does not expect Crowsnest to achieve initial operating capability until September 2021. The Department told us that the problems arose because the …
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The Department told us that an internal audit at Thales in January 2019 declared that it would be very late delivering the programme. As a result, the Department does not expect Crowsnest to achieve initial operating capability until September 2021. The Department told us that the problems arose because the industry consortium had underestimated the technical risk from the outset and had under-resourced the programme. These problems had been compounded by a “can-do” attitude within industry and a misplaced belief that it could catch up. As a result, Crowsnest will be delivered some 18 months later than planned.50 45 Q 26; Ministry of Defence letter to the Chair, 8 October 2020; C&AG’s Report, para. 1.16 46 Qq 24–25 47 Qq 26–28; Ministry of Defence letter to the Chair, 8 October 2020; C&AG’s Report, para. 8 48 Q 15; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.2 49 Q 32; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.3 50 Qq 29–32; C&AG’s Report, paras. 2.4 and 2.7 14 Delivering carrier strike
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the associated recommendation, committing to provide a written brief by February 2021 on how it addressed Crowsnest's late delivery, increase oversight of sub-contractors, and use Earned Value Management to track supplier performance.
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HM Treasury
22
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department acknowledged that Crowsnest will not provide the capability it had originally expected when it deploys Carrier Strike operationally in 2021, but it assured us that there will be a credible baseline radar capability. It also said that some capabilities would not be available, such as the weather mode. …
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The Department acknowledged that Crowsnest will not provide the capability it had originally expected when it deploys Carrier Strike operationally in 2021, but it assured us that there will be a credible baseline radar capability. It also said that some capabilities would not be available, such as the weather mode. However, the ability to understand, survey and search all the area, identify potential threats, and pass that information onto the carrier and other parts of the carrier group, would be in place. The Department plans to improve the radar capability incrementally between 2021 and 2023 through a series of upgrades. However, it acknowledged that the capability might not be delivered as quickly as it would wish, and it could not assure us that Crowsnest will achieve full operating capability in 2023.51 Other key supporting capabilities
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's finding, agreeing that a credible baseline Crowsnest capability will be available for CSG21 and will be enhanced until Full Operating Capability in 2023. A written brief detailing how the late delivery is being addressed will be provided to the Committee …
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HM Treasury
24
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The operational freedom of a carrier group relies on tankers supplying it with oil and water, and solid support ships providing food, ammunition and general stores, where and when they are required. The Department identified that it needed new solid support ships in 2005, and by 2017 it had decided …
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The operational freedom of a carrier group relies on tankers supplying it with oil and water, and solid support ships providing food, ammunition and general stores, where and when they are required. The Department identified that it needed new solid support ships in 2005, and by 2017 it had decided that a fleet of three new support ships was necessary, entering service from 2026. Indeed, the Department told us that the fleet solid support ship programme was one of the four key components of its ambition to develop Carrier Enabled Power Projection. It began the procurement of the three ships in May 2018 but stopped the competition in November 2019 because it did not have a compliant bidder. The Department told us it was now reconsidering its requirement and had not yet launched a further competition. It has not confirmed when the first new ship will now enter service but estimates it will be October 2027 at the earliest, and possibly as late as April 2029.53
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation and will address support capabilities for carriers as part of the Integrated Review, launching a new competition for Fleet Solid Support ships in Q1 2021.
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HM Treasury
25
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
In the meantime, the Department must rely on RFA Fort Victoria, which has limited cargo capacity, to provide the carriers with stores and munitions. RFA Fort Victoria entered service in 1994 and is due to retire in April 2028, having already been extended beyond its 25-year service life. Furthermore, this …
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In the meantime, the Department must rely on RFA Fort Victoria, which has limited cargo capacity, to provide the carriers with stores and munitions. RFA Fort Victoria entered service in 1994 and is due to retire in April 2028, having already been extended beyond its 25-year service life. Furthermore, this ship will be unavailable for much of 2022 as it undergoes major maintenance work.54
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation and will address carrier support capabilities as part of the Integrated Review, with a new competition for Fleet Solid Support ships launching in Q1 2021 involving international partners.
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HM Treasury
26
Recommendation
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrie…
Accepted
The Department told us that, consequentially, it would have to think through how 51 Qq 30–31, 35–37 52 Qq 17–18, 50, 78–79; C&AG’s Report, paras. 1.6–1.7 53 Qq 56–57; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.16 54 Q 56; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.17 Delivering carrier strike 15 much spares and stores it must …
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The Department told us that, consequentially, it would have to think through how 51 Qq 30–31, 35–37 52 Qq 17–18, 50, 78–79; C&AG’s Report, paras. 1.6–1.7 53 Qq 56–57; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.16 54 Q 56; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.17 Delivering carrier strike 15 much spares and stores it must preload onto the carriers before they are deployed. It would also need to manage the consumption rates of stock and spares, depending on the environment the ship was operating in. Where necessary, it might also need to seek support from allies. The Department admitted that having only RFA Fort Victoria would inevitably constrain carrier operations, and that it had known about this issue since 2011, when the delivery of the new fleet solid support ships had first been delayed.
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's finding, stating it will address carrier support capabilities, including Fleet Solid Support requirements, as part of the Integrated Review by Q1 2021, and will launch a new competition for support ships.
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HM Treasury