Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation 22
22
The Department acknowledged that Crowsnest will not provide the capability it had originally expected when...
Conclusion
The Department acknowledged that Crowsnest will not provide the capability it had originally expected when it deploys Carrier Strike operationally in 2021, but it assured us that there will be a credible baseline radar capability. It also said that some capabilities would not be available, such as the weather mode. However, the ability to understand, survey and search all the area, identify potential threats, and pass that information onto the carrier and other parts of the carrier group, would be in place. The Department plans to improve the radar capability incrementally between 2021 and 2023 through a series of upgrades. However, it acknowledged that the capability might not be delivered as quickly as it would wish, and it could not assure us that Crowsnest will achieve full operating capability in 2023.51 Other key supporting capabilities
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government
Not Addressed
5.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target Implementation date: February 2021 5.2 Whilst the department will not have the full Crowsnest capability when Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) deploys, it will have a credible baseline capability to provide surveillance and Force Protection of the task group. That initial baseline capability will be enhanced periodically (via software updates) during the deployment and beyond until Full Operating Capability (FOC) is achieved in 2023. The initial baseline capability will encompass air, littoral and maritime surveillance and interoperability with other aircraft (including F35) and ships over secure datalink. A written brief on how the department has addressed the challenge of the late delivery of Crowsnest will be provided to the Committee in February 2021. 5.3 The department has significantly increased its oversight of Crowsnest sub-contractors through more frequent and senior scrutiny of the programme. Whilst this may appear disproportionate in comparison to other programmes across Defence, in retrospect and regard of the importance of this capability, it is entirely appropriate. 5.4 More broadly, the principal responsibility for managing subcontractor performance rests with the prime contractor, with whom the department directly contracts. However, when a project is of sufficient size and complexity, the department requires the flow-down of performance reporting to sub-contractors (e.g. Tier 2 suppliers). This requires qualifying prime contractors to collect and supply sub-contractor performance data to the department. The department’s equipment procurement organization, Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), has introduced widespread use of Earned Value Management to better track supplier (and hence sub-contractor) variance to cost and schedule, which provides greater insight when variances arise and drives improved performance.