Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Twenty-Third Report - Delivering carrier strike
Public Accounts Committee
HC 684
Published 13 November 2020
Conclusions (27)
2
Conclusion
There remains considerable uncertainty over the Department’s future ambitions for Carrier Strike. The government is re-assessing its defence priorities in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (the Review), which it is due to publish in November 2020. We are extremely frustrated that the government has failed …
3
Conclusion
The Department still does not fully understand Carrier Strike’s support and operating requirements or costs. In 2018, we highlighted that the Department must develop detailed estimates of the costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike. This is even more important now as the defence budget is likely to come under …
4
Conclusion
The value for money of the investment in the carriers will be significantly reduced if the UK cannot afford enough aircraft to sustain operations over the carriers’ service life. The Department acknowledges that it will need more than the 48 Lightning II jets it has ordered so far to sustain …
5
Conclusion
The Department’s failure to ensure the timely delivery of the Crowsnest radar system leaves the carriers with less protection than planned in its early years. The Department has regarded the Crowsnest project—which will provide a new airborne radar system to protect Carrier Strike—as a very high-risk project from the start. …
6
Conclusion
The Department’s failure to fund several key supporting capabilities will restrict how it can use the carriers for many years. The operational freedom of a carrier group relies on support ships providing munitions and stores where and when they are needed, and the Department has long understood that it will …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department) on its progress in developing Carrier Strike and the steps it still needs to take to achieve its full operating capabilities and deliver value for money from its …
7
Conclusion
The government is re-assessing its defence priorities in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (the Review), which, when we took evidence at the end of September, the Department expected would be published in November 2020.13 As part of the Review, government will re-assess its ambition for …
8
Conclusion
The Department told us that a key factor in its thinking going into the Review had been to ensure Carrier Strike has appropriate support to operate on a global scale.17 It said that the Prime Minister has given it a clear instruction that he expects defence to be actively deployed …
9
Conclusion
The Department assured us that Carrier Strike remains a vital component of the 9 Qq 13, 15 10 C&AG’s Report para 1.12 11 Qq 13–14 12 Q 14 13 Q 6 14 Q 49 15 Q 49 16 Qq 50–51 17 Q 76 18 Q 77 19 Qq 6, 58, …
10
Conclusion
In 2018, this Committee recommended that the Department develop more detailed estimates of the costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike.24 This is even more important now given the pressure on the defence budget, as illustrated by funding shortfalls of up to £13 billion on the Department’s Equipment Plan.25 The …
11
Conclusion
Support costs include the cost of maintaining, repairing and upgrading equipment. Operating costs include items like fuel, port fees and stock.27 The Department is developing its understanding of the requirements of a carrier strike group when on deployment, and believes that its cost estimates are beginning to mature.28 It has …
12
Conclusion
The Department assured us that it did not have major concerns over its budget for sustaining a carrier strike group and that it could place the support contracts it needs.31 However, it admitted that it does not yet fully understand the maintenance requirements and told us that the budget for …
13
Conclusion
The Department depends on the availability of various supporting capabilities if it is to achieve the full operational capabilities of Carrier Strike in 2023, and ultimately Carrier Enabled Power Projection in 2026.37 For example, the lack of inflight re-fuelling aircraft and ISTAR high range cover, will severely limit the range …
14
Conclusion
The Lightning II is a sophisticated stealth jet that will be used for both land and carrier-based operations. In 2015, the Department announced that it intended to purchase 138 jets. It is purchasing the jets in tranches under a memorandum of understanding with the US Government. It has ordered 48 …
15
Conclusion
The Department told us that its intention to buy 138 aircraft was based on its original plan that there would always be four operational squadrons and both carriers operating. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Reviews altered this expectation, and the Department now regards Carrier Strike’s full operating capability as …
16
Conclusion
The Department said that if it is to deploy one carrier at a time it would not need all 138 aircraft. It acknowledged, however, that it will need more than 48 Lightning II jets to sustain Carrier Strike operations through to the 2050s and beyond.41 It told us that the …
17
Conclusion
As at April 2020, the Department had spent £6.0 billion on the Lightning II project, 37 C&AG’s Report, para. 2.1 and Figure 6 38 Q 22; C&AG’s Report, paras. 1.14 and 1.15 39 Qq 20, 43–45; C&AG’s Report, para. 3 40 Q 50 41 Qq 22, 49 42 Q 50 …
18
Conclusion
The Department told us that each plane currently costs approximately $100 million and that it expected this price to fall by 13% over the next three tranches.46 Nevertheless, this basic purchase price is just one cost element, and other costs must be taken into the reckoning, including the UK’s original …
19
Conclusion
Crowsnest provides critical radar protection for Carrier Strike. It is fitted to the Royal Navy’s Merlin helicopters and provides long-range air, sea and land surveillance, detection and tracking to identify threats beyond the horizon. Crowsnest is designed to work alongside air defences provided by the Navy’s Type 45 destroyers, and …
20
Conclusion
The Department agreed a fixed-price contract for Crowsnest in November 2016 with Lockheed Martin, which sub-contracted delivery of the project to Thales and Leonardo Helicopters. From the very start the Department regarded the project as a very high risk, having assessed that industry might not be able to deliver the …
21
Conclusion
The Department told us that an internal audit at Thales in January 2019 declared that it would be very late delivering the programme. As a result, the Department does not expect Crowsnest to achieve initial operating capability until September 2021. The Department told us that the problems arose because the …
22
Conclusion
The Department acknowledged that Crowsnest will not provide the capability it had originally expected when it deploys Carrier Strike operationally in 2021, but it assured us that there will be a credible baseline radar capability. It also said that some capabilities would not be available, such as the weather mode. …
23
Conclusion
The carriers cannot be used on their own and need a range of support vessels to provide supplies and protection. The Department told us that in a conflict situation, for example, it would need anti-submarine warfare frigates, anti-aircraft destroyers, and hunter-killer submarines. Deploying Carrier Strike will therefore require a significant …
24
Conclusion
The operational freedom of a carrier group relies on tankers supplying it with oil and water, and solid support ships providing food, ammunition and general stores, where and when they are required. The Department identified that it needed new solid support ships in 2005, and by 2017 it had decided …
25
Conclusion
In the meantime, the Department must rely on RFA Fort Victoria, which has limited cargo capacity, to provide the carriers with stores and munitions. RFA Fort Victoria entered service in 1994 and is due to retire in April 2028, having already been extended beyond its 25-year service life. Furthermore, this …
26
Conclusion
The Department told us that, consequentially, it would have to think through how 51 Qq 30–31, 35–37 52 Qq 17–18, 50, 78–79; C&AG’s Report, paras. 1.6–1.7 53 Qq 56–57; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.16 54 Q 56; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.17 Delivering carrier strike 15 much spares and stores it must …
27
Conclusion
We were also concerned that the Department had not found a solution for other unfunded supporting capabilities since our 2018 report. For example, a Maritime Intra- Theatre Lift capability is crucial for moving spares (including Lightning II parts), people and, potentially, high-value assets around the fleet and to shore. The …