Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation 20
20
The Department agreed a fixed-price contract for Crowsnest in November 2016 with Lockheed Martin, which...
Conclusion
The Department agreed a fixed-price contract for Crowsnest in November 2016 with Lockheed Martin, which sub-contracted delivery of the project to Thales and Leonardo Helicopters. From the very start the Department regarded the project as a very high risk, having assessed that industry might not be able to deliver the initial capability. Between 2016 and 2018 there were numerous problems with the project, which led to the Department raising its concerns with its industry partners and introducing measures to manage the risk. The Department told us that in October 2018 it had become aware that the milestones were not being met as they should be and that some were missed. Nevertheless, it assessed that the project was deliverable through to December 2018.49
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government
Not Addressed
5.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target Implementation date: February 2021 5.2 Whilst the department will not have the full Crowsnest capability when Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) deploys, it will have a credible baseline capability to provide surveillance and Force Protection of the task group. That initial baseline capability will be enhanced periodically (via software updates) during the deployment and beyond until Full Operating Capability (FOC) is achieved in 2023. The initial baseline capability will encompass air, littoral and maritime surveillance and interoperability with other aircraft (including F35) and ships over secure datalink. A written brief on how the department has addressed the challenge of the late delivery of Crowsnest will be provided to the Committee in February 2021. 5.3 The department has significantly increased its oversight of Crowsnest sub-contractors through more frequent and senior scrutiny of the programme. Whilst this may appear disproportionate in comparison to other programmes across Defence, in retrospect and regard of the importance of this capability, it is entirely appropriate. 5.4 More broadly, the principal responsibility for managing subcontractor performance rests with the prime contractor, with whom the department directly contracts. However, when a project is of sufficient size and complexity, the department requires the flow-down of performance reporting to sub-contractors (e.g. Tier 2 suppliers). This requires qualifying prime contractors to collect and supply sub-contractor performance data to the department. The department’s equipment procurement organization, Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), has introduced widespread use of Earned Value Management to better track supplier (and hence sub-contractor) variance to cost and schedule, which provides greater insight when variances arise and drives improved performance.