Recommendations & Conclusions
9 items
7
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
In the remaining 43% of instances a claimant was not referred, this is because the claimant was no longer eligible by the time they were considered by the work coach. This could be, for example, because they had found work or because they no longer needed to search for work …
HM Treasury
9
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
We asked the Department whether it could have had any better information or better data to predict demand, and it told us that it was keen to learn from its experience of Restart about how to predict demand, and later spoke about how some of its data mining work may …
HM Treasury
11
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
Not Addressed
Discussing mental health, the Department did tell us about a number of initiatives arising from a joint Department for Work & Pensions and Department of Health & Social Care unit which looks to target some of the mental health challenges claimants face. The Department told us that it had “paid …
Government response. The government agrees that complex barriers prevent people from finding work and has set out a plan to improve support in the White Paper published on 15 March 2023, including extending the Employment Advisers in NHS Talking Therapies services, working …
HM Treasury
17
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
The Department used its experience of delivering and evaluating the Work Programme, a similar previous scheme which ran between 2011 and 2017, to help it to design and set up Restart.31 The Department’s evaluation of the Work Programme showed that, on average, scheme participants spent 46 additional days in work …
HM Treasury
18
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
So far more Restart participants have moved into sustained jobs than the Department had expected, but this is in the context of historically low unemployment and high vacancies. The Department will not know the impact of Restart in increasing the number of people moving into sustained work until it has …
HM Treasury
19
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
From 2010–11, when it was responding to the last economic crash, to 2020–21, the Department reduced its expenditure on employment support from £2.9 bn to £300 million per year.35 The Department told us that when it was designing Restart, it believed that “well over 2 million” people would be eligible …
HM Treasury
20
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
However, shortly after launching Restart, the Department realised that had it had significantly overestimated the demand, partly because it expected there to be more eligible participants, and partly because it expected more of those eligible participants to be found suitable to start on the scheme.39 To increase the numbers of …
HM Treasury
23
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
The Department set out in the Restart business case that it expected to pay around £1,800 per participant but, following the renegotiations, it now expects to pay around £2,429 per participant. The Work Programme, which ran from 2011 to 2017, cost around £1,760 per participant in 2021–22 prices.46 The Department …
HM Treasury
24
Conclusion
Forty-Second Report - The Restart Schem…
Although the Department signed contracts with eight prime providers to deliver Restart across 12 contract areas in England and Wales the prime providers can, and do, subcontract much of the scheme delivery to other providers.48 In total, there are 77 providers involved in the delivery of Restart. Providers have their …
HM Treasury