Select Committee · Treasury Committee

Economic impact of coronavirus

Status: Closed Opened: 19 Mar 2020 Closed: 20 Jan 2022 35 recommendations 19 conclusions 3 reports

In the first stage of its economic impact of the coronavirus inquiry, the Committee issued a call for evidence on the speed, effectiveness and reach of the Government’s and Bank of England’s immediate financial responses to coronavirus. The Committee highlighted gaps in support to the Treasury. In the second stage, the Committee examined the impact … Show more

Clear

Reports

3 reports
Title HC No. Published Items Response
Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in s… HC 882 15 Feb 2021 24 Responded
Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challeng… HC 271 11 Sep 2020 30 Responded
2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support HC 454 15 Jun 2020 0 Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

9 items
12 Recommendation Eighth Report: Economic impact of coron… Rejected

We are concerned that there may be a significant lack of capacity and willingness for...

We are concerned that there may be a significant lack of capacity and willingness for the private sector to step in to provide solutions for corporate indebtedness especially amongst small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Viable SMEs struggling with debt will prolong the recession and so the Government must develop solutions … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to outline a plan for recapitalising SME balance sheets, stating that accredited lenders, not the government, are best placed to support borrowers with government-guaranteed loans. They have considered the proposed interventions but maintain their view.
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HM Treasury
26 Recommendation Eighth Report: Economic impact of coron… Rejected

The Treasury’s macroeconomic forecasting ability appears to have eroded since the formation of the OBR.

The Treasury’s macroeconomic forecasting ability appears to have eroded since the formation of the OBR. The Treasury needs to maintain sufficient forecasting capacity outside the OBR so that it can ensure that it can adapt policy responses rapidly to an urgent situation. In its response to this report, the Treasury … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation, stating that the Treasury does not produce its own macroeconomic forecasts and instead relies on independent forecasts from the OBR, Bank of England, ONS data, and external sources for policy advice.
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HM Treasury
5 Conclusion Eleventh Report - Economic impact of co… Rejected

By conspicuously leaving out a large proportion of limited company directors from support altogether, we...

By conspicuously leaving out a large proportion of limited company directors from support altogether, we are concerned that the Government is sending out the wrong message—that it is not adequately supporting entrepreneurs and employers, who have suffered significantly from a lack of support. However, we recognise that there are administrative … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government responded to concerns about the exclusion of limited company directors by explaining that difficulties in identifying eligible individuals and high fraud risks prevent broader support through schemes like SEISS, while noting other available business support.
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HM Treasury
7 Recommendation Eleventh Report - Economic impact of co… Rejected

We question whether the Treasury could do more to investigate how to mitigate the fraud...

We question whether the Treasury could do more to investigate how to mitigate the fraud risks inherent in the DISS scheme and similar schemes, and whether the levels of fraud risk merit the Treasury’s position of not providing any support at all. We urge the Treasury to develop measures to … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation to develop new support measures for limited company directors, citing significant difficulties in accurately identifying eligible individuals from HMRC data, high fraud risks associated with self-certification, and the availability of other business support schemes.
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HM Treasury
8 Conclusion Eleventh Report - Economic impact of co… Rejected

Although we acknowledge the Chancellor’s intention to target the SEISS at those who are most...

Although we acknowledge the Chancellor’s intention to target the SEISS at those who are most dependent on self-employed income, not all of them would have access to the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, as we pointed out in our first report of this inquiry. Read more

Government response AI summary
The government defended its SEISS eligibility criteria, particularly the 50% self-employed income test, stating it is designed to target support at those most in need and citing data on other income sources for those who do not qualify.
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HM Treasury
9 Recommendation Eleventh Report - Economic impact of co… Rejected

We believe that the Government should reconsider the 50 per cent limit in the eligibility...

We believe that the Government should reconsider the 50 per cent limit in the eligibility criteria for the fourth tranche of the SEISS grant so that those who derive less than half of their income through self-employment can receive some level of support. Read more

Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation to reconsider the 50% income limit for SEISS eligibility, stating the design aims to target those most in need and noting that stakeholders had initially supported an even higher threshold.
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HM Treasury
10 Recommendation Eleventh Report - Economic impact of co… Rejected

There is a striking inconsistency between the way the Government is treating employees earning more...

There is a striking inconsistency between the way the Government is treating employees earning more than £50,000 a year and those who are self-employed and have trading profits above £50,000 a year. Whereas those who are employed can receive support from the Government up to a maximum wage amount of … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government rejects the implicit recommendation to remove the £50,000 cap or introduce a taper for SEISS, stating it is not proportionate due to complexity and the small number of potential beneficiaries, and that SEISS and CJRS are fundamentally different schemes.
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HM Treasury
11 Recommendation Eleventh Report - Economic impact of co… Rejected

We reiterate our recommendation from our first report in this inquiry that the Government must...

We reiterate our recommendation from our first report in this inquiry that the Government must tackle the cliff edge that exists in the design of the SEISS by removing the £50,000 cap and allowing those with profits just over this cap access to some financial support up to the total … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to remove the £50,000 cap and introduce a taper for SEISS, stating it is not proportionate due to the complexity of administration and the relatively small number of people who would benefit.
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HM Treasury
14 Recommendation Eleventh Report - Economic impact of co… Rejected

We recognise that it may not have been possible for the Government to help all...

We recognise that it may not have been possible for the Government to help all those who have fallen through the cracks of the support schemes. However, we are disappointed that the Government has so far shown no inclination to expand or provide alternatives to the SEISS, which is providing … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government stated it had explored alternative support models, including Northern Ireland's Directors' scheme, but concluded they were not viable due to higher fraud risks and practical issues with identifying eligible populations.
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HM Treasury

Correspondence

51 letters
DateDirectionTitle
14 Apr 2021 Correspondence from the Chief Secretary to HM Treasury, relating to procurement…
17 Feb 2021 To cttee Letter from the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), relating…
10 Feb 2021 From cttee Letter to Chair from Jonathan Athow, Office for National Statistics, regarding …
8 Feb 2021 From cttee Letter to Chair from Caroline Miskin, Technical Manager (Practitioner Support),…
3 Feb 2021 To cttee Letter from Chair to Tom Scholar regarding economic analysis and gaps in suppor…
3 Feb 2021 To cttee Response from Tom Scholar to Chair regarding economic analysis and gaps in supp…
21 Oct 2020 To cttee Letter from the Chancellor relating to the expansion of the Job Support Scheme,…
16 Sep 2020 To cttee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer relating to follow-up from the evid…
4 Sep 2020 To cttee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer re Committee session on 15 July 2020
1 Sep 2020 To cttee Letter from the Office for National Statistics regarding the economic impact of…
23 Jul 2020 Correspondence from Steve Baker MP to the Chancellor following the Committee’s …
21 Jul 2020 To cttee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer re local lockdown in Leicester, dat…
15 Jul 2020 Correspondence from Chancellor relating to changes to Stamp Duty Land Tax, date…
15 Jul 2020 Correspondence from Chancellor relating to responses to correspondence from MPs…
9 Jul 2020 To cttee Letter from the Prime Minister to Chair relating to COVID-19, dated 16 June 2020
9 Jul 2020 To cttee Letter from Governor of the Bank of England relating to the Treasury Committee …
8 Jul 2020 Chancellor Response regarding COVID19 tests by employers
7 Jul 2020 To cttee Letter from Chair of TSC to Chancellor re COVID-19 tests by employers- taxable …
7 Jul 2020 To cttee Letter from Jon Moulton to Chair relating to Future Fund, dated 22 June 2020
1 Jul 2020 To cttee Letter from Chair to Chancellor regarding local lockdowns, dated 1 July 2020