Home / Sources / Select Committees / Treasury Committee / Economic impact of coronavirus
Select committee: Treasury Committee

Economic impact of coronavirus

Closed Opened 19 Mar 2020 Closed 20 Jan 2022 41 recommendations 26 conclusions

Treasury Committee Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

Inquiry scope (the committee's words)
In the first stage of its economic impact of the coronavirus inquiry, the Committee issued a call for evidence on the speed, effectiveness and reach of the Government’s and Bank of England’s immediate financial responses to coronavirus. The Committee highlighted gaps in support to the Treasury. In the second stage, the Committee examined the impact on the economy and different sectors, the implications for public finances, and how the Government can work towards a sustained recovery. The next stage of the inquiry will deal with the coronavirus response as it continues to unfold but also with some of the long-term implications of the challenges and opportunities of the “new normal”. Read an interactive summary of the the key points of our interim report on gaps in support Read an interactive summary of the key points of our second interim report on the challenges to recovery Read an interactive summary of the key points of our third interim report on gaps in support and economic analysis Read the call for evidence for more detail about the inquiry.

Where it stands

The inquiry is closed, opened 19 March 2020.

The committee has published 3 reports, most recently Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis on 15 February 2021.

The government's response to each report

Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis

Published 26 April 2021. The deadline was 15 April 2021.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The Treasury's response sets out the support it has provided and extended, says it has addressed the GDP commentary recommendation in the Budget, and says it cannot identify or fairly support limited company directors or change key SEISS eligibility rules.

  • On the recommendation for a commentary on GDP as a measure, the Government says it "has addressed this recommendation in the Budget", which features a commentary on international comparisons of economic performance and the use of GDP as a measure.
  • The Government has extended CJRS and SEISS "even further, until September", and moved the CJRS employee cut-off date to 2 March 2021 for claims starting on 1 May 2021.
  • On limited company directors, the Government says the Directors Income Support Scheme proposal "is not workable in its current form" because HMRC does not hold the necessary information, and cites fraud and error risks, with a draft planning assumption that these "could be as high as 20%".
  • On SEISS eligibility, the Government says the 50% self-employed income test and the £50,000 threshold are intended to target support. It does not think a taper is "proportionate", given complexity and the small number who would benefit.

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery

Published 20 November 2020. The deadline was 11 November 2020.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The Treasury's response sets out the support measures and positions it has taken on the Committee's recommendations, accepting some points, declining others and deferring several to later announcements.

  • On recapitalising SMEs, the government has considered proposals including contingent tax liabilities and student loan type structures, but remains "of the view that accredited lenders, not the government, are best placed" to support borrowers repaying government-guaranteed loans.
  • On the OBR and levelling up, the government points to the OBR's "clearly defined mandate" and to past reviews recommending "caution" about expanding it, rather than proposing a change.
  • On a roadmap to fiscal sustainability, the government will set out further details, including a revised fiscal framework, "in due course, as the economic and fiscal outlook becomes clearer".
  • On updating its COVID-19 distributional analysis, the government has "taken note and will consider doing so at an appropriate point", citing difficulties producing it to the same quality across wider characteristics.

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support

Fourth Special Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support: Further Government Response

Published 4 September 2020. The deadline was 15 August 2020.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The government's further response sets out reasons why the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) have the eligibility limits the Committee identified, while noting amendments already made and wider support available.

  • On the 19 March cut-off for CJRS eligibility, the government states it was chosen as "the day before the CJRS was announced", and says extending it would "significantly increase the risk of abuse" because claims could not be verified against fraud.
  • On dividends, the government says it "carefully considered the case" for a new system, but states that such support is "much more complex" and that HMRC could not efficiently or consistently verify claims.
  • On SEISS, it states the scheme is based on trading profits, and that using 2019-20 tax returns for those who started trading more recently would carry fraud risks: "The Government cannot expose the Exchequer to these risks."
  • It reports changes made: from 1 July furloughed employees can return for any amount of time and shift pattern, and SEISS eligibility has been amended to cover self-employed new parents.

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

Third Special Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2019–21

Published 23 July 2020.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The Chancellor says the Government has "adapted the CJRS and SEISS as far as is possible", and does not extend them to the newly self-employed, those paid via dividends or those hired after 19 March, citing fraud risk and practical constraints.

  • On the newly self-employed, the Chancellor says it "would not be possible to include those who began trading after the 2018–19 tax year", because accepting 2019–20 returns creates an opportunity to "file fake or misleading returns".
  • On those paid through dividends, the Government "will not be able to provide" a new system for practical reasons, and says IPSE's "pay now, clawback later" proposal would be "highly resource-intensive".
  • On the CJRS cut-off date, it says it is "unable to extend this date any further" beyond 19 March, citing the practical implications of monitoring and the risk of fraud. It also states that discretionary tronc payments cannot be included in CJRS calculations, while non-discretionary ones are.
  • The Government says the CJRS and SEISS "were the right policies for the first phase of the crisis" and points to its Plan for Jobs, making available "up to £30bn" ahead of the Budget and Spending Review.

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

Recommendations and conclusions

  • Conclusion 1Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support
  • Recommendation 2Recommendation · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support
  • Conclusion 3Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support
All 67 recommendations and conclusions

Reports

All reports

Evidence

  • 23 oral evidence sessionsLatest 7 June 2021
  • 75 witnesses
All evidence

Recent activity

Recommendations and conclusions 67 shown

Conclusion 1

Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
While we acknowledge that protection against fraud needs to be a key consideration in policy design, hundreds of thousands of individuals are suffering financial hardship through no fault of their own. Either their unfortunate timing in starting a new job, or their employer’s choice of timing in submitting paperwork to HMRC, will have made them ineligible to be furloughed and unable to claim support.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 2

Recommendation · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We urge the Government to find a way to extend eligibility criteria to all new starters, perhaps by further extending the cut-off date to 31 March, or widening access by accepting alternative forms of evidence that can demonstrate an individual’s employment, such as a signed contract of employment.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 3

Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
While the Committee recognises the importance of allocating financial support to those who earn the least, the design of the SEISS means that hundreds of thousands of people are potentially suffering financial hardship because of the arbitrary £50,000 cut-off that has no equivalent in the job retention support scheme. We are not suggesting that the Government rolls out blanket support to all but it cannot be right to have a system where, in one household, a self-employed single-parent earning just above the cap receives nothing while next door, a couple, either both self-employed and earning profits below the cap, or salaried employees with full entitlement to CJRS receive up to £5,000 a month.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 4

Recommendation · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government must tackle the cliff edge that exists in the design of the SEISS by removing the £50,000 cap and allowing those with profits just over this cap access to some financial support, up to the total monthly support cap of £2,500 (as for salaried employees).

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 5

Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government has acknowledged the issue of hundreds of thousands of limited company directors missing out on support but has so far failed to take any action. Many of these individuals, who have a key role to play in firing up the economy again, are facing significant financial hardship.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 6

Recommendation · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government must find a practical solution to supporting hundreds of thousands of limited company directors who are missing out on support because they pay themselves in dividends. IPSE has presented the Treasury with a ready-made solution whereby HMRC would request additional information about the proportion of dividends that have come from company profits and from other sources and require self-certification by the applicant. HMRC would reserve the right to investigate claims and, if it was later found that applicants had inflated their figures, HMRC would reclaim the support with penalties. While we recognise that this approach may require significant resources, we urge the Government to accept and implement this proposal. While it will have immediate cost implications, it could mitigate future economic scarring and safeguard future tax revenues.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 7

Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
It cannot be right that distinct groups of individuals fail to benefit from the Government’s principal support schemes when the shutdown has taken away their livelihoods overnight through no fault of their own.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 8

Recommendation · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We call on the Government to recognise the impact of the coronavirus on PAYE freelance workers and establish a system of support which ensures that this group of people can access financial support during the crisis. We recommend it gives this group access to financial support that equates to 80 per cent of their average monthly income earned in the first 11 months of the 2019–20 tax year, based on their PAYE tax record in year. This support should be available up to a total of £2,500 per month (as for salaried employees).

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 9

Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government needs to quickly find a way of supporting the many people who have started a new business, or built their business up in the last year, but are unable to qualify for support because they cannot fulfil the eligibility criteria required by the SEISS.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 10

Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Committee recognises the challenges of offering support to those who need it while implementing the safeguards required to mitigate the very real risk of fraudulent claims for support. However, we encourage the Government to undertake an urgent review to see how it can extend support to those newly self-employed who are unable to benefit from the SEISS.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 11

Recommendation · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government must amend the CJRS to allow tronc payments made via PAYE to be included when calculating worker’s pay when assessing entitlement.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 12

Conclusion · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
When challenged about gaps in support the Chancellor has often cited the administrative difficulties in addressing issues given the speed with which he has to act. However, he has now extended the schemes and therefore has more time to tackle these complexities.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 13

Recommendation · 2nd Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: Gaps in support · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government must adapt its existing schemes or develop new support mechanisms to help these people if it is to completely fulfil its promise of doing whatever it takes to protect people and businesses from the impact of the pandemic. The Chancellor has indicated that he may, in future, reform the tax arrangements for self-employed people, in part justifying this on the basis of the Government’s fair treatment now of those self-employed people affected by the crisis. Any lack of fairness in these support schemes may undermine this.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 1

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
In the first half of this year the UK suffered its worst recession in modern history. The latest GDP figures suggest a bounce back has begun. But the path of the economy does not only depend on the course of the virus and Government restrictions or lockdowns, but on how the population views the risk from the virus and their job security, and how that in turn impacts on consumer and business confidence. Combatting the virus is an economic as well as a health priority.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 2

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
Consumption is returning following the lifting of Government restrictions. However, continued consumer caution around re-engaging with the economy, the prospect of more localised outbreaks and a second wave are dampening a full recovery to pre- pandemic levels of consumer spending. The Government has to contain the virus as best it can, but at the same time it has to boost consumer confidence and job security without causing the virus to spread—this is a difficult balancing act. The outlook for the economy remains exceptionally uncertain. Some level of economic scarring is now almost certain.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 3

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Chancellor was right to begin stimulating consumption at the time of the Chancellor’s Plan for Jobs, especially in the hospitality and tourism sector, to ensure these businesses, often reliant on summer months, did not start cutting jobs. However the Eat Out to Help Out Scheme has now ended and the continued VAT cut on hospitality and leisure may not be enough to encourage consumers to continue to spend as the threat of the virus continues and they face rising job insecurity. The Chancellor needs to consider whether additional measures to stimulate consumption are warranted at the next fiscal event.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 4

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
We believe the Chancellor was right to start measures to combat long term unemployment in July. Rising unemployment becoming structural and permanent is a critical risk arising from the crisis.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 5

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
As the crisis moves beyond full lock-down, it is important to effectively target assistance to those businesses and individuals who need it. The ability of labour to move from sector to sector will not be a painless process and will be dependent on the growth of sectors matching the shrinkage of sectors. The Government should set out how it will manage the transition to mitigate the crisis and prevent exacerbating further inequalities that undermine the “levelling up” agenda.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 6

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
A large proportion of businesses in sectors such as hospitality and leisure that are suffering most from social distancing may still have a viable long-term future at the end of October. It is not clear to us that the Job Retention Bonus, which all businesses are eligible for, is value for money, given that most of the funds will be spent on workers who would be retained anyway. The Chancellor needs to carefully consider whether a targeted extension of the CJRS and/or other targeted support measures might be required and to explain his conclusion.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 7

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
It is vital that workers made redundant have the opportunity to reskill. We heard evidence that the poor reputation of schemes in the 1980s actually reduced participants’ employment prospects. Even though the Treasury is unlikely to be responsible for delivering vocational or reskilling schemes, given the role of these schemes in reducing long term unemployment, we recommend that the Treasury ensures that their quality and reputation is monitored. We recommend an evaluation of these schemes every six months afterwards to assess whether they genuinely increase job prospects.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 8

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government also needs to make sure that the requirement for employers interested in offering fewer than 30 Kickstart roles to apply through a representative organisation does not make the scheme inaccessible to SMEs and charities.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 9

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The crisis has hit different groups of people unequally. It is also likely that the differences in hours of paid work carried out between men and women observed during the lockdown may lead to a widening of the gender pay gap, especially if the differences in hours worked persist in the months ahead. We recommend that the Treasury publishes an updated version of its distributional analysis in the Plan for Jobs in the next fiscal event, alongside an equality impact analysis of how the recession is impacting different groups (e.g. gender, race, region and socioeconomic status) and the extent to which Government measures are mitigating falls in incomes for those hardest hit. This analysis should also include a breakdown of how unemployment rates of these different groups have been impacted by the crisis.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 10

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government has raised Universal Credit and made it easier to access. However these changes are time-limited for a year. The Government should consider extending the measures increasing the generosity and accessibility of Universal Credit put in place in March 2020. The Government should also conduct a study to examine the adequacy of and eligibility for sick pay, given that poor levels of statutory sick pay will make it harder for workers to isolate when needed.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 11

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
It remains unclear how the Government expects businesses to pay back loans in the future. The crisis and the lockdown of the economy meant that businesses have largely forgone revenue which many are unlikely to make up in the future and revenue is also likely to be suppressed in some sectors for some time.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 12

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We are concerned that there may be a significant lack of capacity and willingness for the private sector to step in to provide solutions for corporate indebtedness especially amongst small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Viable SMEs struggling with debt will prolong the recession and so the Government must develop solutions for ensuring the recapitalising of their balance sheets. The Government must outline a plan for this within the next three months. It should think creatively (as it has around other support measures) and consider a wide range of potential interventions, such as contingent tax liability or student loan type structures in relation to debt for SMEs, where repayments are conditional on them demonstrating appropriate financial health. TheCityUK has already carried out a comprehensive review on the recapitalisation of businesses, which should provide a starting-point for the Treasury’s work.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 13

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Treasury should evaluate whether there needs to be a new state body or a remodelling of the British Business Bank, to provide loans at speed in a crisis if required, and to also play a part in recapitalising businesses including investing strategically in large businesses.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 14

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
One legacy of the crisis will be a sharp rise in the level of public debt and, possibly, an ongoing rise in borrowing. This has been and will be necessary to contain the economic damage from Coronavirus and does not raise immediate debt sustainability concerns. However, it will make the job of stabilising the public finances in the long term more difficult.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 15

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Chancellor should, at the next fiscal event, set out an initial roadmap of how he intends to place Government finances on a sustainable footing. The milestones on that roadmap will need to be flexible—tax increases imposed too early are like to stifle economic recovery. A reassurance that the Government intends to take steps to ensure fiscal sustainability in future will underpin market confidence and reduce uncertainty for households and businesses that may fear immediate tax rises.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 16

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
In order to prevent “levelling up” becoming an empty slogan, the Government should produce a strategy underpinning it that defines clear objectives and includes the indicators it will use to gauge success at the next fiscal event. The Government needs to clarify whether it is planning to close the productivity gap, the income gap, the gap in health outcomes, the gap in educational outcomes or all of these. It also needs to define the strategies it will use to close different imbalances: strategies to close productivity gaps may well be different to those aimed to close income gaps or those gaps in health outcomes.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 17

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome initiatives by the ONS to improve the quality of its regional data, for instance by producing quarterly regional GDP figures. The Treasury publishing regional data in its March Budget is also a good first step towards increasing the profile of regional data. Such data will be vital in the wake of the crisis to assess the impact on different regions and sectors. While the OBR’s and Bank’s remits are primarily national, showing regional variations can enrich users’ understanding of the economy and enable policy makers to better understand the differentiated impact of the coronavirus on various regions and sectors of the UK economy and how best to implement and measure the Government’s “levelling up” strategy.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 18

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Treasury and the OBR should consider raising the profile of regional data in their publications. We also recommend that the Bank of England develop their datasets from their Regional Agents network and Decision Maker panel and endeavour to highlight disparities in regions in their publications. We recommend that the Treasury also review the remits of both the OBR and Bank in the next year to see whether they need changing to reflect the Government’s “levelling up” agenda.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 19

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We call on the Government to throw its diplomatic weight behind the global community in investing in public health systems in developing countries; ensuring that testing, treatment and a vaccine when developed is made as widely available Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery 57 as possible to emerging economies. The Government should also consider increasing the resources available to the International Monetary Fund, should it be needed to maintain countries’ international financing in the event of renewed market turbulence or further waves of the virus.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 20

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
Local authorities are critical in responding to local outbreaks effectively. In the forthcoming Spending Review or budget process, local government spending must not be treated as a residual and must be costed based on the submissions put forward by local authorities.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 21

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should as soon as possible set out in a public document the type of support available to local authorities in the event of a localised lock-down and how it will work with local authorities to support local businesses.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 22

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
It is too simplistic to say that a compulsory lockdown is a trade-off between the people’s health and the economy. The very presence of the virus, and how people respond to it regardless of what the Government mandates, has an economic impact. And lockdowns don’t just affect the economy—they have health implications as well, positive and negative, beyond just combatting coronavirus.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 23

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
When it imposes and removes social restrictions, the Government needs to be as clear as possible that a) there are harms in restrictions and there is a trade-off between these harms and the harms of the virus spreading; and b) how they have made that balance, recognising this is going to be a matter of judgment.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 24

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
It is notable that the synchronisation of the OBR’s analysis and the Government’s announcements appears to have been challenged in the crisis. The OBR scenario analysis undertaken in the Fiscal Sustainability Report did not include the Government’s measures in its Plan for Jobs announced just a week before. This could be because the crisis requires a rapid policy response, which means that it was not always possible to inform the OBR of policy announcements in the normal working timetable.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 25

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We suggest that by the next fiscal event the Treasury clarifies its relationship with the OBR, in particular what the process is for declaring a Treasury announcement to be a fiscal event requiring an OBR economic and fiscal forecast.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 26

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Treasury’s macroeconomic forecasting ability appears to have eroded since the formation of the OBR. The Treasury needs to maintain sufficient forecasting capacity outside the OBR so that it can ensure that it can adapt policy responses rapidly to an urgent situation. In its response to this report, the Treasury should explain in detail its short-term macroeconomic forecasting capabilities, and how macroeconomic forecasting analysis has informed the design, scope and scale of its interventions during the crisis.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 27

Conclusion · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
We are concerned about the implications of the pandemic for insurance, given that businesses will need the confidence that insurance cover provides if they are to resume normal activities.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 28

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Treasury should consider whether Government intervention is required to support the insurance industry in finding a solution for pandemic insurance cover; and whether such support would be an effective use of public money. We also recommend that the Treasury investigates whether it needs to mitigate the risk of insolvencies in the insurance sector, should the Court’s ruling find in favour of policyholders.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 29

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government must be willing to be flexible, even on manifesto commitments, in response to the crisis. Lifting the Triple Lock on pensions next year is a sensible proposal and should be carefully considered.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 30

Recommendation · Eighth Report: Economic impact of coronavirus: the challenges of recovery · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
One of the clear strengths of the Treasury’s response in the initial stages of the crisis has been its willingness to listen and adjust its policies in response to feedback. However, we are disappointed in its refusal to implement recommendations from our first Report and hope that this does not indicate growing intransigence going forward. The continued uncertainty about the virus and the impact on economic recovery means that the Chancellor must show continued flexibility in his measures.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 1

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
Though the structure of the UK economy makes it potentially more vulnerable to the present shock, the Committee notes that comparisons with other countries’ GDP may also be affected by differing measurement methodologies. We therefore caution against over-reliance on the UK’s GDP performance in comparison to other countries, as a measure of the impact of coronavirus on the economy.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 2

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Treasury and the Office for Budget Responsibility provide a commentary at the time of the Budget on GDP measurement issues and the implications that these measurement issues have for comparisons between the UK and other countries.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 3

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
Given the economic outlook, we believe that the Government was right to extend both the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and the Self-employment Income Support Scheme to the end of April 2021. However, given the extended duration of restrictions, we believe the Government was wrong not to address gaps in support.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 4

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The 2019–20 self-assessment income tax returns will provide the Government with additional information that could allow it to provide support to those who need it but have so far not received it. We therefore strongly urge the Treasury to use the data from 2019–20 tax returns to help the newly self-employed who missed out on previous support. In order to ensure that this group is helped as quickly as possible, we recommend that HMRC prioritises work on analysing the 2019–20 tax returns.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 5

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
By conspicuously leaving out a large proportion of limited company directors from support altogether, we are concerned that the Government is sending out the wrong message—that it is not adequately supporting entrepreneurs and employers, who have suffered significantly from a lack of support. However, we recognise that there are administrative difficulties to overcome and fraud risks with the implementation of any scheme.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 6

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
When responding to this report, the Treasury should provide an assessment of the level of fraud which it believes would arise from the implementation of the DISS scheme.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 7

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We question whether the Treasury could do more to investigate how to mitigate the fraud risks inherent in the DISS scheme and similar schemes, and whether the levels of fraud risk merit the Treasury’s position of not providing any support at all. We urge the Treasury to develop measures to support limited company directors and set these out in the Budget.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 8

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
Although we acknowledge the Chancellor’s intention to target the SEISS at those who are most dependent on self-employed income, not all of them would have access to the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, as we pointed out in our first report of this inquiry.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 9

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We believe that the Government should reconsider the 50 per cent limit in the eligibility criteria for the fourth tranche of the SEISS grant so that those who derive less than half of their income through self-employment can receive some level of support.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 10

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
There is a striking inconsistency between the way the Government is treating employees earning more than £50,000 a year and those who are self-employed and have trading profits above £50,000 a year. Whereas those who are employed can receive support from the Government up to a maximum wage amount of £2,500 a month through the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, those who are self-employed receive nothing at all under the Self-employment Income Support Scheme. This is unfair. We believe the Government ought not to disadvantage the self-employed in this way.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 11

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We reiterate our recommendation from our first report in this inquiry that the Government must tackle the cliff edge that exists in the design of the SEISS by removing the £50,000 cap and allowing those with profits just over this cap access to some financial support up to the total monthly support cap of £2,500 (as for salaried employees).

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 12

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Treasury should in its response to this report provide: • the number of people with self-employed income as their main source of income in the 2019–20 financial year; • the proportion of the self-employed who had more than £50,000 trading profits in the 2019–20 financial year; • the median income of those above the £50,000 trading profits threshold in the 2019–20 financial year who earned the majority of their income from self- employment; and • the range of costs of applying the recommendations we have made to the SEISS.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 13

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
The first version of the SEISS scheme had to be rolled out at speed in March

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 14

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We recognise that it may not have been possible for the Government to help all those who have fallen through the cracks of the support schemes. However, we are disappointed that the Government has so far shown no inclination to expand or provide alternatives to the SEISS, which is providing a vital life-line to many but is not available to all those whom we believe should qualify. We recommend Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis 35 that the Government look at other models of support, including those developed by the devolved administrations with a view to extending support to people who require support and who do not currently qualify.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 15

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
We are disappointed at the lack of analysis provided by the Treasury, despite such analysis being referenced in the SAGE minutes. Without it, the impression is that the Government is making important decisions without proper regard to all their impacts, both on health and the economy. The lack of such analysis also prevents the public from understanding in full the basis for, and impact of, the restrictions imposed upon them.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 16

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We call on the Treasury to be more transparent about the economic analysis which it undertakes to inform Government decisions in the fight against coronavirus and to publish any such analysis in a timely manner. The House should not be asked to take a view on proposals which have far-reaching consequences for the general population, such as those involving restrictions on social interaction, education, movement and work, without the support of appropriate and comprehensive economic analysis.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 17

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We agree with the Treasury that epi-macro modelling relies on assumptions which may not be supported by extensive data sets. Nevertheless, we believe it would be a useful exercise for the Treasury to undertake epi-macro modelling to better understand the implications of Government-imposed social restrictions and to evaluate the costs and benefits of such social restrictions.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 18

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Treasury’s analysis has been criticised for not providing modelling of the alternative to lockdowns. There is evidence to suggest that in the absence of lockdown, people would have socially distanced to a large extent through fear of viral transmission and infection. As such, while a lockdown is a significant and costly imposition by Government, that cost when compared to the alternative with voluntary social distancing, may be less than many assume.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 19

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We strongly urge the Treasury to provide rigorous analysis of future policy choices which quantifies the harms and benefits of each of the plausible range of alternative policies. It has always been considered a good practice to publish an impact assessment for every measure that the Government proposes.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 20

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
While death rates from coronavirus are high, the rationale for Government decisions on social restrictions is well understood by the public. As the vaccines roll-out proceeds and death rates fall, Government decisions on whether or not to lift restrictions will become more finely balanced. We believe that economic analysis and modelling is essential to inform those decisions, alongside evidence of the other necessary infrastructure such as test, trace and isolate, and responses to new variants, being comprehensive and in place to mitigate against the need for a further lockdown.

Link to this item · Read this item

Conclusion 21

Conclusion · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Concluded (the committee's words)
After almost a year of restrictions on social and economic activity, the general public and the business sector need confidence that the Government has as clear and as certain a route out of the crisis as possible.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 22

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that in order to provide some certainty to businesses, as well as to the general public, the forthcoming Government plan for taking the country out of lockdown should set out criteria of how and when it will lift restrictions— this could be in terms of the prevalence and R rate of the virus. We recognise that this would be a contingent plan, based on the stages only being activated after milestones are met, with the Government providing the maximum possible certainty. Alongside this plan, the Treasury should also provide the combined economic and epidemiological modelling to support it, and show how it would best optimise health and economic outcomes.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 23

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
It is vital that economists work together with epidemiologists and health experts to make decisions on social restrictions, and that the output of their work should be made public. We propose that the Government use a more multi-disciplinary approach to examine the health and economic costs of social restrictions without delay, and we recommend that the Government should put more information in the public domain as to how economic and health factors have been taken into consideration regarding Government decisions on social restrictions. How the Government made decisions on social restrictions is an area that might be expected to come under further review in any future public inquiry into the Government’s effectiveness in combating coronavirus.

Link to this item · Read this item

Recommendation 24

Recommendation · Eleventh Report - Economic impact of coronavirus: gaps in support and economic analysis · Addressed to HM Treasury

Recommended (the committee's words)
We strongly believe that the Treasury needs to retain greater modelling capacity outside the OBR, so that it can model the implications of different policies. It should also ensure that it has sufficient capacity to modify or use new types of modelling techniques where necessary. We recommend that the Treasury produces a policy document that sets out what its modelling capacity should be and what modelling it should be expected to carry out and publish, independently of the OBR. This is especially important in times of crisis, when the Treasury may rapidly roll out programmes without the benefit of OBR analysis.

Link to this item · Read this item

Reports

3 reports

Oral evidence sessions

23 sessions

On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to read every column. Keyboard users can focus the table region and use the arrow keys.

Date Session and witnesses Source
7 Jun 2021
Oral evidence session
Helen Dickinson OBE · British Retail Consortium, Kate Nicholls · UKHospitality, Mark Tanzer · Association of British Travel Agents 		View ↗
19 Apr 2021
Oral evidence session
Andy Morrison · National Audit Office, Gareth Davies · Department for Transport, Joshua Reddaway · National Audit Office 		View ↗
20 Jan 2021
Oral evidence session
Caroline Miskin · Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Glenn Collins · Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, Ian Mulheirn · Department for Transport, Jonathan Athow · HMRC, Richard Wild · Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT) 		View ↗
14 Dec 2020
Oral evidence session
Amanda Murphy · HSBC, Anne Boden · Starling Bank, David Oldfield · Lloyds Commercial Banking, Paul Thwaite · NatWest Group, Susan Allen · Santander UK 		View ↗
9 Dec 2020
Oral evidence session
Martin Lewis · moneysavingexpert.com, Martin McTague · Federation of Small Businesses, Matthew Upton · Citizens Advice 		View ↗
2 Dec 2020
Oral evidence session
Dr Marianne Sensier · University of Manchester, Karen Ward · JP Morgan Asset Management, Paul Johnson · Institute for Fiscal Studies, Professor Jagjit Chadha · University of Cambridge 		View ↗
21 Oct 2020
Oral evidence session
Dr Anna Valero · LSE, Dr Luke Munford · University of Manchester, Professor David Miles CBE · Office for Budget Responsibility, Professor Gigi Foster · University of New South Wales, Australia, Professor Philip McCann · Sheffield University Management School, Tony Yates · Resolution Foundation 		View ↗
6 Oct 2020
Oral evidence session
Kate Nicholls · UK Hospitality, Paul Nowak · Trades Union Congress, Rain Newton-Smith · Confederation of British Industry, Tej Parikh · Institute of Directors 		View ↗
2 Sep 2020
Oral evidence session
Alex Brazier · Financial Stability Strategy and Risk, Andrew Bailey · Bank of England, Dame Colette Bowe · Financial Policy Committee, Bank of England, Dave Ramsden · Bank of England, Dr Gertjan Vlieghe · Bank of England 		View ↗
15 Jul 2020
Oral evidence session
Dan York-Smith · HM Treasury, Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP · HM Treasury 		View ↗
8 Jul 2020
Oral evidence session
Bridget Rosewell CBE · National Infrastructure Commission, Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court · HM Treasury, Professor Hamish Low · University of Oxford 		View ↗
1 Jul 2020
Oral evidence session
Gita Gopinath · IMF, Laurence Boone · OECD 		View ↗
17 Jun 2020
Oral evidence session
Adam Marshall · British Chambers of Commerce, Jon Moulton · finnCap, The Lord O'Neill of Gatley 		View ↗
9 Jun 2020
Oral evidence session
Giles Wilkes · Institute for Government, Paul Johnson · Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Torsten Bell · Resolution Foundation 		View ↗
3 Jun 2020
Oral evidence session
Rt Hon. George Osborne, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon. Philip Hammond, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon. the Lord Darling of Roulanish, former Chancellor of the Exchequer 		View ↗
20 May 2020
Former Chancellor of the Exchequers - Corona Response
Andrew Bailey · Bank of England, Ben Broadbent · Bank of England, Elisabeth Stheeman · Financial Policy Committee, Jonathan Haskel · Monetary Policy Committee, Sir Jon Cunliffe · Bank of England 		View ↗
15 May 2020
Economic impact of coronavirus
Adam Posen · Peterson Institute for International Economics, Jagjit Chadha · National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), Joshua Ryan-Collins · Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (University College London), Karen Ward · JP Morgan Asset Management, Professor Philip Booth · Institute of Economic Affairs 		View ↗
4 May 2020
Economic impact of coronavirus
Amanda Murphy · HSBC, Anne Boden · Starling Bank, David Oldfield · Lloyds Commercial Banking, Matt Hammerstein · Barclays UK, Paul Thwaite · NatWest Group 		View ↗
29 Apr 2020
Economic impact of coronavirus
Beth Russell · Her Majesty's Treasury, Katharine Braddick · HM Treasury, Rt Hon Stephen Barclay MP · HM Treasury 		View ↗
21 Apr 2020
Economic impact of coronavirus
Andy Chamberlain · IPSE (Association of Independent Professionals & the Self-Employed), Dr Gerard Lyons · Policy Exchange, Ian Mulheirn · Department for Transport, Kate Nicholls · UK Hospitality 		View ↗
15 Apr 2020
Economic impact of coronavirus
Christopher Woolard · Financial Conduct Authority, Sam Woods · Prudential Regulation Authority, Sarah Breeden · Bank of England, Stephen Haddrill · Finance & Leasing Association (FLA), Stephen Jones · UK Finance 		View ↗
8 Apr 2020
Treasury Committee
Cerys McDonald · HM Revenue and Customs, Jim Harra · HMRC 		View ↗
31 Mar 2020
Economic impact of coronavirus
Rain Newton-Smith · Confederation of British Industry 		View ↗

Who gave evidence

75 witnesses

On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to read every column. Keyboard users can focus the table region and use the arrow keys.

WitnessOrganisationSessions
Amanda Murphy · Head of Commercial Banking, UK HSBC 2
Andrew Bailey · Governor Bank of England 2
Anne Boden · Founder and Chief Executive Starling Bank 2
David Oldfield · Chief Executive Lloyds Commercial Banking 2
Ian Mulheirn · Chief Analyst Department for Transport 2
Karen Ward · Managing Director, Chief Market Strategist for EMEA JP Morgan Asset Management 2
Kate Nicholls · Chief Executive UK Hospitality 2
Paul Thwaite · CEO NatWest Group 2
Rain Newton-Smith · Chief Economist Confederation of British Industry 2
Adam Marshall · Director General British Chambers of Commerce 1
Adam Posen · President Peterson Institute for International Economics 1
Alex Brazier · Executive Director Financial Stability Strategy and Risk 1
Andy Chamberlain · Director of Policy IPSE (Association of Independent Professionals & the Self-Employed) 1
Andy Morrison · Director, HMRC National Audit Office 1
Ben Broadbent · Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy Bank of England 1
Beth Russell · Director General, Tax and Welfare Her Majesty's Treasury 1
Bridget Rosewell CBE · Commissioner National Infrastructure Commission 1
Caroline Miskin · Tax Practitioner Support and Private Clients Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 1
Cerys McDonald · Director of Individuals Policy HM Revenue and Customs 1
Christopher Woolard · Interim CEO Financial Conduct Authority 1
Dame Colette Bowe · External Member Financial Policy Committee, Bank of England 1
Dan York-Smith · Director General, Tax and Welfare HM Treasury 1
Dave Ramsden · Deputy Governor Bank of England 1
Dr Anna Valero · Distinguished Policy Fellow and Growth Programme Director, Centre for Economic Performance LSE 1
Dr Gerard Lyons · Senior Fellow Policy Exchange 1
Dr Gertjan Vlieghe · External Member, Monetary Policy Committee Bank of England 1
Dr Luke Munford · Lecturer in Health Economics University of Manchester 1
Dr Marianne Sensier · Research Fellow University of Manchester 1
Elisabeth Stheeman · External Member Financial Policy Committee 1
Gareth Davies · Second Permanent Secretary Department for Transport 1
Giles Wilkes · Senior Fellow Institute for Government 1
Gita Gopinath · Chief Economist and Economic Counsellor and Director of Research Department IMF 1
Glenn Collins · Head of Technical Advisory and Policy Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 1
Helen Dickinson OBE · Chief Executive Officer British Retail Consortium 1
Jagjit Chadha · Director National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 1
Jim Harra · Permanent Secretary and Chief Executive HMRC 1
Jon Moulton · Chair finnCap 1
Jonathan Athow · Director General for Customer Strategy and Tax Design HMRC 1
Jonathan Haskel · External Member Monetary Policy Committee 1
Joshua Reddaway · Director National Audit Office 1
Joshua Ryan-Collins · Senior Research Fellow in Economics and Finance Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (University College London) 1
Kate Nicholls · Chief Executive UKHospitality 1
Katharine Braddick · Director General for Financial Services HM Treasury 1
Laurence Boone · Chief Economist and G20 Finance Deputy OECD 1
Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court · former Permanent Secretary HM Treasury 1
Mark Tanzer · Chief Executive Association of British Travel Agents 1
Martin Lewis · Broadcaster and Founder moneysavingexpert.com 1
Martin McTague · National Vice Chair Federation of Small Businesses 1
Matt Hammerstein · CEO Barclays UK 1
Matthew Upton · Director of Policy Citizens Advice 1
Paul Johnson · Director Institute for Fiscal Studies 1
Paul Johnson · Director Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 1
Paul Nowak · Deputy General Secretary Trades Union Congress 1
Professor David Miles CBE · Member, Budget Responsibility Committee Office for Budget Responsibility 1
Professor Gigi Foster · Director of Education University of New South Wales, Australia 1
Professor Hamish Low · Professor of Economics University of Oxford 1
Professor Jagjit Chadha · Professor of Economics University of Cambridge 1
Professor Philip Booth · Senior Academic Fellow Institute of Economic Affairs 1
Professor Philip McCann · Chair in Urban and Regional Economics Sheffield University Management School 1
Richard Wild · Head of Tax Technical Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT) 1
Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP · Chancellor of the Exchequer HM Treasury 1
Rt Hon Stephen Barclay MP · Chief Secretary to the Treasury HM Treasury 1
Rt Hon. George Osborne, former Chancellor of the Exchequer Not recorded 1
Rt Hon. Philip Hammond, former Chancellor of the Exchequer Not recorded 1
Rt Hon. the Lord Darling of Roulanish, former Chancellor of the Exchequer Not recorded 1
Sam Woods · CEO Prudential Regulation Authority 1
Sarah Breeden · Deputy Governor for Financial Stability Bank of England 1
Sir Jon Cunliffe · Deputy Governor for Financial Stability Bank of England 1
Stephen Haddrill · Director General Finance & Leasing Association (FLA) 1
Stephen Jones · CEO UK Finance 1
Susan Allen · CEO of Retail and Business Banking Santander UK 1
Tej Parikh · Chief Economist Institute of Directors 1
The Lord O'Neill of Gatley Not recorded 1
Tony Yates · Macroeconomic Policy Unit Research Associate Resolution Foundation 1
Torsten Bell · Chief Executive Resolution Foundation 1

Correspondence

51 letters

On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to read every column. Keyboard users can focus the table region and use the arrow keys.

PublishedDirectionLetter
14 Apr 2021 Not recorded Correspondence from the Chief Secretary to HM Treasury, relating to procurement during the pandemic
17 Feb 2021 To committee Letter from the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), relating to gaps in support, dated 3 February 2021
10 Feb 2021 From committee Letter to Chair from Jonathan Athow, Office for National Statistics, regarding the comparability of GDP figures between countries, dated 1 February 2021
8 Feb 2021 From committee Letter to Chair from Caroline Miskin, Technical Manager (Practitioner Support), ICAEW Tax Faculty, following up from oral evidence, dated 22 January 2021
3 Feb 2021 To committee Response from Tom Scholar to Chair regarding economic analysis and gaps in support, dated 26 January 2021
3 Feb 2021 To committee Letter from Chair to Tom Scholar regarding economic analysis and gaps in support, dated 11 January 2021
21 Oct 2020 To committee Letter from the Chancellor relating to the expansion of the Job Support Scheme, dated 9 October 2020
16 Sep 2020 To committee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer relating to follow-up from the evidence session on 15 July, dated 13 August 2020
4 Sep 2020 To committee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer re Committee session on 15 July 2020
1 Sep 2020 To committee Letter from the Office for National Statistics regarding the economic impact of coronavirus, 28 April 2020
23 Jul 2020 Not recorded Correspondence from Steve Baker MP to the Chancellor following the Committee’s evidence session, dated 21 July 2020
21 Jul 2020 To committee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer re local lockdown in Leicester, dated 15 July 2020
15 Jul 2020 Not recorded Correspondence from Chancellor relating to responses to correspondence from MPs, dated 6 July 2020
15 Jul 2020 Not recorded Correspondence from Chancellor relating to changes to Stamp Duty Land Tax, dated 7 July 2020
9 Jul 2020 To committee Letter from the Prime Minister to Chair relating to COVID-19, dated 16 June 2020
9 Jul 2020 To committee Letter from Governor of the Bank of England relating to the Treasury Committee oral evidence session on 20 May, dated 29 June 2020
8 Jul 2020 Not recorded Chancellor Response regarding COVID19 tests by employers
7 Jul 2020 To committee Letter from Jon Moulton to Chair relating to Future Fund, dated 22 June 2020
7 Jul 2020 To committee Letter from Chair of TSC to Chancellor re COVID-19 tests by employers- taxable benefit in kind
1 Jul 2020 To committee Letter from Chair to Chancellor regarding local lockdowns, dated 1 July 2020
30 Jun 2020 To committee Letter from Chair of TSC to Governor relating to TSC oral evidence session on 20 May 2020, dated 10 June 2020
15 Jun 2020 To committee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer relating to Covid Lending Data, dated 5 June
10 Jun 2020 To committee Letter from HM Treasury following the Treasury Committee evidence session on 29 April, dated 22 May 2020
9 Jun 2020 Not recorded Correspondence from Jim Harra to the Chair re the number of people who had self-employed income
20 May 2020 Not recorded FCA response to Covid-19 Inquiry phase 1 follow-up questions, dated 12 May 2020
20 May 2020 To committee Letter from Chief Executive of Barclays UK relating to Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLS) website, dated 12 May 2020
20 May 2020 Not recorded Additional information received from HMRC, 14 May 2020, following the committee hearing with Jim Harra (HMRC Permanent Secretary and CEO) on 8 April 2020 about coronavirus support schemes and the impacts on HMRC
5 May 2020 To committee Letter from the British Business Bank regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 To committee Letter from the Chancellor regarding COVID-19 lending data
5 May 2020 Not recorded Jim Harra, Chief Executive and First Permanent Secretary, HMRC, to the Chair, relating to Independent Review of analytical and quality assurance processes underpinning HMRC’s Official Statistics
5 May 2020 Not recorded Financial Secretary to the Treasury, HM, Treasury, to the Chair, relating to the Independent Loan Charge Review
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Bank of Ireland UK regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from RBS regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 Not recorded Email to Committee from the Coventry and Warwickshire Reinvestment Trust regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from HSBC regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Cynergy Bank regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Secure Trust Bank regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Santander regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 Not recorded Email to Committee from Newable Limited regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Starling Bank regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Funding Circle regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Virgin Money regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Responsible Finance regarding bank lending data
5 May 2020 To committee Letter from Chair to Stephen Jones, CEO, UK Finance, relating to data on lending through the various government loan guarantee schemes, dated 30 April
5 May 2020 To committee Letter from Stephen Jones, CEO, UK Finance to the Chair, relating to data on lending through the various government loan guarantee schemes, dated 23 April
4 May 2020 From committee Letter to Chair from Metro Bank regarding bank lending data
30 Apr 2020 Not recorded Further summary of evidence to the Economic impact of Coronavirus inquiry
30 Apr 2020 Not recorded Chair to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, relating to issues raised in written evidence to the Committee, dated 8 April 2020
30 Apr 2020 To committee Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, relating to the creation of the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme, dated 3 April 2020
30 Apr 2020 To committee Letter from Chancellor of the Exchequer, relating to COVID-19 interventions, dated 6 April 2020
30 Apr 2020 To committee Letter from the Financial Secretary relating to the delay of the reform to the off-payroll working rules, dated 18 March 2020