Harmful Algorithmic Content Promotion
Harmful content promoted by online platform recommendation systems, requiring government assessment and action.
Source spread
Where this theme appears
This theme appears across 7 independent accountability sources, so the source mix matters as much as the headline total.
7 inquiry recs
22 PFD reports
241 committee recs
7 DHR recs
3 LGO/SPSO decisions
1 Law Commission project
Browse by source
Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Inquiry recommendations(7)
SP21 — School monitoring and filtering systems guidance
Recommendation: The Department for Education should review and strengthen its guidance to schools on monitoring and filtering systems, including ensuring that the systems used are appropriate and adequate from a technical perspective. The department should ensure schools understand these requirements and …
Gov response: The Department for Education (DfE) is the lead department and expects to complete implementation of this recommendation in mid-2027. Progress and next steps: - DfE has proposed an update to Keeping Children Safe in Education …
Accepted
SP33 — CT Policing online activity analysis capability
Recommendation: Counter Terrorism Policing’s capability to access and analyse data relating to a referred person’s online activity should be reviewed in the context of Prevent referrals, to determine whether staff have the technical tools required to undertake this assessment. The Home …
Gov response: The Home Office and CTP are working together to deliver this recommendation. Progress to date: - The Prevent National Referral Form was updated in 2024 to include a request to provide the individual's social media …
Accepted
SP24 — VPN age verification
Recommendation: Phase 2 should consider age verification for the use of Virtual Private Network (VPN) software and other options to avoid VPNs being used to circumvent the age-related protections in the Online Safety Act 2023.
For a later phase of the inquiry
SP22 — LCC online harms risk assessment review
Recommendation: Lancashire County Council should undertake a comprehensive review of how its children’s services and Early Help teams (i.e. Children and Family Wellbeing Service) assess and manage risk and online harms to children. This review should ensure that all frontline staff …
Gov response: The Department for Education (DfE) is taking responsibility for this recommendation in place of the Department for Health and Social Care and expects to complete implementation of this recommendation by mid-2026. Progress and next steps: …
Accepted
SP12 — Detection of concerning online behaviour
Recommendation: Phase 2 should consider systems to detect and report concerning online behaviour and suspicious combinations of purchases. This should include consideration of: 1. Concerning patterns of online browsing and purchasing (e.g. change of names and addresses, use of Virtual Private …
Gov response: The Chair has rightly stated that the acquisition of weapons and poisons is a complex topic, with a range of interested stakeholder groups that could not be consulted within the terms of Phase 1. The …
Noted
SP3 — Internet access restrictions for high-risk children
Recommendation: Phase 2 should consider whether there should be a further ability to restrict or monitor access to the internet on the part of children and young people, if a significant threshold is passed concerning the risk they pose to others.
For a later phase of the inquiry
SP32 — Prevent training on online activity assessment
Recommendation: While training for Counter Terrorism Policing, staff involved in Prevent currently cover the importance of understanding a referred individual’s online activity and the practical steps required to assess it, the Home Office and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review and …
Gov response: The Home Office and Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) are working together to deliver this recommendation. Progress to date: - CTP are quality assuring and reviewing existing CTP mandatory training programmes that relate to Prevent delivery …
Accepted
Prevention of Future Deaths reports(22)
Karnel Haughton
Concerns: Concerns were raised about the open accessibility of uncensored online videos depicting dangerous 'choking game' activities without warnings. The coroner also identified a lack of national guidance for schools and youth groups, and no dedicated support for parents regarding these online challenges.
Overdue
Ben Walmsley
Concerns: The coroner identified a lack of a mechanism to notify schools when pupils attempted to access blocked content related to self-harm on school computers. Concerns were also raised about whether enhanced monitoring functionality is mandatory for all schools.
Overdue
Bradley Trevarthen
Concerns: The coroner raised concerns regarding the extensive availability of self-harm and suicide-related content online for young people, noting that this material risks normalising such actions and goes beyond appropriate freedom of expression.
Response (Department for Digital Culture Media Sport): • The government published its Online Harms White Paper, outlining plans for legislation to establish a statutory duty of care for online companies. • The Department for Education has made … (AI summary)
Responded
Callie Lewis
Concerns: The coroner identified concerns regarding an online suicide forum that provided advice on misleading mental health professionals and perfecting methods of taking one's life.
Response (DCMS): • The government published the Online Harms White Paper in April 2019, outlining plans for legislation to establish a duty of care for online companies. • A working group of … (AI summary)
Responded
Jerrelle McKenzie
Concerns: The coroner noted the deceased consumed Dinitrophenol (DNP), a drug banned since 1938, which was likely accessed via the internet due to social media influence for body image improvement.
Overdue
Joseph Nihill
Concerns: The coroner identified concerns regarding websites that promote methods of suicide to vulnerable individuals, potentially undermining treatment and legitimising self-harm. There were also concerns about the availability and promotion of lethal substances for ending one's life.
Overdue
Berenice Bell
Concerns: Concerns were raised regarding the availability of various resources providing information and assistance related to suicide, which were accessed by the deceased and other individuals prior to their deaths.
Response (Dept for Digital Culture Media Sport): • The department sponsored a Law Commission review of harmful online communications and asked it to examine how criminal law addresses encouragement or assistance of self-harm. • The government is … (AI summary)
Overdue
Frances Thomas
Concerns: The coroner raised concerns that Department of Education e-security guidelines for schools are outdated and insufficiently robust, lacking regulatory oversight on web filtering software and appropriate blocklists. There is also no consideration in the guidance for advanced monitoring systems to detect age-inappropriate content.
Response (Department for Education): • The Department for Education stated it had significantly strengthened online safety provisions within its Keeping Children Safe in Education (KCSIE) statutory guidance, particularly in 2021. • The department launched … (AI summary)
Responded
James Forryan
Concerns: The coroner raised concerns about the easy accessibility of websites and forums that openly promote suicide methods, noting insufficient regulation and enforcement action against such platforms.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): • The Government confirmed that the Online Safety Bill will require in-scope companies to remove illegal content, including that which encourages or incites suicide, and will list encouraging or assisting … (AI summary)
Responded
Molly Russell
Concerns: The coroner noted a lack of age verification and age-specific content on online platforms, along with no separation between adult and child parts of platforms. Concerns were also raised about algorithms providing content and adverts, and the absence of parental control or access to material viewed by children.
Response (Twitter International Unlimited Company): • Twitter automatically restricts users under 18 from viewing sensitive media content and prohibits advertising of certain products to minors. • Twitter provides a 'Safe Search' mode, automatically enabled for … (AI summary)
Response (META): • Meta has implemented a tailored experience for teenagers, including defaulting under-18s to private accounts and restricting sensitive content options. • Meta employs a multi-layered approach to age verification, which … (AI summary)
Response (Snap): • Snap introduced Family Centre, an in-app tool providing parents with insight into their teen's friends and recent communications. • Snap added suicide and self-harm as a dedicated category in … (AI summary)
Response (Pinterest): • Pinterest committed to developing and testing automated signals to further limit the distribution of depressive content to teens. • Pinterest updated its self-harm policy to remove references to self-harm … (AI summary)
Response (Department for Digital Culture Media Sport): • The government introduced the Online Safety Bill to Parliament on 17 March to establish an independent regulator and protections for children online. • The government announced new offences to … (AI summary)
Overdue
Luke Ashton
Concerns: The coroner notes inadequate player protection tools for problem gamblers, which lack meaningful interaction or intervention. Additionally, Betfair's algorithm failed to flag a problem gambler despite escalating activity, due to averaging practices among customers and the operator's reliance on regulatory standards over best practice.
Response (Department for Culture Media and Sport): • The Gambling Commission implemented new customer interaction requirements in September 2022 and February 2023, mandating consistency in harm detection algorithms and specifying indicators of harm. • New guidance was … (AI summary)
Response (Flutter): • Flutter introduced mandatory net deposit limits for customers returning from self-exclusion and for customers under the age of 25. • Flutter implemented financial vulnerability checks using a credit reference … (AI summary)
Response (Gambling Commission): • The Gambling Commission implemented strengthened customer interaction requirements for remote operators in September 2022 and February 2023, which mandate monitoring of specific indicators of harm. • The Commission placed … (AI summary)
Overdue
Bronwen Morgan
Concerns: The coroner identified concerns regarding the accessibility of websites that facilitate or promote self-harm and suicide, providing vulnerable individuals with information and means. Consideration should be given to actions to remove, limit, or mitigate such access.
Response (Welsh Government): The Welsh Government plans to engage with Ofcom's consultations on the Online Safety Act and raise awareness of the new legislation. They are also developing a new Suicide and Self-harm … (AI summary)
Response (Ofcom): Ofcom is implementing the Online Safety Act 2023 to make online services legally responsible for user safety, including tackling harmful suicide content. This involves a multi-phase roadmap of consultations, developing … (AI summary)
Responded
Chloe Macdermott
Concerns: The coroner identified an online forum that encourages suicide, shares methods, and lacks age restrictions, content moderation, and prevention signposting. Further concerns related to the unregulated online availability and delivery of a specific product to the UK.
Response (Amazon UK): • Amazon's UK Store prohibits the sale of high concentration sodium nitrate and sodium nitrite mixtures/substances, in accordance with the UK Poisons Act 1972. • Since October 2022, Amazon has … (AI summary)
Response (British Transport Police): • The NPCC Suicide Prevention Steering Group has raised awareness and informed responses across policing regarding the use of Sodium Nitrate and Nitrite, and supported a National Crime Agency investigation … (AI summary)
Response (Ofcom): • Ofcom has published a consultation on protecting people from illegal harms online, including draft Codes of Practice and guidance for identifying illegal suicide and self-harm content. • Ofcom has … (AI summary)
Response (Google UK & Ireland): • Google Search applies algorithms to demote low-quality pro-suicide forums in search results and promotes authoritative resources. • Google Search has implemented 'OneBoxes' with Samaritans to provide prominent access to … (AI summary)
Response (DSIT): • The Online Safety Act has received Royal Assent, establishing a regulatory framework for online safety. • The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is working with Ofcom to implement … (AI summary)
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): • The Department leads a cross-government and cross-sector group that has identified over 30 live actions to tackle emerging methods of suicide, including reducing access to methods and online content. … (AI summary)
Overdue
Kimberley Liu
Concerns: Unregulated websites are selling prescription-only medications without requiring prescriptions, enabling repeat orders, and potentially exploiting vulnerable individuals with addictions. There is also concern these sites could provide means for self-harm.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): • The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) operates a Criminal Enforcement Unit to monitor online channels, investigate illegal activity, and remove illegally trading websites. • The Online Safety … (AI summary)
Responded
Adrian Gallagher
Concerns: The coroner identified concerns regarding an online guide providing step-by-step instructions on how to end one's life, including methods to avoid coroner referral, and the availability of associated drugs. The guide has minimal age and ID checks before purchase, making it accessible to vulnerable individuals, despite being banned in some countries.
Response (National Crime Agency): • The National Crime Agency has engaged with Ofcom to scope out how they can work together to combat illegal suicide content online. (AI summary)
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Techonology): • The Online Safety Act, which received Royal Assent in October last year, will require in-scope user-to-user services to prevent exposure to illegal suicide and self-harm content once its duties … (AI summary)
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): • Officials are continuing to engage with police and suicide prevention charities to revisit discussions with online marketplaces concerning harmful publications. • A cross-sector, cross-government working group has implemented over … (AI summary)
Responded
Deborah Cooper
Concerns: The coroner expressed concern about the free availability and marketing on Amazon.co.uk of books providing clear instructions on how an individual might end their life, noting the lack of regulation for such publications.
Response (Amazon): • Amazon reviewed the books referenced in the report against its content guidelines. • Amazon decided not to remove the books from sale. • Amazon displays a banner on relevant … (AI summary)
Response (Department for Business and Trade): • The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 received Royal Assent in May 2024. (AI summary)
Responded
Isabella Shere
Concerns: The coroner identified concerns regarding Quora's hosting of sensitive content accessible to children without age verification. The platform also has features that encourage consumption of such material and insufficient content monitoring against its own policies.
Response (Ofcom): • Ofcom has published consultations and draft Codes of Practice for illegal harms and the protection of children under the Online Safety Act 2023. • Ofcom plans to publish final … (AI summary)
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Technology): • The Online Safety Act received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023, establishing duties on tech companies to protect users, particularly children, from harmful online content. • The Act introduced … (AI summary)
Overdue
Bethany Langton
Concerns: Unchecked online availability of lethal Sodium Nitrite, a lack of awareness among suppliers about its misuse, and the presence of online guidance on its use for suicide without adequate removal systems.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): • The Department of Health and Social Care leads an emerging methods working group to reduce public access to substances such as Sodium Nitrite. • The working group has collaborated … (AI summary)
Overdue
Miranda Avanzi
Concerns: The coroner raises concerns about the ready availability of detailed online guides providing instructions for individuals to end their lives, noting that these are easily accessible through search engines and often lack age verification.
Response (DSIT): • The Online Safety Act 2023, which gained Royal Assent in October 2023, includes provisions to address illegal and legal forms of online suicide content. • The Act introduces duties … (AI summary)
Response (Ofcom): • Ofcom will enforce the duties under the Online Safety Act 2023, which become enforceable from March 2025 for illegal harms and July 2025 for children's safety. • Ofcom will … (AI summary)
Responded
Rhiannon Williams
Concerns: The coroner expressed concern about the risk to life posed by online suicide forums and social media platforms that provide information on how to take one's own life and advice on misleading others.
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Technology): • The Online Safety Act's illegal safety duties came into force on 17 March 2025, requiring in-scope services to prevent users from encountering priority illegal content. • Ofcom launched an … (AI summary)
Response (Ofcom): • Ofcom opened an investigation on 9 April 2025 into a specific suicide forum to examine its compliance with duties under the Online Safety Act 2023. • Ofcom stated it … (AI summary)
Responded
Oliver Gorman
Concerns: The coroner identified a lack of age restrictions and inadequate warnings on certain butane/propane aerosol products, alongside concerns about social media platforms' responsibility for harmful content and the appropriateness of their age restrictions.
Response (Product Safety Standards): • Businesses have been working with a charity and trade association since 2024 to design a new warning label for aerosol products. • The British Aerosol Manufacturers Association (BAMA) is … (AI summary)
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Technology): • The Online Safety Act (OSA) has been enacted, with illegal content and child safety duties now in force for regulated services. • Under the OSA, services must protect children … (AI summary)
Response (British Aerosol Manufacturers Association): • BAMA has promoted voluntary caution marks on aerosol products since the late 1990s, recently updating its advice to propose a new mark and statement, "Intentional misuse can kill instantly. … (AI summary)
Responded
Oliver Long
Concerns: The GamStop self-exclusion scheme does not cover unlicenced overseas gambling sites, meaning at-risk individuals are not protected. There is also insufficient public health information and warnings about the risks posed by these unregulated sites.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): • The Department of Health and Social Care acknowledged receipt of the Regulation 28 Report. • The Department of Health and Social Care is actively contributing to a single cross-agency … (AI summary)
Response (Department for Education): • The Department for Education concluded that responsibility for the matters raised lies outside its departmental remit. • The Department for Education indicated that other organisations identified in the report … (AI summary)
Response (Gambling Commission): • The Commission stated it does not possess statutory powers to design or deliver public health information campaigns. • The Commission indicated it would consult on requirements for licensed gambling … (AI summary)
Response (Department of Culture Media and Sport): • The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) launched the Illegal Gambling Taskforce in January 2026 and committed to providing the Gambling Commission with an additional £26 million to … (AI summary)
Responded
Select committee recommendations(241)— showing 50 strongest matches
#27 —
Recommendation: The growth of misinformation and disinformation is an unwelcome development in an uncertain world. Coupled with the rise of AI and algorithms that disproportionately reward engagement, it has real-world consequences eroding social cohesion and inciting disorder, as we have seen …
#24 —
Recommendation: The Government should work with industry at pace to scale existing mitigations in the areas of cyber security ( including systems vulnerable to voice cloning), child sexual abuse material, counter-terror, and counter-disinformation. It should set out progress and future plans …
Response attribution not verified
#24 —
Recommendation: We recommend that Ofcom should explore how to ensure information on climate change and energy transition from trusted sources is prominent and easy to find on social media platforms, specifically on how authoritative information might be given greater prominence within …
#23 —
Recommendation: In response to this Report, the Government should set out its assessment of the merits of granting Ofcom further legislative powers and resources to more effectively regulate misleading information online regarding the energy transition, especially on the “credibility laundering” of …
#22 —
Recommendation: While we recognise that the current remit of Ofcom may not allow it to intervene in matters of climate misinformation raised during this inquiry, we are concerned that exposure to misinformation online and broadcast narratives can erode overall confidence if …
#4 —
Recommendation: The government must implement in full the remaining recommendations of our response to its consultation on Growing up in the Online World as a first step to tackling the harmful effects of screen time on children. In particular, it must …
Response status not verified
#16 —
Recommendation: The Committee recommends that the Government introduces a statutory ban on the use of social media platforms for children under the age of 16. It is time to apply the brakes and prioritise children’s safety. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)
Response status not verified
#15 —
Recommendation: There is a compelling case for an outright statutory ban on social media access for under-16s in order to reset the relationship children and families have with digital devices and social media, and to arrest the current harm. The evidence …
Response status not verified
#14 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government uses the powers available to it to impose clear, enforceable duties on platforms to prioritise child safety by design, backed by meaningful sanctions for non-compliance. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28) 17 The case for restricting social media …
Response status not verified
#2 —
Recommendation: These harms are not accidental or isolated, but occur because of platform design choices, including algorithmic recommendation systems, infinite scrolling, autoplay and private messaging features, which repeatedly expose children to harmful or exploitative content at a scale which reactive moderation …
Response status not verified
#29 — Criminalise use of nudification apps as synthetic NCII and hold platforms accountable.
Recommendation: There is no legitimate reason whatsoever for the use or existence of nudification apps. The Government should ensure that the use of such an app is considered creation of synthetic NCII and therefore also a criminal offence and Ofcom should …
Response attribution not verified
#28 — Require tech companies to cleanse datasets of NCII and source data responsibly.
Recommendation: The private sector has innovated to create AI technology. It does not need to wait for legislation to catch up in order to safeguard individuals from harmful AI-generated content. As a starting point tech companies involved in AI content creation …
Response attribution not verified
#27 — Mandate consent-based offence for deepfake creation, including cultural intimate image abuse.
Recommendation: The Government’s plans to criminalise the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes/NCII, even if they are not shared, are very welcome and worthy of praise. However, the Government must ensure that the offence is consent- based and does not require the …
Response attribution not verified
#26 — Ofcom's proposals should require companies to accept non-consensual intimate image hash matching.
Recommendation: It is clear that some companies require further persuasion to accept NCII hashes. We welcome Ofcom’s plans to launch a consultation in spring 2025 on expansions to its Codes of Practice that would include proposals on the use of hash …
Response attribution not verified
#25 — Accept StopNCII.org hash matching technology as a matter of priority.
Recommendation: Google should accept the StopNCII.org hash matching technology as a matter of priority. (Recommendation, Paragraph 125)
Response attribution not verified
#32 — Google's monetisation of misinformation highlights systemic failures within the digital advertising industry.
Recommendation: In particular, we were concerned by evidence that Google may have helped to monetise misinformation relating to the attacks, contributing to the violence. This is unacceptable, and is just one example of a much wider problem with the digital advertising …
Response attribution not verified
#31 — Under-regulated digital advertising market incentivises and monetises harmful content, often without advertisers' knowledge.
Recommendation: The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and …
Response attribution not verified
#30 — Social media algorithms fail to differentiate harmful from harmless content, spreading misinformation.
Recommendation: Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which …
Response attribution not verified
#29 — Mandate generative AI platforms to automatically label AI-generated media with metadata and watermarks.
Recommendation: To effectively tackle amplified misinformation as per Principle 1, the government should work with relevant experts and platforms to develop technology that automatically detects AI-generated media, meeting mis/ disinformation at its source. It should mandate all generative AI platforms, and …
Response attribution not verified
#27 — Pass legislation requiring generative AI platforms to conduct risk assessments and implement user safeguards.
Recommendation: To protect citizens from the AI-exacerbated spread of misinformation and harm, the government should pass legislation that covers generative AI platforms, bringing them in line with other online services that pose a high risk of producing or spreading illegal or …
Response attribution not verified
#25 — Online Safety Act fails to protect users from synthetic disinformation and harmful experimental features.
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed …
Response attribution not verified
#22 — Collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and their online spreading techniques.
Recommendation: Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of …
Response attribution not verified
#21 — Create an additional regulatory category for 'small but risky' platforms, based on their online harms.
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act does not do enough to address the risks posed by small platforms due to its exclusive focus on size. Ofcom should create an additional category to cover ‘small but risky’ platforms, based on analysis of the …
Response attribution not verified
#19 — Introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments on harmful misinformation.
Recommendation: In line with Principle 5, transparency, the government should introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments and reporting requirements on legal but harmful content, such as potentially harmful misinformation, with a focus on the role of recommendation algorithms in …
Response attribution not verified
#18 — Submit annual report to Parliament on the state of online misinformation trends.
Recommendation: The broad scale—and serious impact—of misinformation online requires greater transparency and accountability from the government. In line with our Principle 1, the government should submit an annual report to Parliament on the state of misinformation online, tracking trends and issues …
Response attribution not verified
#17 — Online Safety Act measures are insufficient to address algorithmic misinformation spread effectively.
Recommendation: It is vital that platforms are held responsible for the algorithmic spread of misleading or deceptive content that can radicalise and harm users. The few measures in the Act that address misinformation fall short. The False Communications offence is vaguely …
Response attribution not verified
#16 — Online Safety Act scope insufficient for 'legal but harmful' content and misinformation.
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act will lead to some improvements, but is designed only to protect users from harm that is illegal or affects children. The decision not to include measures related to the algorithmic amplification of “legal but harmful” content, …
Response attribution not verified
#15 — Commission independent research into effective methods for platforms to address misinformation.
Recommendation: In line with our Principle 1 of tackling amplified misinformation, the government should compel platforms to put in place minimum standards for addressing the spread of misleading content online. More information is needed on the merits of different approaches to …
Response attribution not verified
#14 — Concerns regarding disjointed platform approaches and weakened content moderation policies.
Recommendation: We are concerned by disjointed approaches from platforms to false and harmful content; in particular by recent moves from X and Meta to water down their Terms of Service and approach to content moderation. While there are merits to crowd-sourcing …
Response attribution not verified
#12 — Mandate online services to give users a 'right to reset' recommendation data.
Recommendation: As per Principle 4, users should have more control over the content that is pushed to them online. Government should mandate all online services with a content recommendation algorithm to give the user a ‘right to reset’, which would delete …
Response attribution not verified
#11 — Compel social media platforms to embed tools for deprioritising fact-checked misleading content.
Recommendation: Following our Principles 2 and 3, the government should compel social media platforms to embed tools within their systems that identify and algorithmically deprioritise fact-checked misleading content, or content that cites unreliable sources, where it has the potential to cause …
Response attribution not verified
#10 — Publish government conclusions on harm promoted by platform recommendation systems.
Recommendation: Based on the research described above, the government should publish conclusions on the level and nature of harm that these platforms promote through their recommendation systems. Following our Principle 3, if significant harm is found, the responsible online services should …
Response attribution not verified
#9 — Commission independent research into social media algorithms amplifying harmful content with full data access
Recommendation: There is a shortfall in data needed to accurately analyse the scale of the problem and identify policy solutions. In line with our Principle 4, the government should commission a large-scale research project into how far social media recommendation systems …
Response attribution not verified
#8 — Urge government to define social media companies' responsibility as publishers or platforms
Recommendation: Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not …
Response attribution not verified
#6 — Social media algorithms amplify harmful content, exposing users, particularly young people, to risks
Recommendation: Internet users are exposed to large volumes of harmful and misleading content which can deceive, damage mental health, normalise extremist views, undermine democracy, and fuel violence. We are concerned by the evidence that recommendation algorithms—integral to the advertisement- and engagement-driven …
Response attribution not verified
#4 — Mandate Ofcom's crisis protocol to hold all online services accountable for misinformation spread
Recommendation: We welcome Ofcom’s consultation on a ‘crisis response protocol’ for companies to follow in response to events such as the 2024 unrest. The protocol should directly address misinformation by including all online services at risk of contributing to the spread …
Response attribution not verified
#3 — Online Safety Act fails to adequately tackle misinformation and pervasive online harm
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act was not designed to tackle misinformation—we heard that even if it had been fully implemented, it would have made little difference to the spread of misleading content that drove violence and hate in summer 2024. Therefore, …
Response attribution not verified
#2 — Social media business models amplify harmful content, endangering public safety during unrest
Recommendation: We launched this inquiry in the wake of the riots that followed the horrific attack in Southport in 2024. We received overwhelming evidence that online activity, including social media recommendation algorithms amplifying harmful and misleading content, played a key part …
Response attribution not verified
#1 — Uphold five core principles for social media regulation to ensure public safety and user control
Recommendation: In the course of this inquiry, we identified five key principles that we believe are crucial for regulation of social media and related technologies: 1) Public safety: Algorithmically accelerated misinformation is a danger that companies and government need to address—the …
Response attribution not verified
#27 — Ofcom's hateful content investigation scope is too narrow, lacking confidence in consequences.
Recommendation: We welcome Ofcom’s investigation into the adequacy of social media companies’ actions in the removal of hateful content and potential strengthening of the Code of Practice. This work is urgent, yet only one company will be investigated over the next …
Response attribution not verified
#26 — Review Online Safety Act's fitness for purpose in tackling hateful online extremism.
Recommendation: The Government should review whether the existing legislative framework, including the Online Safety Act, is fit for purpose in tackling hateful extremism. The review should specifically consider whether further regulation is required to tackle the posting of and promotion of …
Response attribution not verified
#25 — Online platforms facilitate religious hatred with inadequate regulation and consequences.
Recommendation: At present people can stir up religious hatred online in the knowledge that their comments are unlikely to be removed and, except in the most extreme cases, are unlikely to face any consequences for their actions. While some individuals have …
Response attribution not verified
#31 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the government legislate for a prominence regime specifically for trustworthy news content, including that from the BBC, on social media. We note that the government is currently consulting on a definition of “trustworthy news”. The government needs …
#29 —
Recommendation: The challenge of providing accurate, impartial and trusted news to audiences is growing as more people access news through unregulated platforms. It is a particular challenge when it comes to the younger audiences. This trend is exacerbated by the fact …
#28 —
Recommendation: We recommend that, subject to the BBC being resourced sufficiently, the Charter gives the BBC an additional responsibility to counter misinformation and disinformation. This is clearly not solely the responsibility of the BBC 57 and it is not a problem …
#36 —
Recommendation: We welcome efforts to improve trust in the information environment, but we caution against a counter-mis/disinformation strategy that relies too heavily on measures in the Online Safety Act, or technical fixes like watermarks, labelling and algorithmic tweaking. Some of these …
Response attribution not verified
#14 —
Recommendation: The Government must preserve the UK’s freedom to regulate AI, digital services taxes, and online safety in the national interest. The UK should not trade away these regulatory freedoms in pursuit of resuming the TPD. (Recommendation, Paragraph 69) Arrangement on …
Response status not verified
#18 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government introduces a risk-based and age- appropriate regulatory framework that applies consistently across social media, gaming and hybrid platforms, private messaging sites and AI chatbots, including sites and platforms widely used by children. This would have …
Response status not verified
#13 —
Recommendation: The Committee believes that social media organisations’ reliance on incremental improvements, voluntary measures and shared responsibility falls way short of the level of accountability that is required to address the scale and seriousness of the risks faced by children online. …
Response status not verified
#7 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government introduces mandatory restrictions on high-risk and addictive design features, such as infinite scrolling, disappearing messages and algorithmic messages for under-18s, with appropriate age-related restrictions enabled by default, rather than relying on voluntary measures or user …
Response status not verified
LGO / SPSO decisions(3)
21-018-598 — London Borough of Hackney
The complainant, whom I shall refer to as Mrs X, complained a councillor had breached the Elected Member Code of Conduct. Mrs X said the councillor had posted an unacceptable image on social media.
LGO (Local Government & …
Other Categories
Apr 2022
24-008-266 — Manchester City Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about information on a pay by phone parking app which the complainant says is misleading. This is because the complainant could have used his appeal rights and because the Council has already taken satisfactory action.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Upheld
Sep 2024
25-001-948 — Melton Borough Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about comments published on the Council’s website about a planning application. This is because we are unlikely to find fault.
LGO (Local Government & …
Planning
May 2025
Domestic Homicide Reviews(7)
Portsmouth — recommendation 1
The panel supports the author to approach the Home Office to legislate for the removal of proven criminal content on social media platforms.
CSP
Portsmouth — recommendation 7
The CSP to consider awareness raising campaigns with regards to technology related abuse for the general public and ensure that information on help seeking organisations is disseminated amongst professionals through training programmes and on communication portals.
CSP
Portsmouth — recommendation 6
The CSP considers whether to recommend the promotion of Report Harmful Content Charity for specialist commissioned services responding to domestic abuse and sexual violence.
CSP
Durham — recommendation 2
Police and Crime Commissioner, Sexual Violence Implementation Group, and Safe Durham Partnership to implement a local action plan to increase public awareness around the dangers related to the use of certain internet sites (as outlined in the previous recommendation).
Police and Crime Commissioner | Sexual …
Durham — recommendation 1
A coordinated national response is needed to increase public awareness around the dangers related to the use of certain internet sites and how these may be used to target and prey on individuals with vulnerabilities.
Government (National)
Cardiff — recommendation 16.2b
That a national review of completed domestic homicide reviews (and other publications) be commissioned to determine the extent to which dating websites feature in background circumstances of cases, to enable consideration to be given as to what advice, if any, may be given to dating website users about their own …
Welsh Government
Welsh Government
Cardiff — recommendation 16.5b
That the Violence Against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence training will consider the impact of social media and dating websites
Cardiff and Vale University Health Board
Cardiff and Vale University …