Harmful Algorithmic Content Promotion
Harmful content promoted by online platform recommendation systems, requiring government assessment and action.
Source spread
Where this theme appears
This theme appears across 4 independent accountability sources, so the source mix matters as much as the headline total.
13 inquiry recs
22 PFD reports
222 committee recs
3 LGO/SPSO decisions
Browse by source
Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Inquiry recommendations(13)
FR-20 — Age Verification Online
Recommendation: The Inquiry recommends (as originally stated in its The Internet Investigation Report, dated March 2020) that the UK government introduces legislation requiring providers of online services and social media platforms to implement more stringent age verification measures.
Gov response: We accept the need to protect children from harmful and age-inappropriate content. The Online Safety Bill requires all in-scope companies to assess whether their service is likely to be accessed by children and, if so, …
Accepted in Part
106 — Online age verification legislation
Recommendation: The government should introduce legislation requiring providers of online services and social media platforms to implement more stringent age verification techniques on all relevant devices.
Gov response: On 12 May 2021, the UK government published a draft Online Safety Bill, which includes a clause that will require providers of regulated services to conduct an assessment of whether children are likely to access …
Accepted
105 — WeProtect international action on CSAM
Recommendation: The government should press the WeProtect Global Alliance to take more action internationally to ensure that those countries hosting indecent images of children implement legislation and procedures to prevent access to such imagery.
Gov response: On 10 November 2020, the UK government committed to continue working with the WeProtect Global Alliance to make combating indecent images of children, grooming and live streaming a priority. It stated that it would do …
Accepted
FR-12 — Pre-screening by Internet Providers
Recommendation: The Inquiry recommends that the UK government makes it mandatory for all regulated providers of search services and user-to-user services to pre-screen for known child sexual abuse material.
Gov response: We accept the need to hold companies to account for removing, reporting and limiting the spread of child sexual abuse material on their services. The UK’s world- leading Online Safety Bill will address this by …
Accepted in Part
71 — Pre-screen material before upload
Recommendation: The government should require industry to pre-screen material before it is uploaded to the internet to prevent access to known indecent images of children.
Gov response: On 10 November 2020, the UK government stated that it had launched the Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse alongside the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The interim code of …
Not Accepted
40 — Publish interim online harms code of practice
Recommendation: The government should publish, without further delay, the interim code of practice in respect of child sexual abuse and exploitation as proposed by the Online Harms White Paper (published April 2019).
Gov response: On 15 December 2020, the UK government published the Interim Code of Practice on Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation.
Accepted
SP21 — School monitoring and filtering systems guidance
Recommendation: The Department for Education should review and strengthen its guidance to schools on monitoring and filtering systems, including ensuring that the systems used are appropriate and adequate from a technical perspective. The department should ensure schools understand these requirements and …
Response Pending
SP33 — CT Policing online activity analysis capability
Recommendation: Counter Terrorism Policing’s capability to access and analyse data relating to a referred person’s online activity should be reviewed in the context of Prevent referrals, to determine whether staff have the technical tools required to undertake this assessment. The Home …
Response Pending
SP24 — VPN age verification
Recommendation: Phase 2 should consider age verification for the use of Virtual Private Network (VPN) software and other options to avoid VPNs being used to circumvent the age-related protections in the Online Safety Act 2023.
Response Pending
SP22 — LCC online harms risk assessment review
Recommendation: Lancashire County Council should undertake a comprehensive review of how its children’s services and Early Help teams (i.e. Children and Family Wellbeing Service) assess and manage risk and online harms to children. This review should ensure that all frontline staff …
Response Pending
SP12 — Detection of concerning online behaviour
Recommendation: Phase 2 should consider systems to detect and report concerning online behaviour and suspicious combinations of purchases. This should include consideration of: 1. Concerning patterns of online browsing and purchasing (e.g. change of names and addresses, use of Virtual Private …
Response Pending
SP3 — Internet access restrictions for high-risk children
Recommendation: Phase 2 should consider whether there should be a further ability to restrict or monitor access to the internet on the part of children and young people, if a significant threshold is passed concerning the risk they pose to others.
Response Pending
SP32 — Prevent training on online activity assessment
Recommendation: While training for Counter Terrorism Policing, staff involved in Prevent currently cover the importance of understanding a referred individual’s online activity and the practical steps required to assess it, the Home Office and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters should review and …
Response Pending
Prevention of Future Deaths reports(22)
Karnel Haughton
Concerns: Uncensored online videos promote dangerous 'choking game' activities, yet there is no national guidance for schools or support for parents, risking further injuries and deaths.
Overdue
Ben Walmsley
Concerns: The school's IT system lacked a mechanism to alert staff when students attempted to access blocked self-harm content, relying solely on teacher monitoring and risking missed safeguarding opportunities.
Overdue
Bradley Trevarthen
Concerns: School friends were aware of the deceased's increasing suicidal ideation and methods explored online but failed to report it to adults, partly due to fear of device bans.
Response (Department for Digital Culture Media Sport): The UK government published its Online Harms White Paper which sets out plans for legislation to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online, establishing a …
Responded
Callie Lewis
Concerns: An online suicide forum provided dangerous advice, enabling individuals to mislead mental health professionals and perfect suicide methods, thus frustrating necessary assessments and interventions.
Response (DCMS): The DCMS outlines the Online Harms White Paper, which proposes a duty of care for companies to protect users online, overseen by an independent regulator. They have also convened a …
Responded
Jerrelle McKenzie
Concerns: The deceased accessed Dinitrophenol (DNP), a drug banned in the UK since 1938 due to its harmful effects, via the internet, likely influenced by social media, leading to his overdose.
Overdue
Joseph Nihill
Concerns: Online platforms actively promoted suicide methods and dangerous substances to vulnerable young men, undermining mental health support and posing a foreseeable risk of drawing individuals into self-harm.
Overdue
Berenice Bell
Concerns: Websites promoting or assisting suicide are easily accessible, and platforms lack adequate independent scrutiny to remove age-inappropriate and harmful content.
Response (Dept for Digital Culture Media Sport): The Department is taking steps to protect users online via the draft Online Safety Bill, which will require in-scope companies to remove illegal content that encourages or incites suicide. They …
Overdue
Frances Thomas
Concerns: Outdated e-security guidance from the Department of Education led to inadequate web filtering, lack of oversight for blocklists, and insufficient scrutiny of age-inappropriate online content in schools.
Response (Department for Education): The Department for Education acknowledges the concerns around online content promoting suicide and self-harm, highlights existing guidance for schools, and mentions the upcoming Online Safety Bill which aims to regulate …
Responded
James Forryan
Concerns: Easily accessible websites openly promote and provide guidance on suicide methods, contributing to deaths. There is a lack of sufficient regulation and enforcement against such harmful online content.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): The Department of Health and Social Care is taking steps to protect users online with the Online Safety Bill, working with stakeholders to remove harmful suicide and self-harm content. They …
Responded
Molly Russell
Concerns: Internet platforms lack age verification, age-specific content control, and parental monitoring features, exposing children to harmful material through algorithms and unrestricted access.
Response (Twitter International Unlimited Company): Twitter acknowledges the concerns and highlights existing safety features, including user controls to manage content, block accounts, and a parental controls guide developed with Internet Matters.
Response (META): Meta highlights existing tools and policies, including content moderation, reporting options, and parental supervision features. They also mention partnerships with experts and engagement with the UK Online Safety Bill.
Response (Snap): Snap highlights existing safety measures and resources, including reporting tools, partnerships with mental health organizations, and extra protections for under 18s. They mention a Global Safety Advisory Board that includes …
Response (Pinterest): Pinterest commits to limiting the distribution of depressive content to teens, updating its self-harm policy for stricter enforcement, partnering with a third-party content checking service, improving moderation processes, and expanding …
Response (Department for Digital Culture Media Sport): The government plans to strengthen online protections for children via the Online Safety Bill, including requiring platforms to publish risk assessments and naming the Children's Commissioner as a statutory consultee …
Overdue
Luke Ashton
Concerns: Inadequate player protection tools and a flawed algorithm failed to identify and intervene with a problem gambler. The operator's reliance on minimal regulatory standards, rather than best practice, exacerbated risks.
Response (Department for Culture Media and Sport): The Department for Culture, Media and Sport outlines actions planned following the Gambling Act Review, including enhanced affordability checks, strengthened protections for young adults, and empowering consumers to control their …
Response (Flutter): Flutter provides background information on the company and its brands, particularly Betfair, explaining the difference between the Sportsbook and the Exchange.
Response (Gambling Commission): The Gambling Commission outlines several initiatives and planned actions, including collaboration with stakeholders to improve understanding of gambling-related harm, support for research, and the development of GamProtect, a 'Single Customer …
Overdue
Bronwen Morgan
Concerns: Vulnerable individuals are able to access websites that facilitate and promote self-harm and suicide methods, enabling them to acquire information and means to cause their own death.
Overdue
Chloe Macdermott
Concerns: Online forums encourage suicide by providing methods without age restrictions or help signposting, and harmful content is not effectively removed. Lethal products are also easily purchased via international online retailers and delivered to the UK without effective border controls.
Response (Amazon UK): Amazon has globally restricted the sale of high concentration sodium nitrite to Amazon Business customers since October 2022 and prohibits the sale of poisons as defined under Schedule 1A of …
Response (British Transport Police): The NPCC Suicide Prevention Steering Group has disseminated briefing materials to all NPCC force and regional suicide prevention leads regarding the emerging trend of Sodium Nitrate and Nitrite use in …
Response (Ofcom): Ofcom is implementing the Online Safety Act 2023, developing codes of practice to address illegal content and protect children, and will take enforcement action against non-compliant services, including financial penalties …
Response (Google UK & Ireland): Google Search prevents predictions for queries relating to methods of suicide and provides prominent signposting to authoritative information and support when users search for suicide-related terms, and delists content that …
Response (DSIT): DSIT outlines how the Online Safety Act will force companies to take more accountability for the safety of their users, including those who use VPNs to bypass protections, and details …
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): DHSC leads a cross-government group to tackle emerging methods of suicide, including sodium nitrite, reducing public access, and working with retailers to ensure labeling compliance for products like curing salt.
Overdue
Kimberley Liu
Concerns: Unregulated websites facilitate dangerous, unchecked sales of prescription-only sedative medications, actively instructing customers to evade detection, which exploits vulnerable individuals and poses a suicide risk.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): The MHRA addresses illegal sale of prescription medications, working with partners across government; the Online Safety Act will give powers to Ofcom to ensure platforms remove illegal content; a national …
Responded
Adrian Gallagher
Concerns: An online book providing explicit, step-by-step suicide instructions, including methods to avoid detection, is readily accessible with inadequate age verification, posing a significant risk to vulnerable individuals.
Response (National Crime Agency): The National Crime Agency (NCA) is engaging with Ofcom to combat illegal suicide content online under the Online Safety Act. It also mentions the HMG Drugs Strategy, the Suicide Prevention …
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Techonology): The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology outlines how the Online Safety Act will require tech companies to take responsibility for user safety and remove illegal content, including suicide and …
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): The Department of Health and Social Care is reviewing actions to reduce harm from suicide-related publications and collaborating with government departments, charities, and experts. They lead a cross-sector working group …
Responded
Deborah Cooper
Concerns: Books providing explicit instructions on methods for ending one's life are freely available on Amazon.co.uk. Concerns are raised about the marketing, supply, and lack of regulation for such publications.
Response (Amazon): Amazon has reviewed the books against their content guidelines and decided not to remove them from sale, but displays a banner on the product page with information on how to …
Response (Department for Business and Trade): The Department for Business and Trade acknowledges the concerns but states there is limited scope to address the issues through existing consumer protection legislation and refers to other legislation and …
Responded
Isabella Shere
Concerns: Quora's platform contains easily accessible, unmoderated content related to self-harm and suicide, lacking age verification and featuring engagement functions that normalise serious subject matter for children.
Response (Ofcom): Ofcom outlines its role in implementing the Online Safety Act 2023, including developing codes of practice, working with industry to secure higher protection for children, and taking enforcement action against …
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Technology): The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology acknowledges the coroner's concerns and states that the Online Safety Act 2023 will place duties on tech companies to protect users online, especially …
Overdue
Bethany Langton
Concerns: The easy online availability of lethal Sodium Nitrite, combined with suppliers' unawareness of its misuse and slow removal of suicide-related online guidance, facilitates self-harm.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): The DHSC leads an emerging methods working group to prevent access to harmful substances and involves multiple agencies. The Online Safety Act requires services to rapidly remove regulated content and …
Overdue
Miranda Avanzi
Concerns: The widespread and easily accessible availability of explicit, step-by-step suicide guides online, often without age verification, poses a significant risk, enabling vulnerable individuals to self-harm.
Response (DSIT): DSIT is working with Ofcom to implement the Online Safety Act 2023, which tackles illegal and legal forms of online suicide content. The Act requires services to assess the risk …
Response (Ofcom): Ofcom is providing guidance to services on identifying content that illegally encourages or assists suicide, and search providers have duties to remove or lower the ranking of illegal suicide content. …
Responded
Rhiannon Williams
Concerns: Online suicide forums and social media platforms provided information on self-harm and misleading professionals, raising concerns about the adequacy of The Online Safety Act 2023 in preventing access to such harmful content.
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Technology): The Department acknowledges the concerns and describes the Online Safety Act 2023 and Ofcom's role in regulating online content, as well as collaboration with the Department of Health and Social …
Response (Ofcom): Ofcom has opened an investigation into a suicide forum mentioned in the report and will provide regular updates on its website; it will work directly with service providers to promote …
Responded
Oliver Gorman
Concerns: There are inadequate age restrictions on dangerous aerosol products and unclear warnings about instant death. Social media platforms also fail to take responsibility for harmful content promoting such misuse.
Response (Department for Science Innovation and Technology): The Department highlights the Online Safety Act (OSA) which requires companies to prevent users from encountering illegal content and remove such content swiftly. Ofcom can issue information notices at the …
Response (Product Safety Standards): OPSS highlights industry led labelling initiatives to address risks. Officials will communicate the new industry labelling initiative to relevant groups to raise awareness.
Response (British Aerosol Manufacturers Association): BAMA has developed a new caution mark and statement that can be used to provide additional detail on the potential problems which can arise if the aerosol dispenser is not …
Response (Department for Culture Media and Sport): The Department for Culture, Media and Sport acknowledges the report and confirms that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) leads on online safety.
Responded
Oliver Long
Concerns: The self-exclusion scheme (GamStop) fails to protect individuals from unlicenced overseas gambling sites, which target vulnerable users. There is a critical lack of public health information regarding these risks.
Response (Department of Health and Social Care): The Department of Health and Social Care acknowledges receipt of the report and states that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is leading the development of a single cross-agency …
Response (Department for Education): The Department for Education acknowledges the concerns raised but states that responsibility for the matters lies outside its remit.
Response (Gambling Commission): The Gambling Commission acknowledges the concerns but states that the action proposed in the report falls outside of the Commission’s remit, but remains willing to share information and cooperate with …
Response (Department of Culture Media and Sport): The Department of Culture, Media and Sport stated the government has pressed technology companies to prevent promotion of illegal gambling sites and the Gambling Commission developed guidance for consumers to …
Responded
Select committee recommendations(222)— showing 50 strongest matches
#16 —
Recommendation: The Committee recommends that the Government introduces a statutory ban on the use of social media platforms for children under the age of 16. It is time to apply the brakes and prioritise children’s safety. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)
Response Pending
#15 —
Recommendation: There is a compelling case for an outright statutory ban on social media access for under-16s in order to reset the relationship children and families have with digital devices and social media, and to arrest the current harm. The evidence …
Response Pending
#14 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government uses the powers available to it to impose clear, enforceable duties on platforms to prioritise child safety by design, backed by meaningful sanctions for non-compliance. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28) 17 The case for restricting social media …
Response Pending
#2 —
Recommendation: These harms are not accidental or isolated, but occur because of platform design choices, including algorithmic recommendation systems, infinite scrolling, autoplay and private messaging features, which repeatedly expose children to harmful or exploitative content at a scale which reactive moderation …
Response Pending
#29 — Criminalise use of nudification apps as synthetic NCII and hold platforms accountable.
Recommendation: There is no legitimate reason whatsoever for the use or existence of nudification apps. The Government should ensure that the use of such an app is considered creation of synthetic NCII and therefore also a criminal offence and Ofcom should …
Gov response: Government response: Accept The sharing of or threatening to share a deepfake intimate image without consent or reasonable belief in consent is a criminal offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The relevant offences came …
No Published Response
#28 — Require tech companies to cleanse datasets of NCII and source data responsibly.
Recommendation: The private sector has innovated to create AI technology. It does not need to wait for legislation to catch up in order to safeguard individuals from harmful AI-generated content. As a starting point tech companies involved in AI content creation …
Gov response: Government response: Reject There are already a range of regulatory requirements that apply to relevant services. Generative AI services which have functionalities that bring them into scope of the Online Safety Act, e.g. meeting the …
No Published Response
#27 — Mandate consent-based offence for deepfake creation, including cultural intimate image abuse.
Recommendation: The Government’s plans to criminalise the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes/NCII, even if they are not shared, are very welcome and worthy of praise. However, the Government must ensure that the offence is consent- based and does not require the …
Gov response: Government response: Partial acceptance The Government has already acted to introduce a ‘consent-based’ offence that does not include a specific intent element that relates to the perpetrator’s motivation, fulfilling our manifesto commitment. We have tabled …
No Published Response
#26 — Ofcom's proposals should require companies to accept non-consensual intimate image hash matching.
Recommendation: It is clear that some companies require further persuasion to accept NCII hashes. We welcome Ofcom’s plans to launch a consultation in spring 2025 on expansions to its Codes of Practice that would include proposals on the use of hash …
Gov response: Government response: Reject (on basis for Ofcom) The Government agrees it is vital that online services take effective steps to tackle intimate image abuse. However, Ofcom is the independent regulator for the Online Safety Act …
No Published Response
#25 — Accept StopNCII.org hash matching technology as a matter of priority.
Recommendation: Google should accept the StopNCII.org hash matching technology as a matter of priority. (Recommendation, Paragraph 125)
Gov response: Government response: Partial acceptance Google is able to consider this recommendation and accepting signing up to StopNCII.org hash-matching technology if it wishes to. The Government would support Google adopting this technology or any other technology …
No Published Response
#32 — Google's monetisation of misinformation highlights systemic failures within the digital advertising industry.
Recommendation: In particular, we were concerned by evidence that Google may have helped to monetise misinformation relating to the attacks, contributing to the violence. This is unacceptable, and is just one example of a much wider problem with the digital advertising …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Not Addressed
#31 — Under-regulated digital advertising market incentivises and monetises harmful content, often without advertisers' knowledge.
Recommendation: The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Not Addressed
#30 — Social media algorithms fail to differentiate harmful from harmless content, spreading misinformation.
Recommendation: Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Not Addressed
#29 — Mandate generative AI platforms to automatically label AI-generated media with metadata and watermarks.
Recommendation: To effectively tackle amplified misinformation as per Principle 1, the government should work with relevant experts and platforms to develop technology that automatically detects AI-generated media, meeting mis/ disinformation at its source. It should mandate all generative AI platforms, and …
Gov response: On AI driven detection of misinformation, the government ran the Deepfake Detection Challenge last year, bringing together academic, industry and government experts to develop innovative and practical solutions focused on detecting synthetic media.
Accepted
#27 — Pass legislation requiring generative AI platforms to conduct risk assessments and implement user safeguards.
Recommendation: To protect citizens from the AI-exacerbated spread of misinformation and harm, the government should pass legislation that covers generative AI platforms, bringing them in line with other online services that pose a high risk of producing or spreading illegal or …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Accepted
#25 — Online Safety Act fails to protect users from synthetic disinformation and harmful experimental features.
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Not Addressed
#22 — Collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and their online spreading techniques.
Recommendation: Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of …
Gov response: We recognise the risk that foreign interference in the UK can pose, both to society as a whole and individuals. Our analysis published at the end of 2024 highlighted a variety of ways in which …
Not Addressed
#21 — Create an additional regulatory category for 'small but risky' platforms, based on their online harms.
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act does not do enough to address the risks posed by small platforms due to its exclusive focus on size. Ofcom should create an additional category to cover ‘small but risky’ platforms, based on analysis of the …
Gov response: We disagree that the OSA does not do enough to address the risks posed by small platforms. The main measures in the OSA apply to all services in scope, including small but risky services. Since …
Not Accepted
#19 — Introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments on harmful misinformation.
Recommendation: In line with Principle 5, transparency, the government should introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments and reporting requirements on legal but harmful content, such as potentially harmful misinformation, with a focus on the role of recommendation algorithms in …
Gov response: The OSA’s duties will deliver greater transparency and accountability from providers, ensuring Ofcom is well informed, adult users are empowered, and companies are publicly held to account for keeping their users safe online. The strongest …
Accepted
#18 — Submit annual report to Parliament on the state of online misinformation trends.
Recommendation: The broad scale—and serious impact—of misinformation online requires greater transparency and accountability from the government. In line with our Principle 1, the government should submit an annual report to Parliament on the state of misinformation online, tracking trends and issues …
Gov response: The government agrees that routine scrutiny and accountability are important and continues to provide regular updates on this work through existing parliamentary channels, such as questions in the House and Ministerial appearances before relevant Select …
Not Accepted
#17 — Online Safety Act measures are insufficient to address algorithmic misinformation spread effectively.
Recommendation: It is vital that platforms are held responsible for the algorithmic spread of misleading or deceptive content that can radicalise and harm users. The few measures in the Act that address misinformation fall short. The False Communications offence is vaguely …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Accepted
#16 — Online Safety Act scope insufficient for 'legal but harmful' content and misinformation.
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act will lead to some improvements, but is designed only to protect users from harm that is illegal or affects children. The decision not to include measures related to the algorithmic amplification of “legal but harmful” content, …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Accepted
#15 — Commission independent research into effective methods for platforms to address misinformation.
Recommendation: In line with our Principle 1 of tackling amplified misinformation, the government should compel platforms to put in place minimum standards for addressing the spread of misleading content online. More information is needed on the merits of different approaches to …
Gov response: The government shares the Committee’s concerns regarding the amplification of misleading content online and agrees that more evidence is needed to assess the merits of different approaches to tackling misinformation. The government engages with social …
Not Addressed
#14 — Concerns regarding disjointed platform approaches and weakened content moderation policies.
Recommendation: We are concerned by disjointed approaches from platforms to false and harmful content; in particular by recent moves from X and Meta to water down their Terms of Service and approach to content moderation. While there are merits to crowd-sourcing …
Gov response: The government shares the Committee’s concerns regarding the amplification of misleading content online and agrees that more evidence is needed to assess the merits of different approaches to tackling misinformation. The government engages with social …
Not Addressed
#12 — Mandate online services to give users a 'right to reset' recommendation data.
Recommendation: As per Principle 4, users should have more control over the content that is pushed to them online. Government should mandate all online services with a content recommendation algorithm to give the user a ‘right to reset’, which would delete …
Gov response: The government is committed to ensuring that individuals have a say over the content they are presented by recommendation algorithms and in how their personal data is processed. While no single piece of UK legislation …
Accepted
#11 — Compel social media platforms to embed tools for deprioritising fact-checked misleading content.
Recommendation: Following our Principles 2 and 3, the government should compel social media platforms to embed tools within their systems that identify and algorithmically deprioritise fact-checked misleading content, or content that cites unreliable sources, where it has the potential to cause …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Accepted
#10 — Publish government conclusions on harm promoted by platform recommendation systems.
Recommendation: Based on the research described above, the government should publish conclusions on the level and nature of harm that these platforms promote through their recommendation systems. Following our Principle 3, if significant harm is found, the responsible online services should …
Gov response: The government believes that, together with the above recommendation, Ofcom is best placed to consider this recommendation as online safety regulator. Under the OSA, regulated providers have enforceable duties to carry out risk assessments, which …
Not Addressed
#9 — Commission independent research into social media algorithms amplifying harmful content with full data access
Recommendation: There is a shortfall in data needed to accurately analyse the scale of the problem and identify policy solutions. In line with our Principle 4, the government should commission a large-scale research project into how far social media recommendation systems …
Gov response: The government believes that the quickest way to fill the shortfall in data is through Ofcom. Ofcom’s role as the UK’s independent online safety regulator means it is best placed to exercise judgement about whether …
Not Addressed
#8 — Urge government to define social media companies' responsibility as publishers or platforms
Recommendation: Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not …
Gov response: The government is grateful to the House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee for their report on “Social Media, Misinformation and Harmful Algorithms”. The report examines the challenges posed by social media algorithms …
Not Addressed
#6 — Social media algorithms amplify harmful content, exposing users, particularly young people, to risks
Recommendation: Internet users are exposed to large volumes of harmful and misleading content which can deceive, damage mental health, normalise extremist views, undermine democracy, and fuel violence. We are concerned by the evidence that recommendation algorithms—integral to the advertisement- and engagement-driven …
Gov response: The government is grateful to the House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee for their report on “Social Media, Misinformation and Harmful Algorithms”. The report examines the challenges posed by social media algorithms …
Not Addressed
#4 — Mandate Ofcom's crisis protocol to hold all online services accountable for misinformation spread
Recommendation: We welcome Ofcom’s consultation on a ‘crisis response protocol’ for companies to follow in response to events such as the 2024 unrest. The protocol should directly address misinformation by including all online services at risk of contributing to the spread …
Gov response: The government believes that Ofcom is best placed to consider this recommendation. As the independent regulator, Ofcom has the discretion to determine which measures are included in its consultation process. However, the government acknowledges that …
Partially Accepted
#3 — Online Safety Act fails to adequately tackle misinformation and pervasive online harm
Recommendation: The Online Safety Act was not designed to tackle misinformation—we heard that even if it had been fully implemented, it would have made little difference to the spread of misleading content that drove violence and hate in summer 2024. Therefore, …
Gov response: The government is committed to a safer online world and we urge providers to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation on their services. The government recognises that online misinformation has the potential to cause …
Not Accepted
#2 — Social media business models amplify harmful content, endangering public safety during unrest
Recommendation: We launched this inquiry in the wake of the riots that followed the horrific attack in Southport in 2024. We received overwhelming evidence that online activity, including social media recommendation algorithms amplifying harmful and misleading content, played a key part …
Gov response: We agree with the Committee that, following the public disorder in summer 2024, it is appropriate that providers are given clear guidance on how to respond to crises that may lead to the rapid spread …
Accepted
#1 — Uphold five core principles for social media regulation to ensure public safety and user control
Recommendation: In the course of this inquiry, we identified five key principles that we believe are crucial for regulation of social media and related technologies: 1) Public safety: Algorithmically accelerated misinformation is a danger that companies and government need to address—the …
Gov response: The report examines the challenges posed by social media algorithms in amplifying harmful and misleading content, and highlights the importance of upholding public safety, free expression, platform accountability, user control, and transparency in shaping the …
Not Addressed
#27 — Ofcom's hateful content investigation scope is too narrow, lacking confidence in consequences.
Recommendation: We welcome Ofcom’s investigation into the adequacy of social media companies’ actions in the removal of hateful content and potential strengthening of the Code of Practice. This work is urgent, yet only one company will be investigated over the next …
Gov response: We agree with the Committee that the role of the online environment is of particular concern. The speed with which hateful and violent content can spread online is unprecedented. What is unacceptable offline should not …
No Published Response
#26 — Review Online Safety Act's fitness for purpose in tackling hateful online extremism.
Recommendation: The Government should review whether the existing legislative framework, including the Online Safety Act, is fit for purpose in tackling hateful extremism. The review should specifically consider whether further regulation is required to tackle the posting of and promotion of …
Gov response: Government response: Police Training
Under Consideration
#25 — Online platforms facilitate religious hatred with inadequate regulation and consequences.
Recommendation: At present people can stir up religious hatred online in the knowledge that their comments are unlikely to be removed and, except in the most extreme cases, are unlikely to face any consequences for their actions. While some individuals have …
Gov response: 68. We agree with the Committee that the role of the online environment is of particular concern. The speed with which hateful and violent content can spread online is unprecedented. What is unacceptable offline should …
No Published Response
#18 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government introduces a risk-based and age- appropriate regulatory framework that applies consistently across social media, gaming and hybrid platforms, private messaging sites and AI chatbots, including sites and platforms widely used by children. This would have …
Response Pending
#13 —
Recommendation: The Committee believes that social media organisations’ reliance on incremental improvements, voluntary measures and shared responsibility falls way short of the level of accountability that is required to address the scale and seriousness of the risks faced by children online. …
Response Pending
#7 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government introduces mandatory restrictions on high-risk and addictive design features, such as infinite scrolling, disappearing messages and algorithmic messages for under-18s, with appropriate age-related restrictions enabled by default, rather than relying on voluntary measures or user …
Response Pending
#3 —
Recommendation: The Committee is clear that the companies whose platforms are responsible for these harms cannot be left to self-regulate. We recommend that the Government treats online harms to children explicitly as a safeguarding and public health issue, rather than relying …
Response Pending
#1 —
Recommendation: The Committee concludes that online harms affecting children are widespread, severe and systemic. The evidence we heard demonstrates clear links between children’s exposure to harmful online content (including material promoting self-harm, suicide, eating disorders, misogyny and sexual exploitation) and serious …
Response Pending
#4 —
Recommendation: Harmful extremist content is circulating widely online, driven by engagement and profit-maximising algorithms, influencer-led dissemination, and decentralised extremist ecosystems. These systems promote content designed to provoke outrage and fear, often purely for commercial reasons, and the speed and scale of …
Gov response: In February, the Home Office published clear guidance on Prevent thresholds, titled Key Principles of Prevent, to help ensure there is a shared understanding of the purpose of Prevent and the circumstances in which it …
Under Consideration
#49 —
Recommendation: The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of …
Gov response: Partially agree. We acknowledge concerns about the role of algorithms in amplifying harmful content, as set out in the Government’s response to the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee’s report on social media, misinformation and algorithms …
Partially Accepted
#23 —
Recommendation: As part of the risk assessments social media platforms will be required to carry out under the new online safety regulation, we recommend that platforms should be required to evaluate the role played by anonymous accounts in creating and disseminating …
Gov response: Government response We agree with this recommendation. The Online Safety Bill requires service providers in scope to identify, mitigate and effectively manage the risks associated with online anonymity on user-to-user services. As part of their …
Accepted
#3 —
Recommendation: Our predecessor Petitions Committee’s report concluded that self-regulation of social media had failed. Despite the user safety tools and innovations platforms have introduced since then, these companies have continued to place insufficient priority on user safety to protect users from …
Gov response: We thank the Committee for this recommendation. The government has taken a consultative approach throughout the Bill’s development. The Bill is clear on what the Secretary of State’s review of the regulatory framework must consider. …
Under Consideration
#9 — Set online slots stake limits to match land-based machines and not exceed £5
Recommendation: The high degree of accessibility of online slots negates the additional protection provided by account-based play. Setting a limit for online slots at the same level as Category B gaming machines, at between £2 and £5, takes account of the …
Gov response: Regarding online slots, in February, we published our response to the consultation on maximum stake limits. Our response confirmed the introduction of a statutory maximum stake limit of £5 per spin for adults aged 25 …
Accepted
#38 — Safeguard General Election integrity from deepfake content and sanction failing platforms
Recommendation: The Government and regulatory authorities, informed by the work of the Defending Democracy Taskforce, should safeguard the integrity of the upcoming General Election campaign in its approach to the online platforms that host deepfake content which seeks to exert a …
Gov response: The Government has in place established systems and processes to protect the democratic integrity of the UK. Alongside this, the Defending Democracy Taskforce works to reduce the risk to the UK’s democratic processes, institutions and …
Under Consideration
#29 — High anti-Muslim abuse in schools shows unmet need for education and inclusive environments.
Recommendation: Schools have a vital role in tackling anti-Muslim abuse. First, through education on Muslim culture and heritage and the positive role Muslim communities have played in shaping the multicultural Britain that exists today, and providing challenge to distorted narratives of …
Gov response: 80. Muslim students and staff should be able to receive an education without the threat of harassment or racial abuse, and we welcome the Committee’s recommendation here. There is no place for hate or prejudice …
No Published Response
#3 — Challenge inaccurate media representations and false online narratives of Muslim women robustly.
Recommendation: There needs to be a cultural shift in how Muslim women are portrayed in the media and online. Inaccurate representations and false media narratives should be challenged robustly, including by press regulators and Ofcom. (Conclusion, Paragraph 37)
Gov response: 19. The UK media plays a vital role in our society and therefore has an important responsibility to shape our values around tolerance and respect of those with different faiths and beliefs. We agree with …
No Published Response
#21 —
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government establishes a clear and enforceable framework for age assurance across platforms likely to be accessed by children, with independent oversight and regular assessment of effectiveness. (Recommendation, Paragraph 38)
Response Pending
LGO / SPSO decisions(3)
21-018-598 — London Borough of Hackney
The complainant, whom I shall refer to as Mrs X, complained a councillor had breached the Elected Member Code of Conduct. Mrs X said the councillor had posted an unacceptable image on social media.
LGO (Local Government & …
Other Categories
Apr 2022
24-008-266 — Manchester City Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about information on a pay by phone parking app which the complainant says is misleading. This is because the complainant could have used his appeal rights and because the Council has already taken satisfactory action.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Upheld
Sep 2024
25-001-948 — Melton Borough Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about comments published on the Council’s website about a planning application. This is because we are unlikely to find fault.
LGO (Local Government & …
Planning
May 2025