Source · Select Committees · Women and Equalities Committee

Recommendation 25

25 Accepted

Online platforms facilitate religious hatred with inadequate regulation and consequences.

Conclusion
At present people can stir up religious hatred online in the knowledge that their comments are unlikely to be removed and, except in the most extreme cases, are unlikely to face any consequences for their actions. While some individuals have been prosecuted for posting hate speech, the platforms that facilitate it have faced no consequences, if anything they are likely to have benefitted through increased traffic and advertising revenue generation. This report focuses on anti-Muslim hate but the same arguments can be made for racism, misogyny and anti-semitism. The Government and Ofcom must take a far more robust approach to the regulation of online spaces. (Conclusion, Paragraph 107)
Government Response Summary
The government states that the Online Safety Act (OSA) introduced measures on in-scope platforms to protect users from illegal content, and that traditional publishers are members of regulatory bodies enforcing codes of conduct.
Government Response Accepted
HM Government Accepted
68. We agree with the Committee that the role of the online environment is of particular concern. The speed with which hateful and violent content can spread online is unprecedented. What is unacceptable offline should not be acceptable online, and platforms which enable dissemination of illegal material must be properly held to account. 69. That is why the Online Safety Act (OSA) introduced measures on in-scope platforms and search services to protect users from illegal content, and to protect children from content that is harmful to them. Since March 2025, platforms and services have been required to take proactive steps to tackle illegal content on their services, including some content which can constitute extremism, such as illegal threats and abuse and content that incites violence. This includes taking proportionate measures to ensure their design features do not amplify this kind of material. 70. Since July 2025, additional child safety duties have been in force. Platforms likely to be accessed by children are required to assess and address the risk of children encountering content that is harmful or age inappropriate for them, even where that content is not illegal. This includes taking proportionate, systems level steps to protect children from content which is abusive or hateful. 71. If companies fail to comply with these online safety duties, Ofcom has the power to issue fines up to £18 million or 10% of a provider’s qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is higher. In its statement on fees and penalties, Ofcom states that using worldwide revenue will help ensure that the maximum penalty cap is an effective deterrent to non-compliance. As of February 2026, Ofcom launched investigations into 94 sites since compliance became enforceable, including eight fines to five providers. 72. We have already committed to reviewing the OSA. The Act includes a statutory duty for the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology’s Secretary of State to undertake a formal review of its effectiveness between two and five years after it comes into force, and to lay the report on the outcome of this review before Parliament. Implementation of the Act is ongoing, and we need to be confident of where regulation is working, and where we could go further, before introducing new measures. 73. We are committed to ensuring transparency from services and their accountability to the public, and under the OSA, Ofcom has extensive information gathering powers. These include the ability to require information related to platforms’ functionalities, such as their algorithms and the use of AI where this is a functionality used by the service, to support Ofcom in exercising its online safety functions. In addition, Ofcom will require certain platforms to publish annual transparency reports containing information requested by Ofcom related to online safety. The content of these transparency reports is at Ofcom’s discretion but can include information about the platform’s AI functionalities or algorithms if Ofcom deems this necessary. We are also laying new regulations to allow independent researchers access to platform data to better understand online harms. This researcher access framework will enable high-quality research and so increase transparency and support the development of better protections for users online. At this stage, the Government therefore does not believe that further transparency powers regarding algorithms or AI are currently required. 74. The UK press has a self-regulatory system. Having a fair and free press is vital to ensure the public has access to accurate and trustworthy information from a range of different sources. We are also clear, however, that with this freedom comes responsibility and publishers must operate ethically and within the bounds of the law. This includes ensuring access to clear, timely and effective routes to redress. 75. Within the self-regulatory system, the majority of traditional publishers are members of the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). Some publishers have joined the Independent Monitor for the Press (Impress), while others including the Financial Times and the Guardian, have chosen to pursue their own detailed self-regulatory arrangements. 76. These regulators enforce codes of conduct which provide guidelines on a range of areas which include discrimination and harassment. This includes avoiding prejudicial or derogatory references to an individual’s religion. IPSO also provides specific additional guidance for journalists and editors which sets out their responsibilities regarding the moderation of comments left by readers for the outlets they regulate. Impress also has guidance on its standards code that set out that the code may also include third-party user- generated content, including comments under news stories.