Harmful Algorithmic Content Promotion
Harmful content promoted by online platform recommendation systems, requiring government assessment and action.
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Committee recommendation
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#30 - Social media algorithms fail to differentiate harmful from harmless content, spreading misinformation.
Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which can result in promotion of misleading, damaging, or hateful material. The effects spread through the online ecosystem, helping...
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terms: content, harmful, promotion
Committee recommendation
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#9 - Commission independent research into social media algorithms amplifying harmful content with full data access
There is a shortfall in data needed to accurately analyse the scale of the problem and identify policy solutions. In line with our Principle 4, the government should commission a large-scale research project into how far social media recommendation systems spread, amplify or prioritise harmful content. This should be undertaken by a group of credible independent researchers, bringing...
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terms: algorithmic, content, harmful, promotion
Committee recommendation
99match
#16 - Online Safety Act scope insufficient for 'legal but harmful' content and misinformation.
The Online Safety Act will lead to some improvements, but is designed only to protect users from harm that is illegal or affects children. The decision not to include measures related to the algorithmic amplification of “legal but harmful” content, such as misinformation, means that full enforcement of the Act would have made little difference to the online...
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terms: algorithmic, content, harmful
Committee recommendation
95match
#2 - 1st Report - Growing up in the online world: The Education Committee’s response to the Government’s...
These harms are not accidental or isolated, but occur because of platform design choices, including algorithmic recommendation systems, infinite scrolling, autoplay and private messaging features, which repeatedly expose children to harmful or exploitative content at a scale which reactive moderation by the companies is not effectively addressing. (Conclusion, Paragraph 7)
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terms: algorithmic, content, harmful
Committee recommendation
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#1 - Uphold five core principles for social media regulation to ensure public safety and user control
In the course of this inquiry, we identified five key principles that we believe are crucial for regulation of social media and related technologies: 1) Public safety: Algorithmically accelerated misinformation is a danger that companies and government need to address—the government and platform companies should work together to protect the public from it. 2) Free and safe expression:...
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terms: algorithmic, content, harmful
Committee recommendation
91match
#6 - Social media algorithms amplify harmful content, exposing users, particularly young people, to risks
Internet users are exposed to large volumes of harmful and misleading content which can deceive, damage mental health, normalise extremist views, undermine democracy, and fuel violence. We are concerned by the evidence that recommendation algorithms—integral to the advertisement- and engagement-driven business models of social media companies—play a role in this. Young people are particularly vulnerable to these harms,...
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
91match
#2 - Social media business models amplify harmful content, endangering public safety during unrest
We launched this inquiry in the wake of the riots that followed the horrific attack in Southport in 2024. We received overwhelming evidence that online activity, including social media recommendation algorithms amplifying harmful and misleading content, played a key part in driving the unrest and violence. Social media companies’ responses were inconsistent and 52 inadequate, often enabling, if...
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
90match
#19 - Introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments on harmful misinformation.
In line with Principle 5, transparency, the government should introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments and reporting requirements on legal but harmful content, such as potentially harmful misinformation, with a focus on the role of recommendation algorithms in its spread. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
90match
#14 - Concerns regarding disjointed platform approaches and weakened content moderation policies.
We are concerned by disjointed approaches from platforms to false and harmful content; in particular by recent moves from X and Meta to water down their Terms of Service and approach to content moderation. While there are merits to crowd-sourcing models of context provision and fact-checking—as part of a wider policy on misleading and harmful content—these platforms seem...
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terms: algorithmic, content, harmful
Committee recommendation
90match
#11 - Compel social media platforms to embed tools for deprioritising fact-checked misleading content.
Following our Principles 2 and 3, the government should compel social media platforms to embed tools within their systems that identify and algorithmically deprioritise fact-checked misleading content, or content that cites unreliable sources, where it has the potential to cause significant harm. It is vital that these measures do not censor legal free expression, but apply justified and...
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terms: algorithmic, content
Committee recommendation
87match
#31 - Under-regulated digital advertising market incentivises and monetises harmful content, often without advertisers' knowledge.
The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and advertisers appear to be either unable or unwilling to address this problem. We heard evidence that platforms may...
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
83match
#27 - Pass legislation requiring generative AI platforms to conduct risk assessments and implement user safeguards.
To protect citizens from the AI-exacerbated spread of misinformation and harm, the government should pass legislation that covers generative AI platforms, bringing them in line with other online services that pose a high risk of producing or spreading illegal or harmful content. Following the Principles identified by this report, this legislation should require generative AI platforms to: provide...
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
83match
#4 - Mandate Ofcom's crisis protocol to hold all online services accountable for misinformation spread
We welcome Ofcom’s consultation on a ‘crisis response protocol’ for companies to follow in response to events such as the 2024 unrest. The protocol should directly address misinformation by including all online services at risk of contributing to the spread of false or harmful information, including large online social media, search and messaging services; those with smaller user...
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
82match
#17 - Online Safety Act measures are insufficient to address algorithmic misinformation spread effectively.
It is vital that platforms are held responsible for the algorithmic spread of misleading or deceptive content that can radicalise and harm users. The few measures in the Act that address misinformation fall short. The False Communications offence is vaguely worded and will be difficult to implement; the advisory committee on mis/disinformation has been renamed, suggesting a change...
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terms: algorithmic, content
PFD report
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Rhiannon Williams
Online suicide forums and social media platforms provided information on self-harm and misleading professionals, raising concerns about the adequacy of The Online Safety Act 2023 in preventing access to such harmful content.
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
77match
#26 - Review Online Safety Act's fitness for purpose in tackling hateful online extremism.
The Government should review whether the existing legislative framework, including the Online Safety Act, is fit for purpose in tackling hateful extremism. The review should specifically consider whether further regulation is required to tackle the posting of and promotion of hateful content, including increased transparency in the use of algorithms and AI and on advertising revenue generation, and...
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terms: content, promotion
Committee recommendation
76match
#49 - 4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy
The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of artificial amplification and foreign interference and the subsequent actions taken to remove such content. (Recommendation, Paragraph 216)
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terms: algorithmic, content
PFD report
73match
Berenice Bell
Websites promoting or assisting suicide are easily accessible, and platforms lack adequate independent scrutiny to remove age-inappropriate and harmful content.
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terms: content, harmful
PFD report
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James Forryan
Easily accessible websites openly promote and provide guidance on suicide methods, contributing to deaths. There is a lack of sufficient regulation and enforcement against such harmful online content.
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terms: content, harmful
PFD report
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Molly Russell
Internet platforms lack age verification, age-specific content control, and parental monitoring features, exposing children to harmful material through algorithms and unrestricted access.
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terms: content, harmful
PFD report
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Chloe Macdermott
Online forums encourage suicide by providing methods without age restrictions or help signposting, and harmful content is not effectively removed. Lethal products are also easily purchased via international online retailers and delivered to the UK without effective border controls.
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terms: content, harmful
PFD report
73match
Oliver Gorman
There are inadequate age restrictions on dangerous aerosol products and unclear warnings about instant death. Social media platforms also fail to take responsibility for harmful content promoting such misuse.
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
73match
#38 - Safeguard General Election integrity from deepfake content and sanction failing platforms
The Government and regulatory authorities, informed by the work of the Defending Democracy Taskforce, should safeguard the integrity of the upcoming General Election campaign in its approach to the online platforms that host deepfake content which seeks to exert a malign influence on the democratic process. If these platforms are found to have been slow to remove such...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
72match
#1 - 1st Report - Growing up in the online world: The Education Committee’s response to the Government’s...
The Committee concludes that online harms affecting children are widespread, severe and systemic. The evidence we heard demonstrates clear links between children’s exposure to harmful online content (including material promoting self-harm, suicide, eating disorders, misogyny and sexual exploitation) and serious deterioration in mental health, wellbeing and behaviour, with tragic consequences in the most extreme cases. (Conclusion, Paragraph 6)
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
72match
#4 - 7th Report – Combatting new forms of extremism
Harmful extremist content is circulating widely online, driven by engagement and profit-maximising algorithms, influencer-led dissemination, and decentralised extremist ecosystems. These systems promote content designed to provoke outrage and fear, often purely for commercial reasons, and the speed and scale of dissemination have outpaced the capacity of moderation and removal tools. Content designed to attract, recruit and radicalise individuals...
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
71match
#15 - Commission independent research into effective methods for platforms to address misinformation.
In line with our Principle 1 of tackling amplified misinformation, the government should compel platforms to put in place minimum standards for addressing the spread of misleading content online. More information is needed on the merits of different approaches to this. The government should commission research into the relative benefits of independent third-party fact-checkers, crowd-sourced context provision, and...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
70match
#25 - Online Safety Act fails to protect users from synthetic disinformation and harmful experimental features.
The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed false or harmful information to their enormous audiences, further threatening information integrity online. This has damaging effects on...
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terms: harmful
Committee recommendation
69match
#28 - Require tech companies to cleanse datasets of NCII and source data responsibly.
The private sector has innovated to create AI technology. It does not need to wait for legislation to catch up in order to safeguard individuals from harmful AI-generated content. As a starting point tech companies involved in AI content creation should cleanse their datasets of NCII content and commit to responsible sourcing of data to safeguard those datasets...
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terms: content, harmful
Committee recommendation
69match
#22 - Collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and their online spreading techniques.
Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of such an influence operation is deeply concerning. In order to tackle amplified disinformation, identified by Principle 1, the...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
69match
#21 - Create an additional regulatory category for 'small but risky' platforms, based on their online harms.
The Online Safety Act does not do enough to address the risks posed by small platforms due to its exclusive focus on size. Ofcom should create an additional category to cover ‘small but risky’ platforms, based on analysis of the role that harmful smaller platforms can play in the online ecosystem, interacting with the recommendation algorithms of large...
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terms: harmful
Committee recommendation
69match
#12 - Mandate online services to give users a 'right to reset' recommendation data.
As per Principle 4, users should have more control over the content that is pushed to them online. Government should mandate all online services with a content recommendation algorithm to give the user a ‘right to reset’, which would delete all data stored by their recommendation algorithm, in the manner that users can clear their cookie history. This...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
69match
#8 - Urge government to define social media companies' responsibility as publishers or platforms
Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not merely platforms but curators of content. As we have seen, the amplification and spread of this content can...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
66match
#3 - 1st Report - Growing up in the online world: The Education Committee’s response to the Government’s...
The Committee is clear that the companies whose platforms are responsible for these harms cannot be left to self-regulate. We recommend that the Government treats online harms to children explicitly as a safeguarding and public health issue, rather than relying primarily on content moderation and reactive reporting systems. Preventative regulation should focus on reducing exposure to harm by...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
66match
#27 - Ofcom's hateful content investigation scope is too narrow, lacking confidence in consequences.
We welcome Ofcom’s investigation into the adequacy of social media companies’ actions in the removal of hateful content and potential strengthening of the Code of Practice. This work is urgent, yet only one company will be investigated over the next four months and we lack confidence that there will be any significant consequences if failings are found. (Conclusion,...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
64match
#23 - Second Report - Tackling online abuse
As part of the risk assessments social media platforms will be required to carry out under the new online safety regulation, we recommend that platforms should be required to evaluate the role played by anonymous accounts in creating and disseminating abusive content, and to consider how to minimise the misuse of anonymity for this purpose. Platforms should be...
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terms: content
PFD report
61match
Ben Walmsley
The school's IT system lacked a mechanism to alert staff when students attempted to access blocked self-harm content, relying solely on teacher monitoring and risking missed safeguarding opportunities.
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terms: content
PFD report
61match
Frances Thomas
Outdated e-security guidance from the Department of Education led to inadequate web filtering, lack of oversight for blocklists, and insufficient scrutiny of age-inappropriate online content in schools.
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terms: content
PFD report
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Isabella Shere
Quora's platform contains easily accessible, unmoderated content related to self-harm and suicide, lacking age verification and featuring engagement functions that normalise serious subject matter for children.
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
61match
#27 - Mandate consent-based offence for deepfake creation, including cultural intimate image abuse.
The Government’s plans to criminalise the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes/NCII, even if they are not shared, are very welcome and worthy of praise. However, the Government must ensure that the offence is consent- based and does not require the determination of any motivation on the part of the perpetrator. Consistent with our recommendations for non-synthetic content, the...
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
60match
#7 - 1st Report - Growing up in the online world: The Education Committee’s response to the Government’s...
We recommend that the Government introduces mandatory restrictions on high-risk and addictive design features, such as infinite scrolling, disappearing messages and algorithmic messages for under-18s, with appropriate age-related restrictions enabled by default, rather than relying on voluntary measures or user opt-ins. (Recommendation, Paragraph 15) Impact on schools, teachers and children’s education
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terms: algorithmic
Committee recommendation
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#10 - Publish government conclusions on harm promoted by platform recommendation systems.
Based on the research described above, the government should publish conclusions on the level and nature of harm that these platforms promote through their recommendation systems. Following our Principle 3, if significant harm is found, the responsible online services should publish the actions they will take to address these harms. Ofcom should be given the power to serve...
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PFD report
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Jerrelle McKenzie
The deceased accessed Dinitrophenol (DNP), a drug banned in the UK since 1938 due to its harmful effects, via the internet, likely influenced by social media, leading to his overdose.
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terms: harmful
PFD report
57match
Joseph Nihill
Online platforms actively promoted suicide methods and dangerous substances to vulnerable young men, undermining mental health support and posing a foreseeable risk of drawing individuals into self-harm.
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Inquiry recommendation
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FR-20 - Age Verification Online
The Inquiry recommends (as originally stated in its The Internet Investigation Report, dated March 2020) that the UK government introduces legislation requiring providers of online services and social media platforms to implement more stringent age verification measures.
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Inquiry recommendation
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106 - Online age verification legislation
The government should introduce legislation requiring providers of online services and social media platforms to implement more stringent age verification techniques on all relevant devices.
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Committee recommendation
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#16 - 1st Report - Growing up in the online world: The Education Committee’s response to the Government’s...
The Committee recommends that the Government introduces a statutory ban on the use of social media platforms for children under the age of 16. It is time to apply the brakes and prioritise children’s safety. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)
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Committee recommendation
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#14 - 1st Report - Growing up in the online world: The Education Committee’s response to the Government’s...
We recommend that the Government uses the powers available to it to impose clear, enforceable duties on platforms to prioritise child safety by design, backed by meaningful sanctions for non-compliance. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28) 17 The case for restricting social media use
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Committee recommendation
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#3 - Online Safety Act fails to adequately tackle misinformation and pervasive online harm
The Online Safety Act was not designed to tackle misinformation—we heard that even if it had been fully implemented, it would have made little difference to the spread of misleading content that drove violence and hate in summer 2024. Therefore, the Act fails to keep UK citizens safe from a core and pervasive online harm. (Conclusion, Paragraph 18)
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terms: content
Committee recommendation
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#25 - Online platforms facilitate religious hatred with inadequate regulation and consequences.
At present people can stir up religious hatred online in the knowledge that their comments are unlikely to be removed and, except in the most extreme cases, are unlikely to face any consequences for their actions. While some individuals have been prosecuted for posting hate speech, the platforms that facilitate it have faced no consequences, if anything they...
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PFD report
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Callie Lewis
An online suicide forum provided dangerous advice, enabling individuals to mislead mental health professionals and perfect suicide methods, thus frustrating necessary assessments and interventions.
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