Mark Duggan

Security classification Not Protectively Marked Disclosable under FOIA 2000 Yes AcPO ASSOCIATION OF Author Chief Police officers Force/organisation Derbyshire Constabulary Telephone number 0300 122 5555 National Policing Business Area Workforce Development Date created 21 July 2014 HHJ Keith Cutler CBE HM Assistant Coroner The Mark Duggan Inquest Taylor House Fourth Floor 88 Rosebery Avenue London ECIR 4QU Monday 21 July 2014 National Policing (ACPO) response to your report to prevent future deaths arising out of the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan Your Honour In accordance with paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 5 of Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
s.29 (4) of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 we set out here the response of the National Armed Policing and the National Policing Professional Standards Portfolios to your report to prevent future deaths arising out of the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan. We should perhaps at the outset point out that national policing work through ACPO is now conducted through a number of national policing business areas, each of which takes lead responsibility for a broad area of policing and is headed by a serving chief officer. There has been high degree of collaborative working in recent years between the work of the respective portfolios for armed policing and professional standards in managing the service's response to incidents involving death or serious injury (DSI) . More particularly, and of relevance to this response, is that in May this year these two portfolios collaborated to submit the national policing response to the IPCC's consultation on its draft statutory guidance to the police service on achieving best evidence in death or serious injury matters. Ist Floor, 10 Victoria Street, London SWIH ONN T 020 7084 8950 F 020 7084 8951 Registered in England and Wales as private company limited by guarantee_ Registered number 3344583. Registered office 10 Victoria Street; London SWIH ONN the police

In paragraph 72 of your report; you invited ACPO to send you a copy of its response to this IPCC consultation_ We are pleased to do and append to this correspondence copy of that response dated 27 May 2014, (Appendix A): can confirm that upon reviewing this response in light of the matters you set out in your report under Concern 2: (Comprehensive accounts were not taken from police witnesses at the first possible opportunity), as you anticipated, the earlier response to the IPCC of 27 May 2014 does indeed deal in some detail with the concerns you articulate. We set out here some additional explanatory context to deal with the specific matters raised under Concern 2 and also under Concern 4: (The scene of the fatal police shooting was not video recorded) , Concern 5: (The planned operation to seize weapons was not pursued after the fatal shot was fired) , and Concern 6 (The armed police operation was not recorded after State Red was called) and upon which you required response from National (ACPO): Concern 2: Comprehensive accounts were not taken from police witnesses at the first possible opportunity Paragraphs 64 and 65 In paragraph 64 of your report, you summarise the reasons for your over-arching concern that fatal shootings are not as rigorously examined as they should be and that doubts about the accuracy of police accounts are not minimised. In paragraph 65 you make clear your belief that the national best practice as sanctioned or encouraged by ACPO may not be the best possible practice_ For some considerable time the Armed Policing Portfolio has been at the forefront of police service's handling of post incident procedures. Indeed, the formal post incident procedures that have evolved over the last decade or so and which continue to evolve are direct result of the service's own desire to secure and preserve the best available evidence , and to bring structure and control to critical incident management in events where there is understandable public concern over the legitimacy of police action or omission to act. These procedures are designed to serve the best interests of an IPCC's independent investigation and the accountability of officers to the law: SO, Policing police the police

The National Policing portfolios quite properly maintain these post incident procedures under constant review, particularly in light of learning from the thankfully rare fatal police shootings and other deaths in or during police contact The current post incident guidance in place has been revised since the events of August 2011 and is now set out in Module of the Authorised Policing Practice (APP) for Armed Policing; guidance which is endorsed and published by College of Policing. It is important to confirm in this response that both the ACPO guidance in place in August 2011 and the existing APP expressly state that officers should not confer (i.e. speak to each other about their evidence) after any death or serious injury incident, and emphasise here that the National Policing portfolios do not approve of officers conferring, save where strictly necessary for the express purpose of a police operation: The National Policing portfolios are currently undertaking further review of these procedures , in part at least as a direct result of the issues arising from the death of Mark Duggan. We have already taken steps to ensure that as part of immediate post incident procedures_ senior officer is present when officers are preparing initial accounts_ This senior officer will be in a position to confirm and reassure that either conferring did not take place or; if it did, it was for necessary purpose as provided by the APP, which sets out in clear terms that an officer should not confer about any honestly held belief relating to the use of force. In addition, we have made clear the post incident process can and should be more transparent to both a host force's initial investigating officers and to the IPCC's investigators_ We believe it to be in the interests of the public, the service and all individual officers involved in such incident that there is both transparency and integrity in mutually dependent post incident imperatives of providing necessarily high degree of welfare support to all officers in what are often highly complex and challenging operational circumstance and the duty to facilitate thorough and impartial investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident: the firmly police any

Paragraph 66 In paragraph 66 of your report you set out your concern that not all witnesses to fatal police shooting are asked to give full statements as soon as possible after the event, and refer to the existing guidance that recommends that at least 48 hours should elapse before full accounts are taken from police officers_ There is nothing in the APP to prevent police witnesses who are not designated as principal officers from making detailed notes at the earliest practicable opportunity: Nor does the guidance seek to prevent officers from providing as detailed accounts as may be necessary: Investigators can properly seek to obtain statements of evidence from officers not designated as principal officers_ The post incident procedures are designed to ensure that the initial investig authority can identify exactly who is included as a principal officer and the rationale for such inclusion will be dependent upon the prevailing circumstances As an investigation unfolds, it may well be the case that others involved in the operation, whose actions or decisions were involved in informing or making critical decisions, may be regarded as principal officers In the initial stages all actions taken by, and in respect of, principal officers in relation to securing evidence, discussion undertaken and notes made should be documented, and there are four clear stages setting out the provision of information and accounts_ The last stage, (Stage 4) sets out that detailed accounts (including statements or interviews) should not normally be obtained immediately, but should be left until the officers involved in the shooting are better able to articulate their experience in a coherent format. This is usually after at least forty-eight hours This period of time is indicative and not prescriptive and will of course be matter for individual case circumstances, and will depend upon factors including the availability of investigators. Police officers should rightly be considered professional witnesses and should be treated as such, and in any fatal police shooting it is a matter for the senior investigating officer of the investigating authority to determine and negotiate how to secure and preserve relevant witness accounts and testimony: ating

Insofar as principal officers are concerned, you raise a question over the distinction made between the seeking of accounts from a police officer and a civilian who uses lethal force in defence of himself or another: think it right to acknowledge that firearms officers can and do face situations of risk and threat with dilemmas that should not be underestimated in the enormity of the consequence and responsibility of their actions and decisions_ Unless there are any reasonable grounds to believe the contrary may be the case, firearms officers who act in accordance with their powers, duties and responsibilities are professional witnesses who place themselves at risk of death or serious injury to protect the public, to reduce and mitigate threat and harm to others, and to bring offenders to justice, and fully deserve recognition as such: Initial investigating officers and indeed the IPCC have sufficient and robust powers to determine prospective culpability and to hold to account any officer using or being involved in the use of lethal force in the event either criminality or misconduct is considered. Where a civilian uses lethal force in defence of self or another, it is also invariably the case the attendant circumstances of the incident are fully taken into account in making a decision as to the prospective culpability for any criminality, and of course, any such person benefits from legal safeguards and guidance for achieving best evidence in securing evidence by way of account taken, statement or interview: In respect of your concern over the extent to which the academic research underpinning the practice of allowing period between a traumatic event and a statement being given can Or should be relied upon, it is beyond the scope of this response to fully place into context the relevant academic studies that provide strong evidence for the basis that best evidence is achieved by taking into account the effective recall and the impact on memory. These issues are expanded upon in detail in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) submission to the IPCC's consultation (May 2014) , and we would therefore respectfully draw your attention to this submission as am aware the MPS will be forwarding to you this response in accordance with your request at paragraph 72 of your report.

In paragraph 66 you make specific reference to the apparent inconsistences in findings between earlier Home Office Study Papers (which lends some support to the practice of allowing period between traumatic event and statement given) and more recent paper by Dr William Lewinski: As part of the National Policing response to the earlier IPCC consultation, we recently commissioned Professor Gudjonsson, Emeritus Professor of Forensic Psychology at King's College, London to conduct a review of the conclusions of Home Office Study Papers of 1986 and 1993, taking into account subsequent relevant studies. Professor Gudjonsson affirms support for the position that where an officer is to be in a state of physical and mental shock and suffering some degree of confusion, statements taken under these conditions be of limited forensic value, and that some form of delaying the formal investigative procedure should be considered in order to give the officer the time and opportunity to recover from the initial effects of his experience_ Furthermore , Professor Gudjonsson highlights his serious concerns about unwarranted assumptions and expectations regarding officers being able to produce detailed and reliable account of events immediately after major firearms incidents. Whereas the gist of what took place is likely to be reasonably clearly recalled, details may take time to recall and on many occasions may never have been properly observed and processed, making any retrieval attempts futile. Professor Gudjonsson also concluded that in view of the likely state of high emotional arousal and confusion, firearms officers involved in shooting incidents that cause serious injury or fatality should only provide an initial account of what happened and what clearly recall before going off with detailed account given later after a period of rest. Professor Gudjonsson's tends to strongly support the National Policing position and reinforces that adopted in the APP_ When providing a statement;, officers should be in a sufficiently sound mentallemotional state to provide a clear, detailed and coherent account of events_ The is to optimize their capacity to provide their 'best' and most reliable account of events_ We have appended a copy of this paper to this response (Appendix B): being likely may they duty being finding key

Paragraph 67 The APP provides that officers who were in the immediate vicinity of the discharge of firearms or other munitions should be examined by registered medical practitioner (FME) as a matter of course, subject to their consent, as may have suffered an injury of which are not aware_ We agree with your view articulated in paragraph 67 that it should be a matter for the officer concerned and the FME as to whether the officer is in a fit state to give an account Nothing in APP should preclude any officer principal or otherwise from making an account in whatever level of detail he or she thinks fit The post incident procedures are designed to accommodate and facilitate the needs of the investigation with the welfare considerations and whilst medical advice and other welfare considerations are properly made available to principal officers under these procedures, they are under no obligation to follow such advice or guidance: It is perhaps salient to point out here that in his recent review, Professor Gudjonsson remarks that forensic medical examiners are generally not trained to consider the impact of the psychological state of witness following traumatic incident, as this kind of assessment requires specialist expertise over and above those of a primary care physician. Paragraph 68 We understand the fact that some officer witnesses who perceived a threat from the person who was shot did not set that out in their statements was subject of significant scrutiny during the course of the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan The existence or otherwise of a threat, real or perceived, would appear to be matter of some critical importance to an investigator and any subsequent inquiry or proceedings to determine. From national policing perspective, it will be prudent to take steps to reinforce this issue through both National Armed Policing and through the College of Policing: they they the police

Paragraph 69 The National Policing perspective is that there does remain a very important purpose in determining the status of a 'principal officer' from that of a general policing witness_ Police officers are entrusted with unique powers of coercion over fellow citizens_ Both the public and the police service remain committed to the principles of policing by consent and largely and routinely unarmed presence in our communities_ Authorised Firearms Officers are right at the very high end of specialist policing; they are volunteers and are trained and expected to deal with situations of extreme violence and significant threat to life where the application of lethal force may be necessary to protect the public and themselves It is from this context that the term 'principal officer' has developed as a result of the police services' commitment to effective post incident procedures that meets the exacting scrutiny of independent investigations and the requirements of an Article 2 ECHR investigation. In the National Policing response to the recent IPCC consultation on its draft statutory guidance to the police service on achieving best evidence in death or serious injury matters also set out our view that the distinction in Module 7 of the APP between 'principal officers' and other police witnesses to a death or serious injury (DSI) incident should be retained: We see some merit in subdividing the balance of the policing witnesses as policing witnesses and other policing witnesses, with the caveat that the definition of a policing witness need not be constrained to those present at the actual scene of the death or serious injury sustained: For instance, as in the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan, firearms commanders, tactical advisors and intelligence officers may be equally to any decision to use force. Paragraph 70 The National Policing portfolios appreciate the real and tangible welfare support invariably offered by representatives of the Police Federation (and indeed the Superintendents' Association) to principal officers during the course of the immediacy of post incident procedures and particularly during then later phases of post incident management; complex and thorough investigations and exacting inquires and inquests_ police key key key

Many police forces in England and Wales quite properly and responsibly ensure staff association representatives receive accredited training in post incident management: Whilst such representative play crucial part in these post incident procedures under the direction and control of the post incident manager , it is equally important that such representatives do not duplicate or intrude into the provision of legal advice It will be prudent to take steps to ensure the APP reflects and reinforces that any intervention by staff association representatives prior to an officer's full account being recorded be restricted to welfare considerations. We will take this matter forward through the National Portfolios in conjunction with the College of Policing: Paragraph 71 Paragraph 71 rightly and understandably describes the issue of opportunities for police officers to confer after police shooting as being controversial: The National Policing perspectives on this issue are set out in some detail in its earlier referred to response to this IPCC consultation of 27 May 2014. It may assist if we set out here some salient points from that response It is noted that your concerns as set out in paragraphs 64 to 72 do not include mention of a requirement to separate officers prior to the provision of a first account;, position taken by the IPCC in its draft consultation. It is unequivocally in the interests of the public, the police service and all individual officers involved in any such incident that there is both transparency and integrity in mutually dependent post incident imperatives of providing necessarily high degree of welfare support to all officers in what are often highly complex and challenging operational circumstance and the duty to facilitate thorough and impartial investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident. The National Policing portfolios contend that there are four important factors to be born in mind in considering post incident procedures: (a) the safety of the public and officers; (b) achieving best evidence; (c) transparency and public confidence; and (d) safeguarding the welfare of officers , particularly in the case of fatal police shootings (due to the traumatic effect of a fatal shooting on the firearms officers concerned): police

The IPCC's draft guidance promotes the third factor at the expense of the first; second and fourth factors_ The National Policing portfolios' view is that post incident procedures should strike an appropriate balance between all four factors, a position that Module 7 of the APP seeks to achieve_ There are certain elements of the IPCC's draft guidance that could usefully be included in the existing APP_ There are other concepts in the IPCC's draft guidance that the National Policing portfolios do not support for the reasons set in detail in that response_ Seeking to ensure the separation of officers engaged and involved in a critical incident for what may prove to be significant period of time before an opportunity to rationally collect thoughts and compose an initial account no matter how brief is of course a legitimate and laudable aim but one that has to be set into context: Where officers have been together at the time of such an incident, as is in the case of many armed policing operations, the separation of officers may prove operationally or logistically impractical, as there are often large numbers of officers who will fall into the definition of key policing witness_ Such officers may have been together for a substantial period of time before it is practical to separate them, negating the rationale for separation Where officers who may be policing witnesses or designated as principal officers have been at different locations in the events leading to the DSI matter, will of course be easier to ensure separation prior to the recording of an initial account both in the immediate aftermath and in subsequent post incident procedures. To simply state that officers identified as policing witnesses should be kept separate prior to completion of a detailed individual first account without any acknowledgement of the very real practical, resourcing and logistical problems of doing so is setting the police service and indeed the IPCC up to fail and will only serve to undermine the effectiveness of any investigation and ultimately will adversely reflect on IPCC and police service credibility. Chief officers are rightly concerned that to pay due regard to guidance that is difficult if not impossible to practically follow without detracting from operational imperatives will have undue adverse consequences for public safety and public confidence 10 out key key having

We have already taken steps to ensure that as of immediate post incident procedures , a senior officer is present when the officers are preparing their initial accounts_ This officer should be in a position to confirm that either conferring did not take place or, if it did, the APP was complied with_ In addition we have made clear the process can and should be more transparent to both host force initial investigating officers or to the IPCC's investigators. Chief officers quite properly contend that ordinarily, police officers who act in full accordance with their powers , duties and responsibilities are professional witnesses and deserve recognition as such. Many chief officers have argued in previous instances that where there are no grounds to consider any criminal conduct or any breach of any standard of professional behaviour on the part of any officer or member of staff; the explicit separation of officers is wholly disproportionate and unjustified and is both morally wrong and legally questionable. In the absence of prima facie evidence to suggest otherwise, principal officers are witnesses and should be treated accordingly: If grounds exist to suspect an officer of a criminal or misconduct offence, investigators have a wide range ofpowers available to satisfactorily deal with officers_ point we reinforced in this response was that we remain keen to engage with the IPCC to seek to establish an evidence-based approach to the issue of capturing and presenting best evidence from officers who are party to dynamically unfolding and often unanticipated traumatic events during the course of their duties. It is important to consider all the academic research on the subject of whether separation actually produces better evidence, or indeed whether the production of a detailed initial first account is a basis upon which to contend best evidence is predicated. Our concern is that the draft IPCC guidance pays no heed to the extent of the authoritative research on the to provide best evidence, and that seeking the wholesale separation of officers as a starting point without any recourse to a flexible and considered approach that takes into account the specific circumstances of the DSI matter will not achieve the best evidence sought by both the service and the IPCC_ As set out in our response, we do not believe the one size fits all' approach to separation of officers in the draft guidance is fit for purpose to deal with the complexities of an armed policing operation and other instances in operational policing where members of the public tragically lose their lives or receive serious injury during or following police contact. 11 part fully ability police

Concern 4: The scene of the fatal police shooting was not video recorded The National Policing portfolios concur with your view that is important to minimise distrust in the police in connection with fatal shootings, and notwithstanding any development over the use of body worn video (BWV), will consider how best to reflect changes in the College of Policing's APP on incident procedures to ensure standard operational procedures encompass the benefits of the earliest possible commencement of the video recording of scenes, subject of course to ongoing operational imperatives to protect public and individual safety and to continue to mitigate any risk of harm: A distinction has of course to be drawn between the responsibilities of an ongoing firearms operation and post incident scene management and the necessity of securing and preserving relevant evidence_ Concern 5: The planned operation to seize weapons was not pursued after the fatal shot was fired The issue you set out in paragraphs 84 to 86 is one for wider operational policing and for senior investigating officer and operational commander and the National Policing portfolios will ensure liaison with the College of to incorporate, reiterate and reflect in its operational training: Concern 6: The armed police operation was not recorded after State Red was called The National Armed Policing Portfolio has already commenced work to determine whether the introduction of body warn video (BWV) , recently trialled in a number of forces in England and Wales might be included in armed policing operations This work is progressing and is likely to lead to some pilot initiatives later in 2014 to assess its validity and feasibility. The Portfolio is keen to establish an evidence based approach upon which BWV might provide best evidence, and as importantly public confidence and reassurance in such operations 12 post Policing

The wider issues of data recording and tracking on covert police vehicles likely to be used in armed policing operations is currently being considered by the National Police Interoperability Working Group and at present am unable to provide any more definitive response_ will of course ensure you are appraised of any progress or developments In conclusion, we hope these responses herein provide you with reassurance that the National Policing Portfolios and the wider police service is and remains committed to ensuring that any action that can reasonably be taken to eliminate or reduce the risk of death of any person in any policing operation is properly considered and acted upon_

Dear Judge, Re: The_Inquest into the death of Mark Duggan This is the response of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to your Report to Prevent Future Deaths' (PFD Report) dated 29th
2014. Introduction The MPS desires and intends to continue to learn lessons from the events of and following 4th August 2011. The MPS welcomes informed comment and assistance in achieving its aspirations, including, but not limited to, that provided by the jury' $ determinations, your subsequent investigation;, and PFD Report dated 29uh
2014. That report directs six concerns to the MPS_ The MPS responds to those concerns in accordance with the statutory 56 time frame. Given the nature and extent of the work undertaken by the MPS and by relevant bodies including the Association of Chief Police Officers [*ACPO'] in response to the events of August 2011, upon which your concerns have an important influence; it will be appreciated that this response describes the present progress rather than the final outcome of the total MPS response_ Background In the fiscal year April 2012 to March 2013 the MPS conducted 1136 pre-planned armed operations. This was 10.3% of the total for England and Wales (10996). The source of this data are the Home Office Statistics on Police Use of Firearms in England and Wales 2012-13 published by the then Policing Minister Damian Green on the 27th March 2014. During this period the MPS conducted 454 MAST operations of which there were 15 incidents where vehicle was Lexcel Practice Management Standard Law Society Accredited 24th May May day

immobilised a total of 28 Hatton rounds this twelve month period no lethal weapons were discharged by police during MAST operations. The use of pre-planned MAST operations was an important tactic in Operation Dibri. Such operations are controlled and led by & cadre of trained strategic and tactical firearms commanders within the Specialist Firearms Command and their detective colleagues of equal occupational accreditation and operational competence in Trident: involve the deployment of specialist firearms officers and both armed and unarmed surveillance officers. Such operations are extremely resource intensive. The MAST operation of 3rd-4th August 2011 was one such pre-planned, resource-heavy and intelligence led operation It was set up because of serious levels of criminality and the reliability of the available intelligence in order to recover firearms from its six named subjects, senior members of the Tottenham Man Dem, any one of whom might had a gun: The operation had to be authorised to keep the public safe_ It was authorised by one of the most experienced Strategic Firearms Commanders in the country following receipt of the requisite tactical advice, full briefing and presentation from the Tactical Firearms Commander; advice from the Tactical Advisor about the available options and whether and how those options met her working strategy, and meeting with intelligence managers on 3rd August 2011. The resultant tactical plan contained range of options designed to permit a flexible response to developing intelligence Intelligence could and did change significantly and rapidly and was acted upon as and when it became specific Concerns Given that general background, the MPS responds as follows to your six concerns Concern I: The MPS and SOCA could have reacted better to developing events and used their joint intelligence resources better The MPS acknowledges both the jury'$ response to question 1and your concern: The MPS is committed to the removal of guns from the streets of London: It has limited resources to effect this commitment;, and decisions must be made as to how to target those resources. Thus, the officers deployed actively in the MAST operation on 3rd and 4th August 2011 were due to be on from
18.O0hrs, reflecting the consistency of the intelligence that any handover of a gun would be after
21.OOhrs. In the event; on 4th August 2011,the pick-up of the gun was arranged to take place some hours earlier, This is an example of a significant change in specific intelligence which had to be and was responded to. The exhaustion of all avenues may be disproportionate; impossible; impracticable and/or unnecessary depending on the particular facts of any given case. The essential point; which governed the decisions on the deployment of MPS resources on 3rd and 4th August 2011, is that all the intelligence, which was ofhigh-grade quality, related to Mark Duggan, the intended recipient of the gun. The MPS resources were therefore directed at the recovery of the gun from Mark Duggan. Intelligence provided to the MPS by SOCA indicated Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was gun or guns for Mark Duggan The MPS did not telephone Mr Hutchinson-Foster's probation officer;, which might have confirmed his bail hostel address and telephone number. Possession of that address by the MPS might, theoretically, on application and diversion of very significant and valuable resources, have led eventually to the location of Mr Hutchinson-Foster at the bail hostel. He was not at the hostel o the night of the 3rd August 2011. The protracted and continuous During using They have duty storing

surveillance necessary to locate Mr Hutchinson-Foster in this way could not and would not have represented a justifiable application of MPS resources in light of the available intelligence. Still less would Mr Hutchinson-Foster have been subject to the continuous directed surveillance necessary to locate him at Burchell Road in advance of the handover_ Crucially, in any event; the location of the gun O guns was and would have been entirely unknown until the and time of handover of a firearm in Burchell Road. Had the whereabouts of the gun(s) had been established, or capable of established, to 17:15 on 4th August 2011,the MPS would have responded Notwithstanding this history, the MPS is anxious to ensure that the manner in which it plans such operations, responds to and develops intelligence and uses the resources available to it is of the very highest order. Following a comprehensive review of intelligence procedures and liaison conducted in response to your PFD report; the MPS has concluded that there were, and continue to be, robust, risk managed and accountable joint MPSINCA (and previously SOCA) processes to request; refuse and allow intelligence opportunities to be developed with clear lines of governance: The MPS have collaborated with the NCA on all aspects of review and learning undertaken as a result of the tragic death of Mark Duggan. These include professional development training courses for staff and managers in specialist skills and (b) reviews into safe-guarding and critical incident procedures. The MPS is adopting processes and developing training specifically designed to ensure the relevant Senior Investigating Officer [*SIO ] is fully sighted on all available intelligence: Covert Intelligence Managers will have a specific responsibility to maintain oversight of covert intelligence processes in order to ensure that the SIO is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving the his Or her strategy. Emphasis will be laid on ensuring that the oversight must include dynamic responses to changes in the SIO s strategy in light of all available intelligence Training for MPS Intelligence Officers will be reviewed to guarantee that there is sufficient emphasis o their role in ensuring the Senior Investigating Officer is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy in each case: Training for SIOs leading operations in which covert intelligence will play significant role will include bespoke input providing them with an understanding of the specific processes & safeguards involved in this specialist arena of policing: In addition to this, and in light of un-related changes to the Met Intelligence structure, the MPS will review the training provided to SIOs who are responsible for the management of proactive policing operations in order to ensure intelligence development activities remain accountable for decisions taken relating to the exploitation of available intelligence to ensure consistency and leamning is maintained. As these issues are of national relevance and significance; the MPS Commander for Intelligence Covert Policing will brief the ACPO Intelligence Portfolio lead on your concems, the MPS response to those concerns and the detailed learning in this case in order that consideration can be given to changes to Intelligence Management from & national policing perspective. Concern 2: Comprehensive accounts were not taken from police witnesses at the first possible opportunity The MPS believes that it is imperative that all police shootings, fatal O otherwise, are subject to the most rigorous examination: The MPS appreciates the need and is eager to work closely with the IPCC to ensure this takes place. The MPS agrees with the IPCC that achieving best evidence in the point being prior (a)

investigation of death or serious incident [*DSI ] matter; as an Article 2 ECHR compliant investigation, must ensure that the public has full confidence in the integrity of the investigation. concern is that post incident procedures adopted in August 2011 for taking accounts officers involved in such shootings which reflected national practice, which procedures were sanctioned and/or encouraged by ACPO and which were implemented by the MPS under the auspices of the IPCC in August 2011, did not amount to best practice. The MPS is grateful for your recognition that its acts in this case were in accordance with the guidance produced by the National Policing Improvement Agency ['NPIA '] on behalf of ACPO in force in August 2011, namely, the Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers 2nd edition [*the Guidance' ] . The MPS understands the need to prevent any perception that the systems employed lack integrity. The MPS can and does in striving to achieve best practice adopt and implement procedures which go beyond but are consistent which national practice and guidance. Thus, for example, a senior officer must now be present in the Post Incident Management [*PIM ] suite whilst officers produce witness statements, with a view to ensuring the openness and transparency of the process. The MPS agrees that the current Post Incident Procedure (PIP) does not attract public confidence and needs to be made more transparent The Guidance was revised in 2011. On 1st December 2012, the functions of the NPIA were assumed by the new College of Policing: The Guidance has since been decommissioned and replaced entirely by the consolidated Armed Policing Authorised Professional Practice' [*APP'] The process of improvement partially reflected in this history is an ongoing one. The MPS anticipates further modification of the APP to improve transparency and accountability and wholly supports such amendment. You refer (at paragraphs 71-72) to the extant IPCC consultation on its draft statutory guidance to the police service on achieving best evidence in DSI matters [*draft guidance ] and requests that a copy of the MPS response be sent to you. This is attached. The MPS makes the further additional comments in response to your observations: The MPS agrees that *bland and uninformative' accounts, if and whenever provided, are not acceptable. The MPS now requires a senior officer to be present in the PIM suite, whose functions include ensuring the inclusion of sufficient detail in initial and subsequent accounts. Sufficient detail includes the presence O absence of any perceived threat and the officer s response thereto. The MPS is working with law firms who represent firearms officers to ensure that its expectations are clearly understood. The success of these measures was demonstrated by the post incident processes adopted following the events of 2013 in Woolwich and the quality of the witness statements produced through those processes
b. There is and was clear ACPO guidance on the identification of Principal Officers. In August 2011, that was contained at paragraph
7.42ff of the ACPO 2010 Manual of Guidance. Identification of Principal Officer required the input of number of individual and/lor organisations, including the IPCC and the Post Incident Manager: Principal Officers are those who either used force or were involved in the decision to use force. Principal Officers are not those more likely to be cautioned; rather; Principal Officers are recognised as those particularly requiring welfare support: Your from May

Neither the 2010 ACPO Manual nor its successors contain blanket prohibition on conferring following & fatal shooting: Such prohibition would be impracticable. It may be essential for officers to confer about a range of matters connected to andlor from the operation; for example;, to ensure public safety in dealing with an ongoing threat Or crime in action; O to establish lines of enquiry that would assist the investigator in determining their forensic strategy. Both the 2010 Manual and its successors warn conferring and stress the critical importance of the individual officer'$ record of his or her individual understanding of the situation was when force was used. There is and was presumption in the guidance that officers should not confer; and must not confer on their own beliefs relating to the use of force. The MPS expressly and explicitly warns its officers, in accordance with this guidance, that officers should not confer o an incident and must not confer on their individual use of force. conferring and the rationale for that conferring must be recorded; in detail, to further ensure transparency in the process_
d. Officers involved in a fatal shooting are under intense scrutiny. A decision about criminal Or disciplinary proceedings may not be made for months or years after such shooting: Such officers are required to carry out difficult and/or dangerous tasks at, not infrequently, personal risk. witness may speak to a solicitor to giving information to police. The same is true of any suspect. A witness is entitled to provide their account in the manner of their choosing: Officers involved in fatal shooting should be entitled to no lesser protections and support than any other member of the public who is a witness. This is codified in the Ministry of Justice 2011 guidance for Achieving Best Evidence [*ABF'] regarding the timing of any interview and the provision of a full and detailed account Police officers are professional witnesses trained to make statements and give evidence and as such are legally and morally obliged to record best evidence as soon aS practicable if medically fit to do s0 and not; for example, suffering or likely to suffer from distress O extreme fatigue in accordance with ABE principles_ Welfare is the primary support provided by the Police Federation. Securing legal advice for supported officers is part of that welfare function: Failing to take welfare concerns into account and attempting to take full statements immediately from witnesses who are suffering shock; distress or extreme fatigue is likely to be counterproductive and of limited forensic value The MPS is aware that ACPO has provided you with copy of Professor Gudjonsson's 2014 review of Home Office Study Papers of 1986 and 1993 and respectfully refer you to that review and its conclusions. The MPS has a legal and moral of care to its officers and staff when are involved in traumatic events. The MPS needs officers to volunteer for high threat; high-risk roles, such as armed policing: The MPS accepts, of course; that this of care must be balanced against the need for a thorough, objective and expeditious investigation of all the circumstances to find the truth for the bereaved family and the wider public. Concern 3: The IPCC had primacy at the scene but did not have the resources to conduct all relevant activities there The MPS agrees that the scene of a fatal police shooting should be the subject of no confusion about the purpose or furtherance of investigation; and that the IPCC should be well resourced, competent; of rapid deployment and able to take control of a scene is essential to achieving this end. Parallel investigations were necessary into the events of 4th August 2011. The IPCC investigated the shooting by an MPS officer; ad the MPS investigated the criminal offences relating to the gun arising against Any great Any 'prior duty they duty capable

found on the The scene of the shooting was, clearly; evidential area for both investigations The control of the scene immediately after the shooting remained with the Tactical Firearms Commander pursuant to the 2011 Manual of Guidance pending the involvement of the IPCC. Such parallel investigations are common to most cases involving the discharge of a firearm by police officers and are likely to share some; though not all, investigative objectives. The issue of command and control at the scene of a critical incident is presently under review within the MPS. A working group led by the Directorate of Professional Standards has been formed to review and examine the issue from the Operational Firearms Commander through to Management Board in DSI incidents. The IPCC has been invited to provide input to this process_ In carrying out an investigation, the IPCC relies on the relevant police service, working t0 its direction, to conduct relevant activities, for example, forensic retrieval and scene examination. In the case of the MPS, the officers and staff charged with providing this assistance are independent to those under IPCC investigation: The Directorate of Professional Standards, Specialist Investigations maintains 24 hour on call service to respond to all incidents involving death and serious injury following police contact. Scene control and the manner in which the MPS assists the IPCC must and are being addressed by the MPS and IPCC working together to achieve clarity of responsibility and effective communication at the scene of a police shooting: You will be aware that paragraphs 7-12 of the IPCC's draft statutory guidance relate to the identification and preservation of all potentially relevant evidence and scenes_ The MPS generally supports these paragraphs. It is an area in which very considerable progress has been made in this area since 2011 in response to events of 4th August 2011 and subsequent incidents, example, the shootings in Woolwich following the murder of Lee Rigby: On 25th September 2013, a Tabletop Workshop was held by the MPS_ The IPCC, SIOs, Operational Command Unit [*OCU'] Commanders and other senior officers from all firearms OCUs and OCUs responsible for the investigation of serious crime were invited The aim of the workshop was to understand and examine the roles and interaction between the various agencies. The resultant analysis is that the essence of effective scene management not in deciding which body holds primacy over the investigation but rather in all investigators meeting at the earliest opportunity to agree o (a) where responsibility lies for each aspect of the investigations and (b) protocols for each aspect of the investigations_ It is anticipated that the MPS and the IPCC will formally record an agreed protocol detailing the commitment to hold a strategic scene co-ordination meeting between the SIOs from the IPCC, DPS and the relevant Operational Command Unit responsibility for any parallel investigation. This work is ongoing The MPS appreciates the distress that inaccurate Or uncorrected false information has caused in number of cases. In respect of Mr Duggan; inaccurate information was provided to the media, for which the IPCC later apologised. Media strategy and communications template for armed policing incidents is currently being reviewed by the MPS Directorate of Media & Communications. This provides framework for the Gold Commander and DMC to work towards and specifies the responsibilities for collecting the information and quality assuring the product: Concern 4: The scene of the fatal police shooting was not video recorded The MPS acknowledges that the recording of the scene of a fatal police shooting is desirable aspect of crime scene management and recognises the importance of securing best evidence in the immediate aftermath and ongoing investigation of police shooting: This is the ultimate responsibility of the senior investigating officer (SIO); in the case of a fatal police shooting; that key grass for lies key

SIO will inevitably be from the IPCC, working with and through the police Professional Standards Unit. In the immediate aftermath of a police shooting, it is inevitable that only the officers on scene will be available to carry out an immediate video O photographic capture The convoy of cars on 4th August 2011 was equipped with both video and still cameras. The primary purpose for which that equipment is provided is to capture images of locations and environments to assist in tactical planning: Armed officers are not currently trained or equipped to record scenes to an evidential standard. On 4th August 2011, officers were able to and did, as an incidence of individual decision making and availability in the circumstances of the particular case of resources, use both cameras to record some parts of the scene, in particular; the provision of first aid. The priorities for armed officers at the scene of a police shooting were and will continue to be saving life, protection of the public and the security of the scene. It is difficult to anticipate with any precision the manner in which resources will fall to be best deployed in such circumstances Further; it is at best highly unlikely that it would be possible to comprehensively record every aspect of the aftermath of police shooting: It is similarly unlikely that officers would correctly select and record each aspect which the benefit ofhindsight proves to have been most significant It is the view of the MPS that firearms officers should not be responsible for recording post incident scene preservation MPS firearms officers are due to commence the piloting of Body Worn Cameras (see Concern 6, below)_ This may provide some level of recording of the actions taken to preserve the scene in the immediate aftermath but have limitations in that they will only capture a certain camera angle: In spontaneous incident; it is likely that this will be the only method of immediately recording the scene Another option that is currently being explored by the MPS in the case of pre-planned operations is to assign this role to an operations team officer_ This officer's primary responsibility would be to record the scene in the event of a police shooting until such time that either a police helicopter (if available or able to deploy), independent investigators (DPS/IPCC) or any specialist support services deployed by them (for example; Crime Scene Managers or the Computer Aided Modelling Bureau see below) arrive on scene. feasibility study is currently conducted to ensure that any issues associated with this option can be considered. The possibility of utilising the Computer Aided Modelling Bureau [*CAMB ] is also relevant in this context is considered by the Directorate of Professional Standards, Specialist Investigations at the early stages of DSI incident It is service which must be deployed, and there will be an inevitable time between incident and arrival, though arrival is typically within the initial 'golden hour' CAMB assists in the accurate surveying and mapping of the scene and other areas_ The output from CAMB allows investigators to identify the exact position and relationship between vehicles, exhibits, street furniture, officers, witnesses and suspects. The call- out of CAMB is to be standard in all DSI cases caused by the discharge of police firearms and discretionary in other Specialist Investigations incidents. Where the method of investigation is set as independent by the IPCC, it will be provided with the extant survey data and the IPCC may thereafter commission CAMB to the analysis under its control, or alternately direct that a third party do so CAMB' s data briefing document on joint working between CAMB and DPS is enclosed: Concern 5: The planned operation to seize weapons was not pursued after the fatal shot was fired they being lapse spatial key complete using

The firearm that was handed to Mark Duggan by Kevin Hutchinson-Foster on 4th August 2011 was recovered in Lane. The intended outcome of the planned operation that is, the interception of Mark Duggan and the recovery of the firearm from him was achieved_ Officers were not deployed to Burchell Road to seek to arrest Kevin Hutchinson-Foster after Mark Duggan was shot. As a matter of fact; the Burchell Road address at which one of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster girlfriends lived remained unknown to the MPS until the arrest of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster on 24h October
2011. Whilst intelligence provided to the MPS by SOCA had indicated that Kevin Hutchinson- Foster was storing a gun Or guns for Mark Duggan, the critical piece of information for the recovery of any further firearm under Hutchinson-Foster' $ control that is, its location remained wholly unknown; That an unarmed officer from Operation Trident had seen the minicab carrying Mr Duggan turning into Burchell Road did not and could not have altered the state of the MPS knowledge. The only firearm whose whereabouts was known with certainty or at all was that contained, with Mark Duggan, inside the minicab. To that piece of information were the MPS resources directed. In such circumstances, the certainty and knowledge necessary to justify the application of armed resources to the Burchell Road area or to further pursue any further firearm under the control of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster were absent The MPS is committed to the removal of guns from the streets of London: It recognises the importance of continuing and concluding planned operations in the furtherance of that commitment Where an operation in the context of which police shooting occurs remains a crime in action; for example an ongoing kidnap or a planned armed robbery, the onus is on the operational head of that investigation to decide to continue the police response to prevent harm/serious injury, to arrest offenders and retrieve evidence. Whilst the seizure of firearms from principal officers should not and would not adversely affect the MPS ability to continue the armed response to a crime in action, and there are a number of MPS armed units that could be utilised to carry out a spontaneous (rather than pre-planned) MASTS operation in this event; the decision to mount such an operation was and is dependent on the particular circumstances and the information available to the SIO. Such operations require independent population of the relevant command, control and deployed roles, that is, very significant deployment of resources. Such deployment could and would be justifiable and authorised only where & sufficient degree of certainty and knowledge is available to the SIO The MPS will continue to provide training and refresher training to these senior officers to ensure the high standards of decision making expected by the MPS are consistently Concern 6: The armed police operation was not recorded after State Red was called The MPS recognises that public confidence in the support of armed policing is essential_ Transparency in the conduct of armed policing is key to strengthening that support. Body Worn Cameras The MPS believes that the audio and visual recording of the actions of firearms officers and those with whom engage is an essential element of that transparency. The MPS has been committed to the testing (in training) and piloting (in firearms operations) of Body Worn Cameras (BWC) with a view to their introduction in London_ The processes, which began in November 2013 under the auspices of DCC Simon Chesterman (ACPO lead, Armed Policing), have established that, for overt policing, the kit is effective and functional. The trials for the use of BWC by uniformed ARV officers concluded in June 2014_ On July 2014, the of Policing produced Ferry applied. long they 21st College

guidance in respect of the overt use of body-worn video. This is enclosed. Careful attention is paid through this guidance to legal issues arising from the use of such Cameras (for example, the identification and obtaining of any requisite authorities, data retention and data protection, and human rights issues). Operational use by uniformed officers is due to commence on 4th August
2014. There are obvious additional logistical complications with both armed officers where the most appropriate camera location would be head mounted or within glasses to reflect the actual view) and covert armed and covert surveillance officers where head O overt camera systems would clearly be nonsensical. The Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) is assisting in examining the right technical solution and the MPS intends to go to training trials shortly. Incident Data Recorder (IDR) The MPS acknowledges the Coroner'$ concerns about the lack of Incident Data Recorder [ IDR '] data available in the Inquest proceedings_ By way of background, all operational MPS vehicles are fitted with IDR technology: An IDR is a permanently installed electronic device with which selected driving data relating to the vehicle can be recorded and stored in the IDR memory. The data recorded includes wheel speed, brake operation, forwards and sideways acceleration and rotations of the vehicle, passing manoeuvres, swerving, cornering and impacts collision, operation of lights and emergency warning instruments. magnetic compass records the vehicle's directions A post August 2011 equipment upgrade means that IDR devices fitted on new vehicles only also provide geographical location. Not all vehicles in the SCO19 fleet have this functionality: An IDR does and did not record conversations taking place in a vehicle. IDR alone does not permit event reconstruction_ The IDR is automatically activated by a collision, by harsh braking or by harsh steering: The IDR memory is capable of storing nine such automatic events, each of which reflects period of approximate 30 seconds before and 14 seconds after the trigger and 100 metres of post trigger movement_ The facility to manually activate the IDR using & push button in the vehicle also exists, and records the status of the vehicle 45 seconds to the event and 10Om following activation: The driver of vehicle equipped with an [DR must press the manual activation button if are involved in a collision, regardless of whether the device has activated automatically. The IDR will also create a record where the vehicle becomes stationary for more than 5 seconds 'standstill event') Three standstill events are stored in the IDRs memory; these are continually overwritten as the vehicle continues the journey_ If the IDR is either automatically or manually activated, it must not be used operationally until the IDR has been downloaded and the memory re-set and cleared_ In relation to 'standstill event' the window for downloading IDR data is narrow. Ideally, the cars should not be driven or moved (if moved three times the relevant data would be overwritten), and Garage Sergeant' or Collision Investigator as appropriate should be requested soon after the event to download and save the IDR data. during prior they they are

None of the four SCO19 vehicles that were involved in Lane on 4th August 2011 were involved in a collision: None of the vehicles had an automatic IDR activation There was no requirement for the SCO19 officers to manually activate the vehicle IDRs, and the SCO19 officers were not required to request that IDR downloads take place from any of the vehicles The four vehicles were driven from the scene of the shooting to Lambeth HQ: In the absence of either automatic O manual activation, then unless the downloading of standstill data had been carried out to this journey; there would have been no data to download by the time the vehicles arrived at Lambeth: There are no records indicating that a Garage Sergeant was called to the scene, and MPS investigations indicate that IDR downloads were neither requested nor carried out_ It is correct that the MPS has statutory duties to obtain and preserve evidence and to comply with directions given by the Commission pursuant to Schedule 3, paragraph 14B of the Police Reform Act 2002. It is correct that neither the MPS nor the IPCC considered the possibility of downloading the data prior to the SCO19 cars being driven away from Lane: The IDR data would probably have been lost at this (or soon after). In light of the Coroner'$ concerns, the MPS will adopt & procedure for all future police shootings whereby a Garage Sergeant Collision Investigator is called by the DPS to download the IDR at the scene, which will then be available to police; the IPCC and any subsequent legal proceedings