The IOPC disputes the coroner's concerns regarding missed opportunities to identify Rebekah as a victim of domestic abuse, stating these criticisms are 'not founded'. They explain their statutory limitations, emphasising they cannot proactively intervene to protect victims without police action. (AI summary)
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Inquest touching on the death of Rebekah Arter Prevention of future death report
I write on behalf of the Director General of the IOPC with regards to the matters of concern raised in your Prevention of Future Death report arising from the inquest into the death of Ms Arter, which concluded on 29 August 2025. This letter is the IOPC’s formal response to your report in accordance with Regulation 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.
Matter of concern: missed opportunities for the IOPC and Metropolitan Police Service from their investigations to identify that Rebekah was a victim of domestic abuse and coercive control, which would have enabled her to be protected
Your report identified the following matters as illustrative of the potential missed opportunities:
• That Rebekah had met her husband initially as a victim of a crime.
• That police investigations uncovered a large number of women with whom he had inappropriate relationships and that he misused his police powers.
• That he was dismissed from the police for drug offences in May 2023, but the risk to Rebekah was not apparently considered at that time.
• A witness has alleged that a video was sent by him of Rebekah , which the family allege was used to shame and enforce control over her, allegedly in 2023.
• A history of her having unexplained repeated bruises and injuries was available in 2024 to anyone who enquired about the risk of domestic abuse.
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• That in retrospect it is recognised by a Detective Chief Inspector that he was an exceptionally persistent and damaging offender against women, but no charges in relation to that had ever been brought.
Background context:
Before responding to the matter of concern, it may assist to set out the relevant duties and responsibilities of the IOPC, and to summarise the investigations into DI the full history of which was outside the scope of the inquest.
Relevant IOPC duties and responsibilities: Police Reform Act 2002 (as in force at the time of Op Venta)
(1) Duties to provide information: (a) The IOPC must provide information about its investigations and outcomes to complainants and interested persons (sections 20 and 21 Police Reform Act
2002). For matters which do not concern a death or serious injury caused as a result of police action, the IOPC has a discretion to recognise someone as having interested person status where they have sufficient interest to make it appropriate to receive information about the investigation, provided the person consents to receive it.
(b) At the time of Op Venta, the requirements in the legislation were to provide information on the progress of the investigation and any provisional findings, the outcome of the investigation and the outcome of any related disciplinary proceedings.1
(c) These entitlements are subject to exceptions set out in Regulation 13 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. Among other matters these exceptions provide for information to be withheld where is a real risk of a significant adverse effect, including in relation to criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
(d) For witnesses who do not have interested person status there is no statutory requirement to provide information about the investigation or regular updates.
1 Paragraph 23(9) Schedule 3 Police Reform Act 2002 (prior to amendments made by the Policing and Crime Act 2017), and Regulation 12 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012
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(2) Decision making process: (a) At the time of Op Venta, the process at the end of an investigation was as follows: (i) The IOPC makes a decision whether to refer the report to the CPS to consider any criminal charges; (ii) The Appropriate Authority [AA] (the chief officer under whose direction and control the officer was at the time of the conduct in issue – here, the MPS) makes a determination whether the officer has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct and whether to bring disciplinary proceedings; (iii) The IOPC decides whether the AA’s determination on these matters is appropriate. If it disagrees, the IOPC can recommend and ultimately direct the AA to give effect to its recommendation. (iv) Proceedings are then brought by the AA, following the process in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012. The disciplinary case is presented by the AA and the IOPC will not necessarily have any formal role in proceedings. However, the IOPC will assist by providing disclosure and will often continue engagement with witnesses, particularly if witnesses are vulnerable, to provide continuity of contact as far as possible.
(3) IOPC jurisdiction: (a) Under section 12 Police Reform Act 2002 the IOPC has jurisdiction to investigate persons serving with police. (b) The IOPC can investigate persons who have ceased serving with the police since the time of the conduct in question, the conduct of concern must have taken place while the person was serving with police. (c) Once a police officer has ceased serving, they are no longer subject to the Standards of Professional Behaviour so their actions subsequent to leaving the force cannot amount to a disciplinary matter. (d) Any criminal conduct committed after the person ceased serving would fall to be investigated by a police force as would be the case for any other member of the public.
Investigations into DI
The MPS commenced an investigation into alleged misconduct by DI in 2016. This became an IOPC independent investigation in 2017 and developed in scale and complexity, eventually being split into 3 separate matters named Operation Venta 1, 2 and
3. Operation Venta 1 concerned allegations of potential abuse of position for sexual
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Operation Venta 1 identified 7 potential victims of APSP behaviour, one of whom was Rebekah Arter. Mrs Arter was pseudonymised in the investigation as ‘Ms G’. The allegations concerning Ms G related to the circumstances in which the consensual relationship between DI and Ms G commenced. These allegations had been made via an anonymous report to Crimestoppers in January 2016. At no point did Rebekah Arter come forward to either the MPS or the IOPC to make any kind of allegation about DI
either in relation to the commencement of their relationship or anything occurring subsequently.
It was not disputed by DI that he first met Rebekah Arter in February 2006, when acting as a police officer to investigate criminal matters which she had reported as a victim of crime. DI maintained that their relationship only started in late April or early May 2006, when he met her again on a night out when not on duty, after any professional involvement on her case had ceased.
In 2017 when the investigation become independent, the IOPC investigator made a policy decision that Rebekah Arter would not be made an interested person in the investigation. As outlined above, interested persons are entitled to specific information about the investigation, subject to a harm test, and must receive regular updates. It was considered that as Rebekah Arter was now married to DI and had not come forward with any allegation herself, that it would not be appropriate to share information with her about the investigation especially as it was considered she was likely to be loyal to her husband.
Rebekah Arter was spoken to by the IOPC in 2018 when a search warrant was carried out at DI home address. Mrs Arter declined to provide a statement but her remarks were recorded in a statement by an IOPC staff member. She corroborated her husband’s account that their relationship only started two months after DI had dealt with her crime report. No other allegation was raised by Mrs Arter at the time. A statement was also provided by her son . This did not make any allegations in relation to DI Rebekah Arter’s phone, as well as DI , was seized under the warrant, and analysed. While the IOPC phone analysis used parameters pertinent to the terms of reference of Operation Venta, and was not looking for any evidence of any domestic abuse behaviour as no such allegation had been made by or about DI and Rebekah Arter at that time, the material reviewed by the IOPC did not disclose any cause for concern in respect of domestic abuse.
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The investigations concluded in 2020 and resulted in referrals to the CPS to consider criminal charges and referral to gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings. The CPS confirmed no charges would be brought in relation to either referral in 2020.
After delay while DI received cancer treatment, Operation Venta 3, which concerned allegations of illegal drug use, resulted in DI dismissal in May 2023. Notwithstanding that DI was placed on the barred list (preventing him from working in law enforcement for at least 5 years) as a result, the MPS (with whom the IOPC agreed) considered there remained a public interest in holding a further gross misconduct hearing in relation to the outstanding allegations concerning APSP behaviour. This was to include allegations concerning how DI relationship with Rebekah commenced, which was to proceed on the basis of documentary evidence alone.
Following confirmation of this decision in November 2023, the IOPC’s Proceedings Support Unit planned engagement with the potential witnesses for the APSP allegations. In respect of Rebekah Arter, the PSU noted that she had not provided a statement to the investigation, and decided she would not be contacted until there was confirmation that DI had been informed the hearing would go ahead.
In December 2023, the PSU made contact with Ms B in respect of the proposed hearing. In an email exchange a family member of Ms B’s made reference to the fact that Mr
was still contacting Ms B, but no detail of the content of the messages was provided (it is not known whether the family member was aware of the nature of the messages). It was agreed that Ms B should be advised not to contact Mr and to save any messages received from him. Arrangements were made for a meeting on 15 March 2024 to discuss potential special measures should Ms B be prepared to give evidence at the gross misconduct hearing.
It was during this meeting, attended by (IOPC Proceedings Support Unit) and (IOPC Survivor Engagement Manager) that Ms B described the content of the messages that she had received. Ms B stated she had deleted the messages so the IOPC were unable to view these. Th IOPC’s then prepared a report detailing the description of the messages Ms B had provided, which the IOPC then reported to MPS by 25 March 2024.
At the time the messages were sent to Ms B, December 2023, Mr had already been dismissed from the MPS. Therefore at the time these potential offences appear to have been committed, he was an ordinary civilian and not a person serving with police. As a result, the IOPC had no jurisdiction to investigate Ms B’s disclosures itself. The only proper
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As you will be aware from the evidence provided at the inquest, the IOPC reported the potential offences to the MPS’s Directorate of Professional Standards, with whom the IOPC had been liaising in respect of the outstanding gross misconduct matters. The DPS endeavoured to transfer the report to the appropriate team within the MPS to investigate the matter and this was when the delays with the MPS’s internal Connect system occurred. For clarity, the IOPC has no direct access to the Connect system and all issues with this system were internal to the MPS. Once the IOPC had reported the matter to the MPS to take action, there was nothing further the IOPC could properly do in relation to it, given that it did not concern an alleged crime committed by a person while they were serving with police.
In the course of the MPS investigation, Ms B made further allegations in relation to Mr These allegations had not previously been made to either the IOPC or the MPS. The IOPC maintained regular contact with Ms B throughout its investigation to ascertain whether she wished to provide a statement or attend an ABE interview, however Ms B never provided a formal account during the IOPC investigation.
Matter of concern
Your report has raised a concern whether there were opportunities missed to recognise the risk to Rebekah posed by Mr
Our purpose in setting out the IOPC’s investigations in detail as above is to set out exactly what was known by the IOPC and when, and the rationale for our decisions in respect of our contact with Rebekah Arter.
In relation to the risk posed by Mr , a number of potential victims / witnesses of APSP behaviour were identified in the investigation. Mr conduct in this regard was considered sufficiently serious to warrant a referral to the CPS to consider a potential offence of Misconduct in a Public Office, and the intention had been to bring gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings against Mr for these allegations notwithstanding that he had already been placed on the barred list. This was on the basis that there was a public interest in a police misconduct panel making findings of fact on these allegations, so that this could be taken into account when deciding whether he should ever be permitted to work in law enforcement again. However, prior to July 2024, no allegation had been made of sexual assault.
Prior to Rebekah’s death, the IOPC was not on notice of any allegations of controlling or coercive behaviour or any other domestic abuse allegation in respect of Mr When in
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During the visit with Ms B in 2024, it was not possible for the IOPC to have identified the victim of the as Rebekah, as Ms B had deleted the images. The IOPC assumes that these were subsequently recovered on forensic examination of the device.
While we do not think a specific risk to Rebekah was apparent from the information available to the IOPC, we wish to reassure you that the IOPC has robust safeguarding procedures in place, which were updated and strengthened in 2024. We will take this opportunity to review whether any additional content to this guidance would be appropriate in respect of risk assessments for spouses and intimate partners.
Conclusion
I express my sincere condolences to the family of Rebekah Arter.
I am grateful to you for raising this issue with the IOPC and trust this response provides reassurance that I have considered the matter of concern raised in your report. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries arising from this letter.