Rebekah Arter

Dear Professor Harris,

On behalf of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, I write to provide the response to the matters of concern addressed to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in your Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 19th September 2025 following the inquest into the tragic death of Mrs Rebekah Arter.

On behalf of the MPS, may I first express my sincere condolences to the family and friends of Mrs Arter, our thoughts and sympathies are very much with them.

The MPS has acknowledged and reviewed all the matters of concern raised in your Regulation 28 Report and responds as follows:

The Coroner’s “Matters of Concern” and the MPS’ Responses

Matter of Concern

“That there may have been missed opportunities for the IOPC and Metropolitan Police Service from their investigations to identify that Rebekah was a victim of domestic abuse and coercive control, which would have enabled her to be protected. This is illustrated by these facts:

• That Rebekah had met her husband initially as a victim of a crime.
• That police investigations uncovered a large number of women with whom he had inappropriate relationships and that he misused his police powers.
• That he was dismissed from the police for drug offences in May 2023, but the risk to Rebekah was not apparently considered at that time.
• A witness has alleged that a video was sent by him of Rebekah which the family allege was used to shame and enforce control over her, allegedly in 2023.
• A history of her having unexplained repeated bruises and injuries was available in 2024 to anyone who enquired about the risk of domestic abuse.
•
• That in retrospect it is recognised by a Detective Chief Inspector that he was an exceptionally persistent and damaging offender against women, but no charges in relation to that had ever been brought.

It is recognised that the MPS will have taken a number of steps to improve investigations since 2016. The public will want to know of these. The issue of the abuse of police powers threatening the safety and lives of women has been a matter of considerable public interest. In my opinion this is a national issue of concern and that ministers should be informed of these matters to consider if any further investigation is needed to prevent future deaths and/or for the public to be reassured.”

MPS Response

In addressing the coroner’s concerns, this response will set out the improvements the MPS has made since 2016 to address these concerns, including in response to the Baroness Casey review on culture and standards in the Metropolitan Police Service, the Angiolini Inquiry Part 1 and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire &

Rescue Services (HMICFRS) concerns on vetting, misconduct and misogyny in the police service.

We will highlight the changes to MPS policy and practice in relation to Vetting and address the work that has been undertaken in relation to the public concern regarding the abuse of police powers and its impact on the safety of women. This includes the creation of the Domestic Abuse and Sexual Offences Investigation Unit (DASO) and the new mandatory training on Abuse of Position for Sexual Purpose (APSP). We will also address the work that the MPS has undertaken in the last three years to tackle violence against women and girls.

Lastly, we will reference the Angiolini Inquiry which is scrutinising the issue of safety of women and girls in Part 2.

Vetting

As part of our New Met for London plan, we are reforming the way we vet officers and staff. We have changed our approach and are confident that, following our reforms, only those who meet the highest standards will be granted vetting clearance and able to join the Met. Our policy and practice on screening out individuals, via vetting, who have misogynistic and/or predatory attitudes and behaviours is strong and robust – and believe it is one of the strongest positions taken by any police force in the UK.

Today, the presumption is an individual who has been previously arrested for rape and applies to join the Met, will not receive vetting clearance, unless there are exceptional circumstances. And in line with national guidance, applications for a position as a police officer, special constable or member of police staff are rejected in all cases where the applicant is, or has been, a registered sex offender. Applicants with convictions/cautions for offences where vulnerable people were targeted or the offences were of domestic abuse should also be rejected.

The MPS’ new Force Vetting Policy was launched in June 2024 and includes a Statement of Vetting Tolerances and Vetting Decision-Making Framework (VDMF). The Statement of Vetting Tolerances provides direction on the level of

tolerable risk for vetting clearances, applied for or held by personnel and contractors. It states that the organisation has a low tolerance to any person holding a vetting clearance who, amongst other things:

• Has been cautioned or convicted of domestic abuse, coercive or controlling behaviour or stalking and harassment.
• Has been cautioned or convicted of sexual offences.
• Has been cautioned or convicted of offences against vulnerable people.
• Been the subject of a non-molestation order or Domestic Violence Prevention Order.

Since the policy was introduced in June 2024, we do not believe anyone who has a caution or conviction for any sexual offence or offences involving domestic abuse, stalking or controlling and coercive behaviour has joined the force. While our strengthened processes have seen refusal rates move from 5.4 per cent in 2020-21 to 11.4 per cent in 2023-24.

In addition, the MPS has also lobbied for, and worked with the Home Office on, new vetting legislation to give police chiefs greater ability to dismiss officers who are unsuitable tohold vetting clearance after serious incidents or where intelligence points to a pattern of behaviour that deems an officer unsuitable to continue in their role.

Domestic Abuse and Sexual Offences Investigation Unit (DASO)

The MPS acknowledges the public concern regarding the abuse of police powers and its impact on the safety of women. Since 2016, the MPS has undertaken significant reforms to strengthen investigations, improve safeguarding, and ensure accountability.

DASO – this was created in early 2022 in response to the cases relating to former Police Constables and , a unique reactive department committed to investigating Police-Perpetrated Domestic Abuse (PPDA) and Sexual

Offending (SO). DASO comprises of four investigation teams and a separate Victim Support Unit (VSU), part of the Professionalism Command.

DASO is made up of specialist officers with safeguarding experience and the requisite skill set. DASO is responsible for investigating all PPDA SO gross misconduct cases however, they also take primacy for the parallel criminal investigation when offences are committed ‘on duty.’

In addition to its core business, DASO is committed to raising awareness of PPDA and SO by visiting Basic Command Units (BCUs) and Operational Command Units (OCUs)to present a DASO input, providing anonymised case studies highlighting common themes and reinforcing the reporting of wrongdoing.

Victim Support Unit (VSU) – this is a team of trained Sexual Offences Investigation Technique Officers (SOITs) who are victim focused to support victims through the misconduct hearing process when a case to answer in gross misconduct has been determined. At present the team are currently supporting in the region of 180 victims. The VSU also support victims through the trial process, particularly if the criminal investigation was held by one of the DASO investigation teams. The VSU are also involved in DASO roadshows, providing bespoke support to BCU/OCU’s (Operational Command Units) when required, supporting officers and police staff. Most recently following the BBC Panorama documentary support was provided to officers and staff at Central West BCU (including Charing Cross Police Station). The VSU work closely with external partners such as Hestia (an organisation that supports adults and children in times of crisis) to further support victim-survivors.

Operation Assure was created in 2023. It was a programme of prioritised vetting reviews for serving officers and staff where the MPS held significant adverse information that necessitated a review of that individual’s vetting clearance. The trigger for this process could come from various circumstances, including at the conclusion of a criminal investigation, following a misconduct hearing where a written warning, final written warning or a reduction in rank had been issued, or when adverse information about an individual came to the notice of the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS). Once a review was triggered, it would be carried out by a senior

vetting officer and could lead to the individual retaining their current vetting status, or a decision to revoke the individual’s minimum vetting status. If revoked, the individual would have been unable to access police premises and systems, which could then trigger a process under the performance regulations which could lead to dismissal. This process ceased following judicial review in February 2025.

However, from 1st September 2025, the MPS operationalised the Police Vetting Regulations (2025). The regulations, which were laid by the Home Office in April and took effect in May, provide police chiefs the ability to dismiss officers who cannot hold vetting clearance.

The main changes for policing are:

• The ability to hold and maintain vetting will become a legal requirement for all serving officers, including senior officers and special constables.
• Forces will have the ability to dismiss officers who aren’t able to maintain/hold vetting.
• The regulations also set out how appeals against withdrawal of vetting should be held, including the inclusion of an independent panel member.

Through a parallel change in MPS policy, police staff will now be required to maintain vetting clearance in order to be employed by the MPS. The MPS priority is to affect the regulations in a fair and transparent way, initially working through cases for those officers and staff who were in the Operation Assure process before it closed.

Abuse of Position for Sexual Purpose (APSP)

It is critical that all officers and staff know the signs and symptoms of abuse of position, how it may begin with professional contact and then quickly progress. Through training and internal communications channels, MPS officers and staff are reminded of the need to be willing to and know how to speak up with any concerns they might have regarding colleagues.

As part of a recent inspection by HMICFRS, the MPS reviewed HMICFRS Standard
6.1.3, specifically looking at how we seek to raise awareness of Abuse of Position for Sexual Purpose, both internally and externally. As a result, this summer the MPS introduced a mandatory training package for all officers and staff on the subject of APSP.

In the training, we highlight a likely offender profile, and the potential indicators of sexual misconduct. Alongside we raise awareness of the potential “red flags” to look out for such as misogynistic or extreme sexual comments often being dismissed as ‘banter’ being an indicator of potentially dangerous behaviour. The training also highlights and raises awareness of the likely characteristics of those that could be targeted, most often being vulnerable females.

Lastly, we seek to make clear how to get help both internally and externally, through MPS and external reporting mechanisms, aiming to eliminate any barrier that individuals may face when reporting concerns of the behaviour of a member of the organisation or the service they have received. This seeks to instil confidence in those reporting that their complaints will be taken seriously and dealt with appropriately.

These principles are now embedded in MPS training and shared with external agencies and organisations across London that support vulnerable people, to ensure those inside of the MPS and those outside are able to identify warning signs of APSP within policing and safeguard potential vulnerable victims and take the appropriate next steps.

DASO also participates in the national APSP working group, seeking best practice from other forces.

Wider training

Additionally, the MPS has mandated that officers and staff complete training on sexual harassment in the workplace of which compliance for this is also tracked.

We have delivered training to our whole workforce – that is around 40,000 officers and staff - that underlines our standards, values and provided tools to assist officers and staff to stand up to inappropriate behaviour. We have also rolled out five days of specific leadership training on culture and values.

In conjunction with the mandatory training, DASO and the VSU work alongside the DPS Prevention and Engagement Team presenting the DASO awareness sessions as well as DASO/ Guardian roadshows. The roadshows bring together a combination of support from DASO, VSU, Helping Employees Affected or Living with domestic abuse (H.E.A.L DA), Hestia, Stalking Threat Assessment Centre (STAC), Network of Women (NoW) and Human Resources (HR) as appropriate. The primary aim is to encourage staff to report wrongdoing, ensuring them that they will be supported if they come forward. Topics covered include how to report wrongdoing or unethical behaviour, sexual harassment in the workplace, what protection and support are available, confidential reporting channels and practical advice with a Q & A session.

Integrity Assurance Unit

The Integrity Assurance Unit (IAU) manages officers or staff who are the subject of an Adverse Judicial Finding (AJF), evidentially tainted by virtue of a criminal or misconduct outcome or in respect of whom adverse information is held. The IAU will ensure that such officers or staff are risk assessed and handled fairly to protect both the individual, the public and the organisation. This is achieved by holistically reviewing all known information and, where applicable convening a management meeting to decide on whether Risk Management Measures need to be imposed to manage the risk presented by the taint, AJF or adverse information. The IAU oversees disclosure requirements associated with taint and maintains confidential records. The unit also liaises with legal and professional standards’ teams, monitors fairness and compliance, and makes referrals to the Disclosure and Barring Service where necessary. Its overall purpose is to uphold integrity, reduce risk, and maintain public confidence in the police service.

Workforce

Almost 1,500 officers and staff have been exited from the MPS in the last three years
– this is the biggest shake up on police standards in 50 years.

We have invested in 200 more professional standards’ officers (working in the MPS’s Directorate of Professional Standards), who proactively seek out wrongdoing, and almost doubled the number of annual criminal conduct investigations to nearly 500 in the year 2023/2024.

Our legacy review of historic domestic and sexual allegations against 1,636 officers and staff – Operation Onyx – has resulted in 378 leaving the MPS through retirement, resignation or dismissal.

Whistleblowing

Alongside strengthened vetting, we have introduced a range of measures to root out those who should not serve in the MPS. They include a dedicated DASO team with victim care specialists. We have enhanced proactive work under our Anti-Corruption and Abuse Command and we have a dedicated team to support ‘whistle-blowers’. Internal reports have trebled from 405 in 2021/22 to 1,389 in 2024/25.

We take reports seriously, and support those who make them. In November 2022, we were the first force to partner with Crimestoppers and launched an anti-corruption hotline for the public to report wrongdoing including police perpetrated abuse. This has been rolled out nationally.

In 2024, 137 officers and staff were arrested for sexual or domestic abuse offences compared with 89 in 2022. This demonstrates a stronger confidence in the MPS by victims to report this type of offending, and we have seen an increase in allegations made year on year. For sexual matters, 86 per cent of cases result in a formal disciplinary outcome.

Angiolini Inquiry

In addition to the work being done in the MPS to address the safety of women and girls, the issue is being scrutinised as part of the ongoing Angiolini Inquiry.

On 22 November 2021, was commissioned to conduct an independent inquiry as to how off-duty Metropolitan Police officer, , had the ability to kidnap, rape, and murder , a member of the public. The inquiry has been divided into 3 Parts with the final report for Part 1 (regarding ), having been published on 29 February 2024.

On 11 May 2023, the Home Secretary announced the Terms of Reference for Part 2 of the Inquiry. The terms of reference are available publicly, and include:

1. The extent to which systems, policies and processes for the recruitment, vetting and transfer of police officers are fit for purpose and help to identify those who display misogynistic and/or predatory attitudes and behaviours
2. The extent to which aspects of police culture observed across police forces enable misogynistic and/or predatory attitudes and behaviours, and what the role of standards is.
3. The extent to which existing measures prevent sexually motivated crimes against women in public spaces.

The latter is the subject of the recently published second report of (Part 2(iii) report).

Whilst the Part 2(iii) report is focused on its review of the safety of women and girls in public spaces only, it should be noted that the issues outlined in the coroner’s PFD concerns are being explored in significant detail across all of Part 2 of the Angiolini Inquiry.

The Inquiry will draw upon evidence from relevant reports to inform its work, including the recent HMICFRS report and Baroness reports. The Inquiry will take into

account the views of those most affected by these issues which will include those who work in policing and those who have been the victim of relevant crimes.

The MPS are continuing to actively support this Inquiry and address recommendations arising from the reports accordingly.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require further information from the MPS.

Dear Professor Harris,

Thank you for sharing the Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) report concerning the tragic death of Rebekah Arter. I am responding as the Minister responsible for crime and policing.

I would like to express my sincere condolences to Rebekah’s loved ones. I was deeply saddened to read the details in your report and cannot imagine the significant impact that her death and the awful experiences she endured leading up to it will have had on those close to her.

I am very sorry to hear about the experiences Rebekah went through as a victim of domestic and sexual abuse, as noted in your report. I recognise the devastating impact these awful crimes can have on their victims. I would like to reassure you that this Government is committed to tackling all forms of violence against women and girls (VAWG), including domestic and sexual abuse. We have set out an unprecedented mission to halve VAWG in a decade. Improving policing practice is a key part of this, and we have provided £13.1m this year to establish a new National Centre for VAWG and Public Protection which will help drive consistency nationally, including through the development of specialist training on VAWG to ensure that officers are well equipped to manage offences and provide consistent support to victims.

Our full programme of work to tackle VAWG will be published in our upcoming cross- Government VAWG Strategy. The Strategy will set out concrete actions to prevent violence and abuse, pursue perpetrators, and provide the support to victims that they deserve.

Your report also highlights multiple issues related to Rebekah’s then husband, a former police officer, abusing his position. I echo the concerns you raise and am clear that all officers should be held to the highest standards. All members of the public should feel confident in reporting crimes or raising complaints and know that they will be taken seriously and treated with respect when they do.

It is crucial that allegations against police officers, including of VAWG, are handled robustly. Your report notes that Rebekah met her husband as a victim of crime whilst he was a police officer. A police officer abusing their position for a sexual purpose or for the purpose of pursuing an improper emotional relationship is, rightly, a very serious conduct matter. By law, if a force becomes aware of such allegations, they must refer them to the

Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) for consideration. The College of Policing’s Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings, which was updated in 2022, is also clear that misconduct involving VAWG is unacceptable and sets an expectation as to the seriousness with which it should be treated.

I take these issues extremely seriously, and this Government is implementing a range of reforms in the police misconduct and vetting systems to help ensure that those who commit heinous crimes such as domestic abuse and sexual offences have no place in policing. In spring this year we introduced a set of reforms, including a route to remove those officers who fail to maintain their vetting, and a presumption of dismissal for any officer found to have committed gross misconduct. We are currently working to place vetting standards on a statutory footing and strengthen requirements on forces to suspend officers under investigation for domestic abuse or sexual offences.

You may be aware that the independent Angiolini Inquiry is examining a range of issues in policing and the safety of women so that women, and the wider public, can have confidence that the police are there to protect them. The first report of Part 2 of the Inquiry examined the prevention of sexually motivated crimes against women in public spaces and was published on 2 December 2025. It can be found here: The Angiolini Inquiry Part 2 First Report: Prevention of sexually motivated crimes against women in public – The Angiolini Inquiry. The Government is now carefully considering its findings and recommendations.

The Inquiry will produce a second report under Part 2 next year which will examine a number of other issues relevant to your report. These include the adequacy of measures to identify and manage the risk of VAWG-related misconduct as well as aspects of police culture.

I hope this letter reassures you that there is work taking place at a national level to improve the response to police-perpetrated VAWG. My thoughts remain with Rebekah’s family.

Ver best wishes MP Minister of State for Policing and Crime

Dear Sir,

Inquest touching on the death of Rebekah Arter Prevention of future death report

I write on behalf of the Director General of the IOPC with regards to the matters of concern raised in your Prevention of Future Death report arising from the inquest into the death of Ms Arter, which concluded on 29 August 2025. This letter is the IOPC’s formal response to your report in accordance with Regulation 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

Matter of concern: missed opportunities for the IOPC and Metropolitan Police Service from their investigations to identify that Rebekah was a victim of domestic abuse and coercive control, which would have enabled her to be protected

Your report identified the following matters as illustrative of the potential missed opportunities:

• That Rebekah had met her husband initially as a victim of a crime.
• That police investigations uncovered a large number of women with whom he had inappropriate relationships and that he misused his police powers.
• That he was dismissed from the police for drug offences in May 2023, but the risk to Rebekah was not apparently considered at that time.
• A witness has alleged that a video was sent by him of Rebekah , which the family allege was used to shame and enforce control over her, allegedly in 2023.
• A history of her having unexplained repeated bruises and injuries was available in 2024 to anyone who enquired about the risk of domestic abuse.

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL
•
• That in retrospect it is recognised by a Detective Chief Inspector that he was an exceptionally persistent and damaging offender against women, but no charges in relation to that had ever been brought.

Background context:

Before responding to the matter of concern, it may assist to set out the relevant duties and responsibilities of the IOPC, and to summarise the investigations into DI the full history of which was outside the scope of the inquest.

Relevant IOPC duties and responsibilities: Police Reform Act 2002 (as in force at the time of Op Venta)

(1) Duties to provide information: (a) The IOPC must provide information about its investigations and outcomes to complainants and interested persons (sections 20 and 21 Police Reform Act
2002). For matters which do not concern a death or serious injury caused as a result of police action, the IOPC has a discretion to recognise someone as having interested person status where they have sufficient interest to make it appropriate to receive information about the investigation, provided the person consents to receive it.

(b) At the time of Op Venta, the requirements in the legislation were to provide information on the progress of the investigation and any provisional findings, the outcome of the investigation and the outcome of any related disciplinary proceedings.1

(c) These entitlements are subject to exceptions set out in Regulation 13 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. Among other matters these exceptions provide for information to be withheld where is a real risk of a significant adverse effect, including in relation to criminal and disciplinary proceedings.

(d) For witnesses who do not have interested person status there is no statutory requirement to provide information about the investigation or regular updates.

1 Paragraph 23(9) Schedule 3 Police Reform Act 2002 (prior to amendments made by the Policing and Crime Act 2017), and Regulation 12 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

(2) Decision making process: (a) At the time of Op Venta, the process at the end of an investigation was as follows: (i) The IOPC makes a decision whether to refer the report to the CPS to consider any criminal charges; (ii) The Appropriate Authority [AA] (the chief officer under whose direction and control the officer was at the time of the conduct in issue – here, the MPS) makes a determination whether the officer has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct and whether to bring disciplinary proceedings; (iii) The IOPC decides whether the AA’s determination on these matters is appropriate. If it disagrees, the IOPC can recommend and ultimately direct the AA to give effect to its recommendation. (iv) Proceedings are then brought by the AA, following the process in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012. The disciplinary case is presented by the AA and the IOPC will not necessarily have any formal role in proceedings. However, the IOPC will assist by providing disclosure and will often continue engagement with witnesses, particularly if witnesses are vulnerable, to provide continuity of contact as far as possible.

(3) IOPC jurisdiction: (a) Under section 12 Police Reform Act 2002 the IOPC has jurisdiction to investigate persons serving with police. (b) The IOPC can investigate persons who have ceased serving with the police since the time of the conduct in question, the conduct of concern must have taken place while the person was serving with police. (c) Once a police officer has ceased serving, they are no longer subject to the Standards of Professional Behaviour so their actions subsequent to leaving the force cannot amount to a disciplinary matter. (d) Any criminal conduct committed after the person ceased serving would fall to be investigated by a police force as would be the case for any other member of the public.

Investigations into DI

The MPS commenced an investigation into alleged misconduct by DI in 2016. This became an IOPC independent investigation in 2017 and developed in scale and complexity, eventually being split into 3 separate matters named Operation Venta 1, 2 and
3. Operation Venta 1 concerned allegations of potential abuse of position for sexual

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL purposes (“APSP”), Operation Venta 2 concerned misuse of police systems and inappropriate involvement by DI in a criminal investigation for which he was the victim, and Operation Venta 3 concerned allegations of illegal drug use by DI . To assist with understanding the key dates and developments in the investigation, we have compiled a timeline which we enclose as Annex A.

Operation Venta 1 identified 7 potential victims of APSP behaviour, one of whom was Rebekah Arter. Mrs Arter was pseudonymised in the investigation as ‘Ms G’. The allegations concerning Ms G related to the circumstances in which the consensual relationship between DI and Ms G commenced. These allegations had been made via an anonymous report to Crimestoppers in January 2016. At no point did Rebekah Arter come forward to either the MPS or the IOPC to make any kind of allegation about DI

either in relation to the commencement of their relationship or anything occurring subsequently.

It was not disputed by DI that he first met Rebekah Arter in February 2006, when acting as a police officer to investigate criminal matters which she had reported as a victim of crime. DI maintained that their relationship only started in late April or early May 2006, when he met her again on a night out when not on duty, after any professional involvement on her case had ceased.

In 2017 when the investigation become independent, the IOPC investigator made a policy decision that Rebekah Arter would not be made an interested person in the investigation. As outlined above, interested persons are entitled to specific information about the investigation, subject to a harm test, and must receive regular updates. It was considered that as Rebekah Arter was now married to DI and had not come forward with any allegation herself, that it would not be appropriate to share information with her about the investigation especially as it was considered she was likely to be loyal to her husband.

Rebekah Arter was spoken to by the IOPC in 2018 when a search warrant was carried out at DI home address. Mrs Arter declined to provide a statement but her remarks were recorded in a statement by an IOPC staff member. She corroborated her husband’s account that their relationship only started two months after DI had dealt with her crime report. No other allegation was raised by Mrs Arter at the time. A statement was also provided by her son . This did not make any allegations in relation to DI Rebekah Arter’s phone, as well as DI , was seized under the warrant, and analysed. While the IOPC phone analysis used parameters pertinent to the terms of reference of Operation Venta, and was not looking for any evidence of any domestic abuse behaviour as no such allegation had been made by or about DI and Rebekah Arter at that time, the material reviewed by the IOPC did not disclose any cause for concern in respect of domestic abuse.

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL

The investigations concluded in 2020 and resulted in referrals to the CPS to consider criminal charges and referral to gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings. The CPS confirmed no charges would be brought in relation to either referral in 2020.

After delay while DI received cancer treatment, Operation Venta 3, which concerned allegations of illegal drug use, resulted in DI dismissal in May 2023. Notwithstanding that DI was placed on the barred list (preventing him from working in law enforcement for at least 5 years) as a result, the MPS (with whom the IOPC agreed) considered there remained a public interest in holding a further gross misconduct hearing in relation to the outstanding allegations concerning APSP behaviour. This was to include allegations concerning how DI relationship with Rebekah commenced, which was to proceed on the basis of documentary evidence alone.

Following confirmation of this decision in November 2023, the IOPC’s Proceedings Support Unit planned engagement with the potential witnesses for the APSP allegations. In respect of Rebekah Arter, the PSU noted that she had not provided a statement to the investigation, and decided she would not be contacted until there was confirmation that DI had been informed the hearing would go ahead.

In December 2023, the PSU made contact with Ms B in respect of the proposed hearing. In an email exchange a family member of Ms B’s made reference to the fact that Mr

was still contacting Ms B, but no detail of the content of the messages was provided (it is not known whether the family member was aware of the nature of the messages). It was agreed that Ms B should be advised not to contact Mr and to save any messages received from him. Arrangements were made for a meeting on 15 March 2024 to discuss potential special measures should Ms B be prepared to give evidence at the gross misconduct hearing.

It was during this meeting, attended by (IOPC Proceedings Support Unit) and (IOPC Survivor Engagement Manager) that Ms B described the content of the messages that she had received. Ms B stated she had deleted the messages so the IOPC were unable to view these. Th IOPC’s then prepared a report detailing the description of the messages Ms B had provided, which the IOPC then reported to MPS by 25 March 2024.

At the time the messages were sent to Ms B, December 2023, Mr had already been dismissed from the MPS. Therefore at the time these potential offences appear to have been committed, he was an ordinary civilian and not a person serving with police. As a result, the IOPC had no jurisdiction to investigate Ms B’s disclosures itself. The only proper

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL action open to the IOPC in the circumstance was to report the potential offences to the MPS, which it duly did – at the latest by 25 March 2024.

As you will be aware from the evidence provided at the inquest, the IOPC reported the potential offences to the MPS’s Directorate of Professional Standards, with whom the IOPC had been liaising in respect of the outstanding gross misconduct matters. The DPS endeavoured to transfer the report to the appropriate team within the MPS to investigate the matter and this was when the delays with the MPS’s internal Connect system occurred. For clarity, the IOPC has no direct access to the Connect system and all issues with this system were internal to the MPS. Once the IOPC had reported the matter to the MPS to take action, there was nothing further the IOPC could properly do in relation to it, given that it did not concern an alleged crime committed by a person while they were serving with police.

In the course of the MPS investigation, Ms B made further allegations in relation to Mr These allegations had not previously been made to either the IOPC or the MPS. The IOPC maintained regular contact with Ms B throughout its investigation to ascertain whether she wished to provide a statement or attend an ABE interview, however Ms B never provided a formal account during the IOPC investigation.

Matter of concern

Your report has raised a concern whether there were opportunities missed to recognise the risk to Rebekah posed by Mr

Our purpose in setting out the IOPC’s investigations in detail as above is to set out exactly what was known by the IOPC and when, and the rationale for our decisions in respect of our contact with Rebekah Arter.

In relation to the risk posed by Mr , a number of potential victims / witnesses of APSP behaviour were identified in the investigation. Mr conduct in this regard was considered sufficiently serious to warrant a referral to the CPS to consider a potential offence of Misconduct in a Public Office, and the intention had been to bring gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings against Mr for these allegations notwithstanding that he had already been placed on the barred list. This was on the basis that there was a public interest in a police misconduct panel making findings of fact on these allegations, so that this could be taken into account when deciding whether he should ever be permitted to work in law enforcement again. However, prior to July 2024, no allegation had been made of sexual assault.

Prior to Rebekah’s death, the IOPC was not on notice of any allegations of controlling or coercive behaviour or any other domestic abuse allegation in respect of Mr When in

OFFICIAL

OFFICIAL 2018 the IOPC had direct contact with Rebekah, and her son, no concerns of this kind were raised and downloads of devices seized at that time similarly did not disclose indications of this behaviour (from the material examined which fell within the parameters for the IOPC investigation). The IOPC had no cause to seek further evidence after 2018.

During the visit with Ms B in 2024, it was not possible for the IOPC to have identified the victim of the as Rebekah, as Ms B had deleted the images. The IOPC assumes that these were subsequently recovered on forensic examination of the device.

While we do not think a specific risk to Rebekah was apparent from the information available to the IOPC, we wish to reassure you that the IOPC has robust safeguarding procedures in place, which were updated and strengthened in 2024. We will take this opportunity to review whether any additional content to this guidance would be appropriate in respect of risk assessments for spouses and intimate partners.

Conclusion

I express my sincere condolences to the family of Rebekah Arter.

I am grateful to you for raising this issue with the IOPC and trust this response provides reassurance that I have considered the matter of concern raised in your report. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries arising from this letter.