Source · Prevention of Future Deaths
John Wright
Ref: 2014-0494
Date: 13 Nov 2014
Coroner: Andrew McNamara
Area: Nottinghamshire
Responses identified: 0 / 6
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Trackside maintenance crews required frequent reminders for vigilance and comprehensive briefings on train routes and safe work methods. There was also a concern about balancing hearing protection with the ability to hear oncoming trains.
Date
13 Nov 2014
56-day deadline
8 Jan 2015 est.
Responses identified
0 of 6
Coroner's concerns
Trackside maintenance crews required frequent reminders for vigilance and comprehensive briefings on train routes and safe work methods. There was also a concern about balancing hearing protection with the ability to hear oncoming trains.
View full coroner's concerns
1. Despite its obviousness I am concerned that track side maintenance crew need frequent reminders/training as to the need to maintain vigilance at all times when working in the vicinity of lines along which trains can pass.
2. When working in the vicinity of stations and/or points on the network where there are multiple lines, crews should be fully briefed as to the potential route of trains through stations or across any such lines, including, where reasonably practicable, consulting timetables; and safe methods of work are briefed and enforced.
3. Further, I am concerned that there needs to be a balance struck between the ensuring that track side maintenance crews are provided with personal protective equipment such as hearing protection and an ability to hear oncoming locomotives/trains.
2. When working in the vicinity of stations and/or points on the network where there are multiple lines, crews should be fully briefed as to the potential route of trains through stations or across any such lines, including, where reasonably practicable, consulting timetables; and safe methods of work are briefed and enforced.
3. Further, I am concerned that there needs to be a balance struck between the ensuring that track side maintenance crews are provided with personal protective equipment such as hearing protection and an ability to hear oncoming locomotives/trains.
Report sections
Investigation and inquest
On 1 February 2014 I commenced an investigation into the death of John Robert Wright,
49. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 15 October 2014. The conclusion of the jury following the inquest was that Mr. Wright’s medical cause of death was: I a. Diffuse axonal injury & multiple organ failure (as a consequence of)
b. Multiple traumatic injury.
The summary of the facts was: John Robert Wright (Rob) died at Queens Medical Centre Nottingham at 17.35 31st January 2014. His death came as a result of multiple injuries sustained on 22nd January 2014 when he was in collision with a North bound East Coast train at Newark Northgate Station.
The conclusion was: Accident.
49. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 15 October 2014. The conclusion of the jury following the inquest was that Mr. Wright’s medical cause of death was: I a. Diffuse axonal injury & multiple organ failure (as a consequence of)
b. Multiple traumatic injury.
The summary of the facts was: John Robert Wright (Rob) died at Queens Medical Centre Nottingham at 17.35 31st January 2014. His death came as a result of multiple injuries sustained on 22nd January 2014 when he was in collision with a North bound East Coast train at Newark Northgate Station.
The conclusion was: Accident.
Circumstances of the death
Mr. Wright was employed by Network Rail as a track maintenance man. On 22 January 2014 he was working with two fellow Network Rail employees, and and together they were charged with carrying out ultrasonic testing of rail track at, amongst other places, Newark Northgate station. This meant that they were testing track which formed part of the East Coast mainline where locomotives can travel at speeds up to125 m.p.h. Mr. Wright was given the task of ‘look out’ whilst his colleagues carried out the testing. Whilst at Newark Northgate only carried out the testing work and Mr. Wright was look out. Newark Northgate is a small station with three platforms and 4 lines passing through it: the ‘Down’ line going North passing platform 1; the ‘Up’ line going South passing platform 2; a combined ‘Up’ and ‘Down’ passenger loop to platform 3; and a goods ‘Up’ and ‘Down’ line. Messrs Wright and were working on track south of the station where there was also a ‘loop’, akin to a siding, of track where rolling stock could be ‘parked’. Shortly after 11.30 an East Coast Train (the 10.08 from London Kings Cross to Newark), driven by approached from the South traveling along the ‘Up’ line. The Train was due to stop at platform 3 which meant that it had to cross the ‘Down’ line and then join the ‘Up and Down’ passenger loop. On approach the driver of the train sounded the horn as he passed a signal and again as he crossed the first set of points taking him onto the ‘Down’ line. As he did so Mr. Wright was positioned in the section of track known as a siding or ‘loop’ which had been designated a ‘place of safety’. acknowledged the approaching train which was slowing and was travelling at a speed below 30 m.p.h. as it neared the station. Mr. Wright did not acknowledge the approaching train, for example by turning and signalling to the driver. CCTV from the train demonstrates that, without seeming to appreciate its presence, Mr. Wright walked in front of the oncoming train and was struck by the front offside buffer as a result of which he sustained multiple injuries from which he did not recover. Despite treatment he died at the Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham on 31 January 2014.
Copies sent to
1. The representatives of the estate of John Robert Wright deceased2. Network Rail3. The Office of the Rail Regulator; &4. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch Mr. General Secretary of the RMT Union
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Report details
- Reference
- 2014-0494
- Date of report
- 13 November 2014
- Coroner
- Andrew McNamara
- Coroner area
- Nottinghamshire
Responses identified
Responses identified
0 of 6
6 responses not yet linked
Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 8 Jan 2015 (estimated).
Sent to
- Frisbys Solicitors
- Kennedys Solicitors
- Network Rail
- Office of the Rail Regulator
- Rail Accident Investigation Branch
- Rail Maritime and Transport Union
Part of a series
2019-0175
All responses identified