Recommendations & Conclusions
29 items
1
Conclusion
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
Over the next decade the UK and the Navy will face an increasingly complex international security environment. Russia and China will remain the primary adversaries at sea, with the relative importance of the UK’s response to each likely to shift and potentially interact through the decade. Developments in technology, particularly …
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Over the next decade the UK and the Navy will face an increasingly complex international security environment. Russia and China will remain the primary adversaries at sea, with the relative importance of the UK’s response to each likely to shift and potentially interact through the decade. Developments in technology, particularly in hypersonic weapons, are changing the conduct of naval warfare and grey zone operations are becoming increasingly important for the UK’s security in the maritime domain, as they are in others.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged that its assessment aligns with the committee's, detailing how the Integrated Review has invested in the Royal Navy, including 'sub-threshold' capabilities like enhancing Royal Marines and developing a counter-hypersonic capability for the Future Air Defence system.
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Ministry of Defence
2
Conclusion
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
The Government has ambitious plans for the Royal Navy. The Integrated Review has given the Navy a significantly increased, and potentially the leading, role in the UK’s security posture. It is likely to be the Government’s tool of choice to deliver its strategy of persistent engagement and competition below the …
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The Government has ambitious plans for the Royal Navy. The Integrated Review has given the Navy a significantly increased, and potentially the leading, role in the UK’s security posture. It is likely to be the Government’s tool of choice to deliver its strategy of persistent engagement and competition below the threshold of warfare. As a result, the Navy must be able to deliver constabulary and presence operations for peace time maritime security, while still able to perform high-end warfighting functions effectively, including upholding NATO taskings and other international agreements.
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Government response AI summary
The government confirms the RN is already delivering the Integrated Review's commitment to persistent global engagement and warfighting capabilities, citing ongoing OPV deployments, regular CSG operations, and planned procurements like F-35B and Type 26 frigates.
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Ministry of Defence
3
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
The Navy cannot fulfil the full ambition of the Integrated Review with its current fleet. It needs more lower-end, adaptable vessels, like the planned Type 31 frigate, to fulfil the presence operations planned. A large part of the Government’s plan to address this relies on increasing availability, as well as …
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The Navy cannot fulfil the full ambition of the Integrated Review with its current fleet. It needs more lower-end, adaptable vessels, like the planned Type 31 frigate, to fulfil the presence operations planned. A large part of the Government’s plan to address this relies on increasing availability, as well as through the Type 32 programme. We are not convinced that increased availability can produce enough vessels to be relied upon in an emergency. If the Navy intends to deliver all missions, especially the presence the IR specifies, growth of major surface combatants needs to double, with growth from small, adaptable vessels. The resource budget, personnel and the number of auxiliary vessels should grow commensurately. This expansion will require a significant increase in funding.
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Government response AI summary
The government outlines commitments to procure new Type 31, Type 32, Type 26, FSS, and Multi-Role Support Ships, stating this will increase overall vessel numbers by 2030, addressing the need for fleet growth, particularly with adaptable vessels, though not explicitly committing to the committee's scale …
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Ministry of Defence
4
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
The Ministry of Defence should be honest with the public about the deteriorating international security situation, the capabilities the Navy will need to protect Britain in this environment, and the funding required to deliver those capabilities. We believe that if the public understands the Navy’s requirements, they will support the …
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The Ministry of Defence should be honest with the public about the deteriorating international security situation, the capabilities the Navy will need to protect Britain in this environment, and the funding required to deliver those capabilities. We believe that if the public understands the Navy’s requirements, they will support the increase in funding necessary to deliver it.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that the international security situation and Defence's capability requirements are set out in public documents, with Ministers engaging public forums, acknowledging that some intelligence cannot be shared. It highlighted the MOD's £24 billion spending review settlement and the Royal Navy's increasing budget …
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Ministry of Defence
5
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
The Indo-Pacific tilt is a significant change in the UK’s defence posture which will increase the demand and risk placed on finite resources. We will consider the value and effectiveness of the overall tilt policy and greater engagement in the region in future inquiries. Under current plans the naval assets …
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The Indo-Pacific tilt is a significant change in the UK’s defence posture which will increase the demand and risk placed on finite resources. We will consider the value and effectiveness of the overall tilt policy and greater engagement in the region in future inquiries. Under current plans the naval assets assigned to the Indo-Pacific are only sufficient for the current very limited presence operations in a stable security environment. It is unlikely that they will be able to complete more challenging missions, and may even find themselves in danger, if the UK is drawn more deeply into the region and forced to commit more forces to defend UK interests, or if the local security situation deteriorates. As a result, the increased commitment to the region must be regarded as one of the many risks the Royal Navy faces in a bumpy decade. The Government must be honest with the public with regards to the cost of “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” 73 the Indo-Pacific tilt. The Department should confirm in its response how regular future carrier strike group deployments will be, and whether they will have the same fleet composition, missions and support from allies as the 2021 carrier strike group deployment. (Paragraph 48) The Current Fleet
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Government response AI summary
The government stated it intends to deploy a Carrier Strike Group annually, but clarified that each deployment will be bespoke in terms of objectives, composition, and allied involvement. It did not explicitly address the request for public transparency on the overall costs of the Indo-Pacific …
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Ministry of Defence
6
Conclusion
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Acknowledged
The Royal Navy should be proud of its position as one of the leading global navies and its ability to deliver and operate two aircraft carriers. The carrier strike group deployment has shown that, when working with allies, the Navy can deliver a task group able to meet the goals …
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The Royal Navy should be proud of its position as one of the leading global navies and its ability to deliver and operate two aircraft carriers. The carrier strike group deployment has shown that, when working with allies, the Navy can deliver a task group able to meet the goals of establishing presence, building relationships with partners and supporting trade. The servicemen and women and civilian staff who worked hard to deliver the deployment should be proud of their achievement. We note that the loss of the F-35 plane, which is still being managed as we write this report, is a significant incident, and we are thankful for the safe recovery of the pilot.
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Government response AI summary
The government's response directly mirrored the committee's conclusion, acknowledging the Royal Navy's achievements and position as a leading global navy, without adding further comment.
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Ministry of Defence
7
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
The Department should provide further explanation of what Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) is intended to deliver. This should include consideration of what innovative capabilities the carriers can provide beyond carrier strike, littoral manoeuvre and humanitarian assistance, and more information on what role the F-35 will play in delivering an …
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The Department should provide further explanation of what Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) is intended to deliver. This should include consideration of what innovative capabilities the carriers can provide beyond carrier strike, littoral manoeuvre and humanitarian assistance, and more information on what role the F-35 will play in delivering an offensive air capability after any improvements to its armaments. It should be set out in advance of the aircraft carriers’ next deployment in a published strategy, with a classified annex if necessary.
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Government response AI summary
The government provided a detailed explanation of Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP), outlining its role in delivering sovereign strike capability, crisis response, and future innovation via HMS PRINCE OF WALES' 2022 program and the Expeditionary Strike Force concept. It also detailed how the F-35's offensive …
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Ministry of Defence
8
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
In light of the Department’s own target that the UK’s CEPP capability will reach Full Operating Capacity in 2026, 2025 is too long to wait to know the size of the planned F-35 fleet and how it could be used. The Department must provide clarity on how it intends to …
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In light of the Department’s own target that the UK’s CEPP capability will reach Full Operating Capacity in 2026, 2025 is too long to wait to know the size of the planned F-35 fleet and how it could be used. The Department must provide clarity on how it intends to operate the F-35 fleet before then. It must specifically address the questions of how many carriers and F-35s will be operated by the Navy and the RAF as part of routine operations and how a surge capacity will be delivered if one is planned. The Department should also be clear about what role uncrewed aircraft will play and when and how that role can be delivered. Until the Department provides clarity on all these points it is impossible for them or us to be reasonably sure of the risks the programme is carrying and how they can be mitigated.
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Government response AI summary
The government provides clarity on F-35 operations, detailing that one carrier will be a 'Strike Carrier' deploying annually, with 12 F-35Bs in 2022 increasing to 24 by 2025, and confirms assessment work for surge capacity and plans for a funded tactical Uncrewed Air System for …
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Ministry of Defence
9
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
It is clear that the budget priorities of successive governments have delivered a fleet of porcupines (well defended herbivores). We welcome the promises from the Department that future vessels will carry the offensive missiles they need and in particular that this will restore a land attack capability to the fleet. …
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It is clear that the budget priorities of successive governments have delivered a fleet of porcupines (well defended herbivores). We welcome the promises from the Department that future vessels will carry the offensive missiles they need and in particular that this will restore a land attack capability to the fleet. The Department must deliver the funding to swiftly end the spectacle of space on highly capable vessels being used to carry nothing but air. This should include consideration of both the threats and the opportunities posed by hypersonic missiles as well as the potential to use common missile silos across classes and to deliver compatibility with different international partners. The Department should confirm in its response that it still intends the FC/ASW to be compatible with the Mark 41 vertical launch system. The Department should also be mindful of previous warnings that procuring a ‘bridging’ system with long post-2030 life expectancy could damage the relationship with France. (Paragraph 73) 74 “We’re going to need a bigger Navy”
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Government response AI summary
The government commits to addressing hypersonic threats through upgrades and future procurement, confirms the FC/ASW will be compatible with the Mk 41 vertical launch system, and states the RN is exploring fitting Mk 41 launchers to other ship classes for commonality.
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Ministry of Defence
10
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
The delivery of digital and data integration like the Naval Strike Network will be absolutely crucial if the fleet is to be operated effectively. The Department must ensure that the Naval Strike Network is fully funded and compatible with Defence’s digital backbone.
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The delivery of digital and data integration like the Naval Strike Network will be absolutely crucial if the fleet is to be operated effectively. The Department must ensure that the Naval Strike Network is fully funded and compatible with Defence’s digital backbone.
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Government response AI summary
The government reassured the Committee that the Naval Strike Network will be fully compliant with Defence’s digital backbone, but stated that the Royal Navy is still exploring opportunities to fully fund this capability.
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Ministry of Defence
11
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
Evidence continues to show that sacrificing the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability would be, in the words of our predecessor Committee, “a short-sighted, militarily illiterate manoeuvre totally at odds with strategic reality.” Against this background we are concerned that the Future Commando Force and the Littoral Response Groups are not properly …
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Evidence continues to show that sacrificing the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability would be, in the words of our predecessor Committee, “a short-sighted, militarily illiterate manoeuvre totally at odds with strategic reality.” Against this background we are concerned that the Future Commando Force and the Littoral Response Groups are not properly resourced to continue amphibious operations. The Department must confirm that it remains committed to retaining the Royal Marines’ amphibious capabilities.
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Government response AI summary
The government confirmed its commitment to maintaining and modernising amphibious capabilities, citing a £278 million allocation, plans for up to six new MRSS vessels by the early 2030s, and exploration of new landing craft.
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Ministry of Defence
12
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Deferred
The underwater domain will become an ever more important part of naval warfare in the future. The Department should explore increasing the size of the attack submarine fleet as part of the Astute successor programme, Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR). At the very least it must confirm in its response …
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The underwater domain will become an ever more important part of naval warfare in the future. The Department should explore increasing the size of the attack submarine fleet as part of the Astute successor programme, Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR). At the very least it must confirm in its response that it will not decrease the number of attack submarines in the fleet below the seven Astute class submarines it plans to operate. The Department must also consider whether the SSNR submarine design will include a horizontal launch missile system in line with current UK submarines, or a vertical launch system for systems such as Tomahawk, in line with some of the more modern US Navy submarines. The Department should confirm in its response how it will ensure that current UK attack submarines retain their land attack missile capability, given the US Navy’s transition to vertical launch systems.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged the advice but stated that the SSN(R) programme is in an early design phase, and no conclusions have yet been reached on class size, weapon systems, or wider capabilities, deferring action on the recommendations.
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Ministry of Defence
13
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Not Addressed
We are very concerned that the limited resource budget allocated under the Spending Review for the remainder of this Parliament will be insufficient to properly operate and maintain the full fleet. We were not convinced by the Department’s assertion that “the resource budget is adequate to ensure that we maintain …
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We are very concerned that the limited resource budget allocated under the Spending Review for the remainder of this Parliament will be insufficient to properly operate and maintain the full fleet. We were not convinced by the Department’s assertion that “the resource budget is adequate to ensure that we maintain the crewing and effectiveness of those additional resources”. If this is not remedied, there will almost certainly have to be a compensating reduction in maintenance of or operations by the aircraft carriers or other vessels. If the Navy attempts to cut the payroll costs element of RDEL by reducing personnel numbers, this could make it even harder to bring in the new classes of vessels in the 2030s as planned. Defence spending must increase to allow the Navy’s resource budget to beat inflation and to accommodate any new cost model for the aircraft carriers.
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Government response AI summary
The government highlights a past £9 billion investment and efficient resource allocation, along with experimenting with crewing models, but does not commit to increasing the Navy's resource budget to beat inflation or accommodate new aircraft carrier costs as recommended.
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Ministry of Defence
14
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
The Navy plans to rely on allies to provide capabilities in almost all military operations and for most major missions working with allies will not be optional. Overall, this way of working is a source of strength for the Navy. However, we do need an honest assessment of the way …
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The Navy plans to rely on allies to provide capabilities in almost all military operations and for most major missions working with allies will not be optional. Overall, this way of working is a source of strength for the Navy. However, we do need an honest assessment of the way in which we will integrate in the systems of allies. The Department must do more at the political level to ensure the Navy can rely on this support when needed, including arranging regular exercises with other navies, and engaging the expanded defence liaison network promised by the DCP. The Department must be clear how far it intends to privilege interchangeability with the US over interoperability with other partners and what the trade-offs involved are. It must also be honest about the realistic limits on its ability to act alone. (Paragraph 105) “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” 75
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Government response AI summary
The government explains interchangeability with the US will build upon wider interoperability, outlining specific efforts like AUKUS, increasing the F-35B fleet to 48 by 2025, and fostering deep relationships with various navies and the expanding liaison network to ensure support and clarity.
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Ministry of Defence
15
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
Building interoperability with nations in the Indo-Pacific will be vital for delivering any tilt to the region. This must include coordinating with European partners and working to rebuild the military relationship with France. The Navy must continue to regularly exercise with partners in the region after the conclusion of CSG21, …
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Building interoperability with nations in the Indo-Pacific will be vital for delivering any tilt to the region. This must include coordinating with European partners and working to rebuild the military relationship with France. The Navy must continue to regularly exercise with partners in the region after the conclusion of CSG21, which will help to deter adversaries and demonstrate that the UK’s commitment to the region goes beyond rhetoric. This should include regular exercises with European and NATO partners, including consideration of developing a programme of exercises under AUKUS. The Department should develop a strategy for how it will collaborate with both regional partners and NATO allies in the Pacific within the next year. The Department should confirm in its response whether the Royal Navy will continue to contribute to Op ATALANTA.
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has a mature strategy for the Pacific, detailing existing deployments and collaboration efforts, but explicitly confirms the UK ceased participation in Operation ATALANTA in March 2019 due to a lack of legal basis.
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Ministry of Defence
16
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
We support the Navy’s plans to retain a sovereign core capability but are concerned that it cannot currently deliver all the elements required to defend and support the task group. As a result, the Department must take early action on the availability of attack submarines and destroyers, and the lack …
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We support the Navy’s plans to retain a sovereign core capability but are concerned that it cannot currently deliver all the elements required to defend and support the task group. As a result, the Department must take early action on the availability of attack submarines and destroyers, and the lack of Fleet Solid Support shipping. If action is not taken to address this within the next year, we will begin to request updates on progress twice a year. The Department should explore whether there is an option of upgrading the Type 45 destroyer to deliver ballistic missile defence and what the costs and timelines involved are and provide us with updates on the exploratory work.
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Government response AI summary
The government states improving ship and submarine availability is a top priority with ongoing projects and confirms Type 45 availability will improve from 2023 with PIP completion. It also states the IR funded SVE Capability 1 for BMD and an Assessment Phase for SVE Capability …
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Ministry of Defence
17
Conclusion
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
We welcome the Secretary of State’s focus on improving vessel availability as it is crucial for the effective operation of the fleet. We recognise that the Navy has already taken measures to address it but are concerned that any improvements come from increased use of low-end warships, rather than improvements …
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We welcome the Secretary of State’s focus on improving vessel availability as it is crucial for the effective operation of the fleet. We recognise that the Navy has already taken measures to address it but are concerned that any improvements come from increased use of low-end warships, rather than improvements in the availability of Type 23 frigates and Type 45 destroyers. The availability of these vessels will be particularly important in the next decade to ensure the Navy’s ambitious plans for the fleet can be delivered without capability gaps. However, availability issues are unlikely to improve significantly, and could potentially deteriorate further, until new frigates are introduced, and the Type 45 Power Improvement Project (PIP) is complete. It is only prudent for the Navy, when it is setting strategic and operational goals over the period, to take a more realistically pessimistic view of UK capabilities than is currently the case.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges improving vessel availability is a high priority, detailing ongoing initiatives like the PIP and EIP to enhance Type 45 availability from 2023, and affirming the Frigate Transition Plan is being optimized.
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Ministry of Defence
18
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
Reporting of availability must improve to avoid concealing issues with the availability of specific classes of vessel. The Ministry of Defence should report annually to Parliament in a written statement on the availability of all surface vessels in the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary by class. The answer to …
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Reporting of availability must improve to avoid concealing issues with the availability of specific classes of vessel. The Ministry of Defence should report annually to Parliament in a written statement on the availability of all surface vessels in the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary by class. The answer to PQ 36545 on Type 23 Frigates, dated 26 July 2021, provides a model and demonstrates that the publication of data at this level of specificity does not compromise security. The Ministry of Defence should also make a classified report to this Committee including details of any times in the previous year when surface vessels were unexpectedly unavailable for more than a month and a list of surface vessels that are expected to enter a refit or maintenance for a year or more, or which are being mothballed, during the course of the following year.
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Government response AI summary
The government committed to providing a single annual update to the Defence Committee on Surface Fleet availability and shipbuilding plans, but did not explicitly confirm the separate annual written statement to Parliament or all the specific details requested for the classified report.
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Ministry of Defence
19
Conclusion
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
The low availability of the UK’s Type 45 destroyers and recognised issues in their propulsion systems are a major cause for concern. The destroyers cannot do their job or effectively deter adversaries if only half, and sometimes only one, of the six 76 “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” …
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The low availability of the UK’s Type 45 destroyers and recognised issues in their propulsion systems are a major cause for concern. The destroyers cannot do their job or effectively deter adversaries if only half, and sometimes only one, of the six 76 “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” ships is available for operations at any time. The PIP that is intended to improve this situation is scheduled for completion in 2028 but there are indications that timelines may be slipping. We find it extraordinary that the Navy is prepared to wait seven years to fully repair these £1 billion destroyers, which are arguably the most powerful units in the surface fleet after the aircraft carriers.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges concerns about Type 45 availability and propulsion issues, detailing ongoing EIP work that has reduced power loss events, and confirming the PIP is progressing, with lessons being learned from HMS DAUNTLESS's conversion.
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Ministry of Defence
20
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Acknowledged
The Ministry of Defence should investigate claims that each PIP upgrade could be delivered in less than twelve months and confirm in its response what if any barriers there are to speeding up the programme. The response should also confirm whether an SRO has been appointed for the PIP. If …
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The Ministry of Defence should investigate claims that each PIP upgrade could be delivered in less than twelve months and confirm in its response what if any barriers there are to speeding up the programme. The response should also confirm whether an SRO has been appointed for the PIP. If not, one should be appointed and they should be prepared to provide the Committee with an annual report on the programme within six months of appointment, and then annually. If necessary, we will expect the SRO to answer additional questions on their programmes in a public evidence session.
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Government response AI summary
The government affirmed timely delivery of PIP is a priority and identified Director General Ships as having ultimate responsibility, but did not explicitly confirm an investigation into speeding up the programme or commit to specific annual reports from an appointed SRO to the Committee.
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Ministry of Defence
21
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Rejected
The Astute class represent arguably the best attack submarine in the world, but they cannot effectively deter anyone until they are actually in service; therefore we cannot afford any further delay in the delivery of the remaining Astute boats. We are concerned by reports that submarine availability is weak, and …
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The Astute class represent arguably the best attack submarine in the world, but they cannot effectively deter anyone until they are actually in service; therefore we cannot afford any further delay in the delivery of the remaining Astute boats. We are concerned by reports that submarine availability is weak, and not reassured by learning that the US and Australian submarine fleets are no better. Reported issues with the availability of the Vanguard class submarines that deliver the nuclear deterrent mean that the Dreadnought successor programme must be brought in on schedule, as further life extensions cannot be relied upon to fill in any gaps. The Ministry of Defence should set out in its response appropriate arrangements it will use to ensure that we are briefed on submarine availability once a year, with due regard to both security and the importance of scrutiny to ensure effective delivery. (Paragraph 132) Shipbuilding and the Future Fleet
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to provide annual briefings on submarine availability, citing UK policy not to comment on such matters for security reasons, but confirms the Dreadnought programme remains on track.
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Ministry of Defence
22
Conclusion
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Acknowledged
The next decade is one of significant risk for the Royal Navy’s fleet. During a period when it is being expected to take on increased responsibilities in a deteriorating international security environment, the Navy will be relying on a mix of elderly vessels (like the Type 23 frigates) and new …
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The next decade is one of significant risk for the Royal Navy’s fleet. During a period when it is being expected to take on increased responsibilities in a deteriorating international security environment, the Navy will be relying on a mix of elderly vessels (like the Type 23 frigates) and new and untested assets and processes (like the uncrewed mine countermeasures), while also being constrained by a tight budget for operations and maintenance that will force it to change how it operates. In addition, crucial programmes like the Crowsnest early warning system, the Type 45 Power Improvement Project and introduction of the Naval Strike Network will not be completed for several years, all of which incurs risk. The Navy will also be forced to carry capability gaps in medical facilities and anti-ship missiles, because of the retirement of RFA Argus and Harpoon, and likely also in its ability to monitor critical national infrastructure and deliver support shipping and logistics, because of the uncertain in-service date of the Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship and delays to the Fleet Solid Support ship programme. The lack of Fleet Solid Support ships is a particular concern because it threatens the Navy’s ability to deliver a force with a sovereign core that can act independently of allies.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the risks to the Royal Navy fleet, stating that significant upgrades are funded, risks are being actively managed, and options for future offensive weapons and medical support are being explored or brought into service.
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Ministry of Defence
23
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
Towards the end of this decade the Navy intends to bring in several completely new classes of vessels simultaneously. These plans must be delivered on schedule if the “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” 77 Navy is to avoid capability gaps and end the period of risk it has …
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Towards the end of this decade the Navy intends to bring in several completely new classes of vessels simultaneously. These plans must be delivered on schedule if the “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” 77 Navy is to avoid capability gaps and end the period of risk it has created through its own planning and procurement decisions. We welcome indications that these programmes are currently on target. However, past performance is not encouraging, and numerous risks have been identified. The security of the fleet and the UK rely on these projects being delivered on time. Given the challenges associated with the age of the vessels, like the provision of spare parts, we are far from confident that any delays can be effectively managed by extending the life of ageing vessels without additional risk.
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Government response AI summary
The government responded that current plans and risk management for Type 26 and Type 31 delivery are robust, with experienced teams, and are projected to avoid capability gaps when replacing Type 23 Frigates on schedule.
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Ministry of Defence
24
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
Proper scrutiny is essential to ensure programmes are delivered on time. In order to allow for proper scrutiny of ongoing programmes, the Ministry of Defence should emulate the US Department of Defense and provide Parliament with an annual shipbuilding plan, including the number of ships planned to enter and leave …
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Proper scrutiny is essential to ensure programmes are delivered on time. In order to allow for proper scrutiny of ongoing programmes, the Ministry of Defence should emulate the US Department of Defense and provide Parliament with an annual shipbuilding plan, including the number of ships planned to enter and leave service each year in the next 30 years. We ask that the Senior Responsible Owners for the Type 26, Type 31, Astute and Dreadnought programmes provide the Committee with an annual report on each of their programmes within six months of the publication of this report, and then annually. If necessary, we will expect the SROs to answer additional questions on their programmes in a public evidence session.
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Government response AI summary
The department will provide a single annual update to the Defence Committee, which will include Surface Fleet availability and shipbuilding plans, but does not explicitly commit to the 30-year plan, individual SRO reports, or public evidence sessions requested.
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Ministry of Defence
25
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
The National Shipbuilding Strategy refresh must finally take on board the consistent recommendations given in successive reports by a range of experts. This includes providing a steady pipeline of work for British shipyards and working collaboratively with industry. The refresh should: • Ensure that warships are built in UK yards …
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The National Shipbuilding Strategy refresh must finally take on board the consistent recommendations given in successive reports by a range of experts. This includes providing a steady pipeline of work for British shipyards and working collaboratively with industry. The refresh should: • Ensure that warships are built in UK yards and that this designation continues to include the Fleet Solid Support ship contract, as well as the future replacements for the Tide and Wave class vessels. • Revisit the principles of the Parker Review and accept that active intervention is required by the government to modernise yards, guarantee an assured pipeline of work for UK yards and protect the skills base. • Prioritise designing vessels for export wherever possible, and consider incorporating adaptability into the design as a way to achieve this; • Give greater weight to social value and the needs of shipyards around the UK when considering competition; • Continue to follow the principles adopted after Sir John Parker’s review, particularly showing agility, pace and grip in procurement, limiting modifications in contract signing and not delaying projects in response to annual budget pressures; and • Provide an assessment of the skills and professional engineering workforce the UK has and will need in its shipbuilding capability and explain how and on what timescales the Department will develop these.
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Government response AI summary
The government committed to addressing the skills aspect of the National Shipbuilding Strategy refresh by conducting an assessment of current requirements and outlining how various bodies will collaborate to deliver necessary skills, but did not address the other five specific recommendations.
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Ministry of Defence
26
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
We are not reassured by the Department’s evasiveness around whether the Fleet Solid Support ships will be built in the UK. The Department must ensure the Fleet Solid Support ship contract is built in a UK yard, reflecting its designation as a warship, whilst outlining the Department’s ambition and confidence …
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We are not reassured by the Department’s evasiveness around whether the Fleet Solid Support ships will be built in the UK. The Department must ensure the Fleet Solid Support ship contract is built in a UK yard, reflecting its designation as a warship, whilst outlining the Department’s ambition and confidence in UK delivery. In its response to this report, the Department should confirm how it will restrict the 78 “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” competition to a national build without further delaying the procurement process. It should also confirm whether the programme will follow the other recommendations in Sir John Parker’s review, notably pace, grip and designing for export. As the Navy’s only current solid support ship is scheduled to retire in 2028, the new vessels must be delivered as quickly as possible to ensure the Navy can deliver the sovereign core capability it aims for.
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that the final contract for Fleet Solid Support ships will be awarded to a UK business, with all three ships integrated in UK shipyards, and the 'warship' designation exempts the program from international competition. It also confirmed that the competition evaluation prioritizes …
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Ministry of Defence
27
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted in Part
We welcome the Department’s ambition to bring new technology into the fleet and the opportunities that the large number of planned vessels offer. It provides an early test of the new Integrated Operating Concept. It is essential that NavyX and Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) improve their ability to take …
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We welcome the Department’s ambition to bring new technology into the fleet and the opportunities that the large number of planned vessels offer. It provides an early test of the new Integrated Operating Concept. It is essential that NavyX and Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) improve their ability to take emerging technology beyond the demonstrator phase and deliver it to the field. Digital systems should be prioritised more highly in procurement, with consideration given to them early in the design and build of new vessels. The Navy should plan as far as possible for them to be fitted flexibly into vessels and regularly upgraded to avoid capabilities becoming out of date. Development stage funding should be increased. We note the importance of space as an enabler for the Navy: the role it plays in delivering military capabilities will be considered as part of our dedicated space inquiry.
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Government response AI summary
The government outlined how DE&S and NavyX address technological development and digital system integration through open architectures and application-based software, committing to their use in future vessel designs. It also stated the Royal Navy would specifically review funding allocated for research, development, and engineering as …
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Ministry of Defence
28
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
The Navy is moving towards principles of modularity, autonomy and lethality in vessel design. Modularity is likely to increase vessels’ capabilities and the potential roles they can play. In the future vessels may perform their roles supported by autonomous vessels to which they can act as motherships. The Navy should …
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The Navy is moving towards principles of modularity, autonomy and lethality in vessel design. Modularity is likely to increase vessels’ capabilities and the potential roles they can play. In the future vessels may perform their roles supported by autonomous vessels to which they can act as motherships. The Navy should consider taking a distributed lethality approach to future fleet and vessel design, learning from the US Navy’s development of the concept.
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Government response AI summary
The government states the RN has been working with the US Navy to learn from their experience in distributed maritime operations, and has begun experimentation with mission modules as part of its concept for distributed lethality.
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Ministry of Defence
29
Recommendation
Third Report - “We’re going to need a b…
Accepted
The Type 32 frigate programme presents an opportunity to start thinking about how to design vessels for the future. We support the Navy’s proposal for a programme that delivers a less exquisite vessel and increases hull numbers for presence operations in relatively permissive environments and lower-level conflict. We strongly recommend …
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The Type 32 frigate programme presents an opportunity to start thinking about how to design vessels for the future. We support the Navy’s proposal for a programme that delivers a less exquisite vessel and increases hull numbers for presence operations in relatively permissive environments and lower-level conflict. We strongly recommend that the Navy look carefully at the possibility of emulating other navies’ successes with heavily armed light frigates/corvettes, and consider delivering a similar vessel that will be fitted with an effective missile capability from the start. This should be included in any consideration of using common missile silos across vessel classes. (Paragraph 199) “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” 79 Comparison of national fleets Table 5: Comparison of UK, Allies and Adversaries’ Fleets United United States France Rest of NATO China Russia India Japan Kingdom Submarines Strategic Nuclear Powered 4 14 4 0 6 11 1 0 Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Ballistic Missile 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Submarine (SSB) Tactical Nuclear Powered 0 51 0 0 0 8 0 0 Attack Submarine with dedicated launch tubes for Guided Missiles (SSGN) Nuclear Power 6 3 4 0 6 10 1 0 Attack Submarine (SSN) Attack Submarine 0 0 0 58 46 20 14 22 (SSK) 80 “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” United United States France Rest of NATO China Russia India Japan Kingdom Principal Aircraft Carriers Nuclear Powered 0 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 Surface Aircraft Carrier Combatants (CVN) Aircraft Carrier 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 (CV/CVH) VSTOL Aircraft 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Carrier (CVS) Cruisers 0 24 0 0 3 4 0 3 Destroyers 6 68 2 19 36 11 10 38 Frigates 12 21 18 90 46 16 17 6 Patrol Corvettes 0 0 6 23 72 42 8 0 Combatants Patrol Ships 8 0 4 56 87 3 10 0 Amphibious Principal Amphibious 0 7 3 4 1 0 0 3 Vessels Amphibious Ships Assault Ship (LHD) Assault Landing 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ship (LHA) Landing Platform 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Helicopter (LPH) Landing Platform 5 22 0 4 7 0 1 0 Dock/Landing Ship Dock (LPD/LSD) “We’re going to need a big
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Government response AI summary
The government welcomes the committee's observations and confirms it is seeking to increase the number of ships fitted with Mk 41 launchers (including Type 31 and potential retrofits), and that Type 32 frigate concept phases will examine common launchers, addressing the recommendation for effective missile …
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Ministry of Defence