Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Third Report - “We’re going to need a bigger Navy”
Defence Committee
HC 168
Published 14 December 2021
Recommendations
5
The Indo-Pacific tilt is a significant change in the UK’s defence posture which will increase...
Recommendation
The Indo-Pacific tilt is a significant change in the UK’s defence posture which will increase the demand and risk placed on finite resources. We will consider the value and effectiveness of the overall tilt policy and greater engagement in the …
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Ministry of Defence
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7
Para 60
The Department should provide further explanation of what Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) is intended...
Recommendation
The Department should provide further explanation of what Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) is intended to deliver. This should include consideration of what innovative capabilities the carriers can provide beyond carrier strike, littoral manoeuvre and humanitarian assistance, and more information …
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Ministry of Defence
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21
The Astute class represent arguably the best attack submarine in the world, but they cannot...
Recommendation
The Astute class represent arguably the best attack submarine in the world, but they cannot effectively deter anyone until they are actually in service; therefore we cannot afford any further delay in the delivery of the remaining Astute boats. We …
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Ministry of Defence
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Conclusions (26)
1
Conclusion
Para 16
Over the next decade the UK and the Navy will face an increasingly complex international security environment. Russia and China will remain the primary adversaries at sea, with the relative importance of the UK’s response to each likely to shift and potentially interact through the decade. Developments in technology, particularly …
2
Conclusion
Para 45
The Government has ambitious plans for the Royal Navy. The Integrated Review has given the Navy a significantly increased, and potentially the leading, role in the UK’s security posture. It is likely to be the Government’s tool of choice to deliver its strategy of persistent engagement and competition below the …
3
Conclusion
Para 46
The Navy cannot fulfil the full ambition of the Integrated Review with its current fleet. It needs more lower-end, adaptable vessels, like the planned Type 31 frigate, to fulfil the presence operations planned. A large part of the Government’s plan to address this relies on increasing availability, as well as …
4
Conclusion
Para 47
The Ministry of Defence should be honest with the public about the deteriorating international security situation, the capabilities the Navy will need to protect Britain in this environment, and the funding required to deliver those capabilities. We believe that if the public understands the Navy’s requirements, they will support the …
6
Conclusion
Para 55
The Royal Navy should be proud of its position as one of the leading global navies and its ability to deliver and operate two aircraft carriers. The carrier strike group deployment has shown that, when working with allies, the Navy can deliver a task group able to meet the goals …
8
Conclusion
Para 65
In light of the Department’s own target that the UK’s CEPP capability will reach Full Operating Capacity in 2026, 2025 is too long to wait to know the size of the planned F-35 fleet and how it could be used. The Department must provide clarity on how it intends to …
9
Conclusion
It is clear that the budget priorities of successive governments have delivered a fleet of porcupines (well defended herbivores). We welcome the promises from the Department that future vessels will carry the offensive missiles they need and in particular that this will restore a land attack capability to the fleet. …
10
Conclusion
Para 79
The delivery of digital and data integration like the Naval Strike Network will be absolutely crucial if the fleet is to be operated effectively. The Department must ensure that the Naval Strike Network is fully funded and compatible with Defence’s digital backbone.
11
Conclusion
Para 86
Evidence continues to show that sacrificing the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability would be, in the words of our predecessor Committee, “a short-sighted, militarily illiterate manoeuvre totally at odds with strategic reality.” Against this background we are concerned that the Future Commando Force and the Littoral Response Groups are not properly …
12
Conclusion
Para 92
The underwater domain will become an ever more important part of naval warfare in the future. The Department should explore increasing the size of the attack submarine fleet as part of the Astute successor programme, Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR). At the very least it must confirm in its response …
13
Conclusion
Para 96
We are very concerned that the limited resource budget allocated under the Spending Review for the remainder of this Parliament will be insufficient to properly operate and maintain the full fleet. We were not convinced by the Department’s assertion that “the resource budget is adequate to ensure that we maintain …
14
Conclusion
The Navy plans to rely on allies to provide capabilities in almost all military operations and for most major missions working with allies will not be optional. Overall, this way of working is a source of strength for the Navy. However, we do need an honest assessment of the way …
15
Conclusion
Para 111
Building interoperability with nations in the Indo-Pacific will be vital for delivering any tilt to the region. This must include coordinating with European partners and working to rebuild the military relationship with France. The Navy must continue to regularly exercise with partners in the region after the conclusion of CSG21, …
16
Conclusion
Para 116
We support the Navy’s plans to retain a sovereign core capability but are concerned that it cannot currently deliver all the elements required to defend and support the task group. As a result, the Department must take early action on the availability of attack submarines and destroyers, and the lack …
17
Conclusion
Para 126
We welcome the Secretary of State’s focus on improving vessel availability as it is crucial for the effective operation of the fleet. We recognise that the Navy has already taken measures to address it but are concerned that any improvements come from increased use of low-end warships, rather than improvements …
18
Conclusion
Para 127
Reporting of availability must improve to avoid concealing issues with the availability of specific classes of vessel. The Ministry of Defence should report annually to Parliament in a written statement on the availability of all surface vessels in the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary by class. The answer to …
19
Conclusion
Para 128
The low availability of the UK’s Type 45 destroyers and recognised issues in their propulsion systems are a major cause for concern. The destroyers cannot do their job or effectively deter adversaries if only half, and sometimes only one, of the six 76 “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” …
20
Conclusion
Para 129
The Ministry of Defence should investigate claims that each PIP upgrade could be delivered in less than twelve months and confirm in its response what if any barriers there are to speeding up the programme. The response should also confirm whether an SRO has been appointed for the PIP. If …
22
Conclusion
Para 144
The next decade is one of significant risk for the Royal Navy’s fleet. During a period when it is being expected to take on increased responsibilities in a deteriorating international security environment, the Navy will be relying on a mix of elderly vessels (like the Type 23 frigates) and new …
23
Conclusion
Para 152
Towards the end of this decade the Navy intends to bring in several completely new classes of vessels simultaneously. These plans must be delivered on schedule if the “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” 77 Navy is to avoid capability gaps and end the period of risk it has …
24
Conclusion
Para 156
Proper scrutiny is essential to ensure programmes are delivered on time. In order to allow for proper scrutiny of ongoing programmes, the Ministry of Defence should emulate the US Department of Defense and provide Parliament with an annual shipbuilding plan, including the number of ships planned to enter and leave …
25
Conclusion
Para 176
The National Shipbuilding Strategy refresh must finally take on board the consistent recommendations given in successive reports by a range of experts. This includes providing a steady pipeline of work for British shipyards and working collaboratively with industry. The refresh should: • Ensure that warships are built in UK yards …
26
Conclusion
Para 177
We are not reassured by the Department’s evasiveness around whether the Fleet Solid Support ships will be built in the UK. The Department must ensure the Fleet Solid Support ship contract is built in a UK yard, reflecting its designation as a warship, whilst outlining the Department’s ambition and confidence …
27
Conclusion
Para 184
We welcome the Department’s ambition to bring new technology into the fleet and the opportunities that the large number of planned vessels offer. It provides an early test of the new Integrated Operating Concept. It is essential that NavyX and Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) improve their ability to take …
28
Conclusion
Para 198
The Navy is moving towards principles of modularity, autonomy and lethality in vessel design. Modularity is likely to increase vessels’ capabilities and the potential roles they can play. In the future vessels may perform their roles supported by autonomous vessels to which they can act as motherships. The Navy should …
29
Conclusion
The Type 32 frigate programme presents an opportunity to start thinking about how to design vessels for the future. We support the Navy’s proposal for a programme that delivers a less exquisite vessel and increases hull numbers for presence operations in relatively permissive environments and lower-level conflict. We strongly recommend …