Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Recommendation 5
5
The Indo-Pacific tilt is a significant change in the UK’s defence posture which will increase...
Recommendation
The Indo-Pacific tilt is a significant change in the UK’s defence posture which will increase the demand and risk placed on finite resources. We will consider the value and effectiveness of the overall tilt policy and greater engagement in the region in future inquiries. Under current plans the naval assets assigned to the Indo-Pacific are only sufficient for the current very limited presence operations in a stable security environment. It is unlikely that they will be able to complete more challenging missions, and may even find themselves in danger, if the UK is drawn more deeply into the region and forced to commit more forces to defend UK interests, or if the local security situation deteriorates. As a result, the increased commitment to the region must be regarded as one of the many risks the Royal Navy faces in a bumpy decade. The Government must be honest with the public with regards to the cost of “We’re going to need a bigger Navy” 73 the Indo-Pacific tilt. The Department should confirm in its response how regular future carrier strike group deployments will be, and whether they will have the same fleet composition, missions and support from allies as the 2021 carrier strike group deployment. (Paragraph 48) The Current Fleet
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
Response: The IR considered the opportunity cost of not delivering greater levels of global engagement, through prosperity and security. An Eastwards shift in the global economic centre-of-gravity is widely accepted, as are the potential impacts for global security of an increasingly assertive China. To match these challenges, which if fully manifest would have a significant impact on the UK’s prosperity, the IR laid out an approach that delivered deterrence through global engagement. In the past, we have tended to ‘pulse’ activity into the Indo-Pacific. However, two permanently deployed OPVs and a regionally focused LRG from 2023, in addition to periodic CSG deployments, signals a deeper and more enduring commitment. This builds on the success of the CSG21 deployment, which demonstrated a more confident, UK-led, highly technological, and internationally partnered effort to strengthen our alliances and national interests in an area critical to global peace and prosperity. Our allies and partners have responded positively and are seeking further engagement with the RN. The Secretary of State is focused on the total cost of CSG21 and this will help assist Defence in striking the right balance of activity and capability to deploy to the region to meet the Government’s policy goals. Operating a CSG will have a cost, regardless of where it operates – bearing in mind transit times, deployment lengths and logistic support, for example. When a decision is made to commit to a region, long-term arrangements can be made to reduce costs, and use of facilities provided by our allies and partners can also ease this burden. The Carrier Strike capability is on track to achieve FOC by December 2023. We intend to routinely deploy a CSG annually; the deployment schedule is a strategic decision, directed by the Senior Strategic Steering Group in Defence and then endorsed by Service Chiefs, Defence Ministers, other government departments (such as the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office or the Department for International Trade) and, ultimately, the Cabinet Office. Each CSG deployment will be bespoke in terms of its objectives, its operating area, its composition, and the extent to which allies and partners are involved. No two deployments will be the same. The UK Operational Headquarters, with guidance from the MOD, will plan and deliver CSG activity to meet the Government’s engagement and security priorities. The Current Fleet