Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee

Fourteenth Report - Windrush Compensation Scheme

Public Accounts Committee HC 174 Published 27 July 2021
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Conclusions & Recommendations
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Conclusions (17)

Observations and findings
2 Conclusion
The scheme design was too complex and made it difficult for victims to engage with. Many of the difficulties suffered by the Windrush generation were due to insufficient documentation, and yet the Department designed a scheme which demands evidence it acknowledges many claimants do not have. It claims its approach …
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3 Conclusion
The Department’s planning estimates for the scheme have been completely wrong. When it set up the compensation scheme in April 2019 the Department made a series of key assumptions about how the scheme would work, which have not matched what has happened in practice. For example, it thought that around …
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4 Conclusion
The Department launched the scheme without the caseworkers it required to deliver the complex scheme it designed and has never had the operational capacity it needs, leaving people waiting for decisions. When it launched the scheme, the Department had only six caseworkers to deal with processing claims, compared to the …
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1 Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department) about the Windrush Compensation Scheme.1
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5 Conclusion
The National Audit Office report noted that for claims received after March 2020 (the only data for which the Department had detailed process data) only 10% (102 claims) had reached payment approval stage. These 102 claims took on average 177 days to reach payment approval, with half of the cases …
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6 Conclusion
The Department recognised that its processing of claims was not always quick and that it had not yet done enough to reduce the time it takes to process them. It claimed that it now has ‘the right plans in place’ to speed them up.14 It repeatedly underlined its desire to …
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7 Conclusion
The Department expressed confidence that the scheme would be quicker and less demanding thanks to the changes it implemented in December 2020.18 We asked what the Department believed was an acceptable period to process claims and heard that it avoided setting such targets as it believes this would create unhelpful …
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8 Conclusion
The Department claimed that the scheme was unprecedented, but that it had spoken to ombudsmen across government in its efforts to design an effective scheme.23 Following the session, the Department wrote to us and described how it drew on the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman’s Principles for Remedy guidance, the …
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9 Conclusion
The Department asserted that no-one eligible to receive compensation should fail to receive it because they could not provide evidence to support their claim.28 The Department claimed it designed the scheme to minimise the amount of evidence required, although the National Audit Office reported that initially some areas, for example …
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10 Conclusion
We noted that it has been especially difficult for some types of claimants to see progress with their claims.33 The National Audit Office reported that more than one-third of claims on behalf of the estate of someone who has died had not moved past the initial registration stage of the …
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11 Conclusion
The Department underlined its determination to right the wrongs it has inflicted on the Windrush generation. It stated that this is why getting the compensation scheme right is absolutely essential.37 The Department repeatedly committed to maximising applications to the scheme and ensuring that people get the maximum amount of compensation …
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12 Conclusion
We asked whether the Department had been too optimistic in setting out its initial assumptions.42 The National Audit Office reported that the Department originally estimated it would pay between £120 and £310 million to an estimated 15,000 claimants.43 In October 2019, the Department reduced this estimate to between £60 million …
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13 Conclusion
The Department told us it wanted to ensure all those potentially eligible to apply to the scheme could do so.47 This committee recommended in March 2019 that the Department extend its historical reviews “beyond Caribbean Commonwealth nationals to include other Commonwealth nationals who may have been wrongfully detained, removed or …
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14 Conclusion
The Department acknowledged it took longer to process claims than it had expected.54 The National Audit Office calculated that claims took an average of 154 staff hours to process to payment, five times more than the Department originally estimated.55 The Department could not explain how it made its original caseworking …
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15 Conclusion
The National Audit Office reported that the Department originally planned to have 125 caseworkers, but at the launch of the scheme it only had six.58 The Department told us it had entirely rebuilt its capacity plan since ‘October or November’ 2020.59 However, the National Audit Office reported that, at March …
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16 Conclusion
The Department told us it has a lengthy and comprehensive training course for caseworkers followed by mentoring to ensure that caseworkers formulate awards accurately.63 The National Audit Office noted that, as of March 2021, the Department was aware of six overpayments, totalling £38,292 in value.64 Based on a review of …
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17 Conclusion
The Department noted that it was exploring options to obtain additional caseworking support for the scheme from elsewhere within the Department.69 In the longer term, it is examining how it can restructure the way it organises its caseworkers across all areas of the Department as part of its transformation programme.70 …
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