Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Twenty-Fourth - Crossrail: A progress update
Public Accounts Committee
HC 184
Published 29 October 2021
Recommendations
4
We are concerned that TfL and the Department do not have a plan to maximise...
Recommendation
We are concerned that TfL and the Department do not have a plan to maximise the long-term, wider economic benefits of Crossrail. When open, the Elizabeth line should increase capacity in central London by around 10%, reduce journey times, improve …
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HM Treasury
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Conclusions (23)
2
Conclusion
The collapse in passenger numbers owing to the pandemic, and subsequent bailout to TfL, has complicated how and when TfL and the Greater London Authority will be able to repay the taxpayer loans for Crossrail. To date, the taxpayer has provided nearly £2.9 billion in loans to TfL and the …
3
Conclusion
It is not clear to passengers and businesses when the Elizabeth line will open or what services will be available. The Elizabeth line services will open in stages. Services have been running on the eastern and western ends of the line (under the brand name ‘TfL Rail’) since June 2017 …
5
Conclusion
The Department has still not demonstrated that it is embedding lessons learned into its major programmes. This Committee has examined many major transport programmes, such as HS2, Great Western route modernisation and Thameslink, many of which have had significant problems in their delivery. We have told the Department many times …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department), Transport for London (TfL) and Crossrail Ltd on progress with the Crossrail programme.1
6
Conclusion
A significant software update is needed to begin Trial Operations, which will allow up to 24 trains an hour to run through the central section.10 Any unexpected issues with software may take time to fix and we have reported on previous challenges with software in our Completing Crossrail report.11 The …
7
Conclusion
Crossrail Ltd is constructing stations along the central section which are then handed over to the eventual infrastructure maintainer - Rail for London Infrastructure (RfLi) or London Underground. TfL told us that completing the stations is on the critical path to opening the central section to passengers.14 Crossrail Ltd told …
8
Conclusion
The estimated cost of Crossrail has increased by £1.9 billion since we last reported and now stands at £18.9 billion.18 This excludes the £1.1 billion cost of the new trains and the depot at Old Oak Common which have historically been reported separately.19 The estimated cost has increased because the …
9
Conclusion
The £1.9 billion estimated cost increase consisted of £1,510 million of Crossrail Ltd costs, and £390 million of Network Rail costs. Schedule delay was the largest category of cost increase of Crossrail Ltd costs, accounting for £934 million. This was followed by £228 million of COVID-19-related costs.22 However, Crossrail Ltd …
10
Conclusion
At May 2021, Crossrail Ltd estimated that its cost to complete the programme would be between £15,820 million and £16,008 million, with a middle value of £15,910 million. This was between £30 million and £218 million above the current funding of £15,790 million. The middle estimate was £15,910 million which …
11
Conclusion
TfL told us that further funding may not be needed if the railway is opened earlier and everything goes to plan.29 By July 2021, Crossrail Ltd expected to have updated its plans to reflect progress and risks remaining, which would inform its range of potential opening dates and costs.30 This …
12
Conclusion
In August 2020, Crossrail Ltd announced that up to £1.1 billion of further funding would be needed to complete the programme. In December 2020, the government agreed to loan the Greater London Assembly (GLA) £825 million to complete the programme, which represented the limit of what the GLA could prudently …
13
Conclusion
TfL told us that it is over-reliant on income through the farebox which accounts for 72% of TfL income. TfL compared this to New York City Transit which received 38% of its income from fares.37 It told us that COVID had caused revenues to collapse because ridership had collapsed. At …
14
Conclusion
The Elizabeth line services will open in stages as different part of the line are completed. Services have been running on the eastern and western ends of the line (under the brand name ‘TfL Rail’) since June 2017 and May 2018, respectively.41 Crossrail Ltd expects the central tunnelled section to …
15
Conclusion
Once the central section opens, commuters must still change to other Elizabeth line services to continue their journeys on the eastern and western ends. The opening of full east-west services must align with national rail timetable changes which take place in May and December each year. TfL told us it …
16
Conclusion
In April 2019 we reported that the Department, TfL and the previous Crossrail Ltd management team had focussed on a fixed delivery date of December 2018, which led to warning signs that programme was in trouble being missed or ignored.45 The Department told us that it was not falling into …
17
Conclusion
Construction work on the programme started in 2009 and tunnelling began in 2012.47 The majority of major construction work is complete and Crossrail Ltd is now transferring assets, such as stations, to Rail for London Infrastructure (RfLi) and London Underground who, along with Network Rail, will maintain and operate different …
18
Conclusion
The Department and TfL told us that, when the Elizabeth line opens, they expect it to increase rail capacity in central London by around 10%, reduce journey times, and be fully accessible.50 These were the transport benefits set out in the last published business case in 2011.51 TfL explained that …
19
Conclusion
The Department and Crossrail Ltd told us about the benefits Crossrail has achieved during construction. Crossrail Ltd told us that Crossrail had “overreached” on its apprenticeship targets, achieving 1,000 apprenticeships. Many of the 1,000 were in civil engineering in the Tier 1 contractors, and Crossrail Ltd does not know where …
20
Conclusion
The Department told us that Crossrail had completed a property and regeneration study looking at 2008 to 2016 which identified some 90,000 homes and four million square feet of office space resulting from Crossrail. It also noted plans in place for 12 major developments around the Elizabeth line stations and …
21
Conclusion
The NAO report sets out what it would expect to see in place to achieve benefits. It reported that the Department and TfL did not have a clear overarching benefits management strategy or plan for the Elizabeth line, but had started work on one since its fieldwork.56 Local economic growth …
22
Conclusion
We have examined many major transport programmes over the years, including modernising the Great Western railway, the Sheffield to Rotherham tram-train, the Thameslink programme, the A303 Stonehenge tunnel, High Speed Two and Crossrail. We have seen common issues around programmes not keeping to cost or schedule, a lack of transparency …
23
Conclusion
We have asked the Department for the lessons it has learned from these experiences on several different occasions and we asked again at this session in July. The Department referred again to the report it had produced with the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, following the announcement of delays and cost …
24
Conclusion
The Department also referred to the lessons it and HS2 Ltd have learnt from the difficulties Crossrail had in integrating the 36 main works contracts and ensuring that they work together. Informed by the Crossrail experience, at our June 2021 session on HS2, HS2 Ltd and the Department told us …