Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee

Tenth Report - Restoration and Renewal of Parliament

Public Accounts Committee HC 49 Published 29 June 2022
Report Status
Government responded
Conclusions & Recommendations
40 items (4 recs)
Government Response
AI assessment · 1 of 40 classified
Not Addressed 1
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Recommendations

4 results
3

Critical value for money risks, which we have previously highlighted, have still not been addressed.

Recommendation
Critical value for money risks, which we have previously highlighted, have still not been addressed. The NAO’s January 2022 report found that risks we identified in our October 2020 report remained. This included the Sponsor Body managing factors outside its … Read more
HM Treasury
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4

The Commissions have asked for further options to be explored but is unclear how the...

Recommendation
The Commissions have asked for further options to be explored but is unclear how the higher costs, greater duration and added risks, including extraordinary health and safety risks, of a continued presence during the building works can be managed. The … Read more
HM Treasury
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5

To date, there has been a failure of transparency and accountability over work to restore...

Recommendation
To date, there has been a failure of transparency and accountability over work to restore and renew the Palace. This includes: the House administrations being three months late sharing, in line with expected standards, information on a recent asbestos incident … Read more
HM Treasury
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6 Not Addressed

The Parliamentary Accounting Officers have not made clear whether the House authorities can deliver the...

Recommendation
The Parliamentary Accounting Officers have not made clear whether the House authorities can deliver the work envisaged by Parliament. We are concerned that the Clerks may feel constrained in sharing their professional views as Accounting and Corporate officers on what … Read more
Government Response Summary
The government's response provides lists of Treasury Minutes responses for previous sessions without addressing the specific recommendation about the Clerks making their expert advice available and writing to the Commons and Lords should they be tasked with delivering a programme which they cannot assure themselves is value for money.
HM Treasury
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Conclusions (36)

Observations and findings
2 Conclusion
The House of Commons Commission proposed to dissolve the Sponsor Body without considering why governance arrangements did not work and potential alternatives, including whether the House administrations can satisfactorily oversee work. Following a discussion of the indicative cost and schedule estimates and a continued presence assessment, the Commission proposed that …
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1 Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence on the restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster (the Palace) from the Sponsor Body Chief Executive Officer, the Delivery Authority Chief Executive, the Clerk of the House and the Clerk of the Parliaments.2 …
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7 Conclusion
The Clerk of the House told us that every year the restoration and renewal of the Palace is delayed adds risk and cost such as through nugatory spending.18 In 2014, an independent assessment found delays to the decision may add between £60 million and £85 million per year (in 2014 …
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8 Conclusion
Since the start of 2016, there have been 25 fire incidents within the Palace and 13 incidents of falling masonry.22 Nearly two hundred years ago, in 1834, the historic Palace was destroyed by a fire following delay restoring the building.23
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9 Conclusion
In May 2022, the Clerk of the House of Commons told us that this period of uncertainty was “highly corrosive and damaging” for retaining the vital expertise needed to develop the Programme.24 This echoed the Delivery Authority’s comments to us in March, that there was a significant risk it would …
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10 Conclusion
In March 2022, the Delivery Authority had already lost some newly recruited staff and access to technical contractor expertise. Then, in May 2022, the CEO of the Sponsor Body announced her resignation, along with two other senior members of Sponsor Body staff.27 The Clerk of the House of Commons told …
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11 Conclusion
We questioned the Clerk of the House of Commons on the timeframes and Parliamentary processes required to make any changes and provide more certainty. He told us that the House Commissions had sought additional assurance work ahead of a June 2022 joint meeting to agree a report setting out their …
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12 Conclusion
The Commissions intend to put indicative resolutions based on this report to Members and Peers before the summer 2022 recess. The Clerk of the House explained that formalising the Commissions’ proposal would require the Leader of the House of Commons to lay an affirmative instrument before both Houses to be …
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13 Conclusion
The Sponsor Body told us it has not estimated the costs associated with dissolving itself, which will depend on what the changes to the governance arrangements and proposed work look like. Depending on their grade, its staff have notice periods of between three and 12 months.35 The independent expert review …
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14 Conclusion
In February 2022, the House of Commons Commission proposed that the sponsor function should transfer to a “new, separate department serving both Houses”, with its head formally accountable to the Clerk of the House or the Clerks of both Houses and ultimately to the Commissions.37 The House of Lords Commission …
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15 Conclusion
On 14 June 2022, the Commissions published the areas where they sought the Houses agreement. This included that the Sponsor Body should be replaced, and that the sponsorship function, now termed client function, would be brought in-house to Parliament for these early programme stages. In practice, the Clerks of the …
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16 Conclusion
The Clerk of the House of Commons explained that the technical capacity needed to take on the Sponsor Body’s role was well beyond anything within the House administrations’ in-house resource. He suggested there will need to be a professional client function with the same mix of professional skills as the …
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17 Conclusion
In terms of the Clerks’ role, Members of both Houses value their expertise in terms of procedural knowledge, but they may not have the requisite skills to oversee the delivery function (the Delivery Authority) in a complex programme with multiple interdependences. There is no evidence that the Clerk of the …
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18 Conclusion
We questioned the Clerk of the House of Commons on the House administration’s performance managing similar programmes. The expected cost of the Elizabeth Tower refurbishment has roughly tripled, from £29 million set out in the outline business case in 2016 to £80 million in the revised business case approved in …
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19 Conclusion
We also questioned the House administrations’ protocols on how they to responded to safety incidents during works.46 On 19 November 2021, contractors working in the Speaker’s private apartments identified a release of asbestos between 23 October and 27 October 2021.47 We heard that, although the site was immediately closed when …
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20 Conclusion
The Clerk of the House of Commons explained the House administrations stood down all works on the parliamentary estate on 9 February, in part to check whether the right protocols were in place and understood by the relevant staff.50 He told us that the handling of the incident was not …
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21 Conclusion
The incident was formally reported to the Health and Safety Executive on 10 February 2022, with relevant trade unions informed on 15 February. The Clerk of the House of Commons acknowledged that the staff affected should have been contacted with greater urgency. The Clerk attributed the delay to disputes between …
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22 Conclusion
In proposing to replace the Sponsor Body, the Commission did not set out what options were considered for the revised governance and how they differed from existing arrangements.54 The Sponsor Body told us that it has not been involved in all the conversations that led to the Commission’s proposals.55 We …
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23 Conclusion
In June 2022, the independent review panel recommended that bringing the sponsor function in-house should be viewed as a pragmatic measure – the sponsor body governance model could be made to work but was unlikely to be viable given the “extent of lost confidence and momentum for bringing the sponsor …
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24 Conclusion
The Clerk of the House told us that he expected the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) to assure the arrangements but recognised that the IPA had no formal role over the Programme.60 Following our March evidence session, the Clerk clarified that the IPA will not be providing assurance over the …
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25 Conclusion
When we reported on this Programme in October 2020, we found the Sponsor Body had not engaged sufficiently with Members, Peers, Officials, and staff to clarify how it would reconcile the range of individual views within Parliament. While the Sponsor Body should consider Members’ differing perspectives as much as is …
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26 Conclusion
The Clerk of the House of Commons recognised the challenge of the Programme’s clients—including Members and the Commissions—not having a single voice.66 In our view, until Parliament can provide a clear steer on what it wants, it is almost impossible for anything to be delivered.67 We are concerned that the …
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27 Conclusion
On 18 March, the Commissions issued a joint statement setting out nine parameters to guide forthcoming decisions. This included considering further options to undertake work without decanting and looking at doing work over a shorter period. The statement reaffirmed the Commissions’ commitment to health and safety.69 The Clerk of the …
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28 Conclusion
In our October 2020 report, we noted that success for the Programme depended on factors outside the Sponsor Body’s control.73 The NAO’s January 2022 report reported 64 Committee of Public Accounts, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, HC 549, 2 October 2020 65 …
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29 Conclusion
When we last examined the Programme, the House of Commons planned to decant to Richmond House, creating a temporary chamber.78 We heard that of the £70 million written off when the Commons decided not to pursue this plan, most was related to the planning permission. The Clerk of the House, …
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30 Conclusion
Until February 2022, the Sponsor Body was preparing a business case based on Parliament fully moving out of the Palace during the works (known as a ‘full decant’). In December 2020, the House of Commons Commission agreed to ask the Sponsor Body to consider the implications of the Commons staying …
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31 Conclusion
The Sponsor Body returned to the Commissions with its initial analysis on the impact of a continued presence in January 2022.82 In the initial analysis, the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority assumed that the Commons Chamber, alongside other functions requested by the Speaker of the House such as a media …
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32 Conclusion
In March 2022, the Delivery Authority explained to us that initial analysis showed that, although technically possible, continued presence would lead to higher costs and 74 C&AG’s Report, para 3.24 75 C&AG’s Report, Figure 12 and para 3.27 76 C&AG’s Report, para 3.25 77 HC1100 Qq 141–142, HC49 Q59 78 …
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33 Conclusion
The Delivery Authority has now been tasked with developing new options for undertaking the work that will involve some continued presence.87 We asked the Clerks if they could manage the risks to users of the building should the House of Commons maintain a presence in the Palace during the works. …
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34 Conclusion
In our May evidence session we asked the Delivery Authority whether, given its earlier analysis of continued presence options, it was comfortable developing these current options. The Delivery Authority told us that it had agreed a task brief to respond to a new and different question on the issue of …
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35 Conclusion
Through our work we often see a lack of openness and transparency about programme progress, performance and decision-making. In January 2021, we concluded it was vital that Parliament’s own major project, the Restoration and Renewal Programme, was an exemplar of an open and transparent project which welcomes full scrutiny.93 84 …
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36 Conclusion
For government major programmes, Accounting Officers are expected to assess the delivery risks, publishing a summary of this assessment, and seek a ministerial direction should they consider a decision they are being asked to implement compromises value for money.94 In 2020 the Speaker of the House introduced a procedure, modelled …
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37 Conclusion
Furthermore, the Commission has not yet set out its reason for suggesting the abolition of the Sponsor Body.99 The Sponsor Body had set out indicative cost and time estimates for the work, and then heard about plans to abolish it – we asked if this was a case of ‘shooting …
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38 Conclusion
To work quickly, Parliament and the Sponsor Body agreed that parliamentary domestic committees, such as the finance committees for each house who support the Commissions, would not scrutinise and endorse the Programme’s assessment of the Programme costs and the impact of continued presence before this material was shared with the …
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39 Conclusion
We reiterated that significant developments with the Programme should be fully in the public domain and received a commitment from the Clerk of the House, that the House will always be told when there is a significant development with the Programme.106 94 HM Treasury, Managing Public Money, May 2021, Box …
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40 Conclusion
Following the House administrations being three months late sharing information about a recent asbestos incident, the Clerk of the House acknowledged staff should have been notified earlier.108 We heard relevant trade union representatives were informed on 15 February, five days after the report to the Health and Safety Executive.109 The …
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