5th Report - MoD follow-up Spring 2026

It is completely unacceptable that the Department failed to maintain accounting records to support more than £6 billion of assets included in its 2024–25 Annual Report and Accounts. The Comptroller and Auditor General concluded that the Department’s 2024–25 accounts did … Read more It is completely unacceptable that the Department failed to maintain accounting records to support more than £6 billion of assets included in its 2024–25 Annual Report and Accounts. The Comptroller and Auditor General concluded that the Department’s 2024–25 accounts did not provide a true and fair representation of its financial position. This was because the Department had misclassified historic expenditure by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), some of which dated back to 2007, as spending that had resulted in it developing infrastructure. The issue arose because the Department did not accurately reflect the costs of AWE’s asset management 3 programmes on its own balance sheet. About 85% of the overstatement was due to early-stage feasibility work being capitalised, and the Department is likely to write off some of those costs. The Department has identified control weaknesses in its processes which it needed to put right. However, the Department’s repeated emphasis on the complexity and scale of its spending only highlights the importance of it having effective controls and processes in place across all its activities, which it tests regularly to ensure they continue to fulfil their purpose. The Department should set out: a. What additional checks and processes it has put in place so that the Accounting Officer was assured that all balances reported in the 2025–26 financial statements presented to the National Audit Office for audit were supported by appropriate accounting records and complied with accounting policies. b. How it will ensure that its checks and assurance processes continue to work as intended in future years. c. In writing to the Committee, how much of the costs it has written off, as soon as it has agreed the amount. Show less

View Details →

The Department is not currently providing Parliament with sufficient transparency over its ever-increasing nuclear expenditure. In 2024–25, the Department spent 18% (£10.9 billion) of the defence budget on the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), a figure expected to rise to 20% … Read more The Department is not currently providing Parliament with sufficient transparency over its ever-increasing nuclear expenditure. In 2024–25, the Department spent 18% (£10.9 billion) of the defence budget on the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), a figure expected to rise to 20% for 2025–26, once its accounts have been finalised. The Department expects this will increase further to up to 25% in coming years. Nine DNE programmes have whole-life costs of more than £10 billion. The Department claims that the cost of Dreadnought, which is due to enter service in the early 2030s, currently remains within its £41 billion budget (including a £10 billion contingency). However, published information about other DNE programmes is too vague to allow Parliament to understand and challenge the range of activities they cover, what their costs are and how these have changed over time. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review identified this gap in scrutiny and recommended that Government should develop mechanisms for enhanced Parliamentary scrutiny to provide confidence that taxpayer money is being spent wisely. We understand that the Government has now agreed that a proper scrutiny mechanism will be set up. We call on the Government not to allow the current political uncertainty to delay this is essential parliamentary scrutiny. 4 recommendation The Ministry of Defence must set out how and when it will routinely provide Parliament with more detailed cost and performance information for the nuclear enterprise, so that Parliament can provide taxpayers with the confidence that the increasing DNE budget is being spent wisely. Show less

View Details →

The Department’s delay in publishing the Defence Investment Plan risks weakening the UK’s defence industrial base. The Department currently spends 85% of its budget in the UK, a proportion that it hopes to maintain or expand as defence spending increases. This amount of spending means that the Department can be …

View Details →

The Department is placing unrealistic expectations on how soldiers operate Ajax vehicles safely when it has still not resolved the underlying noise and vibration issues. In November 2025 Exercise TITAN STORM was stopped when 33 soldiers reported symptoms from noise and vibration after operating in Ajax armoured vehicles. Five soldiers …

View Details →

The Department does not know whether a recent improvement in recruitment and retention is a result of changes it has made, or whether it can sustain these improved trends. After many difficult years for both recruitment and retention, the latest public statistics for the year to October 2025 point to …

View Details →

On the basis of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s audit of the Ministry of Defence’s (the Department) Annual Report and Accounts 2024–25, we took evidence from the Department to examine why he had qualified those accounts.1

View Details →

The Comptroller and Auditor General also qualified the Department’s 2024–25 accounts because of a regularity issue.15 This related to provisions to cover probable compensation and legal costs associated with personal injury claims, and probable costs and compensation associated with Afghan resettlement schemes.16 The Department needed to make a prior-year adjustment …

View Details →

The Department repeatedly emphasised that it was a large and complex organisation.19 Controls that are working one year may be less effective the following year. Because of this, the Department said that it constantly tests its controls and processes to ensure that they are working as planned. The Department said …

View Details →

The Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) has a ring-fenced budget comprising the Defence Nuclear Organisation, including the Submarine Delivery Agency and the Atomic Weapons Establishment, and the nuclear-related costs of parts of the Military Strategic Headquarters, particularly the Royal Navy.21 In 2024–25, the Department spent £10.9 billion on the DNE, which …

View Details →

The DNE is a large, complicated portfolio, to which new programmes are added and others are growing. The Department said that it was re- establishing its capability to produce nuclear fuel, and that there have been changes in the scope of the DNE portfolio, for example as a result of …

View Details →

The Department said that nine DNE programmes have whole-life costs of more than £10 billion, including three submarine programmes, maintaining the existing warhead and designing its replacement, and building complex infrastructure facilities at three sites.25 The Department stated that the cost of Dreadnought, which is due to enter service in …

View Details →

The 2025 Strategic Defence Review identified this gap in scrutiny of the DNE and recommended that Government should develop mechanisms for enhanced Parliamentary oversight. This would help to sustain public support for the nuclear deterrent, ensure stability in delivering the portfolio and provide confidence that taxpayer money is being spent …

View Details →

The Department told us that the whole point of the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) was to provide genuinely long-term demand signals so that industry, both large and small companies, can invest in preparation. It said that this was vital to foster a better investment climate, attract companies into the UK, …

View Details →

The Department is a key customer for the defence industry, and it currently spends 85% of its budget in the UK, a proportion that it hopes to maintain or expand as defence spending increases. It said that this amount of expenditure means it can be an important element of the …

View Details →

The Department’s goal is not just to stimulate the domestic market, but also to help UK industry benefit from the expanding international market for defence equipment. The Department has established an export team designed to ensure that it buys equipment which is not just suitable for the UK’s Armed Forces, …

View Details →

The UK’s ongoing support for Ukraine underlines the UK defence industry’s potential for swift action and technological innovation while working with an ally, particularly amongst SMEs. Recent developments include a low- cost drone interceptor and a ground-launched ballistic missile with a range greater than 500 kilometres. The Department said that …

View Details →

The Department said that it was still awarding contracts, guided by the SDR, despite the delayed publication of the DIP. However, it acknowledged that the delay was having an adverse impact on industry. The Department acknowledged that serial delays were undermining its credibility with the defence sector. In particular, SMEs …

View Details →

Our predecessor Committee first reported on the failings of the Ajax programme in June 2022. It was told that the Army’s trials team had first raised concerns about vibrations in late 2019, and the Department rightly described it as “unforgivable” that soldiers had been injured because of shortcomings with its …

View Details →

The Department said that for our soldiers to develop and maintain the skills they require to operate on armoured vehicles, it needs to get them back on those vehicles as quickly as possible. However, it asserted that the safety of our soldiers is of the utmost importance.36

View Details →

The Department told us that it had no safety concerns about Ajax provided it was operated and maintained correctly within its design parameters. It then asserted that the incident during the exercise occurred because the vehicles had not been operated or maintained within those parameters.37 32 Qq 41-42 33 Qq …

View Details →

The Department told us it is developing an ‘Ajax 2’ package of upgrades, including composite rubber tracks and automatic track tensioners, as a technical solution which would reduce the need for soldiers undertaking the maintenance checks. These modifications are intended to make Ajax a more comfortable ride for its crew …

View Details →

After many difficult years with both recruitment and retention, the latest public statistics for the year to October 2025 point to a corner being turned, with the number of people joining the Armed Forces exceeding the number leaving. All three services have recorded a reduction in the number of trained …

View Details →

Data indicates that the time taken to recruit new personnel has fallen. Overall, the average time between someone applying to join and them starting basic training reduced from 496 days in 2023 to 290 days in 2024, and the Department said that this needs to come down further.43 In 2024, …

View Details →

Initiatives that have helped improve retention include a new housing strategy, wraparound childcare and improved pay, and the Department particularly flagged the importance of housing.46 Day-to-day maintenance and servicing of the estate has begun to improve, albeit from a very poor starting point, with satisfaction with repairs increasing from 23% …

View Details →

The Department acknowledged, however, that there remains much to do to create better, more consistent homes and family experiences for our Armed Forces, and that it will take a decade to create a qualitatively better situation. Following the buy-back of 36,000 houses from Annington Homes, the estate is just under …

View Details →

The Department said that ideally it would want to know which of the measures it has taken to improve recruitment and retention are having which of the effects. It has not, however, analysed this. Instead, the Department said it should be doing all these things, because a modern employer should …

View Details →