7
Recommendation
Ninth Report - Fraud and Error
Not Addressed
HMRC, DWP and BEIS are unable to justify the inconsistencies in their approaches to the consequences of fraud and error for different groups of debtors. Departments need to take steps to detect, pursue and recover the billions of pounds of fraud and error overpayments it has lost during the COVID-19 …
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HMRC, DWP and BEIS are unable to justify the inconsistencies in their approaches to the consequences of fraud and error for different groups of debtors. Departments need to take steps to detect, pursue and recover the billions of pounds of fraud and error overpayments it has lost during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, we are concerned that Departments are taking different approaches to dealing with the consequences of fraud or errors of a similar nature, such as failing to disclose a change in circumstances. DWP applies a financial threshold when deciding whether to pursue criminal sanctions, whereas HMRC will only pursue criminal proceedings for the most serious crimes, focusing instead on disrupting criminal activity to make it unprofitable. Although BEIS is working with the police on criminal sanctions for loan scheme fraud, it maintains it is up to the bank to follow usual recovery procedures in the first instance. These differences in approaches results in penalties appearing unfair and inconsistent to the public. DWP is investing in making it easier for people inform it of changes in circumstances, for example through more online prompts in systems, rather than assuming fraudulent intent. We welcome the Cabinet Office’s commitment to, through the Counter Fraud Function, improving the consistency of sanctions applied for fraud and whether enforcement and recovery powers can be expanded across government. Recommendation: HMRC and DWP should write to the Committee within three months setting out how they will identify and address inconsistencies of sanctions for frauds that are similar in nature. BEIS should write to the Committee within three months setting out details of steps it will take to assess whether the recovery efforts of banks are reasonable, and the steps it will take to recover taxpayers’ money if deficiencies are identified. Fraud and Error 9 1 Government’s understanding of fraud and error risks and the resources needed to tackle them
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Government response AI summary
The government's response is irrelevant, referencing reports on the English Rail System rather than addressing the recommendation for HMRC, DWP, and BEIS to detail how they will address fraud sanction inconsistencies and recovery efforts.
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HM Treasury
12
Conclusion
Ninth Report - Fraud and Error
Not Addressed
It also assessed a large number of other COVID-19 schemes as potentially at high risk of fraud but believed scheme owners needed to do more work to fully quantify those risks.32 Counter fraud resources across government
Government response AI summary
The government response provided addresses a different PAC recommendation regarding the identification and publication of fraud risks, rather than the committee's specific conclusion about high-risk COVID-19 schemes and the need for scheme owners to quantify those risks.
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HM Treasury
17
Conclusion
Ninth Report - Fraud and Error
Not Addressed
The Counter Fraud Function describes fraud as a hidden crime which you must find before you can fight.41 The government’s counter-fraud functional strategy states an aim to be the most transparent government globally in dealing with public sector fraud.42 Cabinet Office told us it aims to put as much focus …
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The Counter Fraud Function describes fraud as a hidden crime which you must find before you can fight.41 The government’s counter-fraud functional strategy states an aim to be the most transparent government globally in dealing with public sector fraud.42 Cabinet Office told us it aims to put as much focus into the areas where there are low levels of detected fraud, and low levels of investment in counter fraud, as it does those areas where there are known to be higher levels of loss.43 It publishes an annual Fraud Landscape report every year, which reports on the detected fraud levels across government.44
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Government response AI summary
The government's response focused on its plans to increase the use of real-time application checks and improve data sharing across departments, without directly addressing the committee's conclusion about transparency and annual fraud reporting.
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HM Treasury
28
Conclusion
Ninth Report - Fraud and Error
Not Addressed
We asked DWP how it balanced the need to protect taxpayers’ money with the speed and accessibility of support schemes. DWP told us that Universal Credit was a good example of balancing these needs as applications normally rely on people coming into the jobcentre for ID checks which was no …
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We asked DWP how it balanced the need to protect taxpayers’ money with the speed and accessibility of support schemes. DWP told us that Universal Credit was a good example of balancing these needs as applications normally rely on people coming into the jobcentre for ID checks which was no longer possible. DWP told us it had to find other ways of verifying information which were “less satisfactory”, but over time was able to find new techniques, using data and remote methods. DWP explained that those early cases where payments were made without having satisfactory data were flagged for review and it now has a team of 1,400 people methodically going through those cases, one by one, to put them right.83 Consequences of fraud and error
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Government response AI summary
The response provides a general statement about departments taking a risk-based approach to fraud and error, failing to address the specific DWP processes, verification issues, or the team reviewing past cases mentioned in the conclusion.
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HM Treasury