Recommendations & Conclusions
33 items
2
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
Lessons learned from supporting Ukraine have made the Department examine its own decision-making and procurement processes, finding some of them in need of improvement. The Department has learned several lessons from its support for Ukraine. These include: the need for a mixture of high-end capabilities, such as Storm Shadow long-range …
Read more
Lessons learned from supporting Ukraine have made the Department examine its own decision-making and procurement processes, finding some of them in need of improvement. The Department has learned several lessons from its support for Ukraine. These include: the need for a mixture of high-end capabilities, such as Storm Shadow long-range cruise missiles, and affordable high-mass equipment, such as drones; the importance of augmenting crewed capabilities, such as helicopters, with uncrewed autonomous collaborative platforms; the advantages of having fewer systems for easier logistics management; and having the industrial ability and capacity to sustain equipment if supply chains are disrupted. The Department has responded to these lessons by splitting its procurement of military equipment into three segments: big strategic programmes to provide long-term platforms, such as submarines, ships and aeroplanes; 4 programmes for developing capabilities used on the platforms; and the rapid development and deployment of inexpensive, innovative capabilities. The Department also recognises it must reassess what financial and operational risk it is willing to tolerate, because a higher risk appetite allows it to deliver equipment quicker. In addition, the Department has learned that the pace of innovation means equipment can become outdated quickly, so it must adapt to ending programmes sooner and disposing of equipment which no longer meets requirements. recommendation The Department should update the Committee by the end of June 2026 on what further improvements to how it operates it has identified from its support for Ukraine, and how it will implement them.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government details ongoing reforms to procurement processes, including tailoring acquisition, early industry engagement, driving pace through spiral acquisition, and establishing UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) on 1 July 2025 to implement lessons learned from supporting Ukraine.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
3
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department’s defence reform programme sets out ambitious plans for improving defence procurement, but it is unclear how long it will take for these benefits to become fully embedded. In April 2025 the Department reorganised itself into four areas–the Department of State, a Military Strategic Headquarters, a National Armaments Director …
Read more
The Department’s defence reform programme sets out ambitious plans for improving defence procurement, but it is unclear how long it will take for these benefits to become fully embedded. In April 2025 the Department reorganised itself into four areas–the Department of State, a Military Strategic Headquarters, a National Armaments Director (NAD) Group and Defence Nuclear. The Department anticipates that the NAD will have significantly more control over the end-to-end acquisition process than the old structure provided. The Department is building on reforms begun under the previous government to speed up procurement: it aspires to reduce by two-thirds the time to award a contract to a two-year maximum, and to complete most programmes in under five years. The Department anticipates it can achieve this by involving industry in the process much earlier and reducing the overspecification of requirements. Instead of the Department developing a firm requirement then going to industry, it will state what the military capability problem is, and the NAD Group will seek solutions from industry. The Department expects this approach will increase defence exports, as industry will be able to design products that also work for the expanding international market. However, 2025–26 is a transitional year, and the new approach will take several years to reduce average times, primarily owing to legacy programmes which had started before April 2025. recommendation The Department should provide the Committee with an evidence-based update by the end of June 2026 which demonstrates how defence procurement has improved in the first year that the National Armaments Director Group has operated, including key performance indicators.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government states it has brought teams together under the National Armaments Director (NAD) Group and implemented a new segmented approach to procurement. It is also developing key performance indicators and measures to track progress, with a target to agree these KPIs within the next …
Read full response →
HM Treasury
4
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Strategic Defence Review (the SDR) has set out the government’s high-level policy and capability ambitions, but the Department will need to complete further work to prioritise what it must do to achieve them. The government launched the SDR in July 2024 and 5 published it on 2 June 2025, …
Read more
The Strategic Defence Review (the SDR) has set out the government’s high-level policy and capability ambitions, but the Department will need to complete further work to prioritise what it must do to achieve them. The government launched the SDR in July 2024 and 5 published it on 2 June 2025, five weeks after our evidence session with the Department. The Department said that the SDR would try to balance ambition and resource, chart the direction needed to respond to the current geopolitical situation and ensure that the UK has the armed forces it needs, both now and for the future. The Department stressed that its existing equipment programme was already ambitious–including renewing the nuclear warhead, spending £40 billion on new equipment for the Army, and investing in a sixth-generation fighter–and that the SDR would build upon and develop this. As confirmed in the Spending Review on 11 June, the government has announced that it will increase defence spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product from April 2027, but the Department is only midway through the process of deciding how to invest the additional funding. Now that the SDR has been published the Department will have to work through the detailed capability choices, and it does not expect to have completed this process until the latter part of 2025–two years since this Committee was last able to scrutinise the Department’s spending plans. recommendation The Department should provide the Committee with: • a written update during Parliament’s September 2025 sitting on its progress in converting the SDR’s ambitions into a deliverable plan; and • an update on its final implementation plan before the Christmas 2025 recess.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government states it will develop and publish a new Defence Investment Plan (DIP) in the autumn to convert the Strategic Defence Review’s ambitions into a deliverable plan. It commits to providing updates on progress to the Committee as requested.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
5
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Deferred
We are extremely disappointed that the Permanent Secretary did not have concrete suggestions for how the Department will provide Parliament with annual reporting on its plans. The Department last published a full Equipment Plan in November 2022. Since July 2023, it has written to both this and the previous Public …
Read more
We are extremely disappointed that the Permanent Secretary did not have concrete suggestions for how the Department will provide Parliament with annual reporting on its plans. The Department last published a full Equipment Plan in November 2022. Since July 2023, it has written to both this and the previous Public Accounts Committee several times with excuses for why it has not produced any subsequent Equipment Plan reports, and it has questioned whether that format was best suited to explaining its future investment and support plans. The recent SDR says that the Department will develop a new ‘Defence Investment Plan’ to supersede the Equipment Plan, but provides no details. We held this inquiry in the sincere hope that by its end we would have heard clear proposals from the Department as to how this Committee, and by extension Parliament, will be able to scrutinise annually the crucial issue of its forward spending plans. The Department acknowledged that it works better with scrutiny from this Committee and the Defence Committee and told us that Ministers were clear that they wanted the Department to be more transparent than previously. However, the Department did not propose how it might present its plans to Parliament and could not give us a date for when it might be able to do so. These answers were entirely unsatisfactory. 6 recommendation During Parliament’s September 2025 sitting the Department must provide the Committee with a fully worked out proposal for how it will update Parliament each year about its equipment procurement and support plans. The Department should include in its proposal how it will: • ensure that the updates are timely; and • provide analysis of any variances from the Spending Review baseline.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the recommendation but states that officials cannot pre-empt Ministerial decisions, referring instead to the plans for the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) outlined in the Strategic Defence Review publication on 2 June 2025. It does not commit to providing the requested fully …
Read full response →
HM Treasury
6
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Rejected
The ever-increasing cost of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (the DNE) is likely to add pressure on the Department’s overall budgets. In 2024–25 the nuclear budget was £10.9 billion, around 18% of the whole defence budget (unchanged as a percentage from 2023–24 figures). The Department has sought to ensure that it …
Read more
The ever-increasing cost of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (the DNE) is likely to add pressure on the Department’s overall budgets. In 2024–25 the nuclear budget was £10.9 billion, around 18% of the whole defence budget (unchanged as a percentage from 2023–24 figures). The Department has sought to ensure that it manages the DNE budget effectively and efficiently, and is exploring opportunities to include more British small and medium-sized enterprises in its supply chain. However, costs are rising through a combination of the Department trying to speed up the work schedule and adding new programmes to it, and inflation. In consequence, forecast costs for the DNE for the ten years beginning 2023–24 have increased by around £10 billion from £117.8 billion (to approximately £128billion). Yet in 2023, the DNE’s ten-year costs were already £7.9 billion more than budget. The government has created a ringfence which prevents the Department from using elsewhere money allocated to the DNE, but which allows money to flow the other way. The Department has not yet worked through the implications of the SDR on the balance of investment between the DNE and conventional capabilities. However, increasing nuclear costs may restrict the money available for conventional equipment and other important requirements, such as improving poor accommodation which is crucial in addressing the military’s recruitment and retention problems. recommendation The Department’s annual update to Parliament on the DNE should provide details of its planned costs, including: • the proportion of the defence budget this comprises; • an explanation of any variances from the previous year’s plan; and • budgets moving between years or from the wider defence budget into the DNE ringfence. 7 1 Responding to lessons learned from the UK’s military support for Ukraine Introduction
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation, stating that the annual update to Parliament is not the appropriate vehicle for detailed DNE financial reporting, as this information is already provided through wider MOD financial reports and the Parliamentary Estimates process.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
1
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which followed its annexation of Crimea in 2014, has contributed to making the world more unstable. In response, the UK government has confirmed in its Spending Review on 11 June that it will increase defence spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product …
Read more
Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which followed its annexation of Crimea in 2014, has contributed to making the world more unstable. In response, the UK government has confirmed in its Spending Review on 11 June that it will increase defence spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product from April 2027, with an ambition to increase it to 3% in the next Parliament.1 Likewise, total NATO defence spending has increased enormously, predominantly through European countries, and NATO has refreshed its operational plans so that member nations know how they best fit in and what capabilities are required.2
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government detailed its ongoing support for Ukraine, including providing £4.5 billion in capability support this financial year, a landmark agreement to integrate battlefield technology into UK production lines, and sustained close relationships with Ukrainian counterparts.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
7
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
Through Taskforce Hirst, UK and Ukrainian industry are working together to design, build and support innovative and adaptable equipment. The Department said that both the UK and Ukraine are benefitting from this collaboration, including aligning how the defence industries in the two countries operate.9 The Department for Business and Trade …
Read more
Through Taskforce Hirst, UK and Ukrainian industry are working together to design, build and support innovative and adaptable equipment. The Department said that both the UK and Ukraine are benefitting from this collaboration, including aligning how the defence industries in the two countries operate.9 The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) works with the Department on Taskforce Hirst, and DBT has led trade missions to Ukraine in support of this initiative.10 5 Q 1 6 C&AG’s Report, Investigation into military support for Ukraine, Session 2024–25, HC 230, 11 September 2024 7 C&AG’s Report, Ukraine, paras 1, 2, 1.1 8 Q 44; C&AG’s Report, Ukraine, paras 2.4 and 2.7 9 Q 39 10 C&AG’s Report, Ukraine, para 1.9 9
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's point, reiterating its commitment to supporting Ukraine, including £4.5 billion in capability support this financial year, and implementing long-term solutions from the Strategic Defence Review by partnering with Ukraine's defence industry.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
8
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department said that there are two important but unheralded international groups working to assist Ukraine: the Ukraine defence contact group, and the conference of national armaments directors.11 The UK, Germany and Ukraine now lead the Ukraine defence contact group, which works with more than 40 allies to coordinate responses …
Read more
The Department said that there are two important but unheralded international groups working to assist Ukraine: the Ukraine defence contact group, and the conference of national armaments directors.11 The UK, Germany and Ukraine now lead the Ukraine defence contact group, which works with more than 40 allies to coordinate responses to Ukrainian requests for equipment, oversee delivery, and marshal European resources in the most effective way.12 This is supported by around a dozen capability coalitions, led by different nations, which work to supply Ukraine’s immediate needs, and develop future capabilities for it. The UK and Norway lead on maritime capability, and other capability coalitions lead on drones, artillery, cyber and IT.13 The Department said that there is significant overlap between the Ukraine defence contact group, and the conference of national armaments directors, with the latter working to make sure that member countries are able to support NATO’s plans and sustain them in a warfighting situation.14 The UK is also working with allies to identify who is best placed to supply particular capabilities to satisfy the anticipated operational requirements of any future peacekeeping operations in Ukraine.15 Lessons learned from military support provided
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's point, reiterating its commitment to supporting Ukraine, including £4.5 billion in capability support this financial year, and implementing long-term solutions from the Strategic Defence Review by partnering with Ukraine's defence industry.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
9
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The importance of allies, discussed in the previous section, is one of the lessons that the Department has learned from its support for Ukraine.16 The Department also highlighted several other lessons. First, for future conflicts armed forces will need a mixture of capabilities to be effective. For example, Storm Shadow …
Read more
The importance of allies, discussed in the previous section, is one of the lessons that the Department has learned from its support for Ukraine.16 The Department also highlighted several other lessons. First, for future conflicts armed forces will need a mixture of capabilities to be effective. For example, Storm Shadow long-range cruise missiles have been of fundamental importance in the war in Ukraine, but they are a long-term, expensive capability at the cutting-edge of technology. However, a transformation during the war has been the importance of affordable high-mass equipment, such as drones. The Department now considers that it needs both high end equipment and affordable mass going forward.17
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the committee's observation and commits to fundamentally changing procurement processes by tailoring acquisition, engaging early with industry, adopting spiral acquisition, and has established UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) as of July 2025 to accelerate defence capability delivery.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
10
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department said that autonomy is starting to really matter in warfare. The importance of having a mix of crewed and uncrewed platforms is now more apparent, such as by augmenting crewed helicopters with 11 Q 26 12 Qq 26, 44 and 45 13 Q 45 14 Q 26 15 …
Read more
The Department said that autonomy is starting to really matter in warfare. The importance of having a mix of crewed and uncrewed platforms is now more apparent, such as by augmenting crewed helicopters with 11 Q 26 12 Qq 26, 44 and 45 13 Q 45 14 Q 26 15 Q 54 16 Qq 26 and 39 17 Q 39 10 autonomous collaborative platforms. Similarly, the use of artificial intelligence is important to support operations in battlefields when there are very high levels of electronic warfare.18
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the implicit recognition of the strategic importance of autonomy and AI in warfare, stating it has implemented lessons from Ukraine into procurement reforms and established UK Defence Innovation (UKDI).
Read full response →
HM Treasury
11
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The advantage of having fewer systems has also been reinforced. The Department explained that with more systems, it is more complicated to manage the logistics and more difficult to sustain warfighting operations, which reduces the deterrent effect. As a result, the Department’s view was that you might get less value …
Read more
The advantage of having fewer systems has also been reinforced. The Department explained that with more systems, it is more complicated to manage the logistics and more difficult to sustain warfighting operations, which reduces the deterrent effect. As a result, the Department’s view was that you might get less value for the money spent. The Department contrasted this with the benefits of working with as many allies as possible to co-design, co-develop, co-produce and co-support equipment, and cited the Boxer armoured fighting vehicle as an example of this. It said that this approach was much more cost-effective compared with allies having different systems.19 The Department expressed this view prior to the SDR and the Committee will monitor any changes in its assessment following its publication.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the committee's observation and commits to fundamentally changing procurement processes by tailoring acquisition, engaging early with industry, adopting spiral acquisition, and has established UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) as of July 2025 to accelerate defence capability delivery.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
12
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The final lesson is the importance of having the industrial ability and capacity to sustain equipment if supply chains are disrupted. The Department said that this means making sure that the armed forces could continue to operate equipment, even if the UK’s allies have been disrupted for political or technical …
Read more
The final lesson is the importance of having the industrial ability and capacity to sustain equipment if supply chains are disrupted. The Department said that this means making sure that the armed forces could continue to operate equipment, even if the UK’s allies have been disrupted for political or technical reasons.20 The Department regards factories as in effect being part of weapon systems because they are fundamental to the UK’s ability to fight and sustain its armed forces.21 The Department explained that the UK defence industry needs to be reorganised to increase its capacity when needed to meet greater demand.22
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the committee's observation and commits to fundamentally changing procurement processes by tailoring acquisition, engaging early with industry, adopting spiral acquisition, and has established UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) as of July 2025 to accelerate defence capability delivery.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
13
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department has responded to these lessons by splitting its procurement into three segments. The top segment consists of large strategic programmes that provide long-term platforms, such as submarines, ships and aeroplanes. The second segment is for developing capabilities and systems that the Department will deploy on those platforms. The …
Read more
The Department has responded to these lessons by splitting its procurement into three segments. The top segment consists of large strategic programmes that provide long-term platforms, such as submarines, ships and aeroplanes. The second segment is for developing capabilities and systems that the Department will deploy on those platforms. The third segment, based on the UK’s support for Ukraine, is the rapid development and deployment of inexpensive, innovative capabilities.23
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the committee's observation, confirming it has already implemented a segmented approach to procurement based on lessons from Ukraine and has established UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) to drive faster, more agile capability delivery.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
14
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department explained that for the third segment, it has developed a process through its support for Ukraine whereby it provides industry with a problem statement and within a month gets proposals back from industry. It requires at least three proposals but often gets more than that, many 18 Q …
Read more
The Department explained that for the third segment, it has developed a process through its support for Ukraine whereby it provides industry with a problem statement and within a month gets proposals back from industry. It requires at least three proposals but often gets more than that, many 18 Q 39 19 Q 26 20 Q 26 21 Qq 26 and 41 22 Q 41 23 Q 22 11 from British small and medium-sized enterprises. The Department then uses experts to select the two best proposals, which are tested in the field. It then selects the best solution to scale up.24
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the implicit recommendation to learn from Ukraine procurement methods, detailing ongoing reforms and the establishment of UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) on July 1, 2025, for faster capability delivery.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
15
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department’s support for Ukraine has also led it to reconsider what level of financial and operational risk it is willing to tolerate. A higher risk appetite allows equipment to be delivered quicker as there is less checking for mistakes. Circumstances can affect the risk appetite – in a war …
Read more
The Department’s support for Ukraine has also led it to reconsider what level of financial and operational risk it is willing to tolerate. A higher risk appetite allows equipment to be delivered quicker as there is less checking for mistakes. Circumstances can affect the risk appetite – in a war situation, for example, the risk appetite is extraordinarily high. The Department is trying to streamline its procurement processes by pushing decision-making down the hierarchy as much as it can. To do this, the Department said it must gauge which of its regulations and procedures are sensible, and which are arcane.25 This includes ensuring that the approvals process strikes a better balance between assurance and pace.26
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees that lessons from Ukraine have prompted a reconsideration of risk appetite and procurement processes, confirming its ongoing reforms aim to streamline acquisition, increase pace, and empower agile decision-making.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
16
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The speed of innovation seen in Ukraine has highlighted that quicker procurement is important to ensure that new equipment is not already out of date by the time the armed forces deploy it.27 The Department explained that this requires a change in mindset. It will become more common for programmes …
Read more
The speed of innovation seen in Ukraine has highlighted that quicker procurement is important to ensure that new equipment is not already out of date by the time the armed forces deploy it.27 The Department explained that this requires a change in mindset. It will become more common for programmes to end sooner, or even be abandoned, because the pace of innovation and the new, higher-threat environment, means they are no longer relevant. It also means that equipment will have a shorter shelf life than the Armed Forces have been used to, because the Department will need to update capabilities continually to meet evolving requirements.28 Improving defence procurement
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the committee's observation that quicker and more adaptable procurement is vital, confirming its ongoing reforms, including the NAD Group and segmented approach, are designed to address this.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
17
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
On 1 April 2025 the Department’s defence reform programme reorganised it into four areas – the Department of State, a Military Strategic Headquarters, a National Armaments Director (NAD) Group and Defence Nuclear.29 The Department anticipates that defence reform will give the NAD significantly more control over the end-to-end acquisition process …
Read more
On 1 April 2025 the Department’s defence reform programme reorganised it into four areas – the Department of State, a Military Strategic Headquarters, a National Armaments Director (NAD) Group and Defence Nuclear.29 The Department anticipates that defence reform will give the NAD significantly more control over the end-to-end acquisition process than the old structure provided.30
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the committee's observation regarding the departmental reorganisation and the NAD Group's role, confirming its ongoing procurement reforms build on this structure to enhance collaboration and acquisition processes.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
18
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department intends to build on procurement reforms begun under the previous government to procure faster. It has identified that the biggest problem is that it takes too long to get programmes on contract.31 24 Qq 22 and 40 25 Qq 42 and 43 26 Q 27 27 Qq 40 …
Read more
The Department intends to build on procurement reforms begun under the previous government to procure faster. It has identified that the biggest problem is that it takes too long to get programmes on contract.31 24 Qq 22 and 40 25 Qq 42 and 43 26 Q 27 27 Qq 40 and 43 28 Qq 44 and 46 29 Q 29; Secretary of State for Defence, Defence Reform, Statement made on 1 April 2025, Statement UIN HCWS573 30 Q 28 31 Q 47 12 Consequently, the Department aspires to reduce the time taken to award a contract for the most complex programmes from six years to two years, and for programmes in the second segment from three years to one year.32 The Department is also trying to reduce the average time for completing programmes by ensuring that the vast majority of them are completed in less than five years.33
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government confirms its ongoing procurement reforms are designed to reduce programme and contract award times, with progress expected by June 2026, and will establish key performance indicators within three months.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
19
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department has set the five-year target for programme length to stop the armed forces over-specifying their requirements.34 It said that the troubled Ajax programme, for example, had been tremendously over-specified.35 The Department anticipates it can achieve this target by involving industry in the procurement process much earlier.36 Instead of …
Read more
The Department has set the five-year target for programme length to stop the armed forces over-specifying their requirements.34 It said that the troubled Ajax programme, for example, had been tremendously over-specified.35 The Department anticipates it can achieve this target by involving industry in the procurement process much earlier.36 Instead of the armed forces developing a firm requirement then going to industry with it, the Department will state what the military capability problem is, and the NAD Group will seek solutions from industry.37 The Department expects this approach will also help to increase defence exports, as industry will be able to design products that work for an international market that is expanding as spending across NATO nations, especially in Europe, increases dramatically.38
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government confirms it is already implementing procurement reforms, including the NAD Group and a new segmented approach, to achieve a five-year programme length target by June 2026, and will agree key performance indicators within three months.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
20
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
However, 2025–26 is a transitional year as the changes bed in. The Department has started to roll out new processes so that programmes beginning this year adhere to the faster timeframes. The Department’s senior leadership team will monitor progress using a refreshed dashboard.39 However, the Department said it will take …
Read more
However, 2025–26 is a transitional year as the changes bed in. The Department has started to roll out new processes so that programmes beginning this year adhere to the faster timeframes. The Department’s senior leadership team will monitor progress using a refreshed dashboard.39 However, the Department said it will take several years for the new approach to reduce average times because of legacy programmes that had started before April 2025.40 32 Qq 22, 32 and 46 33 Q 47 34 Q 47 35 Q 29 36 Q 22 37 Qq 28 and 33 38 Qq 11, 22, 23 and 24 39 Q 37 40 Q 36 13 2 Future Parliamentary scrutiny of defence spending plans The 2025 Strategic Defence Review
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's point and will develop a new Defence Investment Plan (DIP) to implement the Strategic Defence Review's recommendations, publishing the plan in autumn 2025 and providing updates.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
21
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The government launched the Strategic Defence Review (the SDR) in July 2024 and said it would publish it in the first half of 2025.41 The Department told us that the SDR would try to balance ambition and resource, but also chart the direction needed to respond to the current geopolitical …
Read more
The government launched the Strategic Defence Review (the SDR) in July 2024 and said it would publish it in the first half of 2025.41 The Department told us that the SDR would try to balance ambition and resource, but also chart the direction needed to respond to the current geopolitical situation and ensure that the UK has the armed forces it needs, both now and for the future.42 Five weeks after the Department’s oral evidence to us, it published the SDR on 2 June 2025.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's point and will develop a new Defence Investment Plan (DIP) to implement the Strategic Defence Review's recommendations, publishing the plan in autumn 2025 and providing updates.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
22
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
At our evidence session the Department had reiterated the importance of NATO to its strategic outlook and noted that one theme of the SDR’s terms of reference is thinking ‘NATO-first’, when considering policy, capability requirements and procurement .43 The Department said that NATO is now stronger following recent geopolitical developments: …
Read more
At our evidence session the Department had reiterated the importance of NATO to its strategic outlook and noted that one theme of the SDR’s terms of reference is thinking ‘NATO-first’, when considering policy, capability requirements and procurement .43 The Department said that NATO is now stronger following recent geopolitical developments: its membership has increased to 32 with the addition of Finland and Sweden; it is refreshing its operational plans so that they are in a better state, with member nations knowing how they best fit in and what capabilities are required; and total NATO defence spending has increased enormously, predominantly through European countries.44 One area of renewed emphasis is on NATO’s planning, meaning that the 32 nations can operate collectively, with each knowing its place in NATO’s war plans. NATO is also reemphasising the importance of standardisation and the interoperability of equipment between members, which the conference of national armaments directors is working to address.45 41 Q 4; Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review 2024–2025: Terms of Reference, 17 July 2024 42 Q 6 43 Qq 26 and 41 44 Qq 23 - 26 45 Q 26 14
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government confirms its "NATO-first" strategic outlook and states it has endorsed the Strategic Defence Review's vision and recommendations, which will be implemented via a new Defence Investment Plan published in Autumn 2025.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
23
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department said that the SDR would build upon and develop the current equipment programme. The Department described the existing programme as “ambitious” and an “extraordinary list” of “massive programmes” which includes renewing the nuclear warhead, spending £40 billion to reequip the Army, and the long-term investment in a sixth-generation …
Read more
The Department said that the SDR would build upon and develop the current equipment programme. The Department described the existing programme as “ambitious” and an “extraordinary list” of “massive programmes” which includes renewing the nuclear warhead, spending £40 billion to reequip the Army, and the long-term investment in a sixth-generation fighter. It also said it was trying to strengthen some areas of weakness.46 For example, the previous Public Accounts Committee heard during its inquiry on the 2023 Equipment Plan that integrated air missile defence needed to be deeper and broader both within the UK’s armed forces and within NATO collectively.47
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government confirms its endorsement of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and commits to developing a new Defence Investment Plan (DIP) by Autumn 2025 to implement its recommendations, which will build upon and strengthen the current equipment programme.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
24
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Acknowledged
In March 2025, the government announced that it will increase defence spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product from April 2027.48 However, the Department told us it is only midway through the process of deciding how to invest the additional funding in priorities that ensure the armed forces deliver what …
Read more
In March 2025, the government announced that it will increase defence spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product from April 2027.48 However, the Department told us it is only midway through the process of deciding how to invest the additional funding in priorities that ensure the armed forces deliver what the government has asked of them.49 The Department said that once the SDR was published it would have to work through the detailed capability choices using an internal balanced investment process, and then set out the results of that for parliamentary scrutiny. It does not expect to have completed this process until the latter part of 2025.50 The absence of full Equipment Plan since 2022
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged the increase in defence spending to 2.5% of GDP from April 2027.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
25
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
The Department published an Equipment Plan (the Plan) each year from 2012 to 2022, setting out its 10-year spending plans for equipment procurement and support projects. The Department’s aim was to produce a reliable assessment of the affordability of its equipment programme, and to demonstrate to Parliament how it intended …
Read more
The Department published an Equipment Plan (the Plan) each year from 2012 to 2022, setting out its 10-year spending plans for equipment procurement and support projects. The Department’s aim was to produce a reliable assessment of the affordability of its equipment programme, and to demonstrate to Parliament how it intended to manage its equipment funding. Each year, the National Audit Office published a report examining the Department’s assessment of the Plan’s affordability and its response to the financial challenges it faced.51
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government commits to publishing a new Defence Investment Plan (DIP) in Autumn 2025, which will replace the previous Equipment Plan and allow thorough scrutiny of the department's spending and procurement plans.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
26
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
In July 2023, the Department’s Permanent Secretary wrote to the Chair of the previous Public Accounts Committee to say that it would not provide a full Plan that year as it needed “to work through the direction from the 46 Q 5 47 Public Accounts Committee, Oral Evidence: Defence equipment …
Read more
In July 2023, the Department’s Permanent Secretary wrote to the Chair of the previous Public Accounts Committee to say that it would not provide a full Plan that year as it needed “to work through the direction from the 46 Q 5 47 Public Accounts Committee, Oral Evidence: Defence equipment plan 2023–33, Q 61, HC 451, 22 January 2024 48 HM Treasury, Spring Statement 2025, para 2.4, CP 1298, March 2025; The 2.6% figure referred to in the announcement on 11 June includes the 0.1% intelligence and security services contribution. 49 Q 3 50 Q 59 51 C&AG’s Report, The Equipment Plan 2023–2033, Session 2023–24, HC 315, 4 December 2023, paras 1.2 and 1.3 15 Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23) and further understand the impact of extraordinary inflation and how to mitigate it.”52 In December 2023, however, it published affordability analysis of its equipment and support projects for 2023 to 2033, in which the forecast costs of £305.5 billion were £16.9 billion more than its available budget.53 The total forecast 10-year defence costs to 2032–33 were £42.5 billion more than the overall budget.54 The previous Public Accounts Committee reported on this in March 2024.55
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government commits to publishing a new Defence Investment Plan (DIP) in Autumn 2025, which will be affordable and allow thorough scrutiny of spending, implicitly addressing past issues with the Equipment Plan's affordability.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
27
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
In November 2024, the Minister for Defence Procurement & Industry wrote to the Chair to say that the Department would not publish a Plan for 2024 because “it would not provide an accurate reflection of this Government’s spending plans and I do not believe it would provide a useful means …
Read more
In November 2024, the Minister for Defence Procurement & Industry wrote to the Chair to say that the Department would not publish a Plan for 2024 because “it would not provide an accurate reflection of this Government’s spending plans and I do not believe it would provide a useful means for Parliament to hold the Department to account on how we will deliver the plan affordably”.56 In March 2025, the Permanent Secretary wrote to the Chair: “In light of the Defence funding announcement made by the Prime Minister on 25th February we are working through the consequences for our future spending and our approach to procurement and as a result what that means for how we might best support the committee and Parliament in its scrutiny of the department’s equipment planning.”57
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the implicit recommendation, committing to publish the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) in Autumn 2025 to allow for thorough scrutiny of the department’s evolving spending plans.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
28
Recommendation
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
We held this inquiry in the sincere hope that by its end we would have heard clear proposals from the Department as to how this Committee, and by extension Parliament, would be able to scrutinise annually the crucial issue of its forward spending plans.58 The Department acknowledged that it works …
Read more
We held this inquiry in the sincere hope that by its end we would have heard clear proposals from the Department as to how this Committee, and by extension Parliament, would be able to scrutinise annually the crucial issue of its forward spending plans.58 The Department acknowledged that it works better with scrutiny from this Committee and the Defence Committee and told us that Ministers were clear that they wanted the Department to be more transparent than previously.59 However, the Department made no proposals for how it might present its plans to Parliament and could not give us a date for when it would be able to do so.60 These answers were entirely unsatisfactory.61 52 Correspondence from David Williams CB, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, re Update - MOD Equipment Plan 2022 - 2032 in Session 2022–23, dated 21 July 2023 53 Revised correspondence from David Williams CB, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, re Equipment Plan 2023–2033: Update on affordability, dated 4 December 2023 54 C&AG’s Report, Equipment Plan 2023, para 2.8 55 Committee of Public Accounts, MoD Equipment Plan 2023–2033, Nineteenth Report of Session 2023–24, HC 451, 8 March 2024 56 Letter from the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry relating to the Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan 2024, 13 November 2024 57 Letter from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence relating to the response on the Defence Equipment Plan, 12 March 2025 58 Q 1 59 Q 57 60 Qq 58 and 59 61 Q 60 16
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees to provide clear proposals for parliamentary scrutiny of its spending plans, committing to publish the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) in Autumn 2025, which will allow thorough scrutiny of the department's evolving spending.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
29
Recommendation
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Accepted
At the end of our evidence session, we asked the Department to write to us setting out a satisfactory and precise methodology for providing Parliament with an update on its spending plans at least once a year.62 The Permanent Secretary has since written to us, but yet again he has …
Read more
At the end of our evidence session, we asked the Department to write to us setting out a satisfactory and precise methodology for providing Parliament with an update on its spending plans at least once a year.62 The Permanent Secretary has since written to us, but yet again he has failed to address our concerns. Instead, the letter contained platitudes regarding the Department’s commitment to report to Parliament annually to provide opportunities for regular scrutiny, but was vague about how the Department would do this.63 The recently published SDR says that the Department will develop a new ten-year Defence Investment Plan, which will be completed in autumn 2025. While the SDR says this will supersede the Equipment Plan, the ongoing lack of details means we cannot judge how adequate a replacement this might be. The rising cost of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (the DNE)
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendation, committing to publish the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) in Autumn 2025, which will provide a framework for Parliament to scrutinise the department's evolving spending plans.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
30
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Rejected
The Department said the UK’s status as a nuclear nation is crucial for keeping the country safe.64 In 2024–25 the nuclear budget was £10.9 billion, around 18% of the whole defence budget (up from £9.433 billion in 2023–2465). The Department said it was focused on delivering its nuclear programmes effectively …
Read more
The Department said the UK’s status as a nuclear nation is crucial for keeping the country safe.64 In 2024–25 the nuclear budget was £10.9 billion, around 18% of the whole defence budget (up from £9.433 billion in 2023–2465). The Department said it was focused on delivering its nuclear programmes effectively and efficiently.66 To achieve this, it has sought to improve its management of the nuclear budget. For example, it can now, with HM Treasury consent, move money between years, which helps to manage the budget effectively, and move some money between programmes to support prioritisation.67 In addition, the Department is exploring opportunities to include more British small and medium-sized enterprises in the DNE’s supply chain.68
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's implicit recommendation for specific DNE financial reporting, stating that DNE financial information is already provided through existing parliamentary processes and will be included in the Defence Investment Plan.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
31
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Rejected
However, costs of the DNE are rising, driven by various factors.69 The Department is seeking to quicken the pace of delivering its nuclear programmes. The Department noted, however, that there is a very strong correlation between speeding up the schedule and costs, because many of the costs are workforce related. …
Read more
However, costs of the DNE are rising, driven by various factors.69 The Department is seeking to quicken the pace of delivering its nuclear programmes. The Department noted, however, that there is a very strong correlation between speeding up the schedule and costs, because many of the costs are workforce related. Inflation continues to flow through into costs. The Department has also added new programmes to the DNE, such as to re-establish the capability to produce nuclear reactor fuel for defence 62 Q 60 63 Letter from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence relating to the future of the Defence Equipment Plan, 13 May 2025 64 Q 41 65 The overall defence budget also increased between 2023–24 and 2024–25 meaning that the nuclear budget as a percentage was around 18% of the total budget. 66 Q 12 67 Q 15 68 Qq 19 and 20 69 Q 13 17 purposes.70 In consequence, forecast costs for the DNE for the ten years from 2023 and 2033 have increased by around £10 billion to approximately £128 billion from the £117.8 billion reported in the NAO’s 2023 Equipment Plan report.71 However, that 2023 Plan itself had reported that the DNE’s costs were already £7.9 billion more than its budget of £109.8 billion.72
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the implicit recommendation for separate reporting, stating that DNE financial information is already provided through broader MOD financial reporting, Annual Report and Accounts, and the Defence Investment Plan.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
32
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Rejected
The prioritisation of the DNE has led to government creating a ringfence which prevents the Department from using elsewhere money allocated to delivering the DNE, but which allows money to flow the other way.73 The Department recognises that one of the big capability questions it must answer through the SDR …
Read more
The prioritisation of the DNE has led to government creating a ringfence which prevents the Department from using elsewhere money allocated to delivering the DNE, but which allows money to flow the other way.73 The Department recognises that one of the big capability questions it must answer through the SDR and its follow-on work is the balance of investment between nuclear and conventional capabilities.74 However, it has not yet worked this through.75
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's implicit recommendation for specific DNE financial reporting, stating that DNE financial information is already provided through existing parliamentary processes and will be included in the Defence Investment Plan.
Read full response →
HM Treasury
33
Conclusion
32nd Report - The Future of the Equipme…
Rejected
The increase in nuclear costs may restrict the money available for other important needs.76 For example, improving poor accommodation is crucial in addressing the military’s recruitment and retention problems.77 The Department recognises that this is an area where there has been sustained under-investment for many years, and it will take …
Read more
The increase in nuclear costs may restrict the money available for other important needs.76 For example, improving poor accommodation is crucial in addressing the military’s recruitment and retention problems.77 The Department recognises that this is an area where there has been sustained under-investment for many years, and it will take several years for the Department to get all accommodation up to the standard it would like. The Department said it was now addressing this, but noted that future funding for this would be one of the balance of investment decisions later this year.78 70 Q 12 71 Qq 13 and 14 72 C&AG’s Report, Equipment Plan 2023, para 2.17 73 Q 15 74 Q 21 75 Q 16 76 C&AG’s Report, Equipment Plan 2023, para 2.19 77 Q 1 78 Q 2 18
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the implicit recommendation, stating that detailed DNE financial reporting is already provided through wider MOD financial reporting and other existing documents, to avoid inconsistency.
Read full response →
HM Treasury