7th Report - Transnational repression in the UK

The government's response outlines how the National Security Act 2023 addresses state threats, including transnational repression, and mentions ongoing reviews by the Independent Reviewer and broader TNR reviews. It discusses emerging technologies and a 'whole-of-system response' but does not commit to adopting a formal definition of transnational repression or developing specific guidance as recommended.

The government's response focuses on how transnational repression will be considered within the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) and states they will keep enhanced tier specifications under review, but it does not address the recommendation for police forces to collect data on TNR reports or for law enforcement to record and retain data from cases not leading to prosecution.

The government's response discusses online guidance for individuals at risk of TNR, its review, accessibility, and integration with other resources. However, it does not address the recommendation to prioritize TNR in FIRS country designations or to specify China under the enhanced tier of FIRS.

The government's response outlines updates on police training modules concerning the National Security Act and foreign interference, noting their review and mandatory status for counter-terrorism officers. However, it does not address the recommendation to develop guidance on how FIRS data can be used for TNR investigations or to conduct regular reviews of FIRS's effectiveness in this regard.

The government's response did not address the recommendation regarding a timeline or criteria for reviewing the effectiveness of SLAPPs provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023.

The government's response focuses on safeguards against the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices and Diffusions, and working with INTERPOL on reforms, but it does not address the recommendation to develop and implement a proactive outreach strategy for individuals and communities at high risk of TNR.

The government's response discusses INTERPOL processes, general FCDO travel advice, and existing guidance on GOV.UK, but it fails to address the specific recommendations for regular review with victim input, multilingual provision within six months, or proactive promotion of the guidance.

The government's response discusses its general approach to TNR, diplomatic measures, and a review of the OSJA guidance, but does not address the specific recommendations regarding police training evaluation, participation rates, or making training mandatory for all officers.

The government's response focuses on international cooperation, multilateral meetings, and G7/UN statements to raise awareness of TNR, but it does not address the recommendation to establish a dedicated national reporting hotline within one year.

The government's response outlines its whole-of-government approach to countering TNR and inter-departmental collaboration, but it does not address the recommendation to work with international partners on tracking and exposing the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices or advocating for greater transparency in INTERPOL procedures.

The government did not address the recommendation to provide regular confidential updates to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the rationale for imposing or not imposing sanctions. Instead, it outlined existing parliamentary scrutiny procedures for sanctions legislation and general updates to Parliament.

The government's response outlines the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), its objectives, and a commitment to publish an annual report on its operation and impact on TNR. It does not directly address the committee's conclusion regarding the effectiveness of existing UK criminal legislation for TNR and the non-necessity of new criminal offences.

The government's response outlines its general approach to TNR, including awareness campaigns and police training, and states it will refine its approach. However, it does not directly address the committee's concern about the absence of China from the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS).

The government's response discusses and rejects the establishment of a dedicated hotline for reporting transnational repression and describes existing police reporting mechanisms, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the limited scope of SLAPP provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023.

The government's response provides boilerplate text about INTERPOL's CCF and the UK's inability to intervene in other nations' judicial processes, completely failing to address the committee's welcome of online guidance for people experiencing transnational repression.

The government's response outlines how immigration decision-makers are guided on INTERPOL Red Notices and how Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs) consider relevant country information, including TNR. However, it does not address the committee's conclusion regarding the broader rollout of TNR training across police forces.

The government's response did not address the conclusion about the absence of an effective reporting mechanism for TNR or the inconsistent way police forces handle such cases, instead providing generic information on sanctions.

The government's response discusses the design, scrutiny, and legal framework of sanctions, but does not address the committee's conclusion about the importance of establishing a dedicated reporting mechanism for victims of transnational repression.