7th Report - Transnational repression in the UK

We welcome the Government’s decision to describe TNR in broad terms. This approach provides an important opportunity to ensure that all victims of TNR are recognised regardless of ethnicity, nationality or background. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

However, we are concerned by the Government’s decision not to adopt a formal definition of TNR. Whilst we acknowledge the difficulties in adopting a single globally accepted definition, we are not persuaded that the existence of differing national definitions would hinder international cooperation on this issue. Adopting a formal UK definition of TNR would significantly enhance the UK’s ability to collect reliable data, monitor trends, and develop effective policy responses. (Conclusion, Paragraph 20)

We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression. This should be developed in consultation with law enforcement, civil society and affected communities. It should include, as core elements, the ‘involvement’ of a foreign state, and the targeting of individuals located outside that state’s jurisdiction. The definition should be sufficiently broad to encompass victims of TNR regardless of their ethnicity or nationality. In addition to adopting a legal definition, authorities should be equipped with clear guidance and explanatory materials outlining the various forms transnational repression can take. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)

Without clear data on the scale and nature of TNR events in the UK, it is difficult both to create effective policy responses and to judge the effectiveness of the Government’s new TNR strategy. The Government should ask police forces to collect relevant data on the number and nature of TNR reports in the UK. This data should then be used to review the effectiveness of the new TNR strategy and to identify countries of concern. This approach will enhance the UK’s capacity to identify patterns of state- linked harassment and coercion, and to respond more effectively to the evolving threat landscape. We recommend that, in cases where reports of TNR do not lead to prosecution or further action, law enforcement 40 agencies should nonetheless record and retain relevant data, where appropriate, to support TNR trend analysis and future investigative efforts. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)

The evidence we have received indicates that existing UK criminal legislation provides an effective framework for dealing with offences related to TNR. We have not identified any significant gaps in criminal law related to TNR. We agree that the creation of additional criminal offences is not necessary at this time to address the challenges posed by TNR. (Conclusion, Paragraph 26)

However, we recognise the rapidly evolving nature of digital technologies and the increasing sophistication of methods used to conduct TNR. It is therefore essential that the legal framework remains agile and responsive to evolving threats. We recommend that the Government keeps relevant legislation under regular review to ensure it remains fit for purpose in addressing emerging threats, particularly those facilitated by advances in artificial intelligence and surveillance capabilities. The Government should write to this Committee annually to provide an update on the effectiveness of current legislation at addressing evolving digital forms of TNR. (Recommendation, Paragraph 27)

We welcome the introduction of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) as a tool to help strengthen the UK’s ability to tackle transnational repression. The designation of Iran and Russia as countries listed on the enhanced tier of FIRS is consistent with the evidence presented to us regarding the threat posed by TNR originating from these states. However, we are concerned by the evidence we have received regarding transnational repression linked to China. The absence of China on the enhanced tier of FIRS is therefore notable. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32)

The Government should ensure that TNR is a high priority consideration when deciding which countries should be specified under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. Decisions on which countries to specify under the enhanced tier of FIRS must be guided by objective assessments of threat, not influenced by broader foreign policy considerations. We recommend that the Government specify China under the enhanced tier of FIRS. China conducts the most comprehensive TNR campaign of any foreign state operating in the UK. Its omission from the enhanced tier risks undermining the credibility and coherence of FIRS. Any attempt to specify only isolated parts of the Chinese state in the FIRS would fail to reflect the true nature and complexity of the threat, as influence operations span all sectors of the economy and lack clear command-and- control structures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33) 41

The Home Office and relevant enforcement bodies should develop clear guidance on how FIRS data can be used to support investigations into TNR, and regular reviews should be conducted to assess the scheme’s effectiveness in this regard. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are increasingly used as instruments of transnational repression. These lawsuits are designed to intimidate and silence individuals who expose or criticise the actions of authoritarian regimes. The evidence we have received demonstrates that journalists are at particular risk of TNR via the use of SLAPPs. Whilst the inclusion of SLAPP provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 was a welcome first step towards tackling SLAPPs, the current framework is limited to measures related to economic crime and fails to address the broader use of SLAPPs as a tool of transnational repression. Expanding the scope of protections is essential to safeguarding freedom of expression and ensuring that the UK does not become a jurisdiction of choice for legal harassment. (Conclusion, Paragraph 40)

In response to this report, the Government should provide this Committee with a clear timeline in which it plans to review the effectiveness of the SLAPPs provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. The Government should also set out the criteria it intends to use to assess whether these provisions have worked as intended. The Government should use the results of this review to inform the drafting of future legislation to address SLAPPs that are not related to economic crime. (Recommendation, Paragraph 41) Policing and Support for victims

We recommend that the Government develop and implement a proactive outreach strategy aimed at individuals and communities likely to be at high risk of TNR. This strategy should be developed within 12 months and include clear timelines for how engagement activities will be rolled out. The Government should engage with diaspora groups, civil society organisations, and community leaders to provide practical guidance on the methods and tactics commonly used in TNR, as well as the steps individuals can take to enhance their personal safety and access appropriate support and reporting mechanisms. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)

We welcome the Government’s publication of online guidance for people experiencing TNR. This is a positive step towards providing easily accessible information on TNR and helping victims understand avenues of support available to them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48) 42

We recommend that the content of this guidance be reviewed regularly, with input from victims, to ensure it is genuinely effective and helpful for victims and that it remains responsive to evolving TNR tactics. The Government should ensure that this guidance is made available in multiple languages within six months, this should include languages commonly spoken by affected communities. We further recommend that the Government take proactive steps to promote this existence of this guidance amongst communities at high risk of experiencing TNR. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)

We welcome the development of new training materials for police forces on TNR. This represents a positive step toward improving frontline awareness and ensuring appropriate responses to TNR incidences. We welcome the decision to make this training mandatory for counter-terrorism officers. However, it is equally important that the training is rolled out more broadly across police forces, ensuring that officers in all relevant roles are equipped to recognise and respond to transnational repression. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)

The Government should regularly evaluate the uptake of the new police training on transnational repression. Updates on participation rates should be provided to the Committee every six months. If uptake remains limited, serious consideration should be given to making this training mandatory for all police officers. Police should also be given training on early warning signs of TNR-related risks, such as intimidation of friends and family members abroad. (Recommendation, Paragraph 56)

We heard consistent evidence highlighting the absence of an effective mechanism for reporting suspected incidents of TNR. This gap not only leaves victims without adequate support but also significantly undermines the UK’s capacity to monitor, assess, and respond to such threats. There is little consistency in the way police forces deal with reported TNR cases. Individuals seeking to report incidences of TNR are often referred to police departments unfamiliar with the nature and tactics of TNR, resulting in delays and inaction. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

Victims of TNR often take considerable personal risk in reporting TNR related crimes. Many choose not to come forward due to a lack of confidence in existing reporting systems, concerns that have often been shaped by previous negative experiences. Establishing a dedicated reporting mechanism could play a vital role in building trust within affected communities. If individuals knew their reports would be handled by trained, sensitive personnel who understand TNR and the potential risks victims face even in coming forward to report it, more victims may feel safe and supported enough to seek help. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61) 43

We recommend that the Government establish a dedicated national reporting hotline for individuals who experience TNR to enhance victim support, improve data collection, and facilitate timely referrals to the appropriate personnel. The reporting hotline should be established within one year of the publication of this report. It should be staffed by personnel specifically trained to identify and respond to TNR, with a clear understanding of the tactics employed by particular state actors and established referral pathways to the appropriate law enforcement agencies. The service should be supported by a multilingual provision, including translated materials and guidance, as well as access to interpreters who can assist callers in their preferred language. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

We further recommend that data collected through the hotline be anonymised and recorded to inform policy development and threat assessments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 63) INTERPOL and visa applications

We are deeply concerned by the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices by certain member states. Refusal by the INTERPOL secretariat to acknowledge that there is a problem and to take remedial action poses a significant threat to the rights and freedoms of individuals targeted by authoritarian regimes and sends a message that this behaviour is acceptable. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)

We recommend the Government works with ‘Five Eyes’ and other partners to track and expose malicious, vexatious, and politically motivated use of Red Notices by member states. In doing so, the Government should advocate for greater transparency and accountability within INTERPOL’s procedures and advocate for the use of corrective measures and suspensions for systematic abusers of INTERPOL mechanisms. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)

Currently there is no requirement for INTERPOL to alert people at risk of politically motivated reprisals by foreign governments of a Notice being issued against them. This lack of transparency is particularly problematic in cases where individuals face credible risk of TNR, effectively restricting their ability to travel freely. Whilst there may be many legitimate reasons why some individuals should not be informed of the existence of Red Notices against them, we see a need for greater support for those whose lives are impacted by attempts to use this system maliciously. (Conclusion, Paragraph 73) 44

While the option exists for individuals to request access to or removal of their data via INTERPOL’s independent oversight body, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, this process is often significantly delayed and may not offer timely protection to those at immediate risk. The Government should undertake a review of existing procedures to consider whether it is possible to introduce a formal mechanism by which the Home Office or the National Crime Agency (NCA) may alert individuals of the existence of a Red Notice or Diffusion where there is a strong basis to believe it has been politically motivated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 74)

In addition, the Government should take proactive steps to protect individuals facing an extradition risk due to a politically motivated Red Notice. A voluntary mechanism should be introduced to allow targeted British Nationals to notify the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) of planned travel to high-risk countries. This would give UK missions advance notice and allow them to prepare for early intervention if needed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75)

The presence of a politically motivated INTERPOL Red Notice can have serious implications for individuals seeking asylum or applying for visas, often resulting in automatic refusal without due consideration of the underlying political context. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)

The Home Office should ensure that all relevant immigration staff are adequately trained and informed about the potential misuse of Red Notices. In addition, the Country Policy and Information Notes used in assessing asylum claims should be revised to explicitly address the threat of transnational repression. The Government should update the Committee within six months, outlining what specific steps it has taken to improve training for Home Office staff around politically motivated Red Notices. (Recommendation, Paragraph 79) Departmental Coordination and Diplomatic Policy

TNR represents a growing threat to democratic values, the rule of law, and freedom of expression. We are concerned that foreign policy decisions and international trade partnerships are often made without sufficient consideration of the TNR record of perpetrator states. A failure to acknowledge and respond to instances of TNR as part of the UK’s diplomatic relations with perpetrator countries risks undermining the UK’s credibility as a leader on global human rights issues and emboldening authoritarian 45 regimes to escalate TNR activities. Recognising TNR as a foreign policy concern will help to ensure a more coherent and principled approach to the UK’s TNR policies. (Conclusion, Paragraph 86)

We recommend that the Government explicitly incorporate transnational repression into the UK’s human rights reporting frameworks. In particular, references to TNR should be included in the next iterations of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s annual Human Rights and Democracy Report and in the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance. The UK should also ensure that diplomatic responses, such as the expulsion of officials, public demarches, and the imposition of sanctions, are not only available in principle but are actively and visibly deployed in response to serious incidents. (Recommendation, Paragraph 87)

The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 do not capture the full range of TNR tactics, including violence, intimidation, harassment, illegal deportations, abductions and abuse of international mechanisms such as INTERPOL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

The Committee recommends that the Government review the scope of the UK’s sanctions framework to assess the feasibility of introducing specific TNR sanctions. The UK should also adopt a more proactive approach to sanctions, particularly in cases where UK nationals and residents are directly affected. This should include the timely designation of perpetrators and state actors responsible for systematic TNR in appropriate cases, even in the absence of prior action by international partners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89)

Due to the national security sensitivities and the need for swift action, there are limited opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise sanctions policy. We recommend that the Government provide regular confidential updates to the Intelligence and Security Committee, outlining the rationale for imposing, or not imposing sanctions, in relevant cases. (Recommendation, Paragraph 90)

The UK should support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority on the UN agenda and promote coordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes. The Government should also ensure that information and data on TNR is shared with likeminded countries through fora such as the Council of Europe, INTERPOL, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, OSCE and UN, to help combat TNR at a global level. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92)

We recommend that the Government work closely with Canada to strengthen international collaboration on countering TNR during Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency. As part of this effort, the UK should play a leading role in the launch and development of the proposed Digital TNR Detection 46 Academy under the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. This initiative will enhance collective capacity to detect and respond to online forms of TNR by equipping G7 members and partners with the technical skills and tools needed to identify and counter emerging technology-enabled threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93)

The UK should seek to play a leading and proactive role in shaping the Global response to TNR as part of the US chaired Working Group on Transnational Repression. The Government should also raise the issue at the next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, scheduled to take place in 2026 in Antigua and Barbuda. (Recommendation, Paragraph 94)

The UK’s response to TNR would benefit significantly from more structured and consistent coordination across government departments. Currently, responsibilities related to TNR are dispersed across the Home Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the National Crime Agency (NCA), and the intelligence and security services. While each plays a vital role, the absence of a formalised mechanism for collaboration can lead to consistent responses and support for individuals at risk. We welcome the recent announcement of the State Threats Joint Unit, which is intended to enhance the UK’s capacity to respond to hostile state activity. (Conclusion, Paragraph 96)

We recommend this new unit has a central role in coordinating the UK’s response to TNR, ensuring that intelligence, law enforcement, and policy functions are aligned and responsive to emerging threats. We recommend the appointment of a dedicated lead for transnational repression within the unit, responsible for driving cross-government coordination. (Recommendation, Paragraph 97) 47