Source · Select Committees · Human Rights (Joint Committee)
7th Report - Transnational repression in the UK
Human Rights (Joint Committee)
HC 681
Published 30 July 2025
Recommendations
3
Not Addressed
We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression.
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression. This should be developed in consultation with law enforcement, civil society and affected communities. It should include, as core elements, the ‘involvement’ of a foreign state, and the …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response outlines how the National Security Act 2023 addresses state threats, including transnational repression, and mentions ongoing reviews by the Independent Reviewer and broader TNR reviews. It discusses emerging technologies and a 'whole-of-system response' but does not commit to adopting a formal definition of transnational repression or developing specific guidance as recommended.
Ministry of Justice
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4
Not Addressed
Without clear data on the scale and nature of TNR events in the UK, it...
Recommendation
Without clear data on the scale and nature of TNR events in the UK, it is difficult both to create effective policy responses and to judge the effectiveness of the Government’s new TNR strategy. The Government should ask police forces …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response focuses on how transnational repression will be considered within the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) and states they will keep enhanced tier specifications under review, but it does not address the recommendation for police forces to collect data on TNR reports or for law enforcement to record and retain data from cases not leading to prosecution.
Ministry of Justice
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6
Accepted in Part
However, we recognise the rapidly evolving nature of digital technologies and the increasing sophistication of...
Recommendation
However, we recognise the rapidly evolving nature of digital technologies and the increasing sophistication of methods used to conduct TNR. It is therefore essential that the legal framework remains agile and responsive to evolving threats. We recommend that the Government …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response focuses on the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA) related to SLAPPs, committing to monitor its effectiveness and update the Committee by June 2026. However, it does not broadly address the recommendation for regular review of all relevant legislation concerning evolving digital forms of TNR, AI, and surveillance, or provide an annual update on these broader areas.
Ministry of Justice
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8
Not Addressed
The Government should ensure that TNR is a high priority consideration when deciding which countries...
Recommendation
The Government should ensure that TNR is a high priority consideration when deciding which countries should be specified under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. Decisions on which countries to specify under the enhanced tier of FIRS …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response discusses online guidance for individuals at risk of TNR, its review, accessibility, and integration with other resources. However, it does not address the recommendation to prioritize TNR in FIRS country designations or to specify China under the enhanced tier of FIRS.
Ministry of Justice
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9
Not Addressed
The Home Office and relevant enforcement bodies should develop clear guidance on how FIRS data...
Recommendation
The Home Office and relevant enforcement bodies should develop clear guidance on how FIRS data can be used to support investigations into TNR, and regular reviews should be conducted to assess the scheme’s effectiveness in this regard. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)
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Government Response Summary
The government's response outlines updates on police training modules concerning the National Security Act and foreign interference, noting their review and mandatory status for counter-terrorism officers. However, it does not address the recommendation to develop guidance on how FIRS data can be used for TNR investigations or to conduct regular reviews of FIRS's effectiveness in this regard.
Ministry of Justice
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11
Not Addressed
In response to this report, the Government should provide this Committee with a clear timeline...
Recommendation
In response to this report, the Government should provide this Committee with a clear timeline in which it plans to review the effectiveness of the SLAPPs provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. The Government should also …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response did not address the recommendation regarding a timeline or criteria for reviewing the effectiveness of SLAPPs provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023.
Ministry of Justice
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12
Not Addressed
We recommend that the Government develop and implement a proactive outreach strategy aimed at individuals...
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government develop and implement a proactive outreach strategy aimed at individuals and communities likely to be at high risk of TNR. This strategy should be developed within 12 months and include clear timelines for how engagement …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response focuses on safeguards against the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices and Diffusions, and working with INTERPOL on reforms, but it does not address the recommendation to develop and implement a proactive outreach strategy for individuals and communities at high risk of TNR.
Ministry of Justice
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14
Not Addressed
We recommend that the content of this guidance be reviewed regularly, with input from victims,...
Recommendation
We recommend that the content of this guidance be reviewed regularly, with input from victims, to ensure it is genuinely effective and helpful for victims and that it remains responsive to evolving TNR tactics. The Government should ensure that this …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response discusses INTERPOL processes, general FCDO travel advice, and existing guidance on GOV.UK, but it fails to address the specific recommendations for regular review with victim input, multilingual provision within six months, or proactive promotion of the guidance.
Ministry of Justice
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16
Not Addressed
The Government should regularly evaluate the uptake of the new police training on transnational repression.
Recommendation
The Government should regularly evaluate the uptake of the new police training on transnational repression. Updates on participation rates should be provided to the Committee every six months. If uptake remains limited, serious consideration should be given to making this …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response discusses its general approach to TNR, diplomatic measures, and a review of the OSJA guidance, but does not address the specific recommendations regarding police training evaluation, participation rates, or making training mandatory for all officers.
Ministry of Justice
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19
Not Addressed
We recommend that the Government establish a dedicated national reporting hotline for individuals who experience...
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government establish a dedicated national reporting hotline for individuals who experience TNR to enhance victim support, improve data collection, and facilitate timely referrals to the appropriate personnel. The reporting hotline should be established within one year …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response focuses on international cooperation, multilateral meetings, and G7/UN statements to raise awareness of TNR, but it does not address the recommendation to establish a dedicated national reporting hotline within one year.
Ministry of Justice
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20
Accepted
We further recommend that data collected through the hotline be anonymised and recorded to inform...
Recommendation
We further recommend that data collected through the hotline be anonymised and recorded to inform policy development and threat assessments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 63) INTERPOL and visa applications
Government Response Summary
The government states that policing is actively building increased systems to collate and analyse data from public reporting to inform strategic and operational response, policy development, and threat assessments, aligning with the recommendation.
Ministry of Justice
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22
Not Addressed
We recommend the Government works with ‘Five Eyes’ and other partners to track and expose...
Recommendation
We recommend the Government works with ‘Five Eyes’ and other partners to track and expose malicious, vexatious, and politically motivated use of Red Notices by member states. In doing so, the Government should advocate for greater transparency and accountability within …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response outlines its whole-of-government approach to countering TNR and inter-departmental collaboration, but it does not address the recommendation to work with international partners on tracking and exposing the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices or advocating for greater transparency in INTERPOL procedures.
Ministry of Justice
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23
Rejected
Currently there is no requirement for INTERPOL to alert people at risk of politically motivated...
Recommendation
Currently there is no requirement for INTERPOL to alert people at risk of politically motivated reprisals by foreign governments of a Notice being issued against them. This lack of transparency is particularly problematic in cases where individuals face credible risk …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejected the implied recommendation for the UK to inform individuals about INTERPOL notices. It stated it is not appropriate for the UK to intervene in other nations' judicial processes, directing individuals to INTERPOL's Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files for data access.
Ministry of Justice
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24
Rejected
While the option exists for individuals to request access to or removal of their data...
Recommendation
While the option exists for individuals to request access to or removal of their data via INTERPOL’s independent oversight body, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, this process is often significantly delayed and may not offer timely protection …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects undertaking a review to introduce a mechanism for alerting individuals about politically motivated Red Notices, stating it would not be appropriate for the UK to intervene in the judicial processes of other nations and that the existing INTERPOL CCF process is the correct avenue.
Ministry of Justice
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25
Accepted
In addition, the Government should take proactive steps to protect individuals facing an extradition risk...
Recommendation
In addition, the Government should take proactive steps to protect individuals facing an extradition risk due to a politically motivated Red Notice. A voluntary mechanism should be introduced to allow targeted British Nationals to notify the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development …
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Government Response Summary
The government did not commit to introducing a new voluntary mechanism for British Nationals to notify the FCDO of travel to high-risk countries. Instead, it highlighted existing INTERPOL processes, FCDO consular assistance, travel advice, and guidance already available to individuals.
Ministry of Justice
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27
Accepted
The Home Office should ensure that all relevant immigration staff are adequately trained and informed...
Recommendation
The Home Office should ensure that all relevant immigration staff are adequately trained and informed about the potential misuse of Red Notices. In addition, the Country Policy and Information Notes used in assessing asylum claims should be revised to explicitly …
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Government Response Summary
The government states that immigration staff already receive extensive guidance on Red Notices and processes are kept under review. It also indicates that Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs) can include transnational repression but do not cover case-specific Red Notices, stating relevant information may be considered within existing frameworks.
Ministry of Justice
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29
Accepted in Part
We recommend that the Government explicitly incorporate transnational repression into the UK’s human rights reporting...
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government explicitly incorporate transnational repression into the UK’s human rights reporting frameworks. In particular, references to TNR should be included in the next iterations of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s annual Human Rights and Democracy …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledged the recommendation, stating it already deploys diplomatic measures against TNR. Regarding explicit incorporation into reporting frameworks, it will 'consider' including TNR in a future Human Rights and Democracy Report and as part of its ongoing review of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance.
Ministry of Justice
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31
Accepted
The Committee recommends that the Government review the scope of the UK’s sanctions framework to...
Recommendation
The Committee recommends that the Government review the scope of the UK’s sanctions framework to assess the feasibility of introducing specific TNR sanctions. The UK should also adopt a more proactive approach to sanctions, particularly in cases where UK nationals …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledged the recommendation but indicated that it already keeps its sanctions framework under review and can impose sanctions for state-directed crimes, including those amounting to TNR, providing examples of past designations.
Ministry of Justice
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32
Not Addressed
Due to the national security sensitivities and the need for swift action, there are limited...
Recommendation
Due to the national security sensitivities and the need for swift action, there are limited opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise sanctions policy. We recommend that the Government provide regular confidential updates to the Intelligence and Security Committee, outlining the rationale …
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Government Response Summary
The government did not address the recommendation to provide regular confidential updates to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the rationale for imposing or not imposing sanctions. Instead, it outlined existing parliamentary scrutiny procedures for sanctions legislation and general updates to Parliament.
Ministry of Justice
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33
Accepted
The UK should support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority on the UN agenda...
Recommendation
The UK should support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority on the UN agenda and promote coordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes. The Government should also ensure that information and data on TNR is shared with …
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Government Response Summary
The government accepts the recommendation, committing to working with international partners to raise awareness of transnational repression (TNR) and strengthen collaboration, citing recent multilateral meetings, supporting the G7 statement on TNR, and enhancing information sharing through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism.
Ministry of Justice
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34
Accepted
We recommend that the Government work closely with Canada to strengthen international collaboration on countering...
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government work closely with Canada to strengthen international collaboration on countering TNR during Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency. As part of this effort, the UK should play a leading role in the launch and development of the …
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Government Response Summary
The government accepted the recommendation, committing to strengthen international collaboration with G7 partners, including Canada, on countering TNR. It will deliver initiatives such as enhancing information sharing through a TNR Resilience and Response Framework in the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism.
Ministry of Justice
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35
Acknowledged
The UK should seek to play a leading and proactive role in shaping the Global...
Recommendation
The UK should seek to play a leading and proactive role in shaping the Global response to TNR as part of the US chaired Working Group on Transnational Repression. The Government should also raise the issue at the next Commonwealth …
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Government Response Summary
The government states its commitment to working with international partners and through multilateral channels like G7 to raise awareness and strengthen resilience to TNR, and to enhance information sharing. However, it does not explicitly confirm a leading role in the US-chaired Working Group or raising the issue at CHOGM.
Ministry of Justice
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37
Accepted
We recommend this new unit has a central role in coordinating the UK’s response to...
Recommendation
We recommend this new unit has a central role in coordinating the UK’s response to TNR, ensuring that intelligence, law enforcement, and policy functions are aligned and responsive to emerging threats. We recommend the appointment of a dedicated lead for …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the need for structured coordination to counter transnational repression (TNR) and highlights the existing Defending Democracy Taskforce as coordinating the whole-of-government response, with the Home Office owning the overall UK response, implying that existing mechanisms achieve the recommended coordination without needing a new unit or dedicated lead.
Ministry of Justice
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Conclusions (14)
1
Conclusion
Accepted
We welcome the Government’s decision to describe TNR in broad terms. This approach provides an important opportunity to ensure that all victims of TNR are recognised regardless of ethnicity, nationality or background. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)
Government Response Summary
The government accepted the committee's welcome of its broad description of TNR, affirming its agreement with the principle that the definition should capture all victims regardless of background.
2
Conclusion
Acknowledged
However, we are concerned by the Government’s decision not to adopt a formal definition of TNR. Whilst we acknowledge the difficulties in adopting a single globally accepted definition, we are not persuaded that the existence of differing national definitions would hinder international cooperation on this issue. Adopting a formal UK …
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the importance of robust data and strengthening its understanding of transnational repression (TNR), stating it is taking active steps to improve data collection and analysis and will continue to develop its understanding, but it does not commit to adopting a formal UK definition of TNR.
5
Conclusion
Not Addressed
The evidence we have received indicates that existing UK criminal legislation provides an effective framework for dealing with offences related to TNR. We have not identified any significant gaps in criminal law related to TNR. We agree that the creation of additional criminal offences is not necessary at this time …
Government Response Summary
The government's response outlines the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), its objectives, and a commitment to publish an annual report on its operation and impact on TNR. It does not directly address the committee's conclusion regarding the effectiveness of existing UK criminal legislation for TNR and the non-necessity of new criminal offences.
7
Conclusion
Not Addressed
We welcome the introduction of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) as a tool to help strengthen the UK’s ability to tackle transnational repression. The designation of Iran and Russia as countries listed on the enhanced tier of FIRS is consistent with the evidence presented to us regarding the threat …
Government Response Summary
The government's response outlines its general approach to TNR, including awareness campaigns and police training, and states it will refine its approach. However, it does not directly address the committee's concern about the absence of China from the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS).
10
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are increasingly used as instruments of transnational repression. These lawsuits are designed to intimidate and silence individuals who expose or criticise the actions of authoritarian regimes. The evidence we have received demonstrates that journalists are at particular risk of TNR via the use of …
Government Response Summary
The government's response discusses and rejects the establishment of a dedicated hotline for reporting transnational repression and describes existing police reporting mechanisms, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the limited scope of SLAPP provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023.
13
Conclusion
Not Addressed
We welcome the Government’s publication of online guidance for people experiencing TNR. This is a positive step towards providing easily accessible information on TNR and helping victims understand avenues of support available to them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48) 42
Government Response Summary
The government's response provides boilerplate text about INTERPOL's CCF and the UK's inability to intervene in other nations' judicial processes, completely failing to address the committee's welcome of online guidance for people experiencing transnational repression.
15
Conclusion
Not Addressed
We welcome the development of new training materials for police forces on TNR. This represents a positive step toward improving frontline awareness and ensuring appropriate responses to TNR incidences. We welcome the decision to make this training mandatory for counter-terrorism officers. However, it is equally important that the training is …
Government Response Summary
The government's response outlines how immigration decision-makers are guided on INTERPOL Red Notices and how Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs) consider relevant country information, including TNR. However, it does not address the committee's conclusion regarding the broader rollout of TNR training across police forces.
17
Conclusion
Not Addressed
We heard consistent evidence highlighting the absence of an effective mechanism for reporting suspected incidents of TNR. This gap not only leaves victims without adequate support but also significantly undermines the UK’s capacity to monitor, assess, and respond to such threats. There is little consistency in the way police forces …
Government Response Summary
The government's response did not address the conclusion about the absence of an effective reporting mechanism for TNR or the inconsistent way police forces handle such cases, instead providing generic information on sanctions.
18
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Victims of TNR often take considerable personal risk in reporting TNR related crimes. Many choose not to come forward due to a lack of confidence in existing reporting systems, concerns that have often been shaped by previous negative experiences. Establishing a dedicated reporting mechanism could play a vital role in …
Government Response Summary
The government's response discusses the design, scrutiny, and legal framework of sanctions, but does not address the committee's conclusion about the importance of establishing a dedicated reporting mechanism for victims of transnational repression.
21
Conclusion
Acknowledged
We are deeply concerned by the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices by certain member states. Refusal by the INTERPOL secretariat to acknowledge that there is a problem and to take remedial action poses a significant threat to the rights and freedoms of individuals targeted by authoritarian regimes and sends a …
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the committee's concern about the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices, stating it monitors existing safeguards, works with INTERPOL on reforms, and will continue to work with partners to ensure the system's legitimacy.
26
Conclusion
Accepted
The presence of a politically motivated INTERPOL Red Notice can have serious implications for individuals seeking asylum or applying for visas, often resulting in automatic refusal without due consideration of the underlying political context. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the issue of politically motivated INTERPOL Red Notices and states that immigration decision-makers already receive extensive guidance on handling them, with processes kept under review. It clarifies that Country Policy and Information Notes do not cover case-specific Red Notices but assess country conditions.
28
Conclusion
Accepted
TNR represents a growing threat to democratic values, the rule of law, and freedom of expression. We are concerned that foreign policy decisions and international trade partnerships are often made without sufficient consideration of the TNR record of perpetrator states. A failure to acknowledge and respond to instances of TNR …
Government Response Summary
The government states it already recognises TNR as a threat to national security, human rights, and democracy, and deploys diplomatic measures, including sanctions. It will consider including TNR in a future Annual Human Rights and Democracy Report and referencing it in the updated Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) guidance as part of a review.
30
Conclusion
Acknowledged
The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 do not capture the full range of TNR tactics, including violence, intimidation, harassment, illegal deportations, abductions and abuse of international mechanisms such as INTERPOL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)
Government Response Summary
The government states it keeps sanctions powers and regimes under review to respond to new developments, and that it can impose sanctions for state-directed crimes, including TNR activities, citing recent examples of such sanctions. It also notes the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 has been updated.
36
Conclusion
Accepted
The UK’s response to TNR would benefit significantly from more structured and consistent coordination across government departments. Currently, responsibilities related to TNR are dispersed across the Home Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the National Crime Agency (NCA), and the intelligence and security services. While each plays a vital …
Government Response Summary
The government accepted the committee's conclusion regarding the need for more structured coordination on TNR across government. It stated that a dedicated team has been established within the Home Office to act as the central point of coordination for the UK's overarching TNR strategy.