Recommendation 2

HM Government · verbatim extract Acknowledged

2. The Government accepts the Committee’s view that any definition should be sufficiently broad to capture the full range of victims. We agree with this principle and have intentionally shaped our description to reflect this. The Government’s description of TNR was developed through the Defending Democracy Taskforce’s Review and informed by engagement with law enforcement, civil society, and affected individuals. It ensures that all victims are recognised, regardless of ethnicity or nationality, and avoids introducing limitations based on community affiliation or motivation, which are often difficult to conclusively establish. This approach provides maximum flexibility to respond to the evolving threat and aligns as closely as possible with international partners’ interpretations. 3. The Government’s description of TNR captures the totality of the issue and the full spectrum of threats - from online harassment to assassination at the most serious end of the scale. TNR is not a new phenomenon and the UK’s legal, policy and operational responses to this type of harm have developed over decades. The National Security Act 2023 provides a comprehensive suite of powers to tackle TNR, in particular, the Foreign Interference Offence and the state threats aggravating factor, which enable conduct to be prosecuted where it is carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power. Therefore, the Government agrees with the Committee’s conclusion that the creation of additional criminal offences is not necessary at this time to address the challenges posed by TNR. ... 5. While there is no universally agreed international definition of TNR, the UK’s flexible approach enables effective collaboration with likeminded partners. The Government want individuals to feel confident reporting any incident of state-directed crime, without needing to consider whether or not their experience meets a strict definition.