Recommendations & Conclusions
8 items
8
Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not merely platforms but curators of content. As we have seen, …
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Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not merely platforms but curators of content. As we have seen, the amplification and spread of this content can have serious, large-scale impacts. We recognise that this is a complex area of law and that defining social media companies as publishers would have major consequences, but the current situation is deeply unsatisfactory. We call on the government to set out its position on this question in its response to this report. (Conclusion, Paragraph 28)
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Government response AI summary
The government thanked the committee and acknowledged the challenges of misinformation but did not set out its position on whether social media companies are publishers or platforms as requested.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
23
Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
Responsibility for tracking foreign disinformation campaigns appears to be split between several departments, including DSIT. This suggests that the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 characterisation of countering Russian influence operations as a “hot potato”, passed between different bodies, has not been addressed. To meet our Principle 1, the government should …
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Responsibility for tracking foreign disinformation campaigns appears to be split between several departments, including DSIT. This suggests that the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 characterisation of countering Russian influence operations as a “hot potato”, passed between different bodies, has not been addressed. To meet our Principle 1, the government should clarify which department has ownership over tracking and countering online narrative operations. It should consider consolidating responsibility within a single entity, for example the National Security Online Information Team, or establishing a clear chain of command, and in its response to this report the government should set out the actions it intends to take in this regard. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)
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Government response AI summary
The government response cuts off mid-sentence and does not address the recommendation to clarify departmental ownership of tracking and countering online narrative operations.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
24
Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
The NSOIT is an important tool in protecting citizens from disinformation and needs appropriate scrutiny. Government should place NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee, to ensure that our Principle 1 is being effectively and safely pursued, in line with …
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The NSOIT is an important tool in protecting citizens from disinformation and needs appropriate scrutiny. Government should place NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee, to ensure that our Principle 1 is being effectively and safely pursued, in line with Principle 2. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62) Generative AI
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Government response AI summary
The government response cuts off mid-sentence and does not address the recommendation to put the NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
25
Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed false or harmful information to their enormous audiences, further threatening …
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The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed false or harmful information to their enormous audiences, further threatening information integrity online. This has damaging effects on all users, undermining the reputation of the companies that introduce them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the potential harm of online misinformation but states the Online Safety Act (OSA) takes a proportionate approach by focusing on content that is illegal or harmful to children. It reaffirms that for other legal content, platforms decide what is permitted, and the …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
26
Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
We are concerned at what appears to be contradiction and confusion between regulators and government over the capabilities, limitations and principles behind the Online Safety Act. We expect senior Ofcom officials and ministers to be fully aligned in their understanding of the Act—particularly in relation to critical issues such as …
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We are concerned at what appears to be contradiction and confusion between regulators and government over the capabilities, limitations and principles behind the Online Safety Act. We expect senior Ofcom officials and ministers to be fully aligned in their understanding of the Act—particularly in relation to critical issues such as misinformation and generative AI. Ofcom at times appeared complacent in its approach to 57 public safety online, failing to live up to its role as the UK’s online safety regulator and slipping into the role of mediator between the industry and the consumer. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75)
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Government response AI summary
The response text is truncated and does not engage with the substance of the conclusion.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
30
Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which can result in promotion of misleading, damaging, or hateful material. …
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Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which can result in promotion of misleading, damaging, or hateful material. The effects spread through the online ecosystem, helping to incentivise the production and spread of harmful content. (Conclusion, Paragraph 85) 58
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Government response AI summary
The government reaffirms its commitment to a safer online world and urges providers to counter mis- and disinformation, but reiterates the Online Safety Act's focus on illegal content and content harmful to children. It does not address the committee's conclusion about recommendation algorithms incentivising harmful …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
31
Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and advertisers appear to be either unable or unwilling to address …
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The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and advertisers appear to be either unable or unwilling to address this problem. We heard evidence that platforms may have profited from misinformation and hateful content after the Southport attack. (Conclusion, Paragraph 95)
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Government response AI summary
The government reiterates its commitment to a safer online world and the Online Safety Act's focus on illegal and child-harming content. It does not directly address the conclusion regarding the opaque and under-regulated digital advertising market's role in the production and monetisation of harmful and …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
33
Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinformati…
Not Addressed
There is a regulatory gap around digital advertising, as much of the regulation and interventions have been industry-led and focused on tackling harmful advertising content, as opposed to the monetisation of harmful content through advertising. We are not convinced that the digital advertising industry is able, or willing, to effectively …
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There is a regulatory gap around digital advertising, as much of the regulation and interventions have been industry-led and focused on tackling harmful advertising content, as opposed to the monetisation of harmful content through advertising. We are not convinced that the digital advertising industry is able, or willing, to effectively self-regulate. The government’s reliance on industry-led, content-focused solutions, is insufficient to meet the current scale of harm. One industry-led intervention that saw some success in increasing transparency and reducing monetisation of harmful content, the Global Alliance for Responsible Media, ended following legal challenge. (Conclusion, Paragraph 97)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges its commitment to a safer online world and that the Online Safety Act addresses illegal misinformation and content harmful to children. However, it does not directly address the committee's specific concern about a regulatory gap for the broader monetization of harmful content …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology