Recommendations & Conclusions
9 items
17
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
Elections have become dependent on external suppliers over which the Government have little control. This creates points of weakness and even potential failure in our elections system. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Government response. The government's response does not directly address the committee's conclusion regarding the dependency of elections on external suppliers and the vulnerabilities this creates. It reiterates that planning is the responsibility of Returning Officers and the Electoral Commission, and rejects the …
21
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
The timing of the election placed extra pressure on the administration of the election, and placed stress on the thin supplier market. It also meant certain areas of the UK, such as Scotland and Northern Ireland, were placed at an administrative disadvantage. While we accept that the timing of the …
Government response. The government's response does not directly address the committee's conclusion about the administrative pressures and disadvantages caused by the timing of the general election.
37
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
We appreciate the Royal Mail’s assurances that over 99% of all election mail was delivered on time. However, we are concerned that despite this a number of candidates felt their messaging was not delivered when they expected. To ease concerns for candidates, timelines for delivery of different materials should be …
Government response. The government outlines changes to improve resilience in the postal and proxy voting system, but does not specifically commit to making timelines for delivery of different election materials clear and tight. It rejects next-day delivery for poll cards and rolling …
46
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
While these and other options are being considered, we agree with the Electoral Commission that, as an interim measure, all overseas voters that are registered should automatically receive a postal vote, meaning they would have to actively apply to vote by another means, i.e. in person or by proxy. (Recommendation, …
Government response. The government states that overseas electors continue to have options for voting by proxy, post, or in person, and that proxy voters can acquire postal votes. However, it does not address the specific recommendation to automatically send postal votes to …
50
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
We recommend that more is done to make voters aware that additional support and equipment may be requested. This should be done through clearer advice in communications to voters. (Recommendation, Paragraph 129) 71
Government response. The government discusses its Accessibility of Elections Working Group and its intention to investigate how existing data might be used, but this response does not address the recommendation to improve voter awareness of available support and equipment.
54
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
The Government should set out clear criteria for judging the effectiveness of the voter ID policy. This statement should include criteria for assessing the acceptability of any impact of the policy on turnout. A detailed assessment of the general impact of voter ID on turnout and on different demographic groups …
Government response. The government defends its voter ID policy and cites existing research from the Electoral Commission and IFF Research. While it announces that UK-issued bank cards will be accepted as voter ID to increase accessibility, it does not commit to setting …
55
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
Our assessment is that the longer voter ID prevails the more it will become accepted, reducing, though not removing, the prevention and discouragement effect. It is unfortunate that data was not regularly collected at polls in Northern Ireland, in particular following the introduction of photo ID there in 2003. The …
Government response. The government's response focuses on defending its voter ID policy, announcing the acceptance of bank cards, and committing to create a digital Voter Authority Certificate and accept digital forms of existing photo ID. It does not, however, commit to considering …
59
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
Alternatively, the Government should consider the Electoral Commission’s recommendation to introduce a vouching system, which would provide an emergency system for people who do not have, or find they have lost, an acceptable form of ID on the day of the election. However, we 73 are cognisant of the concerns …
Government response. The government's response does not address the committee's recommendation to consider introducing a vouching system for emergency voter identification.
66
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
We recommend that Ofcom in coordination with the Electoral Commission set out the timescale for setting up arrangements to address online abuse and intimidation at elections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 173) 74
Government response. The government's response details the implementation of the Online Safety Act (OSA) and its provisions, including commencement dates for certain offenses and duties, but does not commit to Ofcom and the Electoral Commission setting out a joint timescale for addressing …