Recommendations & Conclusions
69 items
1
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
We agree that the 2024 general election was well run. This was due to the hard work, dedication, and often the personal sacrifice of the people running it. The electoral administrators, the civil servants and the Electoral Commission worked hard to deliver the election and, as shown later in the …
Government response. The government agrees on the importance of clear assessments but deflects responsibility for establishing criteria for assessing election effectiveness to the Electoral Commission, stating it will consider proposals from them. It also vaguely commits to exploring ways to improve democratic …
2
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
In line with previous elections, the fabric of our electoral administration system held together sufficiently at the 2024 general election to allow a well-run election to be delivered. However, as the Electoral Commission report sets out increasing demands and tight deadlines are placing ever greater pressure on the system. Our …
Government response. The government acknowledges calls for consolidation of electoral law but largely rejects major reform, citing extensive time and multi-parliamentary effort required. It highlights its existing ambitious agenda and ongoing Review of Electoral Registration and Conduct as current efforts to improve …
3
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
While the Electoral Commission have rightly reported that each general election on which they have reported was well run, there have also been repeated concerns raised. While we do not doubt the Electoral Commission’s overall assessment of this or previous elections, we do note that there could be improvements to …
Government response. The government rejects producing an annual readiness report, stating that planning and contingency for elections are the responsibility of independent Returning Officers and the Electoral Commission. It commits to introducing legislation to ensure senior officials hold the Returning Officer role …
4
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
There need to be clear criteria and, where appropriate, metrics, for assessing and judging how effectively an election has been run. The Electoral Commission should establish such criteria in consultation with Government and other stakeholders. This should be in place in 64 advance of the next general election, and reports …
Government response. The government deflects the core recommendation on establishing clear criteria for assessing election effectiveness, instead stating that the process of conducting counts is a matter for independent Returning Officers. It then shifts to discussing its plans for improving voter registration …
5
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
Low turnout continues to be an issue of concern but was not due to the administration of the election. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)
Government response. The government commits to strengthening the postal and proxy voting system through specific changes outlined in its Strategy for Elections, including new deadlines and increased flexibility. It will also conduct pilot projects in May 2026 and 2027 to trial flexible …
6
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
The decline in turnout is not an indictment of any one government or party. While it may be uncomfortable for those directly involved in politics and government, the decline in voting risks undermining the authority and legitimacy of government in the UK. Reversing the decline in turnout is a task …
Government response. The government commits to encouraging full participation and addresses specific suggestions for overseas electors by raising significant concerns about their feasibility or viability (such as embassy voting or telephone-based assisted voting). It states some potential recommendations remain under active consideration.
7
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
We welcome consideration of political education as part of the Department for Education curriculum review. But what is needed is a complete overhaul of political education in the UK, particularly within England. The Government has committed in its manifesto to introduce votes at 16. That would provide an opportunity for …
Government response. The government deflects this recommendation on political education by discussing its commitment to ensuring accessible voting for disabled electors and improving awareness of available support, and also briefly mentioning exploring the use of existing data. It does not address political …
8
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
The development of a new school curriculum for political education is an opportunity to engage the public in order to create the wider environment and culture for political education in schools to be successful. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)
Government response. The government deflects this recommendation on political education by focusing on its commitments and ongoing work related to Voter Identification policy, including monitoring its impact and exploring digital ID. It does not address political education.
9
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
We note the message about the importance of politicians engaging with young people in schools, and we support continued efforts to enable MPs and Parliament more widely in this work. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37) State of electoral law and systems for electoral administration
Government response. The government deflects this recommendation on politician engagement with young people in schools by detailing its commitment of £31 million to improve security for MPs and elected officials, address online harms, and protect democracy from intimidation and harassment.
10
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
There is a clear consensus in our evidence around the necessity and benefits of simplification and consolidation of electoral law. This is not a new position and has been reiterated by the practitioners and experts of electoral law for some time, and this appeared to have been accepted by this …
Government response. The government acknowledges the calls for consolidation but rejects undertaking major reform now due to the extensive time and cross-Parliamentary effort required, prioritising its existing manifesto commitments and ongoing Review of Electoral Registration and Conduct, which specifically excluded consolidation.
11
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
The Government should make clear whether it accepts in principle that UK elections law needs simplification and consolidation, and if it does not should set out its evidence for this position in full in its response to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44)
Government response. The government explains that while it understands calls for electoral law consolidation, it is not prioritizing this major reform due to the extensive time, resources, and multi-Parliamentary commitment required, focusing instead on current manifesto pledges and its ongoing Review of …
12
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
We recognise that the Government has manifesto commitments in the area of electoral law that it is prioritising. We commend the Government for recognising these challenges and including this work alongside the implementation of their other manifesto commitments. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)
Government response. The government acknowledges the committee's recognition of its manifesto commitments, reiterating its focus on these electoral improvements and explaining why comprehensive electoral law consolidation is not currently prioritized due to its extensive nature and other pressing agenda items.
13
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
We are however concerned that the Government has not put in motion the work necessary to simplify and consolidate electoral law. It is clear to us that the conclusion of the Law Commissions’ report was correct, and that the UK would be better off with a single elections act. We …
Government response. The government acknowledges the committee's concerns but rejects the immediate commencement of electoral law simplification and consolidation, explaining that such a major reform would be a multi-Parliamentary undertaking and not a current priority over its manifesto commitments and ongoing electoral …
14
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
The Government should start the process of simplification and consolidation of electoral law alongside the work being carried out to produce a Bill to implement its manifesto commitments and the outcome of the strategic review. In doing this it should commit to introducing the consolidation legislation when this process is …
Government response. The government rejects starting the process of electoral law simplification and consolidation, stating that such a major, multi-Parliamentary reform is not feasible alongside its current manifesto commitments and was explicitly out of scope for its ongoing Review of Electoral Registration …
15
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
We are aware of a range of concerns regarding the pressures placed on electoral administrators. In particular, we note the anxieties raised around recruiting and retaining staff, and securing suitable locations for polling stations and counts. We are also aware of concerns around implementation of new measures and technologies, as …
Government response. The government acknowledges committee concerns about electoral administration pressures, stating that planning and contingency are responsibilities of independent Returning Officers and the Electoral Commission. It highlights ongoing support for local authorities and outlines intentions from its Strategy for Elections to …
16
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
We recommend that the Government produce an annual report assessing the readiness for elections, and that it provide this report to this committee, and lay it before Parliament. (Recommendation, Paragraph 70) 66
Government response. The government rejected the recommendation to produce an annual report on election readiness, stating it would not be conducive or appropriate as planning and delivery falls within the autonomy of independent Returning Officers.
17
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
Elections have become dependent on external suppliers over which the Government have little control. This creates points of weakness and even potential failure in our elections system. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Government response. The government's response does not directly address the committee's conclusion regarding the dependency of elections on external suppliers and the vulnerabilities this creates. It reiterates that planning is the responsibility of Returning Officers and the Electoral Commission, and rejects the …
18
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
We recommend that as part of the annual report on readiness for elections, the Government include a resilience plan in case of supplier failure. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)
Government response. The government rejected the recommendation for a resilience plan in case of supplier failure, as it had previously rejected the overarching recommendation to produce an annual readiness report which this plan would have been part of.
19
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
Funding and resourcing of elections is a significant issue. Funding structures have become increasingly complex and vulnerable to wider cuts in local government spending. (Conclusion, Paragraph 72)
Government response. The government acknowledges that election funding is a significant issue and describes actions to provide local authorities with greater funding certainty and access to contingency funding through a justification-led bid process in 2025/26, aiming to simplify processes.
20
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
A review of the funding of elections should be carried out by the Government and published to coincide with the first report of readiness for elections. This review should look at how funding structures can be simplified and consider whether money is being spent in the most efficient way. As …
Government response. The government rejected the recommendation to carry out and publish a review of election funding, stating that remuneration for electoral administrators is a matter for local authorities, despite describing efforts to provide greater funding certainty and access to contingency funds.
21
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
The timing of the election placed extra pressure on the administration of the election, and placed stress on the thin supplier market. It also meant certain areas of the UK, such as Scotland and Northern Ireland, were placed at an administrative disadvantage. While we accept that the timing of the …
Government response. The government's response does not directly address the committee's conclusion about the administrative pressures and disadvantages caused by the timing of the general election.
22
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
Given this we hope that the Electoral Commission and others may be able to learn lessons from the July General Election and produce guidance and plans so that some of the difficulties experienced at this election might be mitigated against or at least better prepared for going forward, should another …
Government response. The government redirected the committee's hope for the Electoral Commission to learn lessons from the July General Election and produce guidance, by stating that the Electoral Commission is responsible for providing such guidance and support.
23
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
Recent changes to electoral systems, in particular the greater use of online portals, have provided new and necessary ways for people to engage with the electoral system. However, a consequence of this has been an increase in workload for electoral administrators and others in the electoral system. It appears to …
Government response. The government accepted the need for greater use of technology and data, outlining plans in its Strategy for Elections to deliver improvements, standardize processes, create automated voter registration, and strengthen data provisions in law.
24
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
While we are pleased that the administrative errors made at elections in 2024 did not bring into doubt the election results, such mistakes do threaten to diminish trust in our electoral system. We are concerned that there is no 67 uniform process prescribed for actually counting the votes at an …
Government response. The government redirected the concern about the lack of a uniform vote counting process, stating that the count is a matter for statutorily independent Returning Officers, not the government, and highlighted the Electoral Commission's role in providing guidance.
25
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
At a UK general election, all candidates should be subject to the same requirements and the same system should be used throughout the electoral process. While there are historic reasons why different systems have developed and been maintained, the case for streamlining, standardising, and making the electoral system consistent is …
Government response. The government rejects a single system for counts, stating it is a matter for independent Returning Officers. It commits to working towards automated registration, strengthening data provisions in law, and using non-legislative approaches to support Electoral Registration Officers in using …
26
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
The completeness and accuracy of the electoral register has declined over the last thirty years. A consequence of this has been that an event- led registration process has developed, placing considerable additional burden on electoral administrators during their peak period of activity. This burden is unnecessary. The electoral register can …
Government response. The government is working to create a system of automated registration and will strengthen data provisions and use non-legislative approaches to support Electoral Registration Officers in using data for regular updates. It also intends to explore ways to reduce the …
27
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
Data should be shared across government and with appropriate public bodies with the purpose of identifying people who are not on the register or whose details are not up to date. We encourage the Government to develop an automated electoral registration system that actively prompts people to register to vote …
Government response. The government is working to create a system of automated registration, strengthen data provisions, and use non-legislative approaches to facilitate effective data use by Electoral Registration Officers, aligning with the recommendation for data sharing to update the register. It will …
28
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
Establishing an electoral registration system that effectively utilises public data should mean that the register is updated all year round. As part of reform to the electoral register, the Government should consider whether the requirements for the annual canvas can be removed. This could potentially save considerable administrative effort and …
Government response. The government is working to create an automated registration system and strengthen data provisions, which aligns with the premise that could lead to removing the annual canvas. However, it does not explicitly state it will consider removing the annual canvas …
29
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
Postal voting now makes up a significant proportion of votes cast at elections and there is every possibility that the proportion of people voting in this way will continue to increase. There needs to be consideration given to what the purpose and timelines for postal voting should be since it …
Government response. The government is committed to strengthening the postal and proxy voting system, with changes outlined in its Strategy for Elections including adjustments to application deadlines and allowing earlier replacement of lost/spoilt postal votes. It is also exploring flexible voting options …
30
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
Given this, the Government should, as part of its review, consider whether other means of ‘early’ and ‘flexible’ voting would aid participation in elections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 102)
Government response. The government is exploring flexible voting options through pilot projects at local elections in May 2026 and 2027, but these will not include online voting or electronic machines.
31
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
The Government should improve the information on postal voting given to voters before and after any application they make. The establishment of a single electoral register and good use of public data should allow for more localised and targeted messaging to be provided. (Recommendation, Paragraph 103)
Government response. The government acknowledges the need to improve voter registration and data use, outlining plans for a Strategy for Elections and automated registration, but notes the technical and contractual complications of establishing a single electoral register.
32
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
Currently postal ballot packs are dispatched in two batches. This should be replaced with a system where, following the first dispatch, ballot packs are printed and dispatched on a rolling basis. The first and last dispatch dates should be widely published and voters should be notified when applying. (Recommendation, Paragraph …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation for printing and dispatching ballot packs on a rolling basis, stating it is impractical with current system capabilities.
33
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
The law should be changed to allow the re-issuing of postal ballot packs earlier than four days before the election. People should also be able to apply to change their method of voting, from postal to in-person or proxy, within the election window. People should be able to hand in …
Government response. The government states it is developing measures to allow earlier replacement of lost/spoilt postal votes and more flexibility for electors to change voting methods within the election window. It also notes that handing in postal votes at council premises up …
34
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
There has been a decline in the UK and around the world in the number of letters being delivered, and thus in delivery capacity, and it appears this trend may continue. While the UK postal system is currently still able to cope with the large sudden demands of an election, …
Government response. The government acknowledges the committee's concerns but states it already works with Royal Mail on election preparedness and sees no need for further regulatory or government intervention, expressing confidence in Royal Mail's ability to handle election mail.
35
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
As part of the annual election readiness report, recommended above, the readiness and preparedness of Royal Mail to deliver postal votes and campaign materials should be reviewed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 106)
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation for an annual review of Royal Mail's preparedness, stating it already works closely with Royal Mail and that both the Electoral Commission and the Committee have concluded Royal Mail performed well, indicating no need for …
36
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Deferred
We are concerned that the number of print suppliers is decreasing, which increases the possibility that the printing of ballot packs could be a point of failure. Arrangements should be put in place to ensure that the printing of ballot packs is prioritised, for example by requiring priority clauses in …
Government response. The government notes the recommendation for a resilience plan for supplier failure but states that ensuring supply contracts and contingencies is a matter for statutorily independent Returning Officers. It also mentions future legislative changes will support electors and administrators, including …
37
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
We appreciate the Royal Mail’s assurances that over 99% of all election mail was delivered on time. However, we are concerned that despite this a number of candidates felt their messaging was not delivered when they expected. To ease concerns for candidates, timelines for delivery of different materials should be …
Government response. The government outlines changes to improve resilience in the postal and proxy voting system, but does not specifically commit to making timelines for delivery of different election materials clear and tight. It rejects next-day delivery for poll cards and rolling …
38
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
Postal ballot packs must continue to be a next day delivery, and poll cards should also be delivered the next day. The freepost election mail should be delivered second class, so within 3 days of posting. We do not feel we can designate a delivery period for paid for election …
Government response. The government rejects next-day delivery for poll cards due to estimated £52 million additional cost and states printing ballot packs on a rolling basis is impractical. It does not address the recommendations for next-day postal ballot packs, second-class freepost election …
39
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
As part of the Government’s current review, we ask it to consider the continued utility of poll cards. (Recommendation, Paragraph 109)
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation to consider the continued utility of poll cards, stating it has no plans to remove them as they are considered a vital communication tool.
40
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
We found the level of service provided by Royal Mail, especially in regard to the delivery of ballot packs and postal votes, encouraging. For as long as postal votes continue to be a substantial and essential part of the voting system, it is imperative that this level of service be …
Government response. The government states it already works closely with Royal Mail on election preparedness and will continue to do so, believing that Royal Mail's current performance and focus on election mail means no further government or regulatory intervention is needed to …
41
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
We recommend that the delivery of ballot packs, postal votes and poll cards (subject to the consideration above) should be explicitly mentioned in the universal service obligation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 110)
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation to explicitly mention election mail in the universal service obligation, explaining that Ofcom regulates the USO, and election mail services are business accounts not covered by it, thus no further regulatory or government intervention is …
42
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
The current system for overseas voting cannot guarantee that eligible voters will be given the opportunity to have their vote counted. We take the Government at its word that it is unacceptable that an eligible voter is prevented from having their vote counted. (Conclusion, Paragraph 119)
Government response. The government acknowledges its commitment to full participation and improving postal voting resilience for overseas electors. It notes the committee's concern about the current system's reliability and current voting options, but highlights challenges with alternative methods like embassy or telephone …
43
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
A system capable of reliably allowing eligible voters to cast their ballot must be in place in time for the next general election. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)
Government response. The government commits to encouraging full participation and building more resilience into the postal voting system to benefit overseas voters. However, it does not provide a specific commitment or plan for a reliably capable system to be in place for …
44
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
Other countries make greater use of other means of voting for overseas voters in addition to a postal vote option. We are disappointed that the Government has ruled out considering the Electoral Commission’s recommendations for embassy and telephone voting for those living overseas as part of its current review. We …
Government response. The government acknowledges the committee's recommendations for overseas voting mechanisms but reiterates concerns regarding the significant logistical and administrative burdens of implementing embassy/consulate and telephone voting, effectively maintaining its stance against considering these options.
45
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
We recommend that the Government conduct feasibility studies to report within six months for the following alternatives for overseas voting: • Embassy and consulate voting • Online voting • Digitally receiving and returning ballot papers • Telephone voting (Recommendation, Paragraph 120)
Government response. The government notes the committee's recommendation for feasibility studies on alternative overseas voting methods but highlights significant logistical and administrative burdens for embassy/consulate and telephone voting, without committing to conducting the requested studies within six months or any specific timeframe.
46
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
While these and other options are being considered, we agree with the Electoral Commission that, as an interim measure, all overseas voters that are registered should automatically receive a postal vote, meaning they would have to actively apply to vote by another means, i.e. in person or by proxy. (Recommendation, …
Government response. The government states that overseas electors continue to have options for voting by proxy, post, or in person, and that proxy voters can acquire postal votes. However, it does not address the specific recommendation to automatically send postal votes to …
47
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
We are concerned at the paucity of data available on overseas voters, and how many of them were successfully able to vote. (Conclusion, Paragraph 122)
Government response. The government states its commitment to encouraging full participation for overseas voters and mentions that systems for them were considered in a recent review. It notes the Committee's recommendations on mechanisms but does not commit to collecting more data on …
48
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
As part of the reform to the electoral register, an overseas electoral register should be created and information about what country people are living in and data on whether they were successfully able to vote should be generated. In particular, the number of postal votes sent out and returned, including …
Government response. The government reiterates its commitment to overseas voters and notes that overseas elector systems were reviewed. It acknowledges the Committee's recommendations on considering mechanisms, but does not commit to creating a separate overseas electoral register or collecting the specific data …
49
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
The changes to accessible voting in the Election Act 2022 have had a positive response, but the fact that a significant number still feel unable to vote independently and in secret is a concern. We agree that more can be done. (Conclusion, Paragraph 129)
Government response. The government highlights its Accessibility of Elections Working Group and states it is keen to investigate and further consider ways to use existing government data to improve accessibility.
50
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
We recommend that more is done to make voters aware that additional support and equipment may be requested. This should be done through clearer advice in communications to voters. (Recommendation, Paragraph 129) 71
Government response. The government discusses its Accessibility of Elections Working Group and its intention to investigate how existing data might be used, but this response does not address the recommendation to improve voter awareness of available support and equipment.
51
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
The Government should explore whether existing data held by the Government could be used to allow those most likely to be in need of assistance to be contacted. This information should be used to better inform returning officers of the equipment that may be needed in particular polling stations. (Recommendation, …
Government response. The government agrees to explore how existing government data might be used to identify and contact voters needing assistance and to inform returning officers, acknowledging data protection considerations and stating it will consider this further.
52
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
We are concerned that the evidence base for the necessity and effectiveness of voter ID is simply not there. There were extremely low levels of personation prior to the introduction of voter ID, and no evidence that it was being under reported. After the introduction of voter ID, the situation …
Government response. The government reaffirms its commitment to voter ID, but acknowledges accessibility issues by announcing a legislative amendment to permit the use of UK-issued bank cards as an accepted form of voter identification to increase accessibility.
53
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
When asked what criteria the Government would use to assess the effect of the voter ID policy on turnout, the Government told us that it had commissioned research from IFF Research. However, this research does not consider the impact of the policy on turnout, which was the question put to …
Government response. The government defends its approach to voter ID, citing its commissioned IFF Research, which it states looked into impacts on different demographics, implicitly rejecting the committee's critique of the research. It reiterates its commitment to improve accessibility by accepting bank …
54
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
The Government should set out clear criteria for judging the effectiveness of the voter ID policy. This statement should include criteria for assessing the acceptability of any impact of the policy on turnout. A detailed assessment of the general impact of voter ID on turnout and on different demographic groups …
Government response. The government defends its voter ID policy and cites existing research from the Electoral Commission and IFF Research. While it announces that UK-issued bank cards will be accepted as voter ID to increase accessibility, it does not commit to setting …
55
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
Our assessment is that the longer voter ID prevails the more it will become accepted, reducing, though not removing, the prevention and discouragement effect. It is unfortunate that data was not regularly collected at polls in Northern Ireland, in particular following the introduction of photo ID there in 2003. The …
Government response. The government's response focuses on defending its voter ID policy, announcing the acceptance of bank cards, and committing to create a digital Voter Authority Certificate and accept digital forms of existing photo ID. It does not, however, commit to considering …
56
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
The effect of voter ID on turnout is not simply due to people not possessing an accepted from of ID, but every effort should be made to ensure everyone has easy access to an accepted form of ID. We agree with the Electoral Commission that the current list of accepted …
Government response. The government confirms it keeps the list of accepted IDs under review, citing the previous inclusion of the HM Armed Forces Veteran Card and announcing the future acceptance of UK-issued bank cards, a digital Voter Authority Certificate, and digital forms …
57
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
We are particularly concerned that introducing votes for 16 and 17 year olds poses an issue for a group that may not have the necessary ID. If a Bill is introduced containing provisions to change the voting age to 16, an analysis needs to be undertaken of what forms of …
Government response. The government recognizes challenges for 16-17 year olds and states awareness raising will be important. It also agrees with the use of digital IDs and plans to create a digital Voter Authority Certificate (VAC) as an option, but does not …
58
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted in Part
The Voter Authenticity Certificate (VAC) system was clearly underused. The Government should look at ways of improving the VAC system. This should include improving awareness of the VAC and may include changing the format of the ID, for example to a card rather than a piece of paper. The provision …
Government response. The government agrees with the use of digital IDs for voting and intends to create a digital Voter Authority Certificate (VAC) as a further option. It acknowledges the importance of awareness raising but does not commit to other improvements to …
59
Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
Alternatively, the Government should consider the Electoral Commission’s recommendation to introduce a vouching system, which would provide an emergency system for people who do not have, or find they have lost, an acceptable form of ID on the day of the election. However, we 73 are cognisant of the concerns …
Government response. The government's response does not address the committee's recommendation to consider introducing a vouching system for emergency voter identification.
60
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
The dissemination of information and differing perspectives remains central to a healthy democracy and is essential to effective elections. This has been threatened by the rise in mis- and dis- information, something that has contributed to the decline in trust in the UK’s political system in general and politicians in …
Government response. The government outlines the Online Safety Act (OSA) and its provisions, which include duties for platforms to remove illegal content, address incitement to violence, and tackle foreign interference, demonstrating existing measures to address mis- and disinformation.
61
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
The recent development and growth of AI brings with it both potential benefits and concerns. It is an area where regulation may also find it difficult to keep pace. Any legislative framework to regulate AI must be agile but allow effective scrutiny of new regulations that proceed from that framework. …
Government response. The government repeated the committee's conclusion verbatim.
62
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
The abuse, harassment and intimidation seen at the general election was totally unacceptable and antithetical to our democracy. The level and extent to which this occurred is a serious cause for concern. Candidates for election must be able to go door to door and speak in public without fear. (Conclusion, …
Government response. The government acknowledges the issue and details its existing commitment of £31 million for security for elected officials and candidates, which funded police briefings, dedicated contacts, and private security at events. It also references the Online Safety Act's communication offences.
63
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
It is vital that instances of abuse, harassment and intimidation are identified and addressed quickly. The police have a vital role in defending democracy, and this needs to be carried out proactively, not just reactively. (Conclusion, Paragraph 172)
Government response. The government acknowledges the threat and details its existing commitment of £31 million for security for elected officials and candidates, funding police briefings, dedicated contacts, and private security. It also mentions the Online Safety Act's communication offences.
64
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
There should be a coordinated and consistent police engagement response with all candidates throughout the country. (Recommendation, Paragraph 172)
Government response. The government highlights its existing £31 million funding that provides police-led security briefings and a dedicated police contact for security advice (Operation Bridger) to MPs and locally elected officials, including general election candidates.
65
Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Accepted
Given the rise of online abuse, we agree with the Electoral Commission that Ofcom has a vital role to play ahead of the next election considering their new power and duties. It is vital that work is done early to set up new measures, so that they can be tested …
Government response. The government highlights the Online Safety Act (OSA), explaining that it lays the foundation for strong online protections and grants Ofcom significant enforcement powers to tackle illegal content, incitement to violence, and foreign interference.
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Recommendation
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Not Addressed
We recommend that Ofcom in coordination with the Electoral Commission set out the timescale for setting up arrangements to address online abuse and intimidation at elections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 173) 74
Government response. The government's response details the implementation of the Online Safety Act (OSA) and its provisions, including commencement dates for certain offenses and duties, but does not commit to Ofcom and the Electoral Commission setting out a joint timescale for addressing …
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Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
We are pleased that a Speaker’s Conference has been established to examine these issues in detail and to recommend steps that can be taken to counteract this. We will not be making specific recommendations on measures that could be taken but we offer our evidence and support to the Speaker’s …
Government response. The government values the work of the Speaker's Conference, stating it will carefully consider its recommendations and continue to engage with them.
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Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Rejected
We believe the Electoral Commission carries out a vital role as an independent regulator in the elections sphere, providing vital guidance and support to electoral administrators, political parties, individual candidates and the wider public. However, it is a regulator without sufficient teeth. Approbatory assessments and warnings are not sufficient. We …
Government response. The government rejects the call for an independent review of the Electoral Commission's powers, stating it has no plans for such a review. It notes existing capabilities for criminal referrals and outlines its own reform plans to increase the Electoral …
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Conclusion
2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general…
Acknowledged
A further significant issue that arose during the course of our inquiry was that of political donations, and in particular of overseas donations to political parties. We will keep this issue under review and may return to it later in the Parliament. (Conclusion, Paragraph 176) 75
Government response. The government acknowledges the committee's interest in political and overseas donations, stating its commitment to strengthening democracy against foreign interference through tougher donation rules and improved transparency.