2nd Report – Review of the 2024 general election

We agree that the 2024 general election was well run. This was due to the hard work, dedication, and often the personal sacrifice of the people running it. The electoral administrators, the civil servants and the Electoral Commission worked hard to deliver the election and, as shown later in the report, to ensure that changes to electoral law, new systems and new guidance were implemented in full. We extend our thanks to those involved in running the election. (Conclusion, Paragraph 13)

In line with previous elections, the fabric of our electoral administration system held together sufficiently at the 2024 general election to allow a well-run election to be delivered. However, as the Electoral Commission report sets out increasing demands and tight deadlines are placing ever greater pressure on the system. Our concern is that at a close election, issues could arise in any one of the elements necessary to deliver a successful election, and the fabric may not hold, potentially placing an election result in doubt. (Conclusion, Paragraph 14)

While the Electoral Commission have rightly reported that each general election on which they have reported was well run, there have also been repeated concerns raised. While we do not doubt the Electoral Commission’s overall assessment of this or previous elections, we do note that there could be improvements to make the assessment criteria more rigorous and measurable, allowing for better comparability between elections. This includes where stresses are being felt and increasing, and where the existing system needs to be adapted to the way people are living their lives. It is good that the public opinion survey shows a high level of trust in the election but, by itself, this should not be taken as a measure of how well run an election is. It is vital that there are more objective measures that can be pointed to. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)

There need to be clear criteria and, where appropriate, metrics, for assessing and judging how effectively an election has been run. The Electoral Commission should establish such criteria in consultation with Government and other stakeholders. This should be in place in 64 advance of the next general election, and reports should be made to this Committee regularly on progress towards establishing the criteria, and afterwards on monitoring the criteria. As part of this, there needs to be a clear understanding of what election failure looks like. (Recommendation, Paragraph 16) Turnout

Low turnout continues to be an issue of concern but was not due to the administration of the election. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

The decline in turnout is not an indictment of any one government or party. While it may be uncomfortable for those directly involved in politics and government, the decline in voting risks undermining the authority and legitimacy of government in the UK. Reversing the decline in turnout is a task for the whole of government, Parliament and the wider political system. (Conclusion, Paragraph 28)

We welcome consideration of political education as part of the Department for Education curriculum review. But what is needed is a complete overhaul of political education in the UK, particularly within England. The Government has committed in its manifesto to introduce votes at 16. That would provide an opportunity for a new approach to be considered. However, regardless of whether this change is delivered, a new approach should be undertaken as a matter of urgency so that it is in place ahead of the next general election. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35)

The development of a new school curriculum for political education is an opportunity to engage the public in order to create the wider environment and culture for political education in schools to be successful. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)

We note the message about the importance of politicians engaging with young people in schools, and we support continued efforts to enable MPs and Parliament more widely in this work. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37) State of electoral law and systems for electoral administration

There is a clear consensus in our evidence around the necessity and benefits of simplification and consolidation of electoral law. This is not a new position and has been reiterated by the practitioners and experts of electoral law for some time, and this appeared to have been accepted by this and the previous Government. We are concerned however by 65 some of the evidence the Government gave to us that suggest it does not view simplification and consolidation as a necessary route forward. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

The Government should make clear whether it accepts in principle that UK elections law needs simplification and consolidation, and if it does not should set out its evidence for this position in full in its response to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44)

We recognise that the Government has manifesto commitments in the area of electoral law that it is prioritising. We commend the Government for recognising these challenges and including this work alongside the implementation of their other manifesto commitments. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

We are however concerned that the Government has not put in motion the work necessary to simplify and consolidate electoral law. It is clear to us that the conclusion of the Law Commissions’ report was correct, and that the UK would be better off with a single elections act. We note the Government’s concern that the exercise of simplification and consolidation may take some time, which would likely span over Parliaments. However, it seems imperative to us that this work is started. If it is not started in this Parliament, it will only perpetuate the problem of kicking the issue of electoral law into the long grass. We fear that the longer this is put off, the more likely something will go seriously or catastrophically wrong. (Conclusion, Paragraph 46)

The Government should start the process of simplification and consolidation of electoral law alongside the work being carried out to produce a Bill to implement its manifesto commitments and the outcome of the strategic review. In doing this it should commit to introducing the consolidation legislation when this process is complete. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)

We are aware of a range of concerns regarding the pressures placed on electoral administrators. In particular, we note the anxieties raised around recruiting and retaining staff, and securing suitable locations for polling stations and counts. We are also aware of concerns around implementation of new measures and technologies, as well as more routine but vital issues such as the stocks of appropriate paper and the readiness and availability of suppliers. Finally, concerns have been raised about the timeline of elections, and in particular general elections. (Conclusion, Paragraph 70)

We recommend that the Government produce an annual report assessing the readiness for elections, and that it provide this report to this committee, and lay it before Parliament. (Recommendation, Paragraph 70) 66

Elections have become dependent on external suppliers over which the Government have little control. This creates points of weakness and even potential failure in our elections system. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)

We recommend that as part of the annual report on readiness for elections, the Government include a resilience plan in case of supplier failure. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)

Funding and resourcing of elections is a significant issue. Funding structures have become increasingly complex and vulnerable to wider cuts in local government spending. (Conclusion, Paragraph 72)

A review of the funding of elections should be carried out by the Government and published to coincide with the first report of readiness for elections. This review should look at how funding structures can be simplified and consider whether money is being spent in the most efficient way. As part of this review, it should be considered how the roles of electoral administrators have changed, and what might be the appropriate rates of pay for the functions they now perform. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)

The timing of the election placed extra pressure on the administration of the election, and placed stress on the thin supplier market. It also meant certain areas of the UK, such as Scotland and Northern Ireland, were placed at an administrative disadvantage. While we accept that the timing of the election added to the pressure on the administration of the election and created greater difficulty for some parts of the UK, we believe it is unrealistic to expect a Prime Minister to call an election at any time other than that which gives them maximum political advantage. Conclusion, Paragraph 73)

Given this we hope that the Electoral Commission and others may be able to learn lessons from the July General Election and produce guidance and plans so that some of the difficulties experienced at this election might be mitigated against or at least better prepared for going forward, should another awkwardly timed General Election be called. (Recommendation, Paragraph 73)

Recent changes to electoral systems, in particular the greater use of online portals, have provided new and necessary ways for people to engage with the electoral system. However, a consequence of this has been an increase in workload for electoral administrators and others in the electoral system. It appears to us that these advancements have only gone part of the way, and that greater use needs to be made of advancement in technology and in use of data. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87)

While we are pleased that the administrative errors made at elections in 2024 did not bring into doubt the election results, such mistakes do threaten to diminish trust in our electoral system. We are concerned that there is no 67 uniform process prescribed for actually counting the votes at an election. Candidates standing in a UK general election should be confident that, as far as is reasonably practicable, votes are counted and checked in the same way in every constituency. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

At a UK general election, all candidates should be subject to the same requirements and the same system should be used throughout the electoral process. While there are historic reasons why different systems have developed and been maintained, the case for streamlining, standardising, and making the electoral system consistent is now compelling. We recommend that the Government move to create: • A single system for how counts should be conducted. • A single electoral register, with functions for local authorities to access local data to access local rates of registration. • A single or integrated digital platform and system for electoral administration. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89)

The completeness and accuracy of the electoral register has declined over the last thirty years. A consequence of this has been that an event- led registration process has developed, placing considerable additional burden on electoral administrators during their peak period of activity. This burden is unnecessary. The electoral register can and should be updated on a regular basis, and data already held by government should be used to ensure this is carried out effectively and swiftly. (Conclusion, Paragraph 90)

Data should be shared across government and with appropriate public bodies with the purpose of identifying people who are not on the register or whose details are not up to date. We encourage the Government to develop an automated electoral registration system that actively prompts people to register to vote or update their details, but retains the key democratic function of people actively placing themselves on the register. This would harness the power of the data already held to help make the electoral register both more complete and more accurate. As part of these reforms, a mechanism should also be developed by which people can easily check to see whether they are on the electoral register and confirm that their details are up to date. (Recommendation, Paragraph 90)

Establishing an electoral registration system that effectively utilises public data should mean that the register is updated all year round. As part of reform to the electoral register, the Government should consider whether the requirements for the annual canvas can be removed. This could potentially save considerable administrative effort and public money. (Recommendation, Paragraph 91) 68 Postal voting

Postal voting now makes up a significant proportion of votes cast at elections and there is every possibility that the proportion of people voting in this way will continue to increase. There needs to be consideration given to what the purpose and timelines for postal voting should be since it allows people to vote at a different point in the campaign than polling day. (Conclusion, Paragraph 102)

Given this, the Government should, as part of its review, consider whether other means of ‘early’ and ‘flexible’ voting would aid participation in elections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 102)

The Government should improve the information on postal voting given to voters before and after any application they make. The establishment of a single electoral register and good use of public data should allow for more localised and targeted messaging to be provided. (Recommendation, Paragraph 103)

Currently postal ballot packs are dispatched in two batches. This should be replaced with a system where, following the first dispatch, ballot packs are printed and dispatched on a rolling basis. The first and last dispatch dates should be widely published and voters should be notified when applying. (Recommendation, Paragraph 104)

The law should be changed to allow the re-issuing of postal ballot packs earlier than four days before the election. People should also be able to apply to change their method of voting, from postal to in-person or proxy, within the election window. People should be able to hand in their postal vote at designated council premises up to the day of the election. (Recommendation, Paragraph 105)

There has been a decline in the UK and around the world in the number of letters being delivered, and thus in delivery capacity, and it appears this trend may continue. While the UK postal system is currently still able to cope with the large sudden demands of an election, this should not be taken for granted. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)

As part of the annual election readiness report, recommended above, the readiness and preparedness of Royal Mail to deliver postal votes and campaign materials should be reviewed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 106)

We are concerned that the number of print suppliers is decreasing, which increases the possibility that the printing of ballot packs could be a point of failure. Arrangements should be put in place to ensure that the printing of ballot packs is prioritised, for example by requiring priority clauses in the contracts and that a backup is in place so that delays of more than one day 69 cannot occur. Where delays do occur, a system should be put in place to notify the public. For example, a local authority could be required to notify the Electoral Commission, so they can provide a central point for people to find out about delays, and what options there are to ensure they can vote. (Conclusion, Paragraph 107)

We appreciate the Royal Mail’s assurances that over 99% of all election mail was delivered on time. However, we are concerned that despite this a number of candidates felt their messaging was not delivered when they expected. To ease concerns for candidates, timelines for delivery of different materials should be clear and tight. (Conclusion, Paragraph 108)

Postal ballot packs must continue to be a next day delivery, and poll cards should also be delivered the next day. The freepost election mail should be delivered second class, so within 3 days of posting. We do not feel we can designate a delivery period for paid for election mail as it is up to candidates to choose how to spend their election funds. However, we do think that a record of the delivery times for all paid for election mail should be kept, so that an analysis of its delivery can be made following the election. (Recommendation, Paragraph 108)

As part of the Government’s current review, we ask it to consider the continued utility of poll cards. (Recommendation, Paragraph 109)

We found the level of service provided by Royal Mail, especially in regard to the delivery of ballot packs and postal votes, encouraging. For as long as postal votes continue to be a substantial and essential part of the voting system, it is imperative that this level of service be maintained. (Conclusion, Paragraph 110)

We recommend that the delivery of ballot packs, postal votes and poll cards (subject to the consideration above) should be explicitly mentioned in the universal service obligation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 110)

The current system for overseas voting cannot guarantee that eligible voters will be given the opportunity to have their vote counted. We take the Government at its word that it is unacceptable that an eligible voter is prevented from having their vote counted. (Conclusion, Paragraph 119)

A system capable of reliably allowing eligible voters to cast their ballot must be in place in time for the next general election. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)

Other countries make greater use of other means of voting for overseas voters in addition to a postal vote option. We are disappointed that the Government has ruled out considering the Electoral Commission’s recommendations for embassy and telephone voting for those living overseas as part of its current review. We appreciate some of the 70 technical issues the Government raised. However, we believe that other recommendations we have made to modernise the systems for elections, such as the creation of a single electoral register, would start to produce a system better able to overcome these problems. (Conclusion, Paragraph 120)

We recommend that the Government conduct feasibility studies to report within six months for the following alternatives for overseas voting: • Embassy and consulate voting • Online voting • Digitally receiving and returning ballot papers • Telephone voting (Recommendation, Paragraph 120)

While these and other options are being considered, we agree with the Electoral Commission that, as an interim measure, all overseas voters that are registered should automatically receive a postal vote, meaning they would have to actively apply to vote by another means, i.e. in person or by proxy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 121)

We are concerned at the paucity of data available on overseas voters, and how many of them were successfully able to vote. (Conclusion, Paragraph 122)

As part of the reform to the electoral register, an overseas electoral register should be created and information about what country people are living in and data on whether they were successfully able to vote should be generated. In particular, the number of postal votes sent out and returned, including the number that arrived in the two weeks following the election, should in future be recorded. (Recommendation, Paragraph 122) Accessible voting

The changes to accessible voting in the Election Act 2022 have had a positive response, but the fact that a significant number still feel unable to vote independently and in secret is a concern. We agree that more can be done. (Conclusion, Paragraph 129)

We recommend that more is done to make voters aware that additional support and equipment may be requested. This should be done through clearer advice in communications to voters. (Recommendation, Paragraph 129) 71

The Government should explore whether existing data held by the Government could be used to allow those most likely to be in need of assistance to be contacted. This information should be used to better inform returning officers of the equipment that may be needed in particular polling stations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 130) Voter ID and voter fraud

We are concerned that the evidence base for the necessity and effectiveness of voter ID is simply not there. There were extremely low levels of personation prior to the introduction of voter ID, and no evidence that it was being under reported. After the introduction of voter ID, the situation has not changed: there continues to be extremely low levels of personation and no evidence that it is being under reported. What has changed however is that there is clear evidence that the introduction of voter ID has been an additional barrier to voting for a considerable number of people. At the 2024 general election, 16,000 were prevented from voting and the Electoral Commission data indicates that between 770,000 and 1.9 million people were either prevented or discouraged from voting. The Government clearly state that “it is unacceptable when legitimate voters are prevented or discouraged from voting”. As such, under the Government’s own measure, this policy has an ‘unacceptable’ effect. Yet the Government have been clear that removal of the policy is off the table. (Conclusion, Paragraph 146)

When asked what criteria the Government would use to assess the effect of the voter ID policy on turnout, the Government told us that it had commissioned research from IFF Research. However, this research does not consider the impact of the policy on turnout, which was the question put to the Government. Neither does the IFF Research study consider the effect the policy has had on different demographic groups. Evidence from the Electoral Commission, and other independent studies of the policy’s impact, suggests that certain groups have been more affected that others. The exclusion of this from the Government sponsored research is all the more concerning given that it was explicitly raised as a concern by our predecessor committee. (Conclusion, Paragraph 147)

The Government should set out clear criteria for judging the effectiveness of the voter ID policy. This statement should include criteria for assessing the acceptability of any impact of the policy on turnout. A detailed assessment of the general impact of voter ID on turnout and on different demographic groups should be part of post-election reviews, whether carried out by the Electoral Commission or independent research such as that previously carried out by IFF Research. In response to this research the Government should consider all options to mitigate any negative impact of voter ID on turnout. (Recommendation, Paragraph 147) 72

Our assessment is that the longer voter ID prevails the more it will become accepted, reducing, though not removing, the prevention and discouragement effect. It is unfortunate that data was not regularly collected at polls in Northern Ireland, in particular following the introduction of photo ID there in 2003. The Government should consider what data it is necessary to routinely collect at elections to properly evaluate the effectiveness of the voter ID requirements. This could include what forms of ID are used (preferably broken down by age group), the reasons for refusing an ID, how many people are turned away for not having ID, and how many do not return. (Conclusion, Paragraph 148)

The effect of voter ID on turnout is not simply due to people not possessing an accepted from of ID, but every effort should be made to ensure everyone has easy access to an accepted form of ID. We agree with the Electoral Commission that the current list of accepted IDs needs to be kept under review. Where an additional form of ID may have a significant impact in increasing access for people and can maintain an acceptable level of security, it should be included. The Government should encourage those who supply ID, (universities, transport companies etc) to bring their IDs in line with the Pass plus requirements so they can be used. Alternatively, the Government could create a new template for IDs that would meet sufficient levels of security to be accepted. (Recommendation, Paragraph 149)

We are particularly concerned that introducing votes for 16 and 17 year olds poses an issue for a group that may not have the necessary ID. If a Bill is introduced containing provisions to change the voting age to 16, an analysis needs to be undertaken of what forms of ID people aged 16–17 are most likely to possess, and a plan set out for how the impact of the voter ID requirement on this age group will be mitigated. Consideration should be given to proactively, or even automatically, providing Voter Authenticity Certificates to people coming onto the electoral register for the first time. (Recommendation, Paragraph 150)

The Voter Authenticity Certificate (VAC) system was clearly underused. The Government should look at ways of improving the VAC system. This should include improving awareness of the VAC and may include changing the format of the ID, for example to a card rather than a piece of paper. The provision for an emergency VAC should be extended to the day of the election and additional resources allocated to deliver this. We would support the creation of a digital VAC or a digital government ID that could be used. (Recommendation, Paragraph 151)

Alternatively, the Government should consider the Electoral Commission’s recommendation to introduce a vouching system, which would provide an emergency system for people who do not have, or find they have lost, an acceptable form of ID on the day of the election. However, we 73 are cognisant of the concerns raised by the Association of Electoral Administrators that it would add additional administrative burden. (Recommendation, Paragraph 152) Mis- and Dis- information Abuse and Intimidation

The dissemination of information and differing perspectives remains central to a healthy democracy and is essential to effective elections. This has been threatened by the rise in mis- and dis- information, something that has contributed to the decline in trust in the UK’s political system in general and politicians in particular. There is no easy solution to this, and electoral law and policy has struggled to keep pace. (Conclusion, Paragraph 158)

The recent development and growth of AI brings with it both potential benefits and concerns. It is an area where regulation may also find it difficult to keep pace. Any legislative framework to regulate AI must be agile but allow effective scrutiny of new regulations that proceed from that framework. (Conclusion, Paragraph 159)

The abuse, harassment and intimidation seen at the general election was totally unacceptable and antithetical to our democracy. The level and extent to which this occurred is a serious cause for concern. Candidates for election must be able to go door to door and speak in public without fear. (Conclusion, Paragraph 171)

It is vital that instances of abuse, harassment and intimidation are identified and addressed quickly. The police have a vital role in defending democracy, and this needs to be carried out proactively, not just reactively. (Conclusion, Paragraph 172)

There should be a coordinated and consistent police engagement response with all candidates throughout the country. (Recommendation, Paragraph 172)

Given the rise of online abuse, we agree with the Electoral Commission that Ofcom has a vital role to play ahead of the next election considering their new power and duties. It is vital that work is done early to set up new measures, so that they can be tested and scrutinised. (Conclusion, Paragraph 173)

We recommend that Ofcom in coordination with the Electoral Commission set out the timescale for setting up arrangements to address online abuse and intimidation at elections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 173) 74

We are pleased that a Speaker’s Conference has been established to examine these issues in detail and to recommend steps that can be taken to counteract this. We will not be making specific recommendations on measures that could be taken but we offer our evidence and support to the Speaker’s Conference and await its recommendations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 174)

We believe the Electoral Commission carries out a vital role as an independent regulator in the elections sphere, providing vital guidance and support to electoral administrators, political parties, individual candidates and the wider public. However, it is a regulator without sufficient teeth. Approbatory assessments and warnings are not sufficient. We call for the Government to establish an independent review of the Electoral Commission’s powers, to be carried out with a view to giving it the powers necessary to rigorously and proactively ensure that elections are carried out in a fair, impartial, and truthful environment. As a start, while we do not believe the prosecutorial power removed by the Elections Act 2022 should be restored, we do think the Electoral Commission should have the power to refer cases directly to the Crown Prosecution Service. As part of this review, it should be considered whether the Electoral Commission should have the power to bar a candidate from standing. This review should also consider whether other bodies are better placed to act or work in conjunction with the Commission, and if the powers of these bodies should also be strengthened. (Conclusion, Paragraph 175)

A further significant issue that arose during the course of our inquiry was that of political donations, and in particular of overseas donations to political parties. We will keep this issue under review and may return to it later in the Parliament. (Conclusion, Paragraph 176) 75