Source · Select Committees · Environmental Audit Committee
4th Report – Flood resilience in England
Environmental Audit Committee
HC 550
Published 13 October 2025
Government response
6th Special Report – Flood resilience in England: Government Response · published 23 Dec 2025
Recommendations & Conclusions
1
Conclusion
Current flood risk framework remains underpowered, fragmented, and lacks enforceability
Conclusion
We are concerned that the current flood risk framework is underpowered and fragmented. The Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management (FCERM) Strategy lacks enforceability, and the National Adaptation Programme does not provide the standards, targets, or delivery mechanisms needed to embed resilience across government and infrastructure. Without national benchmarks, statutory duties, and aligned long-term funding, communities remain exposed amid rising climate risks. The system as it stands is reactive and costly. Prevention is more effective and affordable but requires a fundamental shift to the strategic use of resources. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)
2
Recommendation
Amend Flood Act to establish statutory duty for authorities and empower Environment Agency oversight
Recommendation
Flood resilience must be embedded in statute as a clear responsibility, not left as a discretionary ambition. The Government should bring forward proposals to amend the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 to establish a duty for all relevant authorities to act in accordance with a strengthened Flood and Coastal Erosion Management Strategy, which must clearly define what ‘good’ flood resilience looks like and embed a long-term framework that transcends electoral cycles, ensuring shared responsibility at all levels. • Risk Management Authorities (RMAs), including Lead Local Flood Authorities (LLFAs), should be assigned statutory duties to deliver against these standards within two years, with clear accountability and access to adequate, sustained resources. • The Environment Agency must be empowered to oversee delivery across all sources of flooding, monitor compliance with National Adaptation Programme targets, and coordinate activity across RMAs and central departments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 16)
3
Conclusion
Absence of agreed national standard for flood resilient properties and communities
Conclusion
We are concerned that there is still no agreed national standard for what constitutes a flood resilient property, system, or community. This absence undermines public understanding, weakens accountability, and makes 57 it harder to prioritise investment or measure progress. Without a clear benchmark, resilience remains a vague ambition rather than a deliverable goal. We believe England urgently needs to define what flood resilience means, and commit to delivering it. (Conclusion, Paragraph 23)
4
Recommendation
Develop and adopt clear, measurable national flood resilience standards by 2027
Recommendation
By 2027, the Government should develop and adopt clear, measurable national flood resilience standards that define the expected level of resilience based on the characteristics of the area or property. These standards should guide national and local investment, support planning decisions, and give the public confidence that resilience is being delivered consistently and transparently. These standards should be: • Embedded: the standards should be incorporated in the National Adaptation Programme (NAP), supported by long-term funding commitments aligned to those objectives. These commitments must extend beyond existing six-year budget cycles, reflecting the long-term nature of climate risk. Resources should be used more strategically, focusing on prevention and resilience rather than reactive spending. • Tiered: to reflect different types of risk (e.g., risk to life, property damage, infrastructure disruption) and levels of acceptable risk in different contexts (e.g., urban vs rural, critical infrastructure vs residential areas). • Comprehensive: applying across infrastructure, housing, and community planning. • Forward-looking: aligned with future climate projections and long- term adaptation goals. • Deliverable: backed by adequate funding, a clear implementation plan, and integration into planning, investment, and regulatory frameworks. (Recommendation, Paragraph 24)
5
Conclusion
Surface water flooding remains poorly quantified, inconsistently planned, and underestimated nationally
Conclusion
Surface water flooding is the most common source of flooding in England, yet it remains poorly quantified, inconsistently planned for, and often underestimated in development decisions. It is also one of the least understood and least coordinated aspects of flood resilience nationally. This represents a major gap in national flood resilience that must be urgently addressed, though we acknowledge and welcome the Government’s commitment to improving surface water mapping and modelling. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)
6
Conclusion
Ensure surface water flood risk is quantified, integrated, and data shared across authorities
Conclusion
We welcome the flood risk strategy becoming more dynamic and responsive to emerging risks. Surface water flooding, long underestimated, is now understood to be one of the most frequent and complex sources of flood risk. It must no longer be treated as a second-tier issue. By 2027, the 58 Government should ensure that surface water flood risk is consistently quantified and fully integrated into national flood risk assessments. Defra, working with the Environment Agency and Lead Local Flood Authorities, should complete the standardisation of surface water mapping and modelling by the end of 2025, ensuring that dynamic, up-to-date data feeds into national assessments by 2026. The Water Regulator and water companies, supported by Defra, should develop a national framework for data sharing on drainage and sewerage infrastructure, including clear responsibilities for maintenance, capacity, and investment. These improvements must also support better planning, delivery, and maintenance of sustainable drainage systems as part of a coordinated, forward-looking approach to managing surface water. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31)
7
Conclusion
Catchment-based planning inconsistently applied, poorly coordinated, and underpowered by funding
Conclusion
Catchment-based planning is widely acknowledged as the most effective and integrated way to manage flood risk, improve water quality, and deliver nature-based solutions. However, despite years of policy support, it remains inconsistently applied, poorly coordinated, and underpowered by short- term, discretionary funding. Fragmented responsibilities and the absence of statutory oversight continue to limit its reach and impact. If England is serious about long-term, preventative flood management, catchment-based planning must move from pilot to principle and be embedded as the default approach across the country. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38)
8
Recommendation
Mandate catchment-scale planning and delivery through regional partnerships with statutory duties by 2027
Recommendation
Catchment-based planning must become the default approach, not a discretionary extra. By 2027, the Government should mandate catchment- scale planning and delivery through regional partnerships with defined statutory duties, long-term funding, and clear oversight. These partnerships should coordinate key actors across land, water, infrastructure and planning, and lead integrated water management that delivers multiple outcomes, including flood risk reduction, water quality improvements, and environmental enhancement, at the scale and complexity the challenge demands. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39)
9
Conclusion
Nature-based solutions remain undervalued and underutilised in flood risk management
Conclusion
Nature-based solutions remain undervalued and underutilised in England’s approach to flood risk management. Despite growing evidence of their effectiveness in reducing flood risk, improving water quality, and delivering wider environmental and social benefits, they are still treated as peripheral rather than fundamental to national strategy. We find it deeply concerning that, in the face of escalating climate risks, nature- based solutions continue to be overlooked or deprioritised in policy and funding decisions. We welcomed the Minister’s suggestion that the current consultation will encourage nature-based solutions, and we look forward to the results of the consultation. Their long-term value is well recognised, yet current appraisal methods often fail to capture their full benefits, making investment harder to justify. Unless nature-based solutions are fully 59 integrated into planning and flood risk management, England risks missing one of its most cost effective, sustainable tools for building flood resilience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 42)
10
Recommendation
Embed nature-based solutions as core to flood risk management, reforming funding and setting targets.
Recommendation
The Government should embed nature-based solutions as a core component of national flood and coastal erosion risk management by 2027. Defra, working with the Environment Agency, HM Treasury, and other key partners, should: • Reform flood funding appraisal and partnership funding rules, following the Government’s current consultation on reforming the approach to floods funding, to better reflect the multi-benefit value of nature-based solutions. • Set national targets for the uptake of nature-based approaches in flood risk management by 2026. • Fully integrate nature-based solutions into flood, planning, and infrastructure policy by 2027, including economic support for landowners to incorporate flood resilience measures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 43)
11
Conclusion
Absence of comprehensive record of flood resilience assets limits strategic management.
Conclusion
We find that the absence of a comprehensive, up-to-date, and accessible record of flood resilience assets significantly limits England’s ability to manage flood risk strategically. The lack of visibility over third-party, locally delivered, and nature-based assets fragments responsibility, undermines coordination, and hinders long-term investment decisions. Without a full understanding of where assets are, what condition they are in, and who is responsible for them, it is not possible to plan effectively, ensure reliable protection, or respond proactively to future risks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 50)
12
Recommendation
Commission a national audit of all flood resilience assets by 2026.
Recommendation
The Government should commission a national audit of flood resilience assets by 2026, encompassing both engineered and nature-based infrastructure. This audit should identify the type, location, ownership, condition, and maintenance responsibilities of all relevant assets, including those owned or managed by third parties. The process should be led by Defra in collaboration with the Environment Agency and other relevant bodies, and should draw on lessons from the National Framework for Water Resources. The audit must be regularly updated and designed to inform strategic planning, guide investment, and improve coordination between local and national actors. (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)
13
Conclusion
Fragmented responsibilities and unclear accountability persist in flood risk management.
Conclusion
We are deeply concerned that even after more than a decade of reform, many communities still do not know who is responsible for managing flood risk where they live. A system that leaves the public unclear about accountability is not fit for purpose. Despite the original aim of the 60 Flood and Water Management Act 2010 to clarify roles and support local leadership, responsibilities remain fragmented, coordination is inconsistent, and there is no single point of national accountability. This structural weakness is not simply a communications issue, it undermines trust, delays response, and obstructs long-term, strategic planning. England needs clearer leadership, stronger national oversight, and more effective coordination to build resilience at the pace and scale required. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
14
Recommendation
Establish clear national mechanism for strategic oversight and accountability in flood risk management.
Recommendation
Flood resilience must be planned, integrated, and accountable, not fragmented, reactive, or opaque. The Government should establish a clear national mechanism for strategic oversight and accountability in flood risk management. By the end of 2025, it should set out how it intends to deliver this, whether by strengthening the Environment Agency’s mandate, amending the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, or formally assigning oversight responsibilities to a permanent coordinating body, such as the Flood Resilience Taskforce. Implementation should begin no later than 2026. This mechanism should: • Provide strategic oversight across all sources of flood risk, fluvial, surface water, coastal, and groundwater, and set national priorities for risk management authorities. • Coordinate investment, standards, and adaptation targets across departments, sectors, and funding streams. • Support and equip Lead Local Flood Authorities with the powers, funding, and technical capacity needed to deliver locally. • Maintain and publish a national statement of responsibilities, setting out the duties of all relevant actors, including water companies, local authorities, infrastructure operators, and the public. • Ensure flood risk and climate adaptation are fully integrated into spatial planning and development decisions through strategic oversight and consistent national policy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)
15
Recommendation
Consult on introducing statutory duty for Fire and Rescue Services to respond to flooding.
Recommendation
The Government should consult on introducing a statutory duty for Fire and Rescue Services in England to respond to flooding, supported by dedicated funding for training, equipment, and operational planning. This should be undertaken by the end of 2025. This would align England with devolved administrations and strengthen national flood resilience. This should also look at making the Fire and Rescue Services a statutory consultee in planning decisions, to respond to local flooding situations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60) 61 Embedding flood resilience across Government policy and public investment
16
Conclusion
Resilience must become a central organising principle for all public investment.
Conclusion
The evolving understanding of climate risk and growing data on economic losses make clear that resilience must become a central organising principle for public investment. Without a shift from reactive to preventive spending, and from loosely coordinated action to clearly mandated delivery, future climate shocks will continue to impose avoidable costs on communities, infrastructure, and public finances. (Conclusion, Paragraph 68)
17
Recommendation
Embed climate and flood resilience as core test for all public spending by 2026.
Recommendation
By 2026, the Government should embed climate and flood resilience as a core test for all departmental spending and public investment proposals. This should be supported by clear resilience standards, measurable targets, and a requirement for every department to demonstrate how its spending aligns with these standards. (Recommendation, Paragraph 69)
18
Conclusion
Insufficient investment scale to keep pace with growing climate risk.
Conclusion
Experts have been clear: the UK is not investing at the scale required to keep pace with climate risk. This fragmented approach is leaving communities and infrastructure exposed and storing up greater costs for the future, and in real terms costing more than prevention measures due to disruption and damage to infrastructure and property. (Conclusion, Paragraph 70)
19
Conclusion
Increase flood budget to at least £1.5 billion per year by 2030.
Conclusion
Flood investment must match the scale of risk. The Government’s flood budget should rise to at least £1.5 billion per year by 2030, as recommended by the National Infrastructure Commission to keep pace with climate impacts, and be explicitly tied to the delivery of measurable resilience outcomes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)
20
Recommendation
Flood Resilience Taskforce's convening power needs strengthening for future investment priorities.
Recommendation
We welcome the Flood Resilience Taskforce’s role in improving cross-government coordination, including between the Environment Agency, Cabinet Office, and Defra. Its convening power should now be strengthened to influence investment priorities as well as preparedness, ensuring lessons from past events drive decisive action for the future. (Conclusion, Paragraph 72)
21
Recommendation
Strengthen Flood Resilience Taskforce's mandate for oversight of investment priorities and preparedness measures.
Recommendation
The Government should strengthen the Flood Resilience Taskforce’s mandate by 2026 to provide formal oversight of investment priorities and preparedness measures, ensuring that lessons from past events are systematically incorporated into national flood resilience planning across Government departments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 73) 62 Making investment fairer and more inclusive
22
Conclusion
New flood investment framework risks perpetuating shortcomings without social vulnerability considerations.
Conclusion
We welcome the Government’s consultation on a new investment framework for flood and coastal resilience. The proposed shift to a simpler, more strategic approach is a positive step. However, unless the revised framework explicitly considers social vulnerability and the long-term community impacts of flooding, it risks perpetuating current shortcomings. Without such reform, funding may continue to prioritise projects based primarily on narrow financial metrics rather than broader measures of social and community need, even when projects remain economically justifiable. (Conclusion, Paragraph 77)
23
Recommendation
Prioritise funding for flood-risk communities and design framework for fairer, inclusive outcomes.
Recommendation
As the Government prepares to implement the new investment framework from April 2026, it must prioritise funding for communities most at risk from flooding. A simpler system must also be a fairer one, capable of supporting those facing the greatest hardships and repeated flood events. The framework should be designed to deliver fairer and more inclusive outcomes, by: • Incorporating social vulnerability factors such as deprivation, health inequalities, insurance exclusion, and rural isolation, particularly where flooding cuts off entire communities, in decision making, • Improving access to funding for small-scale, rural, and community-led schemes, • Recognising the long-term and repeated impacts of flooding on people, places, and livelihoods, • Valuing the co-benefits of adaptation, including biodiversity, mental health, and economic stability, and • Moving beyond rigid cost-benefit rules to ensure resilience is built where it is most urgently needed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 78)
24
Recommendation
Current planning system builds flood risk into landscape, undermining national resilience efforts.
Recommendation
The planning system in its current form is not keeping pace with the modern realities of flooding but is instead building risk into the landscape. We recognise the need for new homes, but development should not be permitted in areas known to be at high risk of flooding. Such building undermines resilience, burdens households and public services, and drives escalating costs. Prevention is far more effective and cheaper than recovery. Planning policy, and especially the National Planning Policy Framework, must give flood risk greater weight and must treat flood risk as a strategic constraint, directing development to safer areas and embedding long-term resilience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88) 63
25
Recommendation
Initiate consultation on statutory requirements for cumulative flood impact assessments in plans.
Recommendation
The Government should initiate consultation on statutory requirements for assessing the cumulative impact of development on flood risk within local and regional plans by the end of 2025. These requirements should be introduced by 2027, ensuring land use policy and planning decisions are aligned with catchment-scale flood management strategies. Delivery should be supported through spatial planning frameworks and statutory, regularly updated Strategic Flood Risk Assessments. To address persistent weaknesses in implementation, the system must also include stronger compliance and enforcement mechanisms for both strategic and site- level Flood Risk Assessments, with requirements for post-construction inspections to ensure mitigation measures are delivered in practice. In addition, we recommend: • That water companies should be made statutory consultees on major planning applications. • That Defra work with the Environment Agency and farming bodies to develop a standardised approach for compensating farmers who host floodwater or implement natural flood management measures, recognising this as a public good. • That the Environment Agency publish clear guidance for riparian landowners on their statutory obligations and available support, and report annually on enforcement and compliance. • Defra should ensure that the Land Use Framework explicitly incorporate agricultural land and food production as strategic considerations in flood planning, including mechanisms to safeguard productive land and support multifunctional land use. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89)
26
Recommendation
Commence Schedule 3 of Act, making Sustainable Drainage Systems mandatory in new developments.
Recommendation
Despite repeated pledges by successive governments, Schedule 3 of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 has still not been brought into force in England, leaving Sustainable Drainage Systems (SuDS) optional in new developments and missing a critical opportunity to embed resilience from the outset. The Government should now commence Schedule 3 in England without further delay, making SuDS mandatory in all new developments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 90) 64 Supporting people, places and preparedness
27
Conclusion
Public awareness of flood risk remains dangerously low, undermining national resilience.
Conclusion
Public awareness of flood risk is dangerously low, undermining national flood resilience efforts. Too many people do not understand the risks they face, how to respond to warnings, or how to protect their homes. This reflects both a strategic failure and an associated communications oversight, leaving lives, livelihoods, and infrastructure exposed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 99)
28
Recommendation
Launch major national flood awareness campaign to increase preparedness and educate communities.
Recommendation
The Government must launch a major national flood awareness campaign, co-designed with flood-affected communities and delivered with trusted local partners such as flood wardens, schools, the media, and frontline services. This campaign should be coordinated across relevant public bodies and agencies, ensuring consistent messaging and integration into their day-to-day operations as a core part of national flood strategy. It should begin as soon as possible, and no later than March 2026, and must seek to: • Increase sign-up to flood warning services and public readiness to act on them, • Improve public use of risk maps and clarify agency roles and responsibilities in response and recovery, • Target outreach to hard-to-reach groups, including people with low literacy, limited digital access, or language barriers, as well as those with physical or mental health challenges, and • Embed flood education in schools and workplaces, on par with fire safety, with practical household guidance. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)
29
Recommendation
Single national flood reporting and information service is a strategic necessity.
Recommendation
A single national flood reporting and information service is not just a communications improvement; it is a strategic necessity. Without a clear, accessible point of contact, the public remains confused, response is delayed, and resilience efforts are undermined. Establishing this service will provide clarity, coordination, and confidence during flood events, and must be treated as a core component of national flood strategy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 101)
30
Recommendation
Establish a comprehensive national flood reporting and information service by March 2026.
Recommendation
The Government should establish a single, widely promoted national flood reporting and information service by March 2026. This service should build upon and expand the existing Floodline system to provide a clear point of contact for all types of flooding, offer consistent guidance, and be accessible via phone, SMS, and online. It must be co-designed with flood- 65 affected communities and delivered in partnership with local authorities, water companies, and emergency services, supported by a national awareness campaign. (Recommendation, Paragraph 102)
31
Conclusion
Local flood groups and volunteers are undervalued, underfunded, and inadequately supported.
Conclusion
Local flood groups and volunteers are indispensable to England’s resilience, yet they remain undervalued, underfunded, and poorly supported. Without proper recognition and resources, this community capacity risks collapsing at the very moment it is most needed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 108)
32
Recommendation
Establish a national support framework for local flood groups and volunteers by March 2026.
Recommendation
The Government should establish a national support framework for local flood groups and volunteers by March 2026. This must provide: • Core funding to cover basic operational costs, provided through local authorities or Regional Flood and Coastal Committees, • Formal recognition in local resilience plans and flood response structures, • Standardised training, equipment, and guidance, • A national toolkit to support group formation, continuity, and coordination, and • Targeted outreach to harder-to-reach communities, ensuring equity across rural, deprived, and low-participation areas. (Recommendation, Paragraph 109)
33
Conclusion
Local authorities lack capacity and resources to effectively deliver flood risk duties.
Conclusion
Local authorities lack the capacity to deliver their flood risk duties effectively. Without adequate resources and skills, local authorities cannot fulfil their statutory responsibilities or support communities facing increasing flood risk. (Conclusion, Paragraph 110)
34
Recommendation
Complete review of local flood funding and address critical skills shortages by 2025.
Recommendation
The Government should complete its review of local government funding for flood risk management by the end of 2025 and commit to a long- term, needs-based settlement that enables councils to fulfil their flood duties. The Government should set out how it will address critical skills shortages in local flood resilience, including funding and workforce planning. These measures must ensure that local government is equipped to assess, plan for, and respond to flood risk in a changing climate. (Recommendation, Paragraph 111)
35
Recommendation
Property Flood Resilience remains inaccessible, deepening inequalities and leaving communities vulnerable.
Recommendation
Flood resilience is not only about individual protection but about sustaining communities, businesses, and housing markets. Property Flood Resilience (PFR) must be mainstreamed as a core part of flood recovery, rather than treated as an optional add-on. Without reform, PFR will remain inaccessible to those who need it most, deepening inequalities and 66 leaving households and businesses vulnerable to repeated disruption. The Government must act to make resilience mainstream, affordable, and fair. (Conclusion, Paragraph 118)
36
Recommendation
Consult on mainstreaming Property Flood Resilience as routine flood recovery and reforming grants.
Recommendation
The Government should consult on how to make Property Flood Resilience (PFR) a routine part of flood recovery. This consultation should explore options for reforming the existing grant scheme to provide consistent, needs-based funding and wider accessibility, including simplifying the process, updating grant levels, and extending eligibility to renters and social housing tenants. Any changes should be implemented following consultation and evaluation. Local delivery models, such as block grants to councils, direct supplier payments, or insurer-led applications should be explored to increase uptake and reduce barriers. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)
37
Recommendation
Flood insurance system is inadequate, threatening household stability and market access without reform.
Recommendation
Flood insurance is not just a financial product but a cornerstone of household and market stability. Without reform, growing risk and the eventual withdrawal of Flood Re will leave vulnerable households uninsured, businesses exposed, and communities at risk of economic decline. Uninsurable or repeatedly flooded properties risk becoming unmortgageable, depressing local housing markets and trapping families in unsellable homes. The Government must act now to secure a fair, resilient insurance system that underpins recovery, incentivises resilience, and sustains access to housing and finance in a changing climate. (Conclusion, Paragraph 127)
38
Recommendation
Begin work on Flood Re successor to ensure continued, affordable flood insurance beyond 2039.
Recommendation
The Government should begin work with the insurance and mortgage sectors to ensure the continued availability and affordability of flood insurance beyond 2039, when the current Flood Re scheme is due to end. This should include options for a successor scheme (“Flood Re 2.0”) that recognises resilience measures, supports low-income households, and enables a fair transition to a more risk-reflective market. (Recommendation, Paragraph 128)
39
Recommendation
Consult on strengthening insurance in flood resilience and pilot Flood Performance Certificates by 2025.
Recommendation
By the end of 2025, the Government should consult with insurers and stakeholders on strengthening the role of insurance in flood resilience. This should include promoting and simplifying access to the Build Back Better scheme. The Government should support the development and piloting of Flood Performance Certificates (FPCs) as a voluntary tool to improve awareness of property flood risk and resilience. FPCs should be introduced initially on a voluntary basis, with Government support. FPCs should be piloted in high-risk areas with a clear, trusted methodology for assessing resilience, in partnership with local authorities, insurers and estate agents, and they should be free or subsidised for low-income households. Following evaluation of the pilot, the Government should consider how to expand 67 FPCs more widely. Objectives could include minimising the risk that homeowners are penalised for factors beyond their control and reducing the likelihood that properties become difficult to sell or insure due to flood risk. (Recommendation, Paragraph 129) 68