4th Report - The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation

We welcome the introduction of a framework that gives a strong presumption of consent for low-carbon generation and accommodates a broader range of nuclear technologies. However, confidence in a developer- led approach is not yet assured and will only come if DESNZ, GBE-N, and the Planning Inspectorate can collectively provide DCO applicants with the support and guidance they will need to carry out proportionate assessments against the criteria. Without this, there is a risk that the flexibility promised by EN-7 will translate into uncertainty and delay. (Conclusion, Paragraph 16)

As we said in our previous Report, Gridlock or Growth, there remains a fundamental tension between the Government’s stated preference for a market-led approach to energy and the trend towards active government management. This is especially apparent in nuclear policy, where siting for gigawatt-scale plants has always required some degree of state backing. Given this reality, the Government needs to be considerably more explicit about what nuclear technologies it wants deployed and where it envisages them being located. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20)

When designating EN-7, the Government should publish a plan with its preferred level and mix of nuclear technologies, indicative deployment timelines, and the role of EN-6 sites potentially suitable for gigawatt-scale plants. Each part of this plan should explain the role of GBE-N in facilitating it. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)

GBE-N should announce its plans for Oldbury and Wylfa without further delay, including which technologies it intends to deploy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)

If planning examinations stray too far into matters reserved to other regimes this will undermine those regulators. While the exhaustive drafting of the criteria in EN-7 may simply be intended to empower the Planning Inspectorate and the Secretary of State to consider a wide range of relevant factors, this overlooks the pressures on applicants, facing tight project 24 schedules and litigious opponents, which will drive them to “gold plate” their applications with excessive detail to minimise the chance of delay. This could also discourage a fleet-based deployment strategy, where standardisation and replication are key to achieving economies of scale. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

We are deeply concerned that EN-7 fails to present a truly joined- up approach across planning, safety, and environmental regulation. The absence of robust mechanisms to coordinate these regimes risks undermining the very purpose of an NPS: to provide a definitive and coherent framework for decision-making. If the Government’s objective is to bring forward new projects efficiently, then it must confront the reality that regulatory fragmentation continues to delay progress. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)

Language in section 2.4 presuming the effectiveness of regulatory regimes should be strengthened to state that the Examining Authority should require only such information as is reasonably necessary to assess planning and environmental impacts within the scope of this NPS. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31)

We also recommend that EN-7, or the accompanying guidance, explicitly support the use of conditional commencement mechanisms (also known as Grampian conditions). These would allow consent to be granted while restricting the start of specified works until relevant licences or authorisations are secured. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32)

Guidance must make clear to applicants the burden of evidence required against each criterion. Should a pipeline of DCO applications materialise, this guidance should be regularly updated as lessons are learned, rather than waiting for the next NPS review. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)

The Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce has already called for radical reform to the regulatory landscape. It should set out how a “one stop shop” for permitting civil nuclear could operate in practice and examine whether this could be achieved without compromising safety and environmental standards. The Government should respond swiftly with policy and any legislative changes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)

Looking beyond EN-7, the Government will need to start considering proposals for a more diverse fleet of reactors with different benefits and risks. A future NPS might, for certain technologies, need to disapply criteria or introduce entirely new ones. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38) 25

EN-7 should signal the Government’s openness to developing more technology-specific criteria in the next nuclear NPS, and invite ongoing contributions from industry, regulators and independent experts on how siting policy can adapt to a more varied nuclear landscape. (Recommendation, Paragraph 40) Improvements to the draft criteria

As the technology-specific NPS for nuclear, the section of EN-7 dealing with socioeconomic impacts is surprisingly quiet about the factors peculiar to nuclear developments: the long construction timelines, the specialised nature of the labour required, and the enduring presence of infrastructure in host communities. These features distinguish nuclear power from other forms of energy generation and warrant more detailed consideration. (Conclusion, Paragraph 49)

EN-7 should expand on the socioeconomic impacts specific to nuclear infrastructure. This includes recognising the long construction periods and the potential for the creation of high-quality, long-term jobs. While EN1 generically acknowledges construction impacts and training opportunities, EN-7 and accompanying guidance should go further in setting expectations for how nuclear developers, in particular, can deliver lasting economic value to host communities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 50)

Besides traditional measures like apprenticeship quotas and community benefit funds, the Government should also investigate more creative mechanisms to ensure economic value from nuclear developments is captured locally. This could include doing more to encourage jointly consenting public infrastructure like roads and railways, and exploring fiscal measures like full business rate retention for local authorities. These approaches may prove more adaptable to SMRs, with their smaller geographic and economic footprint. (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)

We accept the Government’s view that it is reasonable, in the absence of compelling new safety data, to exclude nuclear reactors from built- up areas. It is rightly the purpose of a national policy statement to provide a consistent definition here. However, the current SUPDC methodology serves neither transparency nor practical decision-making. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

EN-7 should, for now, retain SUPDC to avoid delaying its designation, but should replace the requirement to consult the Health and Safety Executive with a published map showing SUPDC test results for all of England 26 and Wales at a suitable resolution (but ideally on a 100-metre grid at least for the EN-6 sites and any others identified in recent government announcements). (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

The Government should commission the Office for Nuclear Regulation to develop proposals for a replacement methodology to SUPDC. The ONR could consider the risks posed by different nuclear technologies, recognising that some novel technologies may pose greater or lesser risks of radioactive release. These proposals should include the option of dispensing with SUPDC altogether and replacing its role in the DCO process with the emergency evacuation planning done through the REPPIR framework. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

The requirement in the generic EN-1 NPS for applicants to consider the use of waste heat should be restated in more technology-specific terms within EN-7 or the accompanying guidance. This could better support applicants seeking to make productive use of nuclear-generated heat. (Recommendation, Paragraph 66) 27