Select committee: Energy Security and Net Zero Committee

4th Report - The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation

HC 1212 Published 24 October 2025

Energy Security and Net Zero Committee Planning for nuclear energy generation Report on parliament.uk ↗

At a glance9 recommendations and 10 conclusions · Government response published 19 November 2025 (deadline 24 December 2025)

The government's response

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The government welcomes parts of the Committee's report on EN-7, declines several recommendations including changes to section 2.4 and the Semi-Urban Population Density Criterion mapping, and makes a small number of specific commitments.

On regulatory duplication, it says it does "not share this assessment" of industry evidence, because the NSIP regime must judge project viability. On Recommendation 7 it believes the current section 2.4.5 "strikes the appropriate balance".
On guidance, it is developing supplementary information for EN-7 and says it "will publish the supplementary information shortly" and update it as lessons are learned.
On conditional commencement (Grampian conditions), it judges that explicit support in the NPS "is not required", but "can look at this again during future reviews of EN-7".
On the Semi-Urban Population Density Criterion, it proposes to keep the requirement to consult the HSE rather than publish a map, and says EN-7 "will be reviewed at least every 5 years".

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

What the committee recommended 19

See all 19 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

4th Report - The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation ↗The committee's report, HC 1212, parliament.uk
3rd Special Report – The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation: Government Response ↗The government's response, 19 November 2025, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 19

1
Developer-led low-carbon generation approach lacks assurance without coordinated support and guidance. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
We welcome the introduction of a framework that gives a strong presumption of consent for low-carbon generation and accommodates a broader range of nuclear technologies. However, confidence in a developer- led approach is not yet assured and will only come if DESNZ, GBE-N, and the Planning Inspectorate can collectively provide DCO applicants with the support and guidance they will need to carry out proportionate assessments against the criteria. Without this, there is a risk that the flexibility promised by EN-7 will translate into uncertainty and delay. (Conclusion, Paragraph 16)
2
Explicitly state preferred nuclear technologies for deployment and envisaged site locations. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
As we said in our previous Report, Gridlock or Growth, there remains a fundamental tension between the Government’s stated preference for a market-led approach to energy and the trend towards active government management. This is especially apparent in nuclear policy, where siting for gigawatt-scale plants has always required some degree of state backing. Given this reality, the Government needs to be considerably more explicit about what nuclear technologies it wants deployed and where it envisages them being located. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20)
3
Publish a comprehensive plan detailing preferred nuclear technologies, timelines, and GBE-N's facilitating role. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
When designating EN-7, the Government should publish a plan with its preferred level and mix of nuclear technologies, indicative deployment timelines, and the role of EN-6 sites potentially suitable for gigawatt-scale plants. Each part of this plan should explain the role of GBE-N in facilitating it. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)
4
Announce GBE-N's specific plans for Oldbury and Wylfa nuclear sites without delay. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
GBE-N should announce its plans for Oldbury and Wylfa without further delay, including which technologies it intends to deploy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)
5
Excessive detail in planning applications undermines regulators and hinders fleet-based nuclear deployment. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
If planning examinations stray too far into matters reserved to other regimes this will undermine those regulators. While the exhaustive drafting of the criteria in EN-7 may simply be intended to empower the Planning Inspectorate and the Secretary of State to consider a wide range of relevant factors, this overlooks the pressures on applicants, facing tight project 24 schedules and litigious opponents, which will drive them to “gold plate” their applications with excessive detail to minimise the chance of delay. This could also discourage a fleet-based deployment strategy, where standardisation and replication are key to achieving economies of scale. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)
6
EN-7 fails to provide a joined-up approach across regulatory regimes, delaying progress. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
We are deeply concerned that EN-7 fails to present a truly joined- up approach across planning, safety, and environmental regulation. The absence of robust mechanisms to coordinate these regimes risks undermining the very purpose of an NPS: to provide a definitive and coherent framework for decision-making. If the Government’s objective is to bring forward new projects efficiently, then it must confront the reality that regulatory fragmentation continues to delay progress. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)
7
Strengthen EN-7 to limit Examining Authority information requests to essential planning and environmental impacts. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
Language in section 2.4 presuming the effectiveness of regulatory regimes should be strengthened to state that the Examining Authority should require only such information as is reasonably necessary to assess planning and environmental impacts within the scope of this NPS. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31)
8
Explicitly support the use of conditional commencement mechanisms within EN-7 or its guidance. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
We also recommend that EN-7, or the accompanying guidance, explicitly support the use of conditional commencement mechanisms (also known as Grampian conditions). These would allow consent to be granted while restricting the start of specified works until relevant licences or authorisations are secured. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32)
9
Make clear to DCO applicants the burden of evidence required against each criterion. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
Guidance must make clear to applicants the burden of evidence required against each criterion. Should a pipeline of DCO applications materialise, this guidance should be regularly updated as lessons are learned, rather than waiting for the next NPS review. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)
10
Set out how a "one stop shop" for civil nuclear permitting could operate in practice. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce has already called for radical reform to the regulatory landscape. It should set out how a “one stop shop” for permitting civil nuclear could operate in practice and examine whether this could be achieved without compromising safety and environmental standards. The Government should respond swiftly with policy and any legislative changes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)
11
Government must consider proposals for a diverse fleet of reactors for future energy needs. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
Looking beyond EN-7, the Government will need to start considering proposals for a more diverse fleet of reactors with different benefits and risks. A future NPS might, for certain technologies, need to disapply criteria or introduce entirely new ones. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38) 25
12
Signal Government's openness to developing technology-specific criteria in the next nuclear NPS. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
EN-7 should signal the Government’s openness to developing more technology-specific criteria in the next nuclear NPS, and invite ongoing contributions from industry, regulators and independent experts on how siting policy can adapt to a more varied nuclear landscape. (Recommendation, Paragraph 40) Improvements to the draft criteria
13
EN-7 lacks detailed consideration of the unique socioeconomic impacts of nuclear developments. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
As the technology-specific NPS for nuclear, the section of EN-7 dealing with socioeconomic impacts is surprisingly quiet about the factors peculiar to nuclear developments: the long construction timelines, the specialised nature of the labour required, and the enduring presence of infrastructure in host communities. These features distinguish nuclear power from other forms of energy generation and warrant more detailed consideration. (Conclusion, Paragraph 49)
14
Expand EN-7 on socioeconomic impacts specific to nuclear infrastructure for host communities. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
EN-7 should expand on the socioeconomic impacts specific to nuclear infrastructure. This includes recognising the long construction periods and the potential for the creation of high-quality, long-term jobs. While EN1 generically acknowledges construction impacts and training opportunities, EN-7 and accompanying guidance should go further in setting expectations for how nuclear developers, in particular, can deliver lasting economic value to host communities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 50)
15
Investigate creative mechanisms to ensure local economic value from nuclear developments is captured. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
Besides traditional measures like apprenticeship quotas and community benefit funds, the Government should also investigate more creative mechanisms to ensure economic value from nuclear developments is captured locally. This could include doing more to encourage jointly consenting public infrastructure like roads and railways, and exploring fiscal measures like full business rate retention for local authorities. These approaches may prove more adaptable to SMRs, with their smaller geographic and economic footprint. (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)
16
Current SUPDC methodology for excluding nuclear reactors lacks transparency and practical decision-making. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Conclusion (the committee's words)
We accept the Government’s view that it is reasonable, in the absence of compelling new safety data, to exclude nuclear reactors from built- up areas. It is rightly the purpose of a national policy statement to provide a consistent definition here. However, the current SUPDC methodology serves neither transparency nor practical decision-making. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)
17
Publish a map of SUPDC test results for England and Wales, replacing H&SE consultation. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
EN-7 should, for now, retain SUPDC to avoid delaying its designation, but should replace the requirement to consult the Health and Safety Executive with a published map showing SUPDC test results for all of England 26 and Wales at a suitable resolution (but ideally on a 100-metre grid at least for the EN-6 sites and any others identified in recent government announcements). (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)
18
Commission ONR to develop proposals for a replacement methodology to SUPDC. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Government should commission the Office for Nuclear Regulation to develop proposals for a replacement methodology to SUPDC. The ONR could consider the risks posed by different nuclear technologies, recognising that some novel technologies may pose greater or lesser risks of radioactive release. These proposals should include the option of dispensing with SUPDC altogether and replacing its role in the DCO process with the emergency evacuation planning done through the REPPIR framework. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)
19
Restate waste heat consideration requirements in technology-specific terms within EN-7 or guidance. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Recommendation (the committee's words)
The requirement in the generic EN-1 NPS for applicants to consider the use of waste heat should be restated in more technology-specific terms within EN-7 or the accompanying guidance. This could better support applicants seeking to make productive use of nuclear-generated heat. (Recommendation, Paragraph 66) 27