Source · Select Committees · Energy Security and Net Zero Committee
Recommendation 5
5
Rejected
Excessive detail in planning applications undermines regulators and hinders fleet-based nuclear deployment.
Conclusion
If planning examinations stray too far into matters reserved to other regimes this will undermine those regulators. While the exhaustive drafting of the criteria in EN-7 may simply be intended to empower the Planning Inspectorate and the Secretary of State to consider a wide range of relevant factors, this overlooks the pressures on applicants, facing tight project 24 schedules and litigious opponents, which will drive them to “gold plate” their applications with excessive detail to minimise the chance of delay. This could also discourage a fleet-based deployment strategy, where standardisation and replication are key to achieving economies of scale. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)
Government Response Summary
The government rejects the committee's assessment, arguing that the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) consenting regime properly assesses project viability in controlling land, and a finding of regulatory viability during planning must be probabilistic to be proportionate.
Government Response
Rejected
HM Government
Rejected
We have considered the evidence submitted by industry warning that EN-7 introduces duplication by including issues which also fall within the responsibility of separate regulatory regimes, such as Nuclear Site Licencing and Environmental Permitting. We do not share this assessment because we deem it to overlook the role of the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) consenting regime in regulating the control and development of land, and the importance of judging project viability in this matter. The NSIP consenting regime exists to ensure a project is only given the control over land provided by a Development Consent Order (DCO) if it will meet a national infrastructure need without unacceptable local impacts. To properly assess this, the Secretary of State must satisfy themselves the project is viable. Allowing a project to take control of land, clear it and begin development when there is reasonable grounds to believe the project will never be finished would be wasteful and irresponsible, harming all concerned. We understand that some stakeholders assume that no developer would ever seek consent for a project without certainty of success, but the public rightly expect the Secretary of State to verify these expectations before providing them with powers including the Compulsory Purchase of land. One of the factors in determining viability must include whether the project is capable of securing the necessary regulatory permits, licences and other permissions. For obvious reasons, no nuclear power station may begin generating low carbon energy without being deemed safe and secure by the Office for Nuclear Regulation. Equally, various essential construction and waste management activities cannot proceed until the appropriate environmental regulator has verified they will not involve unacceptable discharges which pollute the landscape. However, we are clear that a finding of regulatory viability during the planning phase must be probabilistic to be proportionate. Prior to the start of construction, it is not possible to be certain of success because unpredictable events could jeopardise it, and some factors influencing design and construction plans (e.g. ground conditions) can only be fully understood once construction begins in earnest. Other factors, such as safety and security systems, might rightly be tested with the Office for Nuclear Regulation during construction and only be fully approved shortly before the stations begins operation.