Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS)

5. Mr D complains Cafcass’s Family Court Adviser (FCA): • issued a safeguarding report to the court on 3 April 2025 which contained factual inaccuracies and refused to correct the report when he challenged it • suppressed a safeguarding disclosure made by a close family member on 3 April 2023 • wrongly closed the case on 8 April 2025 and due to this did not attend a First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment (FHDRA) held on 15 October 2025.

6. Mr D also complains Cafcass failed to fully respond to those matters set out above, contradicted its position and wrongly concluded its handling was appropriate and there was no learning it could take forward.

7. Mr D says Cafcass’s flawed safeguarding information led the court to make decisions based on incomplete information.

8. As a result, Mr D tells us he experienced significant avoidable distress and due to Cafcass’s omission of critical information, may have suffered long-term loss of contact with his daughter.

9. Mr D wants Cafcass to acknowledge its mistakes and apologise for them. He also wants Cafcass to improve its service and pay him a financial remedy.

10. The family court asked Cafcass to gather safeguarding information which would assist it in determining the custody arrangements for Mr D’s children.

11. Cafcass filed a safeguarding report with the court on 3 April 2025.

The safeguarding report

14. Mr D said Cafcass’s FCA issued the 3 April 2025 safeguarding report to the court despite him raising concerns about the content.

15. An FCA is a qualified social worker who the court appoints to assess the child or children concerned and their environment. The FCA provides independent advice and support to the family court.

16. Mr D said the safeguarding report contained inaccuracies. Firstly, he said it wrongly set out he was facing ‘two impending prosecutions’ when he was in fact, ‘released under investigation’ and had never been charged.

17. Secondly, he said the report referenced his participation in a ‘domestic abuse programme’ but said this was never, ‘ordered in any judgement’.

18. Mr D said these are factually verifiable errors and are not matters of professional judgement. He tells us the FCA should have amended the report before it was submitted to the court.

19. Cafcass said it is not the FCA’s role to go through the safeguarding report with Mr D. It said if Mr D had any questions about the advice given in this report, it was open for him to raise this in court.

20. It explained in Family Law a factual error is something irrefutable and not the opinion of one person disputed by another. For example, it said wrongly recorded dates or names are factual errors its FCA could amend directly.

21. It said the concerns Mr D raised (which we have set out above at paragraphs 16 and 17) are matters which needed to have been raised in court. It noted Mr D was able to speak to the FCA during a court hearing on 8 April. It said the FCA advised Mr D that they considered his concerns were not factual inaccuracies and should be raised with the court.

22. Cafcass further notes Mr D contacted it on 11 April to say that he intended to raise his concerns at a court hearing on 23 April. Cafcass said this was the appropriate route to challenge the content of the safeguarding report.

23. Cafcass do not make decisions in family court cases. Its role is to assist the court. Cafcass usually does this by preparing and submitting documents for the court’s consideration, which includes safeguarding reports. The court will usually direct Cafcass to complete these reports and has expectations of what they should include.

24. Sections 13.1 to 13.8 of Ministry of Justice Practice Direction 12B – Child Arrangements Programme guidance says an FCA should speak to organisations such as schools, police and local authorities. This is to find out if the parties involved in the case are known to those organisations.

25. If they are known, the FCA will ask the organisations for information they consider relevant. The FCA will then decide, based on their professional judgment, whether this information should be included in the safeguarding report they submit to the court.

26. If any involved party disputes the information in the safeguarding report or has any objections to its publication, this is a matter they should raise with the court.

27. This is set out in Cafcass’s safeguarding reports, which state: ‘Significant factual errors (not matters disputed by the parties) in this letter should be referred to the author. Any concerns about other aspects of the letter (for example, the extent of enquiries, the opinions expressed in it, or matters disputed by the parties) must be addressed in court.’

28. We can see this statement was present on Cafcass’s April 2025 safeguarding report.

29. Cafcass’s complaints policy, section 3.7 sets out what matters Cafcass can consider as part of its complaints process. It says it can consider where, for example, it has not accurately captured factual information in documentation submitted to the court, such as name or date of birth.

30. Section 3.8 sets out that its complaints process cannot look at challenges to its assessments or recommendations to the court.

31. Our complaint standards say public bodies should give clear, evidence-based explanations and reasons for their decisions. It also says public bodies should listen to and consider the complainant’s views.

32. We recognise Mr D has concerns about the content of Cafcass’s April 2025 safeguarding report and feels its FCA should have discussed matters with him prior to submitting this document to the court.

33. As we have set out above, it was open for Mr D to have raised any concerns he had about the content of Cafcass’s safeguarding report as part of the family court proceedings.

34. Cafcass correctly explained that complaints about FCA’s professional thinking, judgement and decisions are matters for the courts to take a view on. This is because it would be for the court to decide whether any evidence supplied by Cafcass was unreliable or misleading.

35. Our general approach is to say that the best place to challenge Cafcass’s safeguarding reports is within the court process. The FCA writes those reports for the court, and it is important to note that the FCA can also be cross-examined in court should someone have questions about the content of those reports, or their approach.

36. The Judge ultimately has the final say having taken all the evidence into consideration.

37. We do not see an indication of maladministration with the explanation supplied by Cafcass during the complaints process. Its explanation appears appropriate and is in line with its complaints policy and our complaint standards.

Suppressed safeguarding disclosure

38. Mr D told us Cafcass supressed a family member’s safeguarding disclosure dated 3 April 2023. Mr D said Cafcass did not acknowledge this disclosure in any of its reporting.

39. Cafcass confirmed it had received the disclosure, and its FCA’s 3 April 2025 safeguarding report noted his concerns about his ex-partner (which is what the 3 April 2023 disclosure describes).

40. It said if Mr D had any concerns that its FCA omitted information from the safeguarding report and he wanted to challenge this, it was open for him to have done so during court proceedings. This would have been the appropriate forum to have raised such concerns.

41. Cafcass’s complaints policy and our complaint standards set out at paragraphs 29 to 31 are also relevant here.

42. We recognise Mr D very strongly believes his family member’s safeguarding disclosure was supressed by Cafcass. He supplied us with a detailed analysis of why he believes this to be the case.

43. He also tells us this information was not part of a subject access request disclosure he subsequently received from Cafcass. Mr D believes this supports his view that Cafcass did not correctly process or fully consider this document.

44. We can see Cafcass are correct to say its April 2025 safeguarding report noted his concerns about his ex-partner. Though we recognise this does not necessarily evidence it considered his family member’s disclosure because the reference in Cafcass’s report is taken from a verbal conversation it had with Mr D.

45. This being said, if Mr D had concerns the FCA had omitted his evidence from Cafcass’s reports or had not given his evidence the appropriate weighting, it was open for him to have raised this with the court during proceedings.

46. As Cafcass set out during the complaints process, this was the appropriate forum to have reviewed such concerns as it cannot consider them as part of its complaints process.

47. We do not see an indication of maladministration with Cafcass’s explanation. Its explanation appears appropriate and is in line with its complaints policy and our complaint standards.

Wrongly closed the case on 8 April 2025 48. Mr D said Cafcass wrongly sent him a case closure letter on 8 April 2025 while the court case remained active. Mr D said the FCA did not then attend the FHDRA held on 15 October 2025 and this meant he was unable to cross examine them.

49. The FHDRA is a key stage in the family court proceedings. Its role is to help the parties to reach an agreement. The FHDRA will set out what further action is needed if the parties fail to reach agreement.

50. Cafcass said it must act on the strict instructions of the court, under its ‘orders’ and ‘directions’. It said Cafcass can only undertake work with children and families, attend court, and write reports when instructed to do so by the court.

51. It confirmed it closed its case on 8 April because the judge did not order any further work from Cafcass following the first hearing. It said this meant Cafcass had no further involvement with the court from this point. It said it wrote to Mr D on 8 April to confirm this.

52. We have considered Cafcass’s reporting to court policy. While this policy focusses upon attendance at court in relation to Section 7 reports and final hearings, it clearly sets out that FCA’s are expected to attend court ‘if directed to do so’ by the judge.

53. A Section 7 report is a document which provides the court with detailed information about a child’s welfare, living arrangements and relationships with each parent.

54. We are persuaded this policy more generally illustrates that Cafcass’s FCAs act on behalf of the court and are expected to attend court when ordered to by the judge.

55. Section 4 of Cafcass’s complaints policy sets out how it will investigate a complaint. It, more generally, includes response timescales and that it will consider any evidence which is proportionate and necessary to address the complaint issues. Our complaint standards set out at paragraph 31 are also relevant here.

56. As we have set out earlier in our statement, Cafcass’s role is to assist the court, and it will do so by way of court orders and directions. If the court has not issued orders or directions for Cafcass to continue to support the court, Cafcass will close its case.

57. We can see Cafcass wrote to Mr D on 8 April. It informed Mr D its involvement in court proceedings had completed, ‘unless the court directs Cafcass to undertake further work.’

58. Having carefully considered Cafcass’s explanation during the complaints process, we are satisfied it appears to be in line with what, overall, is set out in its reporting to court policy. We are also satisfied Cafcass’s explanation is in line with its complaints policy and our complaint standards.

59. We have therefore decided to take no further action in this element of Mr D’s complaint.

Cafcass’s complaint handling

60. Mr D also complains Cafcass failed to fully respond to his concerns (summarised at paragraphs five to seven), contradicted its position and wrongly concluded its handling was appropriate and there was no learning it could take forward.

61. Cafcass’s complaints policy set out at paragraph 55 and our complaint standards set out at paragraph 31 are also relevant here.

62. We have reviewed Cafcass’s complaint responses and copies of emails between Mr D and Cafcass.

63. Having carefully reviewed all the available evidence, we can see no indication Cafcass failed to clearly set out its position on all the matters described in paragraphs five to six of this statement.

64. It explained why Mr D’s concerns around the safeguarding report could not be dealt with as part of its complaints process and needed to have been raised in court.

65. It confirmed the family member’s April 2023 safeguarding disclosure had been received and its April 2025 safeguarding report referred to those matters. It added that if Mr D wanted to challenge the content of its safeguarding report, he would need to do so as part of the court proceedings.

66. Cafcass also confirmed why it closed its case in April 2025.

67. We think the explanations supplied by Cafcass are appropriate and cannot see any evidence to suggest it failed to give suitable explanation in line with its complaints policy and our complaint standards.

68. We also recognise Mr D said there were contradictions in Cafcass’s responses. He said Cafcass’s earlier position concerning its April 2025 safeguarding report was that it should be dealt with at court. He said Cafcass’s subsequent position was that its case was closed as the court had not ordered further work. He said these two positions are irreconcilable.

69. We have found no evidence of a contradiction in Cafcass’s responses. Cafcass explained any concerns about the content of the Safeguarding report (aside from factual inaccuracies) needed to have been raised in court.

70. We do not agree that because the court subsequently did not seek further work from Cafcass in April 2025, which meant it did not attend further hearings, means it contradicted its position.

71. If Mr D still had concerns about the content of the safeguarding report, it was open for him to raise this in court and it would be up to the judge to give a view on these matters.

72. Mr D adds that Cafcass subsequently ‘shut down further engagement’ on 9 December 2025 despite new evidence. Mr D cites a court transcript of a 15 October 2025 court hearing which he claims recorded Cafcass’s FCA was, ‘absent without notice’.

73. We have reviewed the 15 October 2025 court hearing transcripts and cannot see the judge noted Cafcass was ‘absent without notice’. We cannot see any reference in the transcript to indicate the judge felt Cafcass should have been present at this hearing.

74. We have also reviewed Cafcass’s 9 December response to Mr D. This response explains it had already addressed his concerns and in line with its complaints policy, it would not reinvestigate those matters.

75. We do not see Cafcass’s position is unreasonable, it respectfully sets out that it cannot add anything more to what it has already said and will not provide a further response in line with section 6.1 of its complaints policy.

76. Section 6.1 of Cafcass’s complaints policy says Cafcass will not reinvestigate repeated complaints about the same matters where it is satisfied it has already responded appropriately.

77. Overall, we are satisfied Cafcass handled Mr D’s complaint in line with its complaints policy and our complaint standards. We have therefore decided to take no further action in his complaint.

78. We appreciate our decision will likely come as a disappointment, but we hope our decision statement clearly sets out our reasoning, and this provides Mr D with some clarity in these matters.

1. We have carefully considered Mr D’s complaint about Cafcass. We were very sorry to read of the events that caused Mr D to complain and recognise these have been very difficult circumstances for him.

2. We cannot give a view in some of the matters Mr D raises because the family court is best placed to consider them.

3. On the matters we can consider, we have found, overall, Cafcass acted in line with applicable guidance and standards. We have decided to take no further action in Mr D’s complaint.

4. We appreciate our decision will likely be disappointing. We understand Mr D has been through a great deal over the past few years and hope our statement clearly sets out how we reached our decision.