Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS)

3. Miss O complains about the service she received from Cafcass between March and October 2025. She complains that:

• Safeguarding assessments and letters were inaccurate and not impartial • Cafcass dismissed a concern of a conflict of interest regarding the Family Court Adviser • The complaint investigation did not fully address the issues raised, and was not independent 4. Miss O explained that as a result of the failings, she has suffered emotional distress, reputational harm, and unfair disadvantage during court proceedings.

5. She has experienced ongoing anxiety and a loss of trust in the process, as well as significant emotional strain and stress, which has had a lasting impact on her wellbeing.

6. By bringing the complaint to PHSO, Miss O is seeking learning and procedural recommendations to be made to prevent similar issues occurring in future.

7. Miss O was involved in Family Court proceedings, for which Cafcass carried out safeguarding assessments and provided evidence for the court.

Safeguarding Assessments and Letters 10. Miss O complains that the safeguarding assessments carried out by Cafcass and the subsequent letters they wrote were not impartial and contained factual inaccuracies and procedural failings.

11. She states that Cafcass presented unverified information as fact and gave unequal weighting to each parent’s information.

12. She also told us that the assessment had a disproportionate focus on a now-resolved physical health condition she had suffered with previously, which she considers both unnecessary and indirectly discriminatory under the Equality Act 2010. She said the response from Cafcass acknowledged these concerns but dismissed them without showing how proportionality or equality standards were applied.

13. Cafcass responded to Miss O’s complaint on 30 October 2025. It noted her concerns that significant evidence she had provided was not included in the FCA’s report, and also that it had focussed on a historic long-term illness unrelated to her care of her child.

14. It also noted that her illness has resulted in disabilities which are protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, and that she believed the treatment she received from the FCA constitutes indirect discrimination.

15. Cafcass said its review of the complaint showed that the FCA completed a safeguarding letter on 25 March 2025, and an updating safeguarding letter on 30 April 2025.

16. Cafcass went on to explain its remit at the ‘Work to First Hearing’ stage’ is limited to initial risk screening, and that this involves undertaking enquiries with the Police and Local Authority to ascertain if the adults or children named in the application are known to relevant agencies.

17. It informed Miss O that it also completes safeguarding telephone interviews with parents where they feel necessary in support of their advice within the safeguarding letter.

18. Cafcass said it could see that consideration has been given within these letters to Miss O’s physical health. It said it had spoken with the FCA, who explained the inclusion of this information was based on its potential relevance to the welfare of Miss O’s child.

19. Cafcass said the FCA had not made any medical judgements but had advised seeking information from medical sources to understand the potential impact on the child.

20. Cafcass explained it had also liaised with the FCA’s Service Manager (SM), who said they agreed with the FCA’s analysis and advice that the information was relevant and needed further exploration.

21. Cafcass explained that the role of an FCA is unique in that they have dual responsibility; they are accountable to Cafcass for their professional conduct but responsible to the court for their professional judgement.

22. Cafcass said it understands that families will not always agree with the assessments or the advice provided, and that when this happens, it is important that the court is made aware of any disagreements with the content of a Cafcass letter or report. This would include any concerns that the letter, including its analysis and advice, does not accurately reflect a situation or does not capture all relevant information. Cafcass said that Miss O’s concerns in this case are a challenge to the FCA’s professional judgement, which is a matter for the court.

23. Similarly, Cafcass explained that Miss O’s complaints of “mishandling of relevant evidence” and “perceived bias” would also be a matter for the court.

24. Before we decide if we should conduct a detailed investigation of a complaint, we look at whether there are signs the organisation has got something wrong. We do this by comparing what should have happened with what did happen, using the relevant evidence and standards. We recognise Miss O strongly disagrees with the content and balance of the safeguarding letters and believes this affected the court process. We have considered her account alongside Cafcass’ explanation of the FCA’s role and the limits of its Work to First Hearing enquiries. Having done so, we have not found indications of an administrative failing that we should investigate further.

25. To put this complaint, and our decision, into context, it may help to explain more about Cafcass’ role in court proceedings.

26. Cafcass does not make decisions in Family Court cases. Instead, its role is to help the Court make the decisions. Cafcass usually does this by preparing and submitting reports or letters for the Court’s consideration. This includes Safeguarding assessments and the subsequent letters based on those assessments, which Miss O is complaining about here.

27. The role of the FCA during the assessment process is largely to offer a view, based on their professional judgement, on what it feels to be in the best interests of the child/children. Given the nature of Cafcass’ work, that opinion will often appear to favour one party’s view over another. That is not evidence of bias. Nor is it evidence of maladministration.

28. The FCA’s judgement in the letters usually includes, but is not limited to, any enquiries they have made or any information they have gathered. It is not for us to determine what enquiries the FCA should make or what information they should include in, or omit from, their assessment reports and letters. These are matters for the FCA’s professional judgement and for the court to consider

29. These views can be examined, and, where necessary, challenged during the court process. The same is true for any concerns which arise over the information the FCA has, or has not, chosen to include. It will be for the court to decide what weight, if any, to place on that challenge. Furthermore, if the court decides that the FCA has provided insufficient information for it to make a judgement it can ask them to carry out additional work on the case. Again, this is not evidence of maladministration.

30. Miss O has referred to possible bias, unequal weighting of evidence, and indirect discrimination because of the focus on her physical health. These are serious concerns, and we have considered whether Cafcass’ response provides an administrative explanation for the inclusion of that information. Cafcass explained that the information was included because the FCA considered it potentially relevant to the child’s welfare and that the FCA was not making a medical judgement but advising that medical information may be needed. The Service Manager also agreed the matter needed further exploration. On the evidence available, we do not see signs that Cafcass ignored Miss O’s concerns or failed to consider whether the information was relevant. The remaining dispute is about the FCA’s professional judgement and the weight placed on the information, which are matters for the court.

31. We understand why Miss O wants these points considered by PHSO, particularly given the impact she says the letters had on her confidence in the process. However, there is a clear and established process for challenging a Cafcass view through the court. We do not consider it would be appropriate for us to interfere with that process. If the court later makes findings that show Cafcass acted unlawfully or outside its administrative responsibilities, Miss O may be able to bring those matters back to us for consideration.

Conflict of Interest 32. Miss O told us that Cafcass dismissed a concern of a conflict of interest regarding the Family Court Adviser (FCA). She explained that the FCA had previously worked on a case involving the applicant’s partner and child.

33. Miss O says Cafcass dismissed her concerns without any reference to its own Conflict of Interest Policy or explaining how the decision was made and impartiality ensured.

34. In its complaint response of 30 October 2025, Cafcass addressed Miss O’s concern that the FCA had previously worked on the case involving the applicant’s current partner and her child. It noted that she believes this presents a clear and significant conflict of interest and was not compliant with Cafcass’ Conflict of Interest policy.

35. Cafcass explained that the FCA was not directly involved in that case, though she did attend a First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment (FHDRA) as the duty FCA (not the allocated FCA).

36. It confirmed that the FCA has no personal relationship with the parties involved in that case and that any information between this case and Miss O’s would only be considered to assess whether there is any relevant risk to be taken into account for her child.

37. Cafcass noted that the FCA had emailed Miss O on 11 September 2025 to confirm that she had reviewed the details of the connected child’s file and determined that there were no risks present that would impact upon Miss O’s child.

38. Cafcass explained it had not identified any conflict of interest and found no concerns relating to the FCA’s practice in respect of its Conflict of Interest policy.

39. Cafcass noted that Miss O had requested the FCA be reassigned, and her case be allocated to a different person. Cafcass explained that there was no further work on the case to be completed by an FCA, so this was not necessary. It also noted that if further work were to be directed in future, this would be carried out by its ‘Work After First Hearing’ team anyway, of which the FCA in question is not a part.

40. In assessing this point, we reviewed Cafcass’ ‘Conflicts of Interest Policy’. This policy applies to all Cafcass employees, and its purpose is described as follows:

41. ‘This document outlines Cafcass’ policy on conflicts of interest as they arise both in terms of case work and any independent work carried out by Cafcass employees as well as other potential conflicts of interest that might arise in the course of an individual’s duties. It explains the process to be followed by managers and colleagues in the event that a conflict or perceived conflict arises’

42. The policy notes situations where a conflict is likely to arise in a case, where a member of staff:

• ‘is related to or in a relationship with a witness, expert or lawyer involved in the case • where the practitioner or someone close to the practitioner knows a member of the family personally • undertakes voluntary or paid work for, or has a financial involvement with, an organisation (e.g. contact centre) involved in the case • is a member of, or has acted as advisor to, the board of an organisation (e.g. a mother and baby unit) involved in the case; or • sits as a magistrate in the family proceedings court where the case is being heard.’

43. The issue in question here is that the FCA had previous involvement in a case regarding the child of the current partner of the other party involved in Miss O’s case. This would not meet any of the criteria listed above, as their link occurred in a professional capacity in the same role in which they were employed when involved in Miss O’s case.

44. We have considered Miss O’s concern alongside Cafcass’ explanation and its Conflict of Interest Policy. Cafcass’ account is persuasive because it explains the nature of the FCA’s earlier involvement, confirms there was no personal relationship with the parties, and explains that any linked information would only be considered for relevant risk. The policy examples focus on personal, financial, voluntary, advisory or judicial links. The professional involvement described here does not fall within those examples. We have therefore seen nothing to indicate that there was a conflict of interest, or that Cafcass failed to apply its policy, and we will not proceed with a further and more detailed investigation of this point.

Complaint Handling 45. Miss O is unhappy that the complaint investigation did not fully or fairly address the issues she raised. She explained that the process appeared to rely heavily on the original officer’s account of events, without any independent review of evidence or acknowledgment of factual discrepancies. She told us that her equality and bias concerns were dismissed rather than objectively examined and responded to.

46. When considering concerns of this nature it is helpful to begin by explaining our role here. We recognise Miss O feels the complaint response did not fairly reflect the seriousness of her concerns. It is not for PHSO to tell an organisation how it should conduct a complaint investigation, only to consider whether it acted in line with its complaint handling policy and whether its response was reasonable and evidence-based. The substance of the safeguarding and conflict of interest points has been considered above, so we do not need to re-examine those issues in full here.

47. Miss O complained that the issues she raised were dismissed and did not receive an objective response. We can see from the complaint response provided by Cafcass that it did respond to the issues raised, albeit with answers that Miss O did not find satisfactory. In instances where Cafcass was unable to fully address points, it correctly explained that there were matters for the courts to take a decision on, not Cafcass. We would not expect Cafcass to provide a fuller answer to these issues.

48. With regard to the issue of a lack if independent review, we would usually expect an organisation, at least in the first instance, to ask the staff member(s) involved in the complaint for their comments on the situation. Cafcass has done this. We would not consider this a failing, but rather the quickest and most proportionate way to get an outline of what happened. The complainant is free to disagree with that assessment of what happened, as Miss O has done in this instance. However, as noted already, the points which fall to the FCA’s opinion or judgment must be challenged in court, not via the complaints process.

1. We have carefully considered Miss O’s complaint about Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass). We would like to thank her for bringing this matter to our attention and recognise that this has been a distressing time for her.

2. Having carried out an assessment of the three points raised, it is our decision that some of the matters would be for a court to decide on, and for those which would not fall to a court, we have seen no indication that anything went wrong.