Committee on Standards in Public Life: Defining the boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Sp…
R9-18
Published April 2003
Response position and delivery status are recorded separately. Acceptance does not establish implementation.
Recommendation (the Committee's words)
(a) A clear statement of what special advisers cannot do should be set out in primary legislation.
(b) Special advisers should not:
(i) ask civil servants to do anything improper or illegal, or anything which might undermine the role and duties of permanent civil servants;
(ii) undermine the political impartiality of civil servants or the duty of civil servants to give honest and impartial advice to Ministers;
(iii) have any role in the appraisal, reward, discipline or promotion of permanent civil servants; Subject to R31 on the Prime Minister’s Office special advisers should not:
(iv) have powers to authorise the spending of government money;
(v) have any role in the line management of civil servants;
(vi) have charge of or any direction over the work of GICS members;
(vii) have any other executive powers. (page 48)
(c) The Code of Conduct for Special Advisors should continue to list the sorts of work a special adviser may do at the request of their Minister.
(d) The Ministerial Code should be amended to require each Minister to set out in the individual contract for each special adviser the work that adviser is being appointed to undertake. Any significant departure from the sorts of work envisaged in the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers should require the prior written approval of the Prime Minister and should be explained publicly. (page 48)
(b) Special advisers should not:
(i) ask civil servants to do anything improper or illegal, or anything which might undermine the role and duties of permanent civil servants;
(ii) undermine the political impartiality of civil servants or the duty of civil servants to give honest and impartial advice to Ministers;
(iii) have any role in the appraisal, reward, discipline or promotion of permanent civil servants; Subject to R31 on the Prime Minister’s Office special advisers should not:
(iv) have powers to authorise the spending of government money;
(v) have any role in the line management of civil servants;
(vi) have charge of or any direction over the work of GICS members;
(vii) have any other executive powers. (page 48)
(c) The Code of Conduct for Special Advisors should continue to list the sorts of work a special adviser may do at the request of their Minister.
(d) The Ministerial Code should be amended to require each Minister to set out in the individual contract for each special adviser the work that adviser is being appointed to undertake. Any significant departure from the sorts of work envisaged in the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers should require the prior written approval of the Prime Minister and should be explained publicly. (page 48)
From: Committee on Standards in Public Life, Defining the boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the permanent Civil Service, April 2003