Defining the boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the permanent Civil Service

(a) Material currently contained in the Ministerial Code which covers departmental and parliamentary custom and practice should be published separately as a Ministerial Handbook.
(b) The substantive material on issues of conduct should form a new Ministerial Code, which should be defined as having equal weight and authority to the Civil Service Code and the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers. (page 22)

The Cabinet Secretary and Permanent Secretaries should have no responsibility for giving advice to Ministers on conflicts of interest arising under the Ministerial Code. (page 25)

(a) An independent office-holder, called an Adviser on Ministerial Interests, should be established to provide advice to Ministers on compliance with those sections of the Ministerial Code which cover the avoidance of perceived and actual conflicts between their public duties and private interests, formal or otherwise.
(b) The Ministerial Code should be amended to require an incoming Minister to provide the Adviser on Ministerial Interests with a full list in writing of all interests which might be thought to give rise to a conflict and to provide the necessary information in order for the Adviser’s records to be kept up to date.
(c) The Adviser should consult the Minister’s Permanent Secretary about departmental business where necessary to enable the Adviser to ascertain whether a conflict of interest may exist.
(d) The Adviser should be responsible for maintaining a record of ministerial interests and should keep a note of action taken by a Minister on taking up office.
(e) The Adviser should publish information and guidance on how Ministers should deal with conflicts of interest under the Ministerial Code.
(f) The facts of ministerial interests should be published.
(g) Where unforeseen conflicts arise subsequently during the course of a department’s work, the Minister should consult the Adviser over what action might be necessary.
(h) The Adviser should refer any breach or allegation of a breach to the Prime Minister.
(i) The Adviser should be appointed by open competition, chaired by the First Civil Service Commissioner, for a fixed, non-renewable term.
(j) The Adviser should be provided with appropriate resources to achieve his or her task. (page 27)

(a) At the beginning of each Parliament, the Prime Minister should nominate two or three individuals of senior standing after consultation with leaders of the major opposition parties.
(b) The names of these individuals should be made public.
(c) Should the Prime Minister consider an investigation into an allegation of a breach of the Ministerial Code appropriate, the Prime Minister would invite one of these individuals to conduct that investigation.
(d) The individual selected to carry out an investigation should investigate the facts and report his or her findings to the Prime Minister, who would decide on the consequences for a Minister. The report should be published. (page 29)

The Government should ensure that the Civil Service can expand the training options in place to cover the needs both of newly appointed or promoted Ministers and of opposition politicians shadowing Cabinet posts. (page 30)

The Civil Service should be established in statute. (page 34)

The Civil Service Commissioners should have an active role in scrutinising the maintenance of the core values of the Civil Service. (page 34)

The Civil Service Commissioners should monitor the use of both short-term appointments and secondments to ensure that the core values of the Civil Service are not compromised. (page 38)

(a) The overriding principle of selection on merit, after fair and open competition, should be maintained.
(b) The Civil Service Commissioners should continue to be responsible for ensuring that the merit principle is properly applied within the Civil Service.
(c) To that end, the Commissioners should be granted powers and facilities to investigate, on their own initiative, and to report on the operation of the Civil Service recruitment system as it concerns the application of the principle of selection on merit.
(d) The Civil Service Commissioners should grant further relaxation from the overriding principle of selection on merit only if they are fully satisfied that this is needed for the operational effectiveness of the Civil Service, for example after an investigation using the powers referred to in (c) above.
(e) The present practice whereby one candidate, chosen on merit, is recommended to the Minister should continue for open competition involving outside candidates. (page 38)

Principal Private Secretaries should continue to be permanent civil servants and they should have the responsibility for ensuring that the Minister has the full range of governmental advice affecting his or her duties. (page 39)

(a) Departments should ensure that the Civil Service Code is used in induction proceedings and in-service training.
(b) The Civil Service Commissioners should advise departments on their promotion of the Civil Service Code and report on their induction and training activities in their annual report. (page 40)

(a) The Government should actively establish a register of departmental nominated officers to whom any civil servant may go if he or she believes that he or she is being required to act in a way which is inconsistent with the Civil Service Code.
(b) The Civil Service Commissioners should establish and maintain contacts with the departmental nominated officers.
(c) Departments should report the number of appeals they handle under the Code to the Civil Service Commissioners so that the Commissioners can publish figures in their annual report. (page 41)

Paragraph 22 of the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers specifically relating to civil servants should be inserted into the Civil Service Code as soon as possible. (page 42)

The appointment of the First Civil Service Commissioner should be made after consultation with opposition leaders. (page 42)

Special advisers should be defined as a category of government servant distinct from the Civil Service. (page 45)

As a category of government servant distinct from the Civil Service, special advisers should have terms of service which preserve the relevant elements from the Civil Service Code, the Civil Service Management Code and the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers. (page 45)

There should be a single category of special adviser. (page 46)

(a) A clear statement of what special advisers cannot do should be set out in primary legislation.
(b) Special advisers should not:
(i) ask civil servants to do anything improper or illegal, or anything which might undermine the role and duties of permanent civil servants;
(ii) undermine the political impartiality of civil servants or the duty of civil servants to give honest and impartial advice to Ministers;
(iii) have any role in the appraisal, reward, discipline or promotion of permanent civil servants; Subject to R31 on the Prime Minister’s Office special advisers should not:
(iv) have powers to authorise the spending of government money;
(v) have any role in the line management of civil servants;
(vi) have charge of or any direction over the work of GICS members;
(vii) have any other executive powers. (page 48)
(c) The Code of Conduct for Special Advisors should continue to list the sorts of work a special adviser may do at the request of their Minister.
(d) The Ministerial Code should be amended to require each Minister to set out in the individual contract for each special adviser the work that adviser is being appointed to undertake. Any significant departure from the sorts of work envisaged in the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers should require the prior written approval of the Prime Minister and should be explained publicly. (page 48)

The Ministerial Code should be amended to make clear that all Ministers are personally accountable to the Prime Minister and to Parliament for the management and discipline of their special advisers. (page 49)

(a) The Minister concerned should investigate any allegation that his or her special adviser is in breach of the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers.
(b) Where necessary, it would be possible for the Prime Minister to refer the matter for investigation in the same way as an alleged breach of the Ministerial Code. (page 49)

An annual statement should be made to Parliament setting out:
(i) the total number of paid special advisers employed in the year;
(ii) their names;
(iii) the Ministers for whom they work or have worked;
(iv) their particular roles and areas of responsibility;
(v) the total salary cost by department;
(vi) comparison figures for earlier years. (page 50)

(a) The total number of special advisers should be contained in statute, with an upper limit subject to alteration by resolution approved by both Houses of Parliament.
(b) Pending legislation, there should be a debate on the total number of special advisers that can be appointed within government. (page 51)

(a) The Ministerial Code should be amended to make clear that Ministers are personally accountable for the management and discipline of their unpaid advisers in respect of their governmental responsibilities to the Prime Minister and to Parliament.
(b) The annual statement referred to in R21 should also include unpaid advisers, stating:
(i) the total number of unpaid special advisers employed in the year;
(ii) their names;
(iii) the Ministers for whom they work or have worked;
(iv) their particular roles and areas of responsibility;
(v) comparison figures for earlier years.
(c) An unpaid adviser should be defined in the Ministerial Code as anyone who provides, on an unpaid basis, advice to any Minister or represents any Minister in this country or abroad on a recurring or continuous basis.
(d) The requirement to uphold the political impartiality of civil servants and the requirement not to use official resources for party political activity, contained in the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, should be included in the letter of appointment for every unpaid adviser. (page 52)

The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers should be updated as appropriate to take account of the change in status of special advisers. (page 52)

An Accounting Officer should not hesitate to notify his or her concerns, in accordance with Treasury guidelines for Accounting Officers, where he or she believes that the Minister in charge of the department is contemplating a course of action relating to the operation of the press office which would infringe the requirements of financial propriety or regularity. (page 57)

An individual should only be recruited to a senior post in the GICS where the selection panel has a high degree of confidence that he or she will be a leader in upholding the impartiality of the GICS. (page 58)

Wherever possible, GICS press officers should speak on the record as “the department’s spokesman/spokeswoman”. (page 60)

The Guidance on the Work of the Government Information Service should set out the relationship between special advisers and civil servants. (page 60)

It should be for the Government to decide on the overall distribution between departments of the number of special advisers approved by Parliament. (page 63)

(a) The Ministerial Code should be amended to make clear that the Prime Minister is personally accountable to Parliament for the management and discipline of his or her special advisers.
(b) The most senior special adviser in the Prime Minister’s Office should be responsible to the Prime Minister for ensuring that the day-to-day activities of special advisers appointed by the Prime Minister comply with the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers. (page 63)

(a) The existence of two posts in the Prime Minister’s Office with executive powers should be a matter for Parliamentary debate and agreement.
(b) Special advisers with executive powers should not:
(i) ask civil servants to do anything improper or illegal, or anything which might undermine the role and duties of permanent civil servants;
(ii) undermine the political impartiality of civil servants or the duty of civil servants to give honest and impartial advice to Ministers;
(iii) have any role in the appraisal, reward, discipline or promotion of permanent civil servants. But they may:
(iv) have powers to authorise the spending of government money chargeable to the Prime Minister’s Office;
(v) have a role in the line management of civil servants in the Prime Minister’s Office;
(vi) have charge of or direction over the work of GICS members in the Prime Minister’s Office.
(c) The Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary should have the responsibility of drawing to the attention of the Prime Minister any concerns that he or she may have about the ability of civil servants in the office to maintain their political impartiality. (page 66)

The Guidance on the Work of the Government Information Service should deal specifically with the issue of media work in the Prime Minister’s Office. (page 66)

The Government should begin an early process of public consultation on the contents of a draft Bill. The Bill should receive pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament. (page 70)

There should be a short Act to cover the Civil Service and special advisers. In particular, this should:
(a) define the status of the Civil Service;
(b) include a statutory obligation on Ministers to uphold the impartiality of the Civil Service;
(c) set out the responsibility of the Civil Service Commissioners for ensuring that the principle of selection on merit is properly applied, together with the ability to make exceptions from that principle;
(d) set out the Civil Service core values, including the overriding principle of selection on merit;
(e) grant powers for the Civil Service Commissioners to investigate, on their own initiative, and to report on the operation of the Civil Service recruitment system as it concerns the application of the principle of selection on merit;
(f) provide for the First Civil Service Commissioner to be appointed after consultation with opposition leaders;
(g) define the status of special advisers as a category of government servant distinct from the Civil Service;
(h) state what special advisers cannot do;
(i) include power for the Civil Service Code and the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers to be given effect as statutory instruments requiring the approval of both Houses of Parliament and amendable by the same procedure;
(j) state the total number of special advisers, with an upper limit subject to alteration by resolution approved by both Houses of Parliament;
(k) provide for two special adviser posts in the Prime Minister’s Office with “executive powers”;
(l) define special advisers with executive powers by derogation from the restrictions on what other special advisers can do;
(m) require an annual statement to Parliament on paid and unpaid special advisers. (page 71)