Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Stephanie Link

Ref: 2026-0224 Date: 23 Apr 2026 Coroner: Simon Brenchley Area: Birmingham and Solihull Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

The absence of a finalised and agreed care pathway for complex acute pancreatitis, accessible and understood by clinicians across different hospital sites, means an effective Multidisciplinary Team approach is not yet in place.

Date 23 Apr 2026
56-day deadline 18 Jun 2026
Responses identified 1 of 1

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
The absence of a finalised and agreed care pathway for complex acute pancreatitis, accessible and understood by clinicians across different hospital sites, means an effective Multidisciplinary Team approach is not yet in place.
View full coroner's concerns
During the course of the inquest I heard that as a result of the Patient Safety Incident Investigation (“PSII”) into Stephanie’s death which concluded in May 2025 a safety action was recommended and accepted by the Trust which was aimed at promoting a clear Multidisciplinary Team approach and care pathway for patients with acute pancreatitis. The target date for implementation of this action was the 30th August 2025.

The agreed safety action was, in summary, that a meeting was to be conducted between all UHB hospital sites to discuss and confirm a pathway for patients with complex pancreatitis and to include agreement on (i) the threshold for referring patients between sites (e.g. from Good Hope Hospital to Heartlands Hospital or Queen Elizabeth Hospital which is the regional hepatobiliary specialist centre) including timescales (ii) confirmation on how referrals, treatment pathways and outcomes (including MDT outcomes) are documented on each site and processes for ensuring these are visible between sites and (iii) the processes for shared care between hospital sites and services. However, I heard evidence from one of the Trust’s clinical delivery group medical directors that, as at the date of the inquest, whilst meetings had taken place between the specialisms at the different hospital sites regarding the proposed care pathway/MDT arrangements and a draft document setting these out had been discussed, this is still to be finalised and shared with all relevant staff.

In this case, I was satisfied that the absence of an effective MDT approach to the management of Stephanie’s condition had a more than minimal contribution to her death. I am therefore concerned that there remains a risk of future deaths until such time as there is an agreed, documented care pathway for patients with complex acute pancreatitis that is accessible to and understood by clinicians across the different UHB hospital sites.

Responses

1 respondent
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust NHS Trust
PDF
Action Taken

The Trust has implemented the agreed safety action for acute pancreatitis, including developing and approving a Standard Operating Procedure for patient referrals to specialist teams. A weekly Pancreatitis Multidisciplinary Team has been established, and an annual audit is proposed to ensure the pathway remains suitable. (AI summary)

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RESPONSE TO A REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS REGULATION 28 OF THE CORONERS (INVESTIGATIONS) REGULATIONS 2013 When a coroner sends a prevention of future deaths (PFD) report to a person or organisation, they must respond within 56 days. Recipients of a PFD report can apply to the coroner for an extension. A response to a PFD report must detail the action taken or to be taken, whether in response to the report or otherwise, or it must explain why no action is proposed. The purpose of the response template below is to promote clarity, ensure that responses address the coroner’s concerns directly and transparently, and support consistency and good practice across organisations and sectors. It does not restrict how a person or organisation formulates their response; recipients remain responsible for determining what action is appropriate and for ensuring that their response accurately reflects the steps taken or planned. In accordance with the Chief Coroner’s PFD Publication Policy (2026) representations regarding publication of a response should be sent to the coroner. These representations should be made at the same time as the response is provided. The coroner will pass any representations received to the Chief Coroner for a decision

RESPONSE TO A REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS REGULATION 28 OF THE CORONERS (INVESTIGATIONS) REGULATIONS 2013 (Please do not include any living persons’ names in this document, in accordance with the Chief Coroner’s PFD Publication Policy (2026))

THIS RESPONSE IS BEING SENT TO: HM Assistant Coroner Simon Brenchley for Birmingham and Solihull in response to a ‘REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATH REGULATION 28’ following an inquest into the death of Stephanie Link that concluded on 16 April 2026.

1 RESPONDENT In line with our duty under Regulation 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust provides this response within 56 days (plus any extension granted) of the date of the Report to Prevent Future Deaths 2 DATE OF RESPONSE 17 June 2026

3 CONFIRMATION OF CORONER'S MATTERS OF CONCERN The MATTERS OF CONCERN were identified in the report as follows:
1. During the course of the inquest I heard that as a result of the Patient Safety Incident Investigation (“PSII”) into Stephanie’s death which concluded in May 2025 a safety action was recommended and accepted by the Trust which was aimed at promoting a clear Multidisciplinary Team approach and care pathway for patients with acute pancreatitis. The target date for implementation of this action was the 30th August 2025.
2. The agreed safety action was, in summary, that a meeting was to be conducted between all UHB hospital sites to discuss and confirm a pathway for patients with complex pancreatitis and to include agreement on (i) the threshold for referring patients between sites (e.g. from Good Hope Hospital to Heartlands Hospital or Queen Elizabeth Hospital which is the regional hepatobiliary specialist centre) including timescales (ii) confirmation on how referrals, treatment pathways and outcomes (including MDT outcomes) are documented on each site and processes for ensuring these are visible between sites and (iii) the processes for shared care between hospital sites and services.
3. However, I heard evidence from one of the Trust’s clinical delivery group medical directors that, as at the date of the inquest, whilst meetings had taken place between the specialisms at the different hospital sites regarding the proposed care pathway/MDT arrangements and a draft document setting these out had been discussed, this is still to be finalised and shared with all relevant staff.
4. In this case, I was satisfied that the absence of an effective MDT approach to the management of Stephanie’s condition had a more than minimal contribution to her death. I am therefore concerned that there remains a risk of future deaths until such time as there is an agreed, documented care pathway for patients with complex acute pancreatitis that is accessible to and understood by clinicians across the different UHB hospital sites.

4 DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN, how has the concern been addressed. (If no action is proposed please explain why here) Please note that any links to webpages included in the response will not be checked for sensitive information prior to publication, as the information is already online. A Patient Safety Incident Investigation (“PSII”) had been undertaken into Stephanie’s death which concluded in May 2025 and included a safety action to promote a clear multidisciplinary approach and care pathway for patients presenting with acute pancreatitis. The target implementation date for the action was 30 August 2025. Whilst the action was not fully completed at the time of the Inquest, a number of steps had been taken, which included discussions between clinical teams, preparation of a draft standard operating procedure with ongoing discussions required to finalist and implement the SOP. Following conclusion of the Inquest cross site teams have developed a multidisciplinary team (MDT) for complex patients in this category. This has been formalised into a SOP which has been shared. The SOP sets out a clear process that all patients with suspected or confirmed necrotising pancreatitis within the Trust should be referred to the appropriate specialist team as follows:
• QEHB: referral to the HPB Surgery on-call team
• BHH: referral to the BHH Upper GI Surgery team
• GHH: referral to the GHH surgical team

Patients are currently referred to these teams using referrals via the Electronic Patient Record (PICS or NORSE) or via email. A weekly Pancreatitis MDT has also been established and will discuss the following patients to ensure continuity of care:
• patients meeting the operational definition of necrotising pancreatitis where intervention is being considered
• suspected or confirmed infected pancreatic necrosis
• collections being considered for drainage or necrosectomy
• persistent clinical deterioration or ongoing organ failure in the context of necrotising pancreatitis Two patients have already been discussed via the new pathway. Patients with necrotising pancreatitis complicated by symptomatic, infected or persistent collections where intervention is being considered should routinely be listed for MDT discussion. However, if there is clinical concern or if management plans are unclear, cases can be referred for discussion and advice.

The SOP document is available to all staff on our electronic clinical guidelines site and it has also been cascaded to all Clinical Service Leads, CDG Medical Directors and Hospital Medical Directors via email. It is also proposed that an audit will be undertaken annually to ensure the pathway remains suitable. We are satisfied that the action that remained outstanding at the time of the Inquest is now complete and that an appropriate audit is in place.

5 DETAILS OF FURTHER ACTION PROPOSED Please note that any links to webpages included in the response will not be checked for sensitive information prior to publication, as the information is already online.

This will be audited annually.

6 SIGNATURE

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 20 November 2025 I commenced an investigation into the death of Stephanie Anne Barkley Link. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest which took place on 16th April

The conclusion of the inquest was; Natural causes, contributed to by the absence of an effective multi-disciplinary approach to her management, missed opportunities to transfer her to more specialist care and the continued administration of paracetamol despite deteriorating liver biochemistry.
Circumstances of the death
On 20 November 2025 I commenced an investigation into the death of Stephanie Anne Barkley Link. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest which took place on 16th April

The conclusion of the inquest was; Natural causes, contributed to by the absence of an effective multi-disciplinary approach to her management, missed opportunities to transfer her to more specialist care and the continued administration of paracetamol despite deteriorating liver biochemistry.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

On 15th April 2024 Stephanie attended Good Hope Hospital emergency department with severe abdominal pain and vomiting and was admitted to a general surgical ward having been diagnosed with acute pancreatis. She was commenced on standard antibiotic therapy together with analgesia (paracetamol) for pain relief but by 24th April a CT scan revealed that she had developed a large peripancreatic cyst which was likely to require drainage via a cystogastrostomy procedure. She was unable to tolerate food and drink owing to compression on her stomach by the cyst so feeding via a naso-jejunal tube was commenced on 29th April but this had to be subsequently paused or was refused by Stephanie on a number of occasions due to pain and a number of instances of vomiting.

By 13th May, her weight had dropped by 12% since admission owing to a lack of nutrition. She was moved to parenteral feeding but her nutrition continued to be compromised. Her cystogastrostomy procedure had to initially be postponed on a number of occasions due to organizational issues, problems with cannulating her as well as her INR levels being too high for this to take place and the procedure finally took place on 11th June 2024 at Heartlands Hospital to which she was transferred for the procedure.

Following her transfer back to Good Hope Hospital she developed a high fever on 12th June and by 13th June she had developed sepsis for which she was started on a new course of anti-biotic therapy. There were a limited number of instances of her refusing antibiotic doses between 17th and 20th June but clinicians assessed her as having capacity to make those decisions. On 23rd June her blood tests results showed a deteriorating liver biochemistry which ought to have raised concerns about her liver but her IV paracetamol was continued without further blood tests being repeated. On 27th June her condition deteriorated with confusion and further vomiting with further blood tests indicating she had an acute liver injury, probably contributed to in part by the continued administration of paracetamol.

On 28th June she aspirated during an episode of vomiting and as a result suffered a further acute deterioration. She was transferred to ICU where her paracetamol was stopped but despite maximum support she continued to deteriorate. At 2350 hrs on 29th June she suffered a cardiac arrest and despite significant advanced life support being provided to her, she passed away in ICU at 0041 hrs on 30th June 2024.

Evidence was heard at the inquest that there was an absence of an effective multi-disciplinary approach to the management of her complex deterioration especially after the cystogastrostomy and that there were missed opportunities to transfer her to more specialist care either at Heartlands Hospital or Queen Elizabeth Hospital at an earlier stage.

Based on information from the Deceased’s treating clinicians the medical cause of death was determined to be: Sepsis and Multi Organ Failure Acute liver failure Acute Pancreatitis II Malnutrition. Drug induced liver injury. Endoscopic cystogastrostomy
Copies sent to
Medical Examiner

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Report details

Reference
2026-0224
Date of report
23 April 2026
Coroner
Simon Brenchley
Coroner area
Birmingham and Solihull

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 18 Jun 2026.

Sent to

University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust

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