Response from Deputy CEO and Chief Medical Officer, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, with no specific actions mentioned. (AI summary)
Source · Prevention of Future Deaths
John Rust
Ref: 2025-0524
Date: 20 Oct 2025
Coroner: Adam Hodson
Area: Birmingham and Solihull
Responses identified: 1 / 1
View PDF
Mandatory training for automated CSF drainage systems is not adequately enforced, with many staff untrained. There's no sustainable plan to ensure all current and future clinical staff receive essential training on critical equipment.
Date
20 Oct 2025
56-day deadline
15 Dec 2025
Responses identified
1 of 1
Coroner's concerns
Mandatory training for automated CSF drainage systems is not adequately enforced, with many staff untrained. There's no sustainable plan to ensure all current and future clinical staff receive essential training on critical equipment.
View full coroner's concerns
1. In accordance with the PSII report (#SE-48448 ), a specific recommendation was made that "All clinical staff (medical and nursing) using automated CSF drainage systems such as Liquoguard must have completed adequate training to ensure that they are familiar with the functionality of the device prior to use..."
2. The evidence at inquest was that this training was not mandatory at present, and that at the time of the inquest, approximately 55% of the relevant staff have received the training. This has been slowed down somewhat due to a representative of the company being off sick, but further training sessions have been planned.
3. However, the evidence of (author of the PSII report and consultant neurosurgeon) indicated that it was his view that the training should be mandatory, and that consideration must be given to ensuring this is rolled out in a "sustainable" way to staff - both current and future - as opposed to a "knee-jerk reaction" where training is only given to a limited number of staff following an incident.
4. There was no evidence before the court that there was any plan to embed this training and ensure that it is carried out in a "sustainable" way, with a particular focus on ensuring that future staff are adequately and properly trained. This was particularly concerning given the apparent high rotation and through-put of staff in the ITU department. It became apparent to me that the training being offered was the type of "knee-jerk reaction" that was fearful of.
5. There is a risk of future deaths occurring where clinical staff (medical and nursing) do not receive adequate training on equipment.
6. As Coroner, it is not my role to advise what action needs to be taken - that is a matter for your organisation.
2. The evidence at inquest was that this training was not mandatory at present, and that at the time of the inquest, approximately 55% of the relevant staff have received the training. This has been slowed down somewhat due to a representative of the company being off sick, but further training sessions have been planned.
3. However, the evidence of (author of the PSII report and consultant neurosurgeon) indicated that it was his view that the training should be mandatory, and that consideration must be given to ensuring this is rolled out in a "sustainable" way to staff - both current and future - as opposed to a "knee-jerk reaction" where training is only given to a limited number of staff following an incident.
4. There was no evidence before the court that there was any plan to embed this training and ensure that it is carried out in a "sustainable" way, with a particular focus on ensuring that future staff are adequately and properly trained. This was particularly concerning given the apparent high rotation and through-put of staff in the ITU department. It became apparent to me that the training being offered was the type of "knee-jerk reaction" that was fearful of.
5. There is a risk of future deaths occurring where clinical staff (medical and nursing) do not receive adequate training on equipment.
6. As Coroner, it is not my role to advise what action needs to be taken - that is a matter for your organisation.
Responses
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
NHS / Health Body
Noted
Deputy CEO and Chief Medical Officer University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
Report sections
Investigation and inquest
On 10 April 2025 I commenced an investigation into the death of John Christopher RUST. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest. The conclusion of the inquest was that John died due to an uncontrolled CSF leak following elective thoracic aortic replacement surgery
Circumstances of the death
On 25/03/25, John was admitted to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital for a elective thoracic aortic replacement, having been diagnosed with a Type B aortic dissection in October 2019. On 26/03/25 he had a cerebrospinal fluid ('CSF') catheter inserted to minimise post-operative risks of paraplegia that is common with the type of surgery. On 27/03/25, the surgery went ahead without major complications, and he was transferred to ITU to recover. On 28/03/25, there was over-drainage of the CSF drain, and there were concerns raised about a possible CSF leak, which were not acted upon. John's neurological status started to deteriorate which was put down to side effects of medication. At 20.32 hours, Johns' CSF drain was noted to have become disconnected which had resulted in him having a period of unmonitored and uncontrolled CSF loss, and sadly which caused him to suffer a catastrophic and unsurvivable brain injury. He was kept comfortable, and he passed away at 18:36 on 29/3/25, following which John made the generous gift of organ donation. The evidence is that that John’s death was avoidable had concerns surrounding the CSF leak been acted upon sooner. Based on information from the Deceased’s treating clinicians the medical cause of death was determined to be: 1a Intracerebral haemorrhage 1b Excess CSF drainage 1c Lumbar drain, replacement of thoracic-abdominal aortic aneurysm 1d II Chronic Type B Dissection, Hypertension.
Similar PFD reports
Related inquiry recommendations
Muckamore Abbey Inquiry
NED with clinical governance expertise
Muckamore Abbey Inquiry
Board member learning framework
IICSA
Youth Custody Service safeguarding training
IICSA
Lambeth councillor safeguarding training
IICSA
Nationally accredited safeguarding training in schools
IICSA
Mandatory Catholic safeguarding training
Hyponatraemia Inquiry
Board Member Induction Training
Hyponatraemia Inquiry
Clinical Guidance Dissemination Protocol
Mid Staffs Inquiry
Training
Mid Staffs Inquiry
Expert assistance
Report details
- Reference
- 2025-0524
- Date of report
- 20 October 2025
- Coroner
- Adam Hodson
- Coroner area
- Birmingham and Solihull
Responses identified
Responses identified
1 of 1
All listed responses identified
Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 15 Dec 2025.
Sent to
- University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust