Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Thomas Ruggiero

Ref: 2026-0172 Date: 24 Mar 2026 Coroner: Ian Potter Area: Ian Potter Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

Key issues include a vulnerable cell bell system that can be silenced externally, staff failing to complete critical ACCT documentation, and confusion regarding emergency 'Code Blue' protocols.

Date 24 Mar 2026
56-day deadline 18 May 2026
Responses identified 1 of 1
State Custody related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
Key issues include a vulnerable cell bell system that can be silenced externally, staff failing to complete critical ACCT documentation, and confusion regarding emergency 'Code Blue' protocols.
View full coroner's concerns
(1) Emergency Cell Bell System During the evidence there was CCTV footage of other prisoners silencing Mr Ruggiero's cell bell from outside his cell door. The jury found that this hampered the ability of prison staff to respond and react to Mr Ruggiero's needs and distress in the hour or so before his being found unresponsive in his cell. I was told in evidence that anyone (other prisoners or staff members) can silence an emergency call bell at the push of a button outside the relevant cell door and there is no mechanism or system in place to ensure that the cell bell can only be silenced by staff. The evidence was that as and when a cell bell is silenced, staff assume that the call for assistance has been answered. There was clear evidence that this situation has not changed in any way since November 2024. As a result the emergency cell bell system remains highly vulnerable to both misuse and abuse. In my opinion, this raises a significant risk of future deaths if action is not taken.

(2) ACCT documentation and staff approach to this In Mr Ruggiero's case some ACCT documentation (his Care Plan) had not been completed. The jury found that this, "led to missed opportunities for all staff to understand Mr Ruggiero's triggers and other vital information in order to care for him" under the ACCT. I heard evidence that there are now additional systems in place in terms of an 'ACCT reassurance process'. However, during the course of the inquest two supervising prison officers gave evidence to the effect that they had the opportunity to complete Mr Ruggiero's care plan, should have done so, but still did not do it. On further exploration in the evidence, there appeared to be a view that some staff still did not see the value in the completion of such documentation. While there have been some steps taken that are aimed at reducing the risk, I am not sufficiently reassured that sufficient action has been taken. In my opinion, the attitude of some staff towards the value of such documentation remains a real and valid concern that continues place particularly vulnerable prisoners at risk. (3) 'Code Blue' During the evidence in the inquest hearing there was clear confusion among prison staff regarding the calling of a 'code blue' in an emergency situation. That confusion included if / when to call a code blue and how to do so. The evidence was such that not only was there confusion at the time of events in November 2024, but that it persisted to date. I was told in evidence that the prison has issued more guidance to officers in this regard, but I was insufficiently reassured that this guidance has either had time to take effect or has taken affect at all. There is clear evidence that this presents a risk of future deaths and I am of the opinion that action needs to be taken.

(4) Staffing / Experience / Communication etc. The evidence was that in November 2024, up to (and possibly more than) 90% of prison officers at HMP Swaleside were new in post and still in their probationary period. I was told in evidence by a Supervising Officer (SO) that on 16 November 2024, he 'possibly did not have the right mix of staff in terms of skills and experience to keep the wing safe'. In this inquest, the jury found that, "the communication between prison staff was insufficient and lacked clarity. Opportunities to increase formal observations or notify health care were missed. Staff communications failed to relay the severity and complete scope of the situation." The CCTV evidence clearly showed other prisoners regularly at Mr Ruggiero's cell door, silencing the call bell, banging and kicking at the door (including the wielding of a crutch to hit the door and observation panel), and verbally harassing Mr Ruggiero. The evidence from an SO was that he gave landing officers a clear instruction to intervene; however, it appeared that this did not happen. I was told that the level of officers still in their probationary period has now reduced. I was also told that additional staff training is now in place to address matters such as assertiveness, and that there is also an action plan (albeit I was not shown this). I was also made aware of the 'Urgent Notification' (UN) from HM Chief Inspector of Prisons in relation to HMP Swaleside (December 2025), which included in the rationale, "Staff, many of whom lacked experience, were not confident in challenging poor behaviour and there was a lack of order and control." While some action has been taken, I am not sufficiently reassured that this has addressed the concern and I therefore consider that the risks remain.

Responses

1 respondent
HM Prison Probation Service Central Government
15 Jun 2026 PDF
Action Taken

HM Prison and Probation Service has reissued instructions and introduced quality assurance for cell bell responses, and delivered refresher training on ACCT documents and the 'Code Blue' emergency process. They are also introducing a new 12-month modular training programme and developing learning packages for new prison officers. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Potter,

Thank you for your two Regulation 28 reports of 23 March 2026 following the inquest into the death of Mr Thomas Daniel Ruggiero at HMP Swaleside on 16 November 2024, one addressed to and the second to the Governor of HMP Swaleside. I am addressing both reports and recipients as the interim Director General of Operations of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS).

I know that you will share a copy of this response with Mr Ruggiero’s family, and I would first like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority.

You have expressed concern in four areas which include the emergency cell bell system, staff knowledge and understanding in relation to the importance of completing Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) documents, staff understanding in relation to the ‘Code Blue’ emergency code process and the number of inexperienced prison officers across the entire prison estate.

Your first concern relates to the emergency cell bell system at HMP Swaleside. I have received assurance from the Governor that following this inquest local instructions were reissued to all operational staff, clearly setting out the expectation that staff must physically check every emergency cell bell that has been activated. Supervising Officers are required to oversee and monitor responses to cell bells, and directly challenge officers where responses to cell bells are not completed in a timely way.

A quality assurance process has been introduced to identify areas of weakness around responding to cell bells, and where any performance related issues are identified these will be escalated through the performance management process.

Your second concern relates to the completion and quality of ACCT documentation, particularly the ACCT Care Plan. I can confirm that the prison is providing rolling weekly refresher training on the ACCT process to operational staff. Additionally, to support staff in the comprehensive completion of ACCT documentation, two Safety Floorwalkers have been introduced. As well as supporting staff in the completion of ACCT documents, the Safety Support Workers will identify areas of additional upskilling and training needs, feeding their findings back to the establishment Safety Team.

HMP Swaleside also plan to introduce scenario-based learning within the ongoing local ACCT refresher training with the aim of reinforcing the importance of the ACCT process, and to improve the overall quality of ACCT record keeping. Furthermore, ongoing partnership working with Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust will strengthen multidisciplinary care and planning for prisoners with complex needs.

Monthly ACCT quality audits are now being carried out locally. Learning identified as part of this audit is disseminated through formal staff briefings and monthly meetings. Where standards are not being met individual accountability measures, including performance management action, will continue to be applied.

HMPPS recognises that for the ACCT process to be effective in supporting a prisoner it must be tailored to their individual needs. Training on suicide and self-harm prevention is provided to all new members of staff with prisoner contact. All staff who undertake key roles relating to risk assessment and case management also receive additional role specific training.

The national ACCT Quality Assurance (QA) process has been firmly embedded at HMP Swaleside, and all open ACCTs are reviewed daily by a Supervising Officer in line with HMPPS national QA guidelines.

Your third concern is about the emergency call code process. I have received assurance from the Governor that written guidance has been reissued to all staff clearly setting out when, how, and by whom a Code Blue must be initiated. Expectations of how a Code Blue response needs to be managed are reinforced through daily briefings and form part of the Night Orderly Officer handover.

Practical emergency response simulations, including Code Blue scenarios, are being embedded within local training and mentoring arrangements. Compliance and learning will be monitored through incident reviews and feedback reported to the Safer Custody Management Team. Joint exercises with healthcare staff will continue, this joined up approach will strengthen shared understanding and embed a multidisciplinary approach when responding to medical emergencies.

Your fourth concern was about national staffing and staff experience. HMPPS recognise that having sufficient and skilled frontline staff is vital to the safe running of a prison. We are in the early stages of implementing the Enable Programme, which aims to transform prisons over the medium term through a series of workforce changes. This programme is designed to boost training, extend professional development opportunities and invest in our leaders and managers. A key part of the Enable Programme is redesigning the current prison officer foundation training course. This will change the current two-week induction (plus seven

weeks of local training) into a 12-month modular programme to provide more comprehensive development for all new prison officers.

A set of new learning packages is being developed, targeted primarily towards prison officers within their first two years of service. The Reflective Skills Framework (RSF) is a reflective learning intervention developed as part of the Enable programme to build the capability, confidence and professional judgement of front-line prison officers. Its purpose is to provide support in the form of coaching and mentoring through structured reflection on operational practice.

HMPPS continue to take steps to bolster staffing in prisons. Ongoing recruitment campaigns for prison officers are in place at all establishments where there are current or projected vacancies. Enhanced support is provided to those establishments in the most challenging parts of the prison estate.

Central to our efforts to make further improvements to staffing is the Retention Framework. This framework sets out how data, research and insight are used to understand local and national drivers of attrition, guide targeted interventions, and embed retention as a core, ongoing workforce priority. All staff within HMPPS have access to a ‘Career Pathways Framework’ which equips staff with information on career options, as well as learning and development programmes, helping to retain talent within the organisation. HMPPS monitor the reasons staff are leaving through an exit interview process, tracking the drivers of attrition.

Additionally, mentoring and shadowing arrangements are in place for newer members of staff, further supported by a local training and mentoring team.

I hope the measures outlined above taken by HMPPS provide you with reassurance that learning and appropriate action has been taken from the circumstances of Mr Ruggiero’s death.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 18 November 2024 an investigation into the death of Thomas Daniel RUGGIERO was commenced. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest heard by me and before a jury between 9 - 20 March 2026. The conclusion of the inquest was: Mr Ruggiero died by ligaturing himself in circumstances where his intention could not be ascertained. 1a Hanging 1b 1c 1d II
Circumstances of the death
Thomas Daniel Ruggiero was 39 years of age at the time of his death. He was serving an eight year prison sentence. At the time of his death he was held at HMP Swaleside. Mr Ruggiero had complex mental health needs and his diagnoses included severe Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (EUPD), Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), and Poly-substance misuse. As a result of these diagnoses, Mr Ruggiero was well known to self-harm and was at heightened risk. He had been subject to the ACCT provisions on numerous occasions and had had multiple stays in the in-patient unit or IPD at HMP Swaleside. While still subject to the ACCT and requiring hourly observations, Mr Ruggiero was found unresponsive in his cell at HMP Swaleside on the morning of 16 November 2024, having ligatured. Following attempts at treatment and resuscitation, Mr Ruggiero died at the prison later that day.
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Ministry of Justice

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Report details

Reference
2026-0172
Date of report
24 March 2026
Coroner
Ian Potter
Coroner area
Ian Potter

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 18 May 2026.

Sent to

HMP Swaleside

Part of a series

3 reports
2026-0170 0 responses identified
2026-0171 All responses identified

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