• IOSH will raise awareness among its 44,000 members by highlighting the facts of this case, the concerns raised, and the Health and Safety Executive guidance on this topic. • A summary of the key findings will be included in the next available issue (September 2014) of the Institution's official member magazine the Safety and Health Practitioner. • A news item will be included in the e-bulletin, Connect, on Monday 21 July, which is distributed to all members. (AI summary)
Source · Prevention of Future Deaths
Josephine Foday
Ref: 2014-0301-wp24614
Date: 23 May 2014
Coroner: Caroline Beasley-Murray
Area: Essex
Responses identified: 1 / 1
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The pool's inherently dangerous profile was not properly risk-assessed. A lack of lifeguards, unmonitored CCTV, unclear signage, and untrained staff in aquatic rescue created significant drowning risks, especially for non-swimmers.
Date
23 May 2014
56-day deadline
18 Jul 2014 est.
Responses identified
1 of 1
Coroner's concerns
The pool's inherently dangerous profile was not properly risk-assessed. A lack of lifeguards, unmonitored CCTV, unclear signage, and untrained staff in aquatic rescue created significant drowning risks, especially for non-swimmers.
View full coroner's concerns
1) The pool profile was inherently dangerous
2)The pool profile, including depths and gradients were not considered when carrying out the hazard identification that is required in the swimming pool guidance document HSG 179
3) The risk assessments did not cover the accurate profile information and any other specific risk factors
4) There were no lifeguards provided and the duty holders of the pool did not ensure that there were in place effective controls in place to reduce the risk of drowning
5) It did not appear that non swimmers or poor swimmers had been considered in the risk assessment process.
6) The pool operators had not sought the advice of a swimming pool expert in order to decide what would constitute adequate controls where constant pool supervision was not provided in this unusual hopper type pool. The operators were relying on CCTV as a method of supervision but this was not monitored and no system was put in its place when it became unavailable.
7) Some of the signage provided was not clear, accurate and unambiguous.
8)The pool operators did not ensure that in a pool of over 1.5m depth there were always on the premises, when the pool was open, staff trained in aquatic rescue techniques. .
2)The pool profile, including depths and gradients were not considered when carrying out the hazard identification that is required in the swimming pool guidance document HSG 179
3) The risk assessments did not cover the accurate profile information and any other specific risk factors
4) There were no lifeguards provided and the duty holders of the pool did not ensure that there were in place effective controls in place to reduce the risk of drowning
5) It did not appear that non swimmers or poor swimmers had been considered in the risk assessment process.
6) The pool operators had not sought the advice of a swimming pool expert in order to decide what would constitute adequate controls where constant pool supervision was not provided in this unusual hopper type pool. The operators were relying on CCTV as a method of supervision but this was not monitored and no system was put in its place when it became unavailable.
7) Some of the signage provided was not clear, accurate and unambiguous.
8)The pool operators did not ensure that in a pool of over 1.5m depth there were always on the premises, when the pool was open, staff trained in aquatic rescue techniques. .
Responses
IOSH
Action Planned
Dear Ms Beasley-Murray Further to your correspondence regarding the deaths of hotel swimming pool users Josephine and Komba Kpakiwa, in which you seek IOSH assistance to help prevent further such tragedies_ We understand that the swimming pool concerned is now closed and so no-one else will be put at similar risk in this facility: In our capacity as a professional body for occupational safety and health practitioners , we will raise awareness among our 44,000 members by highlighting the facts of this case, the concerns raised and the Health and Safety Executive guidance on this topic. To this end, we will be taking the following actions: Including a summary of the key findings in the next available issue (September 2014) of the Institution's official member magazine the Safety and Health Practitioner Including a news item in our e-bulletin, Connect, on Monday 21 July, which is distributed to all our members. We note that you have written to the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and would also suggest that you contact the Royal Society for Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA); which has a Leisure Safety Department specifically covering water safety, to further raise awareness of this incident_ Ydurg Bincerely Jarl Chmiel Chtef Executive Institution of Occupational Safety and Health Founded 1945 inccrporated by Ryal Charter 2003 Regiztered cnarity' !095790 Recognised b; 'he ILO as an F TCR 0 FBOPLF International ;'GC Foday
Report sections
Investigation and inquest
On 29 April 2013 I commenced an investigation into the deaths of Josephine Foday and of Komba Kpakiwa. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquests on 15 May 2014. The conclusions of the inquests were Accident. Natural The cause of death for both 1a) consistent with drowning.
Circumstances of the death
Both Ms Foday and Mr Komba were found floating in the swimming pool at Down Hall Country House Hotel, Hatfield Heath, Essex. Their deaths were confirmed shortly thereafter.
Copies sent to
copy of your responseHM Senior Coroner for Essex
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Report details
- Reference
- 2014-0301-wp24614
- Date of report
- 23 May 2014
- Coroner
- Caroline Beasley-Murray
- Coroner area
- Essex
Responses identified
Responses identified
1 of 1
All listed responses identified
Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 18 Jul 2014 (estimated).
Sent to
- Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and Institute of Occupational Safety and Health