Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Jeffrey Gash

Ref: 2014-0377 Date: 18 Aug 2014 Coroner: Andrew Tweddle Area: County Durham & Darlington Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

Crisis Team failures included inadequate telephone assessment training, no clear policy for declining home visits, and insufficient exploration of new symptoms leading to poor risk assessment. The clinical risk policy was unclear for non-in-person assessments.

Date 18 Aug 2014
56-day deadline 13 Oct 2014 est.
Responses identified 1 of 1
Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
Crisis Team failures included inadequate telephone assessment training, no clear policy for declining home visits, and insufficient exploration of new symptoms leading to poor risk assessment. The clinical risk policy was unclear for non-in-person assessments.
View full coroner's concerns
In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report t0 you: [BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] The Crisis Team nurse accepted in evidence that she had not been as forceful as she could and should have been t0 explore with the deceased his new symptoms, auditory hallucinations, hearing voices. This evidences a lack of training and understanding of the nature of and importance of an appropriate level of telephone assessment No evidence was provided at the inquest to indicate a formal Trust policy on when t0 decline home visits on the grounds of personal safety and security and Valley 29hh the 28"h hurting day they

Ihe nurse relied upon being told of concerns about visiting this property from colleagues but did not record the same or any explanation for her decision_ The absence of a clear policy and a policy for recording decisions made or understanding and training thereon is an area of concern
3. Notwithstanding the fact that the deceased declined t0 attend the hospital for a face to face interview; insufficient weight was given to the reason therefore and whether domestic and other pressures were mililating against him attending were not properly considered, if at all: Given that there was an insufficiency of enquiry into the deceased's state of mind and in particular a failure to further explore the issue of him claiming to hear voices, on inadequate assessment of risk was undertaken and it was accepted by the Trust in evidence that there ought t0 have been a face to consultation with the deceased and that had he not agreed to it voluntarily; then there ought to have been a compulsory assessment:
5. The clinical risk assessment and management policy document (Version 5) which was presented in evidence fails to clarify the nature and detail of what form of risk assessment needs to be completed when a none in-person face to face is being undertaken: Thus, the notes entered on the PARIS system were unclear as to their author's view of risk of self harm where it was accepted in evidence that full details of the assessment of risk and its conclusion are central to the Crisis Team process. The Trust has carried out an SUI. Certain recommendations have been made and are being implemented: The inquest however; as evidenced above, revealed other issues not dealt with by the SUI and therefore a complete re-evaluation of the deceased's contact with the Trust should be undertaken taking into account the evidence given at the inquest s0 that a complete overview of Trust policy dealing with the above matters and any other such review might uncover can be considered by management and if agreed, implemented:

Responses

1 respondent
Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Trust NHS / Health Body
13 Oct 2014 PDF
Action Taken

Following the inquest, the individual nurse received capability management and observed best practices. The Trust is reviewing policy and practice, planning further suicide prevention training, and monitoring implementation via the Directorate's Quality Assurance Group. Trust-wide actions will be allocated to an owner and monitored by the Patient Safety Team. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Tweddle Regulatlon 28 Report In respect of the death of Mr Jeffrey Gash Thank you for your Regulation 28 report dated 18 August 2014 in respect of the above individual and your findings from the inquest into his death. have tried to address each of your concems in tum below, and have summarised key actions (with timescales) in the appended action plan.
1. The Crisls Team nurse accepted In evldence (that she) should have been more forceful and detalled In explorlng wlth the deceased hls new symptoms, audltory halluclnatlons and hearing volces whlch evldences a Iack of tralning and understandlng of the nature of and Importance of an appropriate level of telephone assessment As you have described, the individual nurse involved in the care of Mr Gash recognised in the inquest that she should have been more detailed in her questioning of him in relation to specific symptoms. This individual has, since the inquest, spent some time reflecting on this with her clinical supervisor: In addition, from September 2013 to January 2014 the individual nurse went through a period of informal capability management During this time she did not undertake the shift co-ordinator role responsibilities and worked all shifts alongside a more senior and experienced member of the team: She observed best practice assessments and then her assessment practice was observed and Way

evaluated: Once the observing expert clinician , Advanced Practitioner and Team Manager were all satsified that she had acheived the appropriate levels of competence she was able t0 resume the shift co-ordinator role Since that time, periodic checks of her assessments (and assessments done by the rest of the team) have been undertaken by the Consultant Psychiatrist to provide assurance that they are of appropriate quality. This has also enabled us to provide specific feedback to staff as needed to help them develop and improve: are now assured that the individual nurse has increased her competence and knowledge in telephone assessment skills together with an overall improvement in team performance.
2. No evldence was provlded at the Inquest to Indicate a formal Trust pollcy on when to decllne home vlslts on the grounds of personal safety and securlty and the nurse relled upon belng told of concerns about vlsiting thls property from colleagues but did not record the same or any explanatlon for her declslon: The absence of a clear pollcy and a pollcy for recording declslons made or understanding and tralnlng thereon is an area of concern: In relation to your specific comments about Trust policy, the Trust Clinical Risk Assesment and Management (CRAM) policy outlines the responsibilities for staff to determine potential risks and the need to document these within the clinical record. The risks identified in relation to Mr Gash at home should have been assessed within gudiance provided by that policy and recorded in the clinical record. Decisions about making Ione or accompanied visits to the home should have been recorded in the clinical record and processes in the Trust Health and Safety workbook also provide guidance on assessing whether a home visit is appropriate or not The Trust also has a Lone Working Procedure which should be completed for all staff who may in the course of their duties have periods where they are working alone including in the context of a high risk visit This is to some extent addressed within SUI report where it is documented that a more assertive approach may have helped within the engagement findings: The policy lead for these areas will be asked to review the relevant policy against your indings and ensure that these are fully taken into account and an implementation plan produced accordingly- In relation to recording the information from colleagues, and the individual nurse's decision making on the shift in question, there is already an 'alerts' section in our electronic care record which staff are asked t0 use t0 document risks in a way that this information is available to all staff working with a specific patient The Team Manager has previously highlighted the importance of recording this with the team, but since Mr Gash's inquest has further reinforced this via team meetings: In addition, the Head of Service for Durham and Darlington AMH Services has asked the Crisis Team Manager to share your recomendations with the Specialty's Acute Care Group in order that the Trust standard operational policy for Crisis Teams can be strengthened accordingly: We visting the the the

also acknowledge the conclusions from the inquest that further options may have been available in the absence of Mr Gash agreeing t0 see the crisis team at the hospital base, and indeed am aware of instances where staff have used alternative venues for appointments. Staff have been reminded of the need t0 explore and utilise alterative appointment venues. 3 Notwlthstanding the fact that the deceased declined to attend the hospltal for a face to face Intervlew, Insufficlent welght was glven to the reason therefore and whether domestlc and other pressures were mllltating agalnst hlm attending were not properly considered, If at all: GIven that there was an Insufflclency of enqulry Into the deceased'$ state of mind and In partlcular a fallure to further explore the Issue of hlm clalmlng to hear volces, an Inadequate assessment of rlsk was undertaken It was accepted by the Trust In evldence that there ought to have been face to face consultatlon wlth the deceased and that had he not agreed to It voluntarlly, then there ought to have been compulsory assessment Since Mr Gash's sad death, the individual nurse has critically reflected upon this at length with the team manager her period of informal capability management described under point 1 above_ agree that more in-depth exploration of his reasons for not wishing to attend should have been undertaken The Trust Did Not Attend policy does highlight that the nurse should have contacted the GP immediately to agree a management plan;, in situations where high risks have potentially been identified. As noted above, the individual nurse has undergone a period of observed practice such that the Advanced Practitioner and Team Manager are now satisfied that she would now manage this situation differently, in that issues would be explored in more depth: We are also confident that she would now, and has been shown t0, use colleagues within the team for additional opinions, and make better use of medical staff for consideration when a formal assessment under the Mental Health Act may be requried. Your recommendations in relation to this have been shared with the team as a whole t0 ensure that their practice reflects the specific actions we have completed with individual nurse. 5, The cllnical rlsk assessment and management pollcy document (verslon 5) whlch was presented In evldence falls to clarlfy the nature and detall of what form of risk assessment needs to be completed when a non In-person face to face Is undertaken: Thus, the notes entered on the PARIS system were unclear as to thelr author's vlew of the risk of hamm where It was accepted In evldence that full detalls of the assessment of risk and Its concluslon are central to the crlsls team process. The Trust has carrled out an SUI. Certaln recommendatlons have been made and are Implemented: The Inquest; however, a8 evldenced above, revealed other Issues not dealt wlth by the SUI and therefore a complete re-evaluatlon of the deceased's contact wlth the Trust should be undertaken taking Into account the evldence glven at the Inquest s0 that a complete overvlew of Trust pollcy dealing with the above matters and any other such revlew might uncover can be considered by management and If agreed, Implemented: and during the belng self

A further review of the Trust's contact with Mr Gash be undertaken, incorporating other matters arising the inquest The review will include the efficacy and relevance of the current Trust policy guidance and an analysis of compliance with that guidance included in the review A Trustwide review of the clinical risk (CRAM) policy and practice is currently underway; with initial reports due in the spring; the information from this Serious Untoward Incident investigation and the inquest will be fed into that review. Further training and development in suicide prevention Is planned for early next year. Implementation plans for the new policy and the training will be evaluted to ensure compliance_ In conclusion; the Adult Mental Health Directorate had begun several pieces of improvement work prior to the inquest t0 address some of the concems, and can only apologise if these were not clear through the evidence given by staff: However there are also a number of Trust-wide issues highlighted through the inquest process which will take a little longer to fully address. The implementation of the actions relating specifcally to issues within the gifit of the Aduit Mental Health Directorate within the action plan attached will be monitored via the Directorate's Quality Assurance Group on monthly basis to ensure completion. In addition review of the effectiveness of the actions, and policy compliance will be reported to the Locality Management and Govemance Board: Trust-wide actions identified will be allocated to an appropriate action plan owner and monitored by the Patient Safety Team by their goverance processes to ensure they are completed to an appropriate standard The Diretorate Quality Assurance Group processes will also ensure that the lessons from this case and associated leaming are shared across other in-patient areas and crisis teams in order that - can assure us that similar issues should not occur elsewhere. The Trust has corporate processes to both monitor completion of serious incident action plans and to audit the efiectiveness of those actions in creating change and improvement hope that the information contained here, and in the amended action plan attached, provides you with the necessary assurance YoU require.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 3r October 2014 commenced an investigation into the death of Jeffrey Gash aged 46 yrs. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 5th August 2014. The conclusion of the inquest was "intentionally took his Own life"
Circumstances of the death
The deceased, following a referral from his GP , met with the Crisis Team on August 2013. He was subsequently seen by his GP again and a Consultant Psychiatrist: On 27/h September 2014 the GP received a telephone call from the deceased's wife saying that he was distressed and was hearing voices. The GP contacted Crisis Team, spoke to a nurse who gave advice which resulted in the GP making a home visit to assess the situation before further contact was made with the Crisis Team:
3. The Crisis Team nurse, after speaking with colleagues decided not t0 make a home visit because of personal safety risks and spoke with the deceased on the telephone to discuss his problems, invite him to attend West Park Hospital and when he declined, gave further contact information to assist: On September; the same Crisis Team nurse received a further telephone call from the deceased stating that he was feeling worse, had spoken to the Samaritans but in evidence, the nurse believed this was a positive not a negative position, as he was seeking assistance, sharing his concerns and she decided not to consider taking matters further not requesting a face to face visit or escalating the matter further: The deceased hung himself on 30"h September 2013. The deceased left a note and in this he said You no went to see the doctors at West Park Hospital was every but weren"t interested"
Action should be taken
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe you and your organisation have the power to take such action_
Copies sent to
SCHEDULE 5 paragraph 7 ACTION To PREVENT OTher DEATHSThis regulation applies where a coroner is under a under paragraph 7of Schedule 5 to make a report to prevent other deathsIn this regulation, & reference to "a report" means a report to prevent other deaths made by the coronerreport may not be made until the coroner has considered all the documents, evidence and information that in the opinion of the coroner are relevant t0 the investigationof Schedule 5In this regulation, a reference to "a report" means a report to prevent other deaths made by the coroner: dutyresponse must be provided to the coroner who made the report within 58 days of the date on which the report is sentcoroner who made the report may extend the period referred to in paragraph(even if an application for extension is made after the time for compliance has expired)On receipt of a copy under paragraph(b) or (c))Representations under paragraphmust be made to the coroner no later than the time when the response to the report to prevent other deaths is provided to the coroner under paragraphcoroner must pass any representations made under paragraph

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Report details

Reference
2014-0377
Date of report
18 August 2014
Coroner
Andrew Tweddle
Coroner area
County Durham & Darlington

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 13 Oct 2014 (estimated).

Sent to

Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust

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