Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Elaine Bradbrook

Ref: 2018-0044 Date: 14 Feb 2018 Coroner: Heidi Connor Area: Nottinghamshire 1 response identified · 1 indexed addressee View PDF

AI-generated concerns summaryThe coroner raised concerns regarding the failure to escalate and act on a patient's deteriorating condition, the lack of clinical review and risk reduction during transfer, and the trust's subsequent lack of internal investigation or learning opportunities.

Date 14 Feb 2018
56-day deadline 11 Apr 2018 stated in the report
Responses identified 1 of 1
Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
The coroner raised concerns regarding the failure to escalate and act on a patient's deteriorating condition, the lack of clinical review and risk reduction during transfer, and the trust's subsequent lack of internal investigation or learning opportunities.
View full coroner's concerns
My concerns are :
a. There was a failure to escalate and act on Elaine’s deteriorating condition from at least 14.00 on 22 April 2017, when her NEWS was 6, and her GCS is also likely to have dropped.
b. There was a failure to record a single GCS after 14.00, when her level of consciousness dropped. I found no evidence of any clinical or nursing review after this time.
c. There was a failure to discuss Elaine’s condition with neurosurgeons in Nottingham again before she was transferred to Nottingham, when it was clear that her condition had deteriorated significantly.
d. There was a failure to reduce the risks during transfer – a patient with a GCS of 4 and a history of vomiting was handed over to ambulance staff with an unprotected airway and without clinical review, or escort.
e. The trust appears not to have appreciated the significance of these issues. It has not carried out any internal investigation, nor contacted Elaine’s family in line with its duty of candour. I am concerned that there has been no opportunity for learning within the trust, following these serious failures.
f. The trust’s procedure for carrying out High Level Investigations and Serious Untoward Incident Investigations should be reviewed.
g. The trust legal services team did not send the witness (doctor) responsible for reviewing Elaine shortly before transfer, as requested. It sent no representative or supporter with , despite the trust being an Interested Person. There was no representative in attendance to hear the conclusions which raised serious concerns.

Responses

1 respondent

United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust

NHS Trust
Indexed date: 9 Apr 2018 PDF
AI-classified response stance Action Taken
AI-generated response summary

• The Trust stated it had made significant improvements to its Serious Incident (SI) process in the last 12 months, incorporating training. • An Interim Director of Governance was leading on the SI process project, and a new Risk Manager commenced in February 2018. • The Trust had asked the Risk Team to commence an SI investigation to review the care in this case and submit an action plan.

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Dear Mrs Connor write on behalf of the Chief Executive in response to your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, following the inquest into the death of Mrs Elaine Bradbrook: The Inquest process is managed by Legal Services Manager and understand that she provided you with a statement in November 2U17 ouilning the problems that occurred in this particular case due to a communication issue between your office and the Trust: Due to this breakdown in communication, the usual procedures were not triggered in the Legal Services Department: The Legal Services Manager is a member of the Sl (serious incident) Group which meets weekly and any issues arising from inquest reports or early indications from the Coroner or other hospitals (as in this case), would have been picked up and addressed at that meeting: The Legal Services Manager and her team work closely with the Risk Team in linking up Sl investigations and inquests and am sorry this did not happen in this particular case It is usual practice for the Legal Services Manager to ensure that staff are adequately supported through the inquest process either meeting her or with the Trust's legal representatives if instructed, Indeed, this is a large part of the role of the Department: am sorry this did not happen in this particular case_ am confident that there are processes in place in the Legal Services Department to ensure requests are dealt with in a timely manner and staff are adequately supported, when notified. agree that there are clear learning points from this case and have asked the Risk Team to commence an Sl investigation to review the care and submit an action plan, as necessary will of course share this with you the family once complete. The Trust recognises that the Sl process at that time was poor: However we have, in the last 12 months_ made significant improvements to our Sl process and this incorporates training across the Trust on undertaking Sl investigations_ This process is being overseen by me and the Director of Nursing and we currently have in post an Interim Director of Governance who is leading on this project Our new Risk Manager also commenced in post in February 2018. Whilst this is very much a work in progress, hope you will be assured that the Trust is striving towards a much improved Sl process_ sincerely Auukkosbu Dr Neill Hepburn MBAJMD FRCP Medical Director (GMC 2855408) and Yours

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 1 August 2017 I commenced an investigation into the death of Elaine Bradbrook.. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 11 January 2018. The conclusion of the inquest was natural causes.
Circumstances of the death
I was asked to refer to the deceased as Elaine during the inquest, and I reflect that request in this report.

Clinical background

Elaine Bradbrook suffered a severe stroke on 21.4.17. Onset of symptoms was around 10.30. She was admitted to Pilgrim Hospital, Boston, Lincolnshire at 11.48. She was quickly scanned and Alteplase was started at 12.18. Her condition was monitored in line with the trust’s protocol for the first 24 hours after administration of the drug. At 12.30, her GCS was recorded as 13. This was the last recorded GCS. Her NEWS was 2. Her next observations were due at 16.30.

In fact, a set of NEWS observations was recorded at 14.00. I found it likely that these were recorded before 16.30 because staff caring for her were concerned about her condition. Her NEWS at 14.00 was 6. This was partly because of a drop in blood pressure, but also because her level of consciousness dropped. She was recorded as being responsive only to pain at that time. The evidence of the neurosurgery witness was that it is likely that her GCS was around 9 or 10 at that time.

The NEWS score alone should have triggered review by a doctor. There is no evidence that this happened. Neurosurgeons in Nottingham were contacted at around 2pm. I found it likely that this call was triggered by the finalised report of a routine head CT (done at 10.00, with final report available at 13.43, suggesting urgent neurosurgical review), rather than by the NEWS Score. This is because :

 The GCS (and its exact EVM components) given to Nottingham matches that recorded at 12.30. It is unlikely that her GCS was 13 or 14 by 14.00.  There was no increased monitoring after 14.00, which is likely to have been suggested after a clinical review at that time. Indeed, there is no evidence of any further monitoring or review after 12.30 that day.

The clear recollection of ambulance staff who arrived to transfer Elaine at 15.26 was that she was GCS 4 and remained so throughout the journey to Nottingham. Nursing staff at the hospital told ambulance crew that Elaine had been vomiting and had required suction. Despite this, Elaine was handed to ambulance staff for transfer in a very deep coma, without protection of her airway, without escort, and without review by an anaesthetist or indeed any other doctor, after her deterioration on the afternoon of 22 April. Hospital staff administered Ondansetron before she left. It is likely that they knew that the ambulance technician and trainee technician sent to transport her could not intubate her.

Surgeons in Nottingham were surprised at Elaine’s condition on arrival. A craniectomy procedure was nevertheless carried out. This showed massive brain swelling. She died at Queen’s Medical Centre on 27 April 2017. Her cause of death (following PM) was :

1a Ischaemic stroke 1b Atherosclerosis

I accepted the evidence that it was unlikely that Elaine would have survived even with different management, given the severity of her stroke. My focus in issuing this report is on the safety of other patients for whom these matters could make a difference.

Investigation and inquest management by the Lincolnshire Trust

Complications arose before the inquest, when the only witness who provided a statement , consultant stroke physician) booked a foreign trip a number of weeks after his summons was sent to the trust. The medical director was involved, and kindly agreed to change his plans.

Unfortunately, he booked a flight for the second day of the inquest, and asked to leave early that day, leaving no representative from the trust to hear the conclusions, which raised serious concerns about the management at Lincolnshire.

In Dr Jergovic’s defence, he had never attended an inquest in the UK before. The trust was aware that he was due to attend a 2 day inquest, but sent no representative or supporter from the trust to assist him. Witnesses from East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust and Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust both attended with representatives from their respective legal services departments, despite the fact that the Lincolnshire trust was the only Interested Person (other than family).

The trust legal team was asked repeatedly to send the witness (doctor) who had been responsible for the patient just before her transfer to Nottingham. We were told that was . He gave evidence that he was not involved that day – he could only give evidence based on the records.

(consultant neurosurgeon from Nottingham) gave evidence that the Lincolnshire trust was made aware of concerns about her transfer to Nottingham. The trust has confirmed (when we asked them) that there has been no internal investigation of these matters. said he was not aware of any investigation. The trust adduced no evidence of either an awareness of the issues arising from this inquest, nor any steps to reduce the risk for similar patients in future.

It is suprising that appears not to have had any support from the trust which employs him, and that the trust has not investigated the circumstances of this case before now. The trust has a duty of candour, which appears to have been overlooked.
Copies sent to
2. Legal services team at United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust3. Legal services team for NUH

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Report details

Reference
2018-0044
Date of report
14 February 2018
Coroner
Heidi Connor
Coroner area
Nottinghamshire

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 11 Apr 2018 (stated in the report).

Sent to

United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust

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