Taiyah-Grace Peebles

Dear Sir Regulatlon 28 Report Talyah-Grace Sharon Peebles refer to your report dated 24 July 2017 made under paragraph 7 , Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 in relation to the inquest into the very ad death of Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles, who died on 25 2017 at Herne railway station: Background As noted in your report, the conclusion of the inquest was that Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles died on the evening of 25 July 2017 whon, having dismounted from a train at the station in an intoxicated state: she turned in the wrong direction, became disorientated and made contact with the Ilve rail canying the electric current: Response to Points of Concern In your report;, you state that "The absence of an end of platform barrier and the existence of rail at ground level that might [be] accessible to members of the public may in my opinion create a risk that future deaths wills occur unless action Is taken_ The Assistant Coroner understands that & barrier has since been constructed at Herne Bay Station to help prevent deaths in similar circumstances but that other platforms in the area have no such barrier. His further understanding is that in Other parts of the country, trains are powered by electric current supplied by way of overhead cables rather than live rails at ground level, thereby making contact with the power supply less likely: In my opinion; action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe your organisation has the power to take such action: Ground level power sugply can confim that the majority of the South East route rail nefwork Is powered by a ground level 750V d.c. conductor rail system: The UK rail network comprises of two main forms of Network Rall Intestrtuo Lhited Redeterec Oilce: 2" Floor; Ona Extraholt Sbeet London, NW1 2DN, Replalerad In Encland and Wcles No 2904587 Floor, July " Bay ~ live

electric traction syetemg, 750V d.c. ground level conductor reil systems and 25kV a.c overhead contact line systems. Both types of traction systems come wth different rsks which are drivers of Network Rails asset polices and standards. The ground level conductor rail system on the South East route was Installed in 1950s and, although Network Rail has no future plans to install new conductor rail syetems; it is not reasonably practicable to convert the system t0 an overhead contact Iine due to the complexity and cost to the railway industry. Whilst the ground level conductor rail cannot be replaced, Network Rail is committed to continue to develop reasonably practical solutions to improve the safety of the system wherover possible. Platform-end foncing With regards to platform-end fencing, hlstorically the fencing has not boon installed a8 standard practlce: The risks Involved in intentlonal and unintentional accessing of the rail network were controlled via wamning notices at the platform-end. The platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels that have been installed at Herne are part of a wider program of mitigations that are being applied to locations across tha South East route to address the risks associated with members of the public either Intentionally or unintentionally accossing the rail notwork: There are curently two programmes of activity which will see platfom-end installed at over 50 stations on the South East route. We have already completed works on 30 locations over the Kent and Sussex areas_ expect the majority of works to be completed by the end of 2018 with some being finished in early 2019. There are also programmes to improve our fencing at areas we congider to be at higher risk of intentional or unintentional public access and this Includes E800,000 of work which Is due to be completed by April 2019. Network Rail, Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and the British Transport Police continue to work together to manage this type of incident on the rail network: Our approach isa risk- based one using data (including data shared by the to identify areas where the public may access tho line: week; joint BTP and Network Rail data ie used to identify trends_ This information is used to Inform our patrolling plans which set out where the BTP, TOC or Network Rail should position thelr security resources throughout weak to best protect both members of the public and our Infrastructure and stations from intentional or unintentional access. Monthly meetings are held with the BTP and TOCs (Southeastem and Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR)) to discuss our priorities around areas we consider to be at a higher risk of the public gaining access to the infrastructure. hope this response provides you with assurance that addresses your concerns. If can be of further assietance, or if you would Ilke further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me: Finally, on behalf of all at Network Rail; would like to take this opportunity t0 express my sincere condolences to the family of Miss Peebles.