Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Ben Haddon-Cave

Ref: 2019-0314-wp26824 Date: 25 Sep 2019 Coroner: ME Hassell Area: London Inner (North) 1 response identified · 1 indexed addressee View PDF

AI-generated concerns summaryThe coroner noted inadequate fence inspections due to obscured views and alternative access not being used. Concerns were also raised regarding a flawed dual reporting system that prevented identification of inspection failures, and an insufficient internal investigation by Network Rail.

Date 25 Sep 2019
56-day deadline 31 Dec 2019 est. estimated from the Judiciary.uk publication date
Responses identified 1 of 1
Railway related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
The coroner noted inadequate fence inspections due to obscured views and alternative access not being used. Concerns were also raised regarding a flawed dual reporting system that prevented identification of inspection failures, and an insufficient internal investigation by Network Rail.
View full coroner's concerns
Paddy and Ben died on 21 March 2019. The last time the broken fence was checked was 27 October 2016. In the intervening two and a half years, reasonable endeavours had not been made to inspect (and repair) the fence.

1. The fence was marked down for annual inspections because there was no history of problems in that area. However, the inspectors conducting the inspections on 27 October 2017 and 27 October 2018 (a different inspector on each occasion) did not consider the relevant part of the fence because dense vegetation blocked their view from trackside.

Neither inspector attempted to view the fence from the other (public) side, which they could easily have done.

This represents a failure of the two individuals and/or a failure of their training and/or both. There are only four inspectors at Tottenham, so two inspectors represents half the inspections workforce.

2. Both inspectors inputted their inspection onto a computer system, but neither submitted a paper form as they were meant so to do.

This represents a failure of the two individuals and/or a failure of their training and/or both. In any event, such a system of dual submission was inherently flawed.

3. As a consequence of no paper forms being submitted, the track engineer did not see the evidence of the failure to inspect the fence, and so was not in a position to challenge this.

This represents a system failure.

4. As a consequence of no paper forms being submitted, the internal auditors did not see the evidence of the failure to inspect the fence or the evidence of the failure to challenge, and so were not in a position to highlight this.

This represents a system failure.
5. Network Rail identified the gap in the fence within a week of the deaths but, despite what was described as a full internal investigation, the system failures I have described were only discovered after the inquest had resumed on 30 August 2019. Their original investigation was inadequate.

Network Rail had been operating for the previous five and a half months on the basis that this was a localised problem. Even after an adjournment to facilitate further investigations, a senior Network Rail representative gave evidence to that effect on 13 September 2019.

Yet the reality is that Network Rail does not know if it has a national system failure of fencing inspection.

Paddy and Ben were adults who had responsibility for their own actions, but the fence gap was accessible to children and appeared to be worn.

And I heard no evidence that the two had planned to go up onto trackside. A determined effort can be difficult to thwart, but an impulsive action (with judgement and motor skills impaired through alcohol) might well be avoided if the route to danger is not so very easily taken.

Responses

1 respondent

Network Rail

Private Sector
Letter dated 25 Nov 2019 PDF
AI-classified response stance Action Planned
AI-generated response summary

• Network Rail implemented a revised Boundary Fencing Inspection Standard in April 2019, which mandates electronic records and includes a new process for recording and reviewing non-tactile inspections. • A National Safety Bulletin will be issued, and competency training modules enhanced, to provide inspectors with guidance on alternative viewing methods for non-tactile inspections. • The audit protocol has been updated to reflect the new standard, and a national special topic audit will be conducted to assess compliance with the new boundary inspection standard.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 26 March 2019, one of my assistant coroners, Sarah Bourke, commenced an investigation into the death of Ben Haddon-Cave and Paddy Bolster, aged 27 and 26 years respectively. The investigations concluded at the end of the inquests earlier today. I made a narrative determination at each inquest, which I attach now.
Circumstances of the death
These two young men climbed on top of a freight train near Hackney Wick Station in the small hours of 21 March 2019 and were electrocuted.

This was an impulsive act. They reached the train by way of a gap in the track perimeter fence giving on to a well worn path leading to trackside.
Copies sent to
Office of Road and Rail, Paddy’s mum

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Report details

Reference
2019-0314-wp26824
Date of report
25 September 2019
Coroner
ME Hassell
Coroner area
London Inner (North)

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 31 Dec 2019 (estimated from the Judiciary.uk publication date).

Sent to

Network Rail

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