Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Corrie McKeague

Ref: 2022-0097 Date: 1 Apr 2022 Coroner: Nigel Parsley Area: Suffolk Responses identified: 4 / 1 View PDF

In effective bin locks and the absence of an automated weight flagging system failed to detect an individual in a bin, further compounded by poor driver visibility and inadequate search tools.

Date 1 Apr 2022
56-day deadline 26 May 2022
Responses identified 4 of 1
Alcohol, drug and medication related deaths Other related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
In effective bin locks and the absence of an automated weight flagging system failed to detect an individual in a bin, further compounded by poor driver visibility and inadequate search tools.
View full coroner's concerns
the MATTERS OF CONCERN as follows. ­ In the conclusion returned by the jury, they identified 6 issues, which directly contributed to Corrie's death. This PFD Reports relates to 4 of those issues.
1. Ineffective bin locks. The court heard that bin locks were designed to keep waste within the bin, keep inclement weather out, but were not designed to keep individuals out. The locks were described as not robust, and a determined or strong individual would get in. Due to their design the locks were also frequently broken. Stronger locks (such as snap locks) had been considered, but due to the risk of entombing (an individual inadvertently becoming locked inside a bin), stronger locks had been discounted. However, the court heard there are currently no stronger bin locks available which would allow an individual to open them from the inside should they become entombed in a bin. There were 740 reported incidents of people in bins over a 6-year period (i.e. 10 per week), which are likely to be reduced if stronger locks are fitted.
2. Ineffective search of the bin. Despite the lifting mechanism recording the weight of each bin every time it is lifted, there is no automated/digital system to recognise when a bin is significantly heavier than it usually is. In this case the usual weight in the bin (based on an average of 13 previous collections) was approximately 15kgs. The bin weight recorded by the lifting mechanism on the dust cart was 116kgs. Such a significant difference in weight of a particular bin, is something that should be recognisable and should warrant a further check being completed.
3. Any driver not having the means to search the bin thoroughly or safely. The court heard that drivers are now told to use a 'push stick' to allow a more thorough search of the contents of a bin. This instruction was not in place at the time of this incident. However, it was not clear from the evidence if the push stick is an identifiable piece of equipment on every vehicle, or if it is deemed as a piece of safety equipment, and therefore included in the daily safety checks of the vehicle.
4. Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on the lorry In relation to the poor visibility through the Perspex viewing aperture/window on the lorry two factors were identified: Firstly, it is physically impossible to undertake a check of the hopper mechanism on the Biffa lorry as the viewing aperture window is too high for this to be achieved by an average height driver.

Secondly, on the six-year-old vehicle in question the Perspex had become opaque. A Detective Constable who had watched the lifting process to provide evidence of its operation for the court, described the driver as standing on tiptoes to try a check the vehicle hopper, whilst peering around the wing of the lifting mechanism. When asked specifically about the viewing window the officer said it was too high to see through and opaque. The officer told the court the viewing aperture was 'totally useless' as a means of checking what was being loaded into the hopper. Whilst viewing the hopper is impossible on the current vehicle, it renders the instruction for drivers to view the hopper prior to compaction (contained in the Biffa Operating Instructions for Trade Waste Vehicles) impossible to achieve. In addition, the automatic nature of the compaction process, also makes adherence to the Operating Instructions impossible on some vehicles, as compaction starts immediately the bin is tipped.

Responses

4 respondents
Container Handling Equipment Manufacturers Other
3 May 2022 PDF
Noted

CHEM notes the concerns raised regarding public entry into containers and will welcome suggestions for additional warnings for operators. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Parsley. Thauk you for your correspondence dated 01/04/2022. The contents of which we note. May we firstly introduce you to CHEM which was formed in the late 1960's, which is a non profit making organisation run by its members whose principal activity is to ensure certain standards ofuniversal interfacing ofequipment with the relevant vehicles & sharing of information by way ofguidance, which all its members can adhere to. The membership mainly comprises ofmanufacturing companies covering the manufacture of Skiploaders, Hooklift demounts, Compactors & certain containers, & Refuse collection vehicles within the UK, all ofwhich have separate Committees. Regarding the containers used & handled, CHEM have formed Technical Standards. which relates to Skiploader, Hookloader, & Compaction containers only, to ensure that these are compatible for use with the UK spec vehicles. The design & build ofRefuse Collection 11001 containers/bins are not covered under CHEM Technical Standards, we understand these are catered for under EN840. The number ofthese containers in use the UK run into the millions and CHEM believe they are fit for purpose and serve our industry needs well. The Refuse Collection Vehicles - RCV's manufactures who are members have their own instruction & guidance manuals along with the appropriate warning signage. In addition, going forward, CHEM share the concerns raised regarding the number of incidents ofmembers of the public gaining entry inside these containers and the CHEM RCV members would welcome any suggestions for the insertion ofadditional warnings for the operator to cover this type ofeventuality.

We hope the information contained within may be ofsome assistance with your enquiries
Biffa
7 May 2022 PDF
Action Planned

Biffa is reviewing operating instructions to ensure clarity on the use of viewing windows, reminding customers about using locks effectively, and continuing to develop relationships with charities supporting rough sleepers. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr. Parsley, REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS - INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF CORRIE McKEAGUE We write in response to your Report dated 1st April 2022. This letter sets out our response to each of the matters of concern you identify in your Report and adopts the same order and numbering (identified in bold below). As a member of the Environmental Services Association, Biffa has, for many years, been part of the Waste Industry Safety and Health forum (WISH), which involves all major waste companies in conjunction with the Health and Safety Executive and manufacturers. Biffa is currently chairing the latest review of industry guidance on best practice for dealing with the risk of people in and around bins. Since your Report was issued, we have engaged with some of the other recipients of the Report to discuss bin design and locking, bin lifting and weighing systems. These discussions are ongoing.
1. Ineffective bin locks We believe that the existing locking mechanisms are effective when used and fulfil their purpose of securing waste inside the bin and preventing unauthorised access. However, we have engaged with bin manufacturers on the locking options available and our understanding is that they are considering alternative design options available to secure containers. Whilst there are snap lock options available (being locks that 'lock' on closure of the bin lid and then require unlocking), as you heard during the Inquest, these do present an entombing risk for any person entering the bin. Options to overcome this risk are being explored by the manufacturers. The effective use of any locking mechanism is reliant upon customers using the locks and not overfilling the bin so that the bin lid can be closed and the locks used effectively. We will be reminding our customers of the importance of bins being secured and, where feasible, being stored in a secure location.

2. Ineffective search of the bin The existing bin weighing systems fitted to our vehicles record the weight of the bin after the emptying cycle has been completed. This involves the equipment recording the weight of the bin before and after it is emptied to calculate the net weight of its contents. We have engaged with the designer of our bin weighing systems to establish the feasibility of using historical bin weight data to recognize if a bin about to be emptied is outside the usual range of historical weights recorded. They have confirmed that the existing weighing system does not have this capability. Any technology solution to achieve this will require a significant redesign of the weighing system and Biffa's systems that hold the historical weighing data. Whilst changing these systems is not feasible in the near term we are keen to explore how improvements to this and other technology in use or in development could help to reduce the risk and will continue to work with equipment designers and suppliers.
3. Any driver not having the means to search the bin thoroughly or safely In our experience it is not always possible for our operatives to search the entire contents of a bin safely. The search of bins is typically limited to the top layer of the materials within a bin and this search may include the use of a push stick. As part of our commitment to continuous improvement, we regularly review our toolbox talks and any other training on the requirements for checking bins (which may include the use of a push stick where this is appropriate to the size of bin to be checked). Any updates and changes to these would typically be communicated by internal awareness campaigns for our operatives on the risks to people in and around bins and our safety procedures for checking bins to prevent injury.
4. Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on the lorry. We have verified that the vehicle involved in this case, complies with the requirements of the European Safety standard BS EN 1501 (Refuse Collection Vehicles - General Requirements and Safety Requirements). This standard does not currently contain a requirement for side windows to be fitted. On the vehicle involved, the side windows fitted are to allow operator vision of the discharge of the container contents relative to the compaction mechanism i.e. the point at which container/ mechanism physically approach one another. The window has therefore been positioned to facilitate viewing of this operation, i.e. at eye line and/or above, rather than to check the contents of the vehicle hopper. We note the comments in your report, and we are reviewing our operating instructions to ensure there is clarity on how and when the viewing window is to be used, if one is present. Where fitted any windows on the various types of bin lifting mechanisms will continue to be used for their designed purpose as stated by the manufacturer of the various types of bin lift mechanism which are fitted across our fleet of collection vehicles.

Our operating instructions will be reviewed to reflect that checking the vehicle hopper prior to compaction may not be possible on some configurations of collection vehicle such as the one involved in this case. As a waste collector with many customers, we take our responsibility to protect people affected by our business and operations seriously. Our deepest sympathies remain with Corrie's family and friends in this tragic case. This terrible incident highlights the wider problem of people seeking shelter in waste containers, an issue we've been actively campaigning on for more than 10 years. We will continue our efforts to reduce, and raise awareness of, the risks to people in and around bins. We believe that our customers can actively support the management of the risk of people in bins by reporting to us any instances of people suspected or found taking shelter within or around bins at their premises before collections take place. Additionally, we are continuing to develop our relationships with national charities who provide support to rough sleepers. This will build on the existing arrangements we have with Streetlink, who we inform of any incidents involving people in and around bins, so they can initiate their outreach support services. We hope that our response addresses the concerns raised in your Report.
Dennis Eagle Other
8 May 2022 PDF
Noted

Dennis Eagle explains the design intent of the side window on their refuse vehicles, stating it's for viewing the discharge of container contents and not for viewing the floor of the tailgate. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Parsley REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS response The Directors of Dennis Eagle Ltd. would like to extend our condolences to the family of Corrie McKeague. Please see below our response to the CORONER'S MATTERS OF CONCERN item number 4. within the REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS issued 1st April 2022:
4. Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on the lorry. Purpose/ Design intent of the side 'window' in Dennis Eagle refuse machines All refuse collection bodies produced by Dennis Eagle Ltd are designed to comply with the European Safety standard BS EN 1501 (Refuse Collection Vehicles - General Requirements and Safety Requirements). This standard does not currently contain a requirement for side windows or camera's etc to enable viewing inside the tailgate for this configuration of machine. The side windows fitted to the OLYMPUS tailgate have been added to allow operator vision when required, of the discharge of the container contents relative to the compaction mechanism i.e. the point at which container/ mechanism physically approach one another. The window has therefore been positioned to facilitate viewing of this operation, i.e. at eye line and/or above. This window is not an absolute requirement for the operation of the machine but has operator benefits in some scenarios and/or situations. For example, when larger containers (1100 Its and above) are discharged, situations can occasionally occur when the container contents and/or the container need to be monitored through the discharge cycle to 'aid' clean transfer into the tailgate. This can be required due to issues with container, container lid condition/position, container contents, how full the container is, etc. Opacity of window Due to the position of this viewing aperture, it cannot be an open feature as occasionally debris, dust, liquids etc., can be dispersed because of the compaction process. The window is therefore made from Dennis Eagle Ltd. Registered Office: Heathcote Way, Heathcote Ind. Est, Warwick, Warwickshire CV34 6TE Registration No, 03794455, VAT No. GB 729 846 779

polycarbonate to resist typical impact scenarios. Over time mechanical scratches, the effect from UV light etc. will build up affecting its transparency. The window is therefore a serviceable part which can be replaced as necessary. Positioning of window The minimum height/ size of the viewing window is determined by the kinematics of the compaction mechanism and discharge trajectory of refuse from containers of many types and sizes i.e. its positioned above areas potentially subject to wear and likely impact. Operating instructions We do not have access to Biffa's Operating Instructions to make specific comments. Automatic compaction Today's RCV's including the OLYMPUS have evolved to support high efficiency collecting systems usually utilising automatic twin lifters (lifting smaller, typically 2401tr containers) and auto cycle start packing mechanism operation. Auto packing cycle start is a significant benefit to the operators in these instances. As multiple smaller containers are loaded in an ongoing random way into the tailgate the auto packing mechanism start function helps to prevent the tailgate from becoming overloaded and removes the need for frequent operator intervention to achieve the same. When lifting larger containers or where refuse tends more towards what may be described as 'trade' waste i.e. a little more unpredictable in content, it is possible to select manual compaction from the bin lift control station. With manual compaction selected the compaction mechanism will only start by the operator pushing the compaction start button on side control station i.e. it will not start automatically when the bin lift is operated. Overall summary The viewing window, as designed, is to aid in the container discharge operation of the machine and not to enable the viewing of the floor of the tailgate after the refuse has been discharged. Your sincerely

Company Secretary
BSI Regulator / Inspectorate
26 May 2022 PDF
Action Planned

BSI consulted experts and will raise the issue of bin locks when the committee next meets to discuss if changes to existing standards are appropriate. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Sir, Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths

I. Introduction

1. This letter constitutes BSI’s response to your Regulation 28 Report (“the Report”).

2. BSI would like at the outset to express its deepest sympathy and condolences for the family of Mr Corrie McKeague, who died in tragic circumstances.

II. Executive Summary

1. BSI’s role as the National Standards Body (“NSB”) is to facilitate expert committees to achieve consensus on industry standards and best practice and to act as the publisher of standards and specifications.

2. BSI has consulted experts from two committees which it considers have relevant expertise to advice on factors involved in Mr McKeague’s death, and summaries their response herein.

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3. BSI is not a regulatory body nor an enforcement authority. It is therefore unable to advise on regulatory matters, which are a matter for HM Government. Nor is it able to compel or monitor compliance with its standards, which are voluntary documents. As such, BSI has a limited ability to prevent further tragedies such as the death of Mr McKeague.

4. BSI believes nonetheless that the views of its experts will be of interest to the Coroner. Should any further questions or issues arise, BSI would be pleased to assist.

III. The role of BSI

5. BSI’s role as the NSB is established by Royal Charter. BSI has several governing documents (available online at

are-standards-made/The-BSI-Guide-to-Standardization/ ):

a. BSI’s Royal Charter and Bye-laws 1981;
b. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 20 June 2002 between the United Kingdom government and BSI in respect of BSI’s activities as the United Kingdom’s NSB;
c. BS 0: 2021 ‘A standard for standards – Principles of standardization’ (BS 0)

6. Article 1.2 of the MoU provides that BSI’s role as the NSB should be interpreted to include the management, co-ordination and understanding of:

a) “British Standards” and “other standardization products”; b) participation by BSI in European and international standards bodies, and other international activity undertaken in the interests of BSI as the United Kingdom’s NSB; c) promotion, marketing, distribution and information activities concerned with British Standards, BSI’s other standardisation products, and standardisation generally; d) support any corporate infrastructure activities intended, wholly or in part, to enable paragraph 9(a) to (c) above. The Director of Standards has the primary responsibility for the activities set out in paragraph 9(a) to (d). BSI’s present Director of Standards is Dr

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(his full title is ‘Director–General, Standards’, which incorporates the role of Director of Standards).
7. BSI develops and distributes standards in response to the needs of UK stakeholders, which include UK Government and business. Standards are technical documents representing good industry practice. They are voluntary documents drafted by independent experts.

IV. Standards committee structure

8. Each individual standard is the responsibility of one technical committee. A technical committee may be responsible for more than one standard, and may establish subcommittees to deal with individual standards or other discreet areas of its work.

9. Technical committees and sub-committees consist primarily of independent (of BSI) experts, often nominated by trade associations, professional bodies, research/scientific institutions, government or other entities (see BS 0, para 7.2). They have an independent chair and BSI provides a committee manager and other support including an editorial project manager for each standard.

10. The committees referred to in this letter are examples of such committees.

V. Status of Standards

11. The defining characteristic of standards is that they are voluntary, agreed by industry experts and users, including manufacturers, health and safety representatives, regulators and consumer groups. They do not have the status of legislation or regulation (unless specifically referred to in a statute or regulatory instrument, which is extremely rare though not unknown), although they may be used as one means of demonstrating compliance in appropriate circumstances. They may also become privately enforceable between individual entities by being incorporated into a contract (see paras 4.14 and 9.2 of BS 0).

12. BSI is therefore not in a position to draft standards which would be binding on owners and operators of commercial waste bins.

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VI. BSI expert committee feedback

13. BSI considered two committees would have relevant expertise:

a. B/538/4 - Building hardware. This subcommittee has expertise in locks.

b. B/183 - Waste containers and associated lifting devices on refuse collection vehicles

14. The subcommittee chair of B/538/4 has advised as follows. First, concerning the effectiveness of the locks on the bin in question. They are not ineffective at holding a lid closed in windy conditions or to keep animals out but they would be ineffective at keeping a motivated person out. However, the locks were never intended for that in the first place. Further, experts would describe them as ‘latches’ rather than ‘locks’ because they are not robust in design and are not operated by a unique mechanical device (they operate using a triangular peg but could also be opened with a device such as a pair of pliers).

15. To upgrade a bin to a security device would mean a significant upgrade of lock, probably one complying with BS 3621: 2017 Lock assemblies operated by key from both the inside and outside of the door, and would require a much more robust lid (most of them at the moment are made of flimsy plastic). In turn, this would make the bin itself much heavier and more costly. With heavier bins there might also be an increase in accidents whilst they were being emptied.

16. The experts also looked at some examples of large, commercial bin locks and noted ‘On one of the bins you can latch and unlatch the device from the inside without the triangular key and is very easy to operate but on the other one you could not as it was enclosed but it would be impossible to lock yourself in that one as you can only operate from the outside. Neither of the bins lock as you close the lid so trapping yourself would have to be a conscious decision. If someone were to lock someone else in these type of bins, it would be easy to get out as the lids are plastic and flexible so the latch would “pop” once force was applied.’

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17. Experts from B/183 were consulted and responded as follows:

Requirements for lids for commercial bins to be lockable

18. In the standards BS EN 840-2 (Dimensions and Design) and EN840-6 (Health and Safety) there is no stipulation that 4 wheeled containers are to be fitted with lid locks.

19. A lot has been done regarding safety with lids, but more so with the topic of entrapment of heads in "roll top" containers or domed lids.

Robustness of locks

20. Some locks within the marketplace are very robust and we should not generalise the whole standard, regarding 4 wheeled containers, on the basis of one manufacturer’s lock design. Lock come in a multitude of varieties and design. Some with padlocks, other slamlocks which have proven to withstand approximately 300Kgs of force and still not open. Some manufacturers have lid designs to fit 2 locks per lid closer to each corner to make even more secure. This is an attempt to prevent contamination of the wrong waste stream entering the incorrect container but even so, preventing entry will have the same effect as stopping an individual entering a container.

21. The EN840 standard could not offer any advances in making locks more robust without introducing a whole new element of testing, and to cover off every single scenario dependant on manufacturers locks. The same lock is very difficult to work on every single container and lid design.

22. A stronger lock would in fact make it more difficult for it to be broken i.e. from inside the skip. Also, the accessory cannot readily prevent access and also subsequently provide egress.

23. In considering the waste skip as a confined space, by providing a means for escape (i.e. emergency secondary release panel, etc.) it should be noted that skips where there is either a compacted or heavy weight content, could in fact cause the escape panel to open inadvertently.

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Are there any changes recommended to prevent similar incidents?

24. The experts considered this a very difficult question. If a car thief wants to steal a particular car, he will steal it, any security devices are merely a deterrent. If someone wants to get into a container they will. This includes homeless people who live in cities. There are too many variables involved in preventing entry to the container. Has the bin crew accidentally left the container unlocked? Has the end user/shop owner left the container unlocked?

25. Some manufacturers fit warning labels on the outside of the containers. In the same vein building owners fit signage to say “Warning fragile roof” therefore pushing the onus onto the individual who might climb upon it.

26. Some manufacturers can supply clear acrylic or polycarbonate panels in order to see into the container to identify the waste stream and any contaminants. To the same effect, some use wire mesh panels which cannot become opaque over time. However, this can be problematic in other areas; it would not be as effective in preventing fires / odours / vermin etc.

Any other standards that should be considered which need to be amended/updated?

27. Is there a possibility of having a sensor device fitted to all refuse vehicles that can detect individuals inside containers, sensing heartbeat, temperature, thermal imaging etc? There would be cost implications for RCV manufacture and implement this to all trucks. There is already a lot of electronic technical hardware fitted so the vehicles potentially have the means of powering such device.

Is the standard fit for purpose?

28. In terms of what the EN840 is intended to achieve, which is to have a waste receptacle which will integrate safely and effectively with a recognised lifting device and carrying out a means of emptying, then it cannot be faulted. It has been there for decades and served manufacturers well throughout Europe and other parts of the world who adopt the same principles.

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29. It is assumed that in many cases, the securing lock falls outside the scope of manufacture/supply of the skip, rather it is an aftermarket accessory provided by the refuse collection provider. Note the relevant standards for supply of Container skips are under BS EN 840-2. The Standard could include a section “Instructions for use” where many of the action points identified in the BIFFA research/ WISH guidance could be included. This would be a proactive way forward to assist the Coroner without fundamentally require a review of the design standard.

30. The BIFFA research can be found at:

waste-containers.ashx

31. The research also makes reference to WISH guidance note 25: - WASTE-25-.pdf (wishforum.org.uk) and states that where practicable, bins should be located in a secure area.

Concluding thoughts of committee members

32. Clearly this is not an isolated case. It is however not accepted by the experts that the number of deaths could be reduced if stronger locks are fitted. Bin crews and/or end users might leave the container unlocked. If a refuse vehicle broke down and therefore did not empty that container when scheduled, and the bin then became overfilled, an individual could easily empty a few bags onto the floor and enter the container. The lock would have served no bearing in that scenario.

33. The container in its entirety is a very simple device. It is a receptacle for collecting waste, it needs to remain simple. More robust locks are available (taking on board the point of entombment), but the lock is not the issue. The problem is the individual themselves, intoxicated or not. Might there be some means of electronically identifying individuals that are inside containers and means of the lifting device not carrying out that cycle by means of an electronic failsafe?

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Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders

34. Finally, BSI reproduces verbatim the response from the Society of Motor Manufacturers, who are one of the nominating organizations represented on the B/183 committee: The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) offers our sincere condolences and sympathy to the family and friends of Corrie following this tragic case. Our understanding is that there were many unusual circumstances that contributed as factors into his death, and that in the coroner’s opinion action should be taken in order to prevent future deaths. Neither the SMMT, nor our members, are involved in the design or manufacture of waste bins for Refuse Collection Vehicles (RCVs) – including the large 1000 litre waste bin containers subject to this case - so we are not in a position to comment on what steps could now be taken to remove all entrapment risks; however, we feel the coroner’s suggestion of considering better locks is appropriate and therefore BSI standards for such bins should be reviewed to determine if such solutions are possible.

With regards to the RCV itself we do not foresee any changes in design that could guarantee such an event could never happen again, but SMMT members continue to invest and refine their products to maximise safety.

35. BSI will raise the issue once again when the committee next has a meeting to discuss further if any changes to existing standards would be appropriate.

Attachments

36. For completeness, BSI includes with this letter the following standards:

a. BS 3621:2017 (Lock assemblies operated by key from both the inside and outside of the door)
b. BS EN 840-2: 2020 (Mobile waste and recycling containers)
c. BS EN 840-6: 2020 (Mobile waste and recycling containers)

37. These standards are the copyright of BSI and sold commercially by BSI. BSI therefore requests that they are not distributed by the Coroner further than is necessary for the purposes of the investigation.

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38. BSI believes that this letter and attachments constitutes a full reply to the Coroner’s Request. If, however, the Coroner has any further questions or requires clarification, BSI would be pleased to assist.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 22nd January 2020 I commenced an investigation into the tragic death of Corrie MCKEAGUE The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 22nd March 2022. The jury conclusion of the inquest was that:­ Corrie McKeague died on the 24th September 2016 at approximately 04:20am in Bury St Edmunds as a result of compression asphyxia in association with multiple injuries, whilst in the back of a refuse lorry. Corrie's death was contributed to by: Impaired judgement due to alcohol consumption. Climbing into a 1100L commercial waste bin. Ineffective bin locks. Ineffective search of the bin. Any driver not having the means to search the bin thoroughly or safely. Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on the lorry The medical cause of death was confirmed as: 1a Compression asphyxia in association with multiple injuries CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Corrie McKeague had been serving in the RAF for three years, and at the time of his disappearance on the 24th September 2016, was based at RAF Hanington, in Suffolk. On the evening of Friday 23rd September 2016, Corrie drove his car into Bury St Edmunds where he subsequently met up with some of his RAF colleagues lo go drinking and socialising. They ended up in the Flex nightclub in Bury St Edmunds. Corrie consumed a significant quantity of alcohol during the evening, although he remained both happy and friendly during the course of the night. However, due to his intoxication Corrie was ultimately asked lo leave the nightclub. Corrie was seen on a number of occasions on CCTV cameras as he made his way through Bury St Edmunds. At 03.25 hrs on the 24th September 2016, CCTV showed Corrie entering a "horseshoe" shaped area in Brentgovel Street, behind a chemists and bakers. In that area were a number of commercial size (1100 litre) waste bins. At 04.19 hrs a Biffa Dennis-Eagle dust cart arrived at the horseshoe area and collected a bin from the rear of a Greggs bakers. The bin weight recorded by the lifting mechanism on the dust cart was 116kgs, which was significantly heavier than usual. Corrie was reported missing when he failed to report to work on the 26th September 2016. Subsequent analysis of the CCTV footage, failed lo identify Corrie again after 03.25 and confirmed he did not leave the horseshoe area on foot. An extensive investigation and search operation failed to find Corrie, leading to the hypothesis that Corrie had been in the bin, and his body had been lost in a landfill site. Despite extensive searches Corrie was never found. At the request of Corrie's family, the Senior Coroner for Suffolk made an application to the Chief Coroner for England and Wales to hold an inquest into Corrie's death, in the absence of his body being found. The Chief Coroner for England and Wales subsequently directed that this inquest should be heard on the basis that, on a balance of probabilities, Corrie did come by his death on or about the 24th September 2016 in the vicinity of Bury SI Edmunds.
Action should be taken
In my opinion action should be taken in order to prevent future deaths, and I believe you or your organisation have the power to take any such action you identify.
Copies sent to
2. Suffolk Constabulary3. Ministry of Defence

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Report details

Reference
2022-0097
Date of report
1 April 2022
Coroner
Nigel Parsley
Coroner area
Suffolk

Responses identified

Responses identified 4 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 26 May 2022.

Sent to

British Standards Institute, Container Handling Equipment Manufacturers Association, Dennis Eagle Ltd and Biffa Waste Services Ltd

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