Completed
· Chair: Sir William Gage
· Established August 2008
· Commissioned by Ministry of Defence
Inquiry into the death of Iraqi hotel receptionist Baha Mousa while in British Army custody in 2003.
More about this inquiry
Inquiry into the death of Iraqi hotel receptionist Baha Mousa while in British Army custody in 2003. Found he was subjected to violent abuse by British servicemen, and identified institutional failings in detainee handling practices.
Blanket response: The Secretary of State for Defence accepted all of the report's 73 recommendations in principle together, in one sentence of his statement to the House of Commons on 8 September 2011, with one reservation: the recommendation on tactical questioning (BAHA-23), which he said he could not accept. That sentence is not a response to any one recommendation alone, and the Ministry of Defence published no response to each recommendation. A written ministerial statement of 27 March 2014 said the Ministry of Defence had taken action to consider and address all the accepted recommendations, and said of recommendation 44 that the existing inspection regime did not require further amendment.
Record checked against the sources 30 January 2026. Latest activity 27 October 2014.
Not accepted · Ministry of Defence says not accepted
Recommended
The harsh approach should no longer have a place in tactical questioning. The MoD should forbid tactical questioners from using what is currently known as the harsh approach and this should be made clear in the tactical questioning policy and in all relevant training materials.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In September 2011, Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox stated that the Ministry of Defence could not accept a blanket ban on the harsh approach in tactical questioning, though he had asked for the practice to be restricted to defined personnel in defined circumstances (Dr Liam Fox response, Sep 2011; Dr Liam Fox, Sep 2011). In December 2014, Sir Thayne Forbes, Chairman of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, reported that the department had confirmed in March 2014 that the recommendation was not adopted for operational reasons, but found that it had withdrawn the technique and replaced it with an approach entitled "Challenging Direct" (Sir Thayne Forbes, Dec 2014).
Not accepted · Ministry of Defence says not accepted
Recommended
In the ongoing deliberations as to what arrangements should be made for external inspection of main operational detention facilities, the fullest consideration should be given to:
(1) the significant benefit that Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons (HMIP) involvement in the inspection process would bring; and
(2) the fact that while inspecting operational detention facilities may involve compromises to, and divergence from, HMIP’s normal practice, certain practical realities (e.g. inspection only with a warning; CPERS who may very well be distrustful of any inspector from the UK; and limitations on visiting some areas in theatre) would apply to anybody that undertook the inspection role.
Were it to be the case that HMIP did not feel able to fulfil the inspection role for the main theatre detention facilities, the MoD should urgently consider other routes to achieving independent inspection/validation of those facilities by the best means that can be achieved short of full HMIP involvement.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry asked the Ministry of Defence to consider external inspection of detention facilities. Answering for the department in October 2014, Mark Francois MP stated that it had considered independent inspection by Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons, but maintained that an existing regime involving the Provost Marshal (Army), the Army Inspector, and the International Committee of the Red Cross was "already fit for purpose and does not require further amendment" (Mr Mark Francois, Oct 2014). Sir Thayne Forbes, Chairman of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, found in December 2014 that the recommendation might well have formed part of the recommendations at the conclusion of his inquiry's report (Sir Thayne Forbes, Dec 2014).
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsAndy Slaughter · Labour
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether (a) the five techniques and (b) harshing were employed during interrogations in Iraq between 2003 and 2009.
Answered by Ministry of Defence: The International Criminal Court (ICC)’s report entitled “Situation in Iraq/UK”, published on 9 December 2020, brings to an end its long running examination into allegations of war crimes by UK personnel in Iraq, with the finding that there is no basis on which to proceed to a full investigation. The UK Government maintains a clear policy framework governing detention, interrogation …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsAndy Slaughter · Labour
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the December 2020 International Criminal Court report entitled Situation in Iraq/UK, if he will make an assessment of the implications for his policies of the reported flawed guidance in interrogation procedures used in Iraq …
Answered by Ministry of Defence: The International Criminal Court (ICC)’s report entitled “Situation in Iraq/UK”, published on 9 December 2020, brings to an end its long running examination into allegations of war crimes by UK personnel in Iraq, with the finding that there is no basis on which to proceed to a full investigation. The UK Government maintains a clear policy framework governing detention, interrogation …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsAndy Slaughter · Labour
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the December 2020 International Criminal Court report entitled Situation in Iraq/UK, whether he plans to compensate in accordance with international law victims of torture perpetrated by British forces during detention and interrogation in Iraq …
Answered by Ministry of Defence: The International Criminal Court (ICC)’s report entitled “Situation in Iraq/UK”, published on 9 December 2020, brings to an end its long running examination into allegations of war crimes by UK personnel in Iraq, with the finding that there is no basis on which to proceed to a full investigation. The UK Government maintains a clear policy framework governing detention, interrogation …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsAnn Clwyd · Labour
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the current status is of any Iraqi Historic Allegations Team investigations into the deaths of (a) Baha Mousa in British Army custody in September 2003 and (b) Tariq Sabri al-Fahdawi on board an RAF helicopter in …
Answered by Ministry of Defence: Following the conclusion of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) were directed by the then Secretary of State to reinvestigate his death. The investigation into the death of Baha Mousa remains ongoing. This is a criminal investigation and it would be inappropriate to provide any further details. The death of Tariq Sabri al-Fahdawi (also known as …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsLady Hermon · Independent
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the undertaking given by the then Attorney-General on 8 February 1977, that the five techniques of questioning used in Northern Ireland in 1971, have not in any circumstances been reintroduced since then as an aid to …
Answered by Ministry of Defence: The undertaking made in 1977 continues to be Government policy, but it was regrettably breached on occasions during operations in Iraq in circumstances described fully in the Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry (HC1452) published on 8 September 2011. Remedial action to prevent any recurrence was taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Inquiry.
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsMr Nicholas Brown · Labour
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps he has taken in response to Recommendation 44 of the Gage Report into the death in custody of Baha Mousa.
Answered by Ministry of Defence: I refer the right hon. Gentleman to the Written Ministerial Statement of 27 March 2014, (Office Report,column 32WS),in which I explained that the Ministry of Defence have considered Sir William Gage’s recommendation but have not felt it necessary to modify further the existing inspection regime which already possesses the required levels of independence: "As envisaged in recommendation 44 of the …
Early Day MotionHouse of CommonsMr George Galloway · Respect Party
Said: That this House congratulates the winner of the Orwell book prize for political writing, A T Williams, for his investigation into the killing of the hotel receptionist Baha Mousa by British soldiers in Iraq; notes that the book, A Very British Killing, unearthed damning evidence …
The Baha Mousa Inquiry, chaired by Sir William Gage, examined the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa, an Iraqi civilian who died in British military custody in Basra in September 2003. The inquiry's report, published in September 2011, made 73 recommendations aimed at reforming the treatment of captured persons by British forces.
The Ministry of Defence's response, published one year after the report, indicated that the Defence Secretary accepted 72 of the 73 recommendations. The single recommendation not accepted (BAHA-23) concerned the complete prohibition of the 'harsh approach' in tactical questioning. The MoD stated it would retain this approach subject to strict parameters and safeguards, including a requirement for Ministerial approval.
According to the government's response texts, substantial changes to military doctrine were reported. These included updates to Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10 to prohibit hooding and other techniques, new definitions of stress positions, and requirements for standard orders on each operation. The MoD reported establishing new roles for detention oversight, developing standardised procedures and checklists, and incorporating enhanced training throughout military exercises.
The available evidence shows 65 recommendations marked as completed and 7 as stalled as of September 2012. However, seven recommendations were redacted from public documentation, making their implementation status uncertain. The MoD's response provided specific details about doctrinal changes, new procedures, and training requirements, though independent verification of these changes in practice is not included in the available documentation.
The inquiry's recommendations addressed fundamental aspects of detention operations, from the prohibition of specific techniques to the establishment of oversight mechanisms and documentation requirements. While the government response indicated acceptance and reported completion of most recommendations within a year, the redaction of several recommendations and the absence of subsequent implementation reviews limits public understanding of the full scope of reforms undertaken.
Reforms attributed to this inquiry · AI-generated- Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10 updated to incorporate prohibition on the 'five techniques' and require standard orders for each operation prohibiting their use - New definition of stress positions incorporated into military doctrine: 'Any physical posture which a captured person is deliberately required to maintain will be a stress position if it becomes painful, extremely uncomfortable or exhausting to maintain' - Establishment of new roles including Battlegroup Detention Officer and Detention Sergeant for operations involving Captured Persons (CPErS) - Development of standardised checklists for unit holding area accommodation and death in custody procedures - Introduction of mandatory occurrence book requirements for all CPErS holding facilities - Revised medical examination procedures focusing on identifying unfitness rather than certifying fitness for questioning - Renamed and restricted 'harsh approach' in tactical questioning, now requiring Ministerial approval for operational use - Enhanced CPErS training incorporated throughout the exercise and training cycle - Formal recognition and extension of PM(A) inspection authority over detention facilities
Key facts
Duration: 3 years, 1 monthTotal reported cost: £13m